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ABSTRACT 
 
Democratization involves many important actors and institutions including vibrant civil 
society organisations (‘CSOs’), a free press, well organized and competitive political 
parties and an independent judiciary. Civil Society sector is one pillar that has contributed 
to the development and the democratization process of scores of countries by 
delegitimizing authoritarian regimes, generating social capital, empowering communities, 
building capacity of democratic institutions, and holding government to account.  
 
However at present, there is an on-going backlash against CSOs across the globe. The 
threats noticeably change from obvious direct repressions of CSOs and activists, to more 
elusive legal or quasi-legal obstacles that restrict the space in which CSOs operate.1 The 
legal barriers include barriers to entry to discourage or prevent the formation of CSOs; 
barriers to operation to restrict or ban advocacy and lobbying activities; and barriers to 
resources to restrict CSOs’ ability to secure fund required to pursue their purposes of 
formation.2  The thesis examines such legal impediments that restrict CSOs space of 
operation and their possible impact in the democratization process of a nation.  
 
It argues that any committed effort towards democratization demands an enabling legal 
framework that ensures freedom of association; facilitates CSOs formation and sustained 
existence; allows CSOs engagement in wider lawful purposes including the promotion of 
human rights and democracy; broadens CSOs access to resources; and regulates CSOs 
accountability. This thesis provides the first comprehensive assessment of the Ethiopian 
legal framework against such ideally enabling legal conditions. It does so in order to 
appraise the potential impacts of the legal framework on the democratic functions of CSOs 
operating in Ethiopia, and to suggest reforms so that those functions be better carried out 
to the advancement of the democratization process of the country. 
 
                                                          
1 ICNL and World Movement for Democracy, ‘Defending Civil Society: A Report of the World Movement 
for Democracy; (2008) 3. 
2 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) which are the associations of people lawfully 
organized, as independent, voluntary and non-profit distribution entities are often 
formed to pursue various legitimate socio economic and political purposes.1 One such 
legitimate purpose of CSOs is the promotion of democracy. While the system of 
democracy allows the growth of Civil Society Organisations, on the other hand civil 
societies also promote the democratization of a nation from an authoritarian political 
system to semi-democracy or from semi-democracy to a full-fledged democracy. 
 
CSOs have an important role in the democratization of a country through the de-
legitimization of an authoritarian government; education and empowerment of the 
citizenry; interest representation and articulation;  watchdog services such as human 
rights monitoring, corruption control, and budget auditing; conflict mitigation, 
resolution and management; and poverty reduction  programs etc. However, CSOs can 
play these roles only when there is an enabling environment. An Enabling environment 
could be social, economic, political and/or legal in its nature.  Although this thesis 
acknowledges the importance of all these factors, it nonetheless focuses on the 
enabling legal environment for CSOs role in democratization.  It thus argues that the 
legal framework in which CSOs operate plays an important role in the functions of 
CSOs including the promotion of democracy.  
 
Such enabling legal conditions that promote CSOs contribution to democratization 
include the recognition and the enforcement of CSOs right to exist; to solicit funds 
from various sources; and to engage in any kind of lawful activities that aim at pursuing 
a legitimate purpose including the promotion of democracy. Enabling legal 
environment also entails CSOs accountability that balances the need to regulate them 
without unwarranted infringement on their autonomous existence and engagement. In 
turn, these factors critically determine the basic attributes of CSOs such as plurality, 
                                                          
1Lester Salamon and Helmut Anhieir, ‘Measuring the non-profit sector Cross-nationally: a comparative 
method’ (1994) Voluntas 4(4) 538. 
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activism, autonomy, resourcefulness, legality and civility that are essential conditions 
to play an effective role in the democratization process. 
 
The democratization role of CSOs was particularly evident during the third wave of 
democratization that took place in the 70s. Recently also, there has been an 
associational revolution where CSOs have played an important role in the removal of 
the authoritarian governments and the promotion of democracy. Following the vibrant 
role of CSOs in democratization however, a number of countries have enacted very 
restrictive laws that would cripple CSOs formation and sustainable existence, free 
engagement and resource mobilization capability. They also stipulate unwarranted 
severe penalties that threaten the organisations and individuals involved in the sector. 
What is peculiar about such restrictive laws is that they particularly target advocacy 
organisations engaged in the promotion of democracy and human rights. Governments 
often justify the enactment of such stultifying regulations on such grounds as the need 
to protect the country from foreign intervention; to prevent terrorism financing; to 
ensure CSOs accountability; to coordinate CSOs engagements with government 
policies etc. However, a careful analysis of these accounts may demonstrate that such 
illiberal democratic governments largely use the law to control CSOs, the media, the 
political parties and the people in general with intent to dominate power, leaving no or 
little room for any form of accountability and opposition from such groups. 
 
Such global trend has provoked the writer of this thesis to answer how the law is being 
used as an instrument to curtail the democratization process of a nation. Hence, the 
main research question that this thesis aims to answer is whether or not the legal 
framework of a nation could possibly have an impact on the democratic functions of 
CSOs. In order to answer this general question, it will also be necessary to answer the 
following supplementary question.  
1. What constitutes the civil society sector?  
2. What is democracy and democratization?  
3. What is the relation between civil society organizations and democracy? What 
roles, if any, do CSOs have for the promotion of democracy?  
4. What factors affect CSOs contribution to democratization?  
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5. Among other factors, the thesis will also specifically aims to answer how the 
law can affect the interplay between CSOs and democracy. Such interplay is 
explained using the four pillars that the law regulates: 
a. The legal existence of CSOs 
b. The purposes of CSOs 
c. The resource mobilization of CSOs 
d. The accountability of CSOs 
 
Ethiopia is chosen as a case study in explaining these four pillars as it is one of those 
countries which recently enacted a very stringent law that regulates the civil society 
sector following the restrictive global trend. The fact that the writer worked in the 
Ethiopian Civil Society Sector is also one of the reasons to choose the Ethiopian legal 
framework as a case study.  
 
This thesis therefore tries to answer the question, ‘What is the role of the law in 
assisting CSOs in democratisation’ by taking a thorough legal analysis of the newly 
enacted Ethiopian Charities and Societies Proclamation as a case study. It sees to 
jurisprudential analysis and best practices of other countries in order to determine how 
enabling or disabling the existing legal framework of Ethiopia is for CSOs and how it 
would potentially affect the democratization functions of CSOs. The thesis is thus 
structured in the following way. 
 
Chapter two answers the first supplementary research question by laying the 
conceptual framework. It thus defines the key terms of the research: Civil Society, 
Democracy and Democratization. It does so in order to clarify such notions and put 
them in context for the purpose of this research. It thus offers workable definitions of 
the terms for this particular thesis. It also briefly introduces the reader to the basic idea 
of the Ethiopian Civil society and the Ethiopian democratization process.  
 
Chapter three answers what roles, if any, CSOs have for the promotion of democracy. 
After discussing how civil society organisations could potentially contribute to the 
democratization process of a nation, it briefly reviews the role of Ethiopian civil 
societies in the democratization of the country. 
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Chapter four by way of introduction answers the question ‘what factors affect CSOs’ 
contribution to democratization?’ Although it briefly discusses all potential factors that 
affect the interplay between CSOs and democratization it in particular focuses on the 
enabling legal conditions for the democratic functions of CSOs. It thus introduces the 
four pillars by which the law can create enabling legal conditions (i) facilitating and 
ensuring the legal existence of CSOs; (ii) allowing the free engagement of CSOs in 
any lawful purpose (iii) permitting the resource mobilization of CSOs; and (iv) 
ensuring the accountability of CSOs.  
 
The subsequent chapters (Chapter five up to chapter eight) discuss each of these four 
pillars of an enabling legal framework in detail by taking the Ethiopian legal 
framework as a case study in order to answer the main research question how the law 
governing CSOs assist in democratization? 
 
Chapter five thus discusses how the rules that govern the ‘legal existence of CSOs’ 
could affect CSOs democratic functions. It argues that a legal framework that 
facilitates undemanding requirements for the formation and acquisition of legal 
personality, and that protects them from an unwarranted dissolution help CSOs to 
boost in volume. The growth of the sector in turn assists the democratization process 
through the formation of social capital and the representation of diverse interests. The 
Ethiopian Charities and Societies Proclamation that governs the formation, registration 
and dissolution of Ethiopian CSOs is assessed against such enabling legal conditions. 
 
Chapter six examines how the law that allows the ‘free engagement of CSOs in lawful 
purposes’ facilitate the democratic functions of CSOs. It asserts that CSOs need to be 
given the right to freely choose and to freely engage in any lawful purpose including 
the promotion of democratization.  It therefore entails the rights of CSOs to choose any 
lawful strategies and activities. Such freedom for CSOs enhances their activism, 
autonomous engagement and coordination with all the relevant actors and institutions 
that promote the democratization of a nation. The Ethiopian legal framework which 
prohibits the engagement of CSOs that raise more than 10% of their annual income 
from foreign sources, in the promotion of human rights and democracy, equality, 
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justice and peace will be particularly examined in detail against the criteria of enabling 
legal conditions discussed in the chapter. 
 
Chapter seven explores how the legal rules that regulate the ‘resource mobilization and 
utilization of CSOs’ could impact on CSOs’ democratic function. It argues that a legal 
framework that allows CSOs to solicit fund from diverse lawful sources ensure their 
financial sustainability and thus their efficiency to undertake any of their purposes 
including democratization.  Moreover resource mobilization from diverse sources 
enables them to remain autonomous and to resist any unwarranted influence which is 
necessary in their democratic functions.  This chapter also assesses the Ethiopian legal 
framework that governs the resource mobilization and utilization of resources to 
analyse the extent to which the law is enabling to enhance the resource capability of 
CSOs. 
 
Chapter eight discusses the ‘accountability of CSOs’ as an enabling legal condition to 
ensure CSOs transparency and accountability. It asserts that impartial and reasonable 
accountability measures, in addition to protecting stakeholders and the public at large, 
will also help to ensure the trustworthiness of CSOs and to screen out corrupt and 
‘uncivil’ societies such as terrorist groups which could threaten the democratic 
functions of the sector. The chapter also make the assessment of the Ethiopian legal 
framework to analyse to what extent it strikes the balance between CSOs 
accountability and/or transparency and that of their autonomy.  
 
Based on the analysis made in the foregoing chapters, the last Chapter concludes by 
summarizing how the Ethiopian legal framework that governs CSOs could potentially 
affect the contribution of the sector for the development of the democratization process 
in the country. Finally, the concluding chapter proposes reforms to the Ethiopian legal 
framework, based on the findings of the research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: CIVIL SOCIETIES, DEMOCRACY, AND 
DEMOCRATISATION 
 
Key words that merit definition for better understanding and laying the conceptual 
framework of this research are civil society, democracy and democratization.  
 
2.1 Civil Society 
Civil Society is most commonly defined as an arena outside of the family, the state, 
and the market where people associate to advance common interests.1 Such broad 
conceptualization encompasses scores of institutions existing as a distinct social space 
in between the family and the state, or between the market and the state. If such broad 
conceptualization is accepted with no qualification, then the following and many more 
may be grouped together as constituting the sector: Academia, activist groups, 
advocacy organisations, charities, citizens’ militias, civic groups, clubs of different 
sorts, community foundations,  community organisations, fanatic terrorist groups 
organisations, cooperatives, churches,  cultural groups, environmental groups, 
foundations, fundamentalist groups, labour unions, lobbyists groups, mafia groups, 
media, men’s groups, non-governmental organisations, non- profit organisations, 
policy institutions, political parties, private voluntary organisations, professional 
associations, rebels, religious organisations, social enterprises, support groups, think-
tanks, trade unions, voluntary associations, women’s groups etc.2  Precisely defining 
Civil Society is therefore difficult owing to the diversity of the units that are said to 
constitute the sector. 
  
                                                          
1 Micheal Bratton, ‘Civil Society and Political Consolidation in Africa’ (1994) IDR Reports 11 (6) 4-5 
in  John Keane (edn) Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives (Verso1988); Jean  Cohen 
and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (MIT Press 1994); Ernest Gellner, Conditions of 
Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals  (Allen Lane 1994); James Schmidt, ‘Civility, enlightenment, and 
society: conceptual confusions and kantian remedies’ ( 1998) American Political Science Review 92 ( 
2) 423; Helmut Anheier, Civil Society: Measurement, Evaluation , Policy  (Earthscan 2004) 22. 
2 See generally, Gordon White, ‘Civil Societies, democratization and development (I): Clearing the 
analytical ground’ (1994) Democratization 1 (2) 375-390; Larry Diamond, ‘Towards Democratic 
consolidation’ (1994) Journal of Democracy 5(3); Udaya Wagle, ‘The Civil Society Sector in the 
developing world, Public Administration and Management’ (1999)  An Interactive Journal 4 (4) 529; 
Commission of European Communities (2001) European Governance: White paper, COM, 428. 
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In order to meet this definitional challenge, the ‘structural-operational definition’ 
which is coined by Salmon and Anheier, has presented four fundamental 
characteristics which CSOs should reasonably exhibit. These are:  Organisation, 
Independence, Non -profit distribution, and Voluntary.3  
 
Organisation: CSOs may be constituted either formally or informally.  Thus an 
institution is deemed to be a civil society organisation if it is either officially registered 
or exercise a certain degree of institutionalization in terms of its organisational form 
and permanence or systems of operation.4 Thus CSOs are distinct  from those activities 
of the informal sector, such as mutual support by family members, which is a similar 
activity to that performed by CSOs, but executed on an ‘ad hoc’ or temporary basis.5 
The structural-operational definition, by giving due recognition to those entities that 
fulfill a minimum characterization of ‘organisation’ devoid of a formal registration 
process as part of the civil society sector, renders the definition more comprehensive 
and workable across jurisdictions.6  
 
Private/Independent: civil society organisations should also remain fundamentally 
private in basic structures7 and exercise a certain degree of autonomy from the state 
apparatus and the private sector8 irrespective of funding or other relationship with 
those entities.9  
 
Non-Profit distribution: Civil society organisations should neither distribute dividends 
or profits among their managers, members, or founders but rather plough back the 
profit into funding their activities.10 
                                                          
3Lester Salamon and Helmut Anhieir, ‘Measuring the non-profit sector Cross-nationally: a comparative 
method’ (1994) Voluntas 4(4) 538. 
4  Ibid, 537.  
5 Lester Salamon, and Helmut Anheier, ‘In Search of the non-profit sector: the question of definition’ 
(1992) Voluntas 3 (2) 125-135. 
6  Lester Salamon, Helmut Anheier, Defining the Non-profit Sector: A cross-national Analysis, 
(Manchester University Press1997) 48. 
7Ibid, 33.  
8 Frederick Powell, The politics of Civil Society: Neoliberalism or Social Left? (The Policy Press 2007) 
14; Jonathan Garton, The Regulation of organized Civil Society (Hart Publishing 2009) 36. 
9 In the united kingdom alone, in the year 2006/07 charities had received more than one third of their 
annual income equivalent to 11.5 billion £ from the state. The UK Civil Society Almanac 2009: 
Executive Summary, accessed on 29 May 2015 <http://www.ncvo-
vol.org.UK/uploadedFiles/NCVO/What_we_do/Research/Almanac/NCVOCivilSocietyAlmanac2009
Summary.pdf> accessed on 20 May 2015. 
10 Lester Salamon and Helmut Anheier, above n 6 at 34. 
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Voluntary:  civil society organisations should also demonstrate some level of voluntary 
participation, either in the actual implementation of the activities of organisations, or 
as members of the board of directors governing or managing the body of the 
organisation,11  notwithstanding the fact that the organisation has  hired staff or income 
aside from voluntary contributions. 12 
 
Thus as per the structural-operational definition, to be considered as part of the civil 
society sector, an organisation ‘must make a reasonable showing on all four of the 
above criteria’. 13  This research in conceptualizing Civil Society however makes two 
further qualifications to the abovementioned standards. 
 
Firstly, the structural- operational definition excludes a significant proportion of ‘non-
statutory’ and ‘non-profit’ community-based development organisations and 
cooperatives which distribute dividends to their members, because they fail the non-
profit distribution test. Nonetheless, the primary objectives of these organisations are 
not to make profits but to improve the livelihood of the general community.14  Hence 
we may qualify the non-profit distribution criteria to Not-for-profit. By not-for- profit, 
we refer to those organisations whose main objectives of formation are not to make 
profit but to bring socio-economic development of their members, but may distribute 
dividends to members or other beneficiaries as part of their basic purpose of formation. 
The Not-for profit standard has a quality of being broad enough to encompass the great 
variety of community organisations and cooperatives commonly considered to be part 
of civil society organisations, and concurrently being sharp enough to distinguish these 
entities from the private sector which has profit making as its primary goal. 
 
Secondly, the yardsticks of the structural operational definition fail to take account of 
the ‘legality’ of either the institutions or their purpose. To use the language of Anheier 
the tests employed to assess what constitute the sector are ‘morally blind.’15 Hence, 
some uncivil entities such as the mafia and fundamentalist groups may be considered 
                                                          
11 Ibid. 
12 Lester Salamon, above n 5 at 126.  
13 Lester Salamon and Helmut Anheier, above n 6 at 34.  
14 Ibid, at 33. 
15Helmut Anheier, Civil Society: Measurement, Evaluation, Policy (Earthscan 2004) 22. 
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as civil societies. Nonetheless there still is much debate concerning civil society’s 
normative content16 as scholars assert that in order to belong to civil society, actors 
must be democratic,17 oriented towards the public good18 or at least adhere to basic 
civil manners.19 Moreover, as the test of  ‘public benefit’, ‘legality’ and ‘civility’ could 
be of a paramount significance in any effort to gauge the sector’s contribution to the 
democratization process of a country, this research would add this standard to those 
provided by the operational-structural definition and exclude uncivil and illegal 
organisations from the realm of the civil society sector.20  
 
Thus, for the purpose of this research civil society could be defined as ‘lawfully 
constituted, independent, voluntary and not-for-profit organisations which are formed 
outside of the family, the state and the market.’ 
 
Ethiopian Civil Society Organisations 
As an associational life of any society, the Ethiopian CSOs are heterogeneous in all 
aspects and can be mainly classified as (1) NGOs (National and international)-most 
of these organisations are primarily engaged in the promotion and implementation of 
projects and programmes focusing on the provision of social welfare, health, clean 
water, education, relief, urban/rural development; (2) Advocacy organisations – Rights 
based institutions which are  engaged in Human rights education, civic education, 
policy advocacy, women’s empowerment, voter education, election monitoring; (3) 
Community Based Organisations (CBO)– informally constituted traditional 
membership based self-help groups and neighbourhood associations; and  (4) 
Membership based Interest groups such as Employers’ Association, Trade unions, 
Professional Associations, Women’s Association, Youth Associations, Co-operatives 
                                                          
16Heinrich Volkhart and Mahi Khallaf, ‘Assessing Civil Society In Cyprus And Across The World’ 
(2011) The Civicus Civil Society Index, CIVICUS, 2. 
<http://www.civicus.org/view/media/AssessingCivilSocietyinCyprus_AcrosstheWorld.pdf.> accessed 
on 30 April 2015. 
17Larry Diamond, ‘Towards Democratic consolidation’ (1994) Journal of Democracy 5 (3) 4-7. 
18 Barry Knight and Caroline Hartnell, ‘Civil Society - Is it Anything More Than a Metaphor for Hope 
for a Better   World?’ (2001) Alliance 6 (4). 
19 Edward Shils, ‘The Virtue of Civil Society’ Government and Opposition (1991) 26 (1) 3-20. 
20 Larry Diamond, ‘Rethinking Civil Society - Towards Democratic Consolidation’ (1994) Journal of 
Democracy 5 (7); Brett Bowden, ‘Civil Society, the State and Global Civil Society: Global Civil 
Society’ (2006) Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations 163-165. 
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and the likes which are primarily engaged in promoting and protecting their members 
rights and interests. 21  
 
This thesis will deal with all these types of CSOs but will focus on those civil society 
organisations that remain largely in the public sphere or have specific democratization 
functions as pressure or advocacy groups.  
 
2.2 Democracy   
An analysis of the role of civil societies for the initiation and consolidation of 
democracy requires some definition of democracy at the outset. However defining 
democracy in a precise manner would be a vain exercise. This section therefore has a 
sole purpose of elucidating its main features.  
 
The term democracy, originating from two Greek words Demos (‘the people’) and 
kratien (‘to rule’) indicates a form of political system or government where the 
supreme power to rule is vested in the people. Reflecting such basic facet where the 
ultimate power has resided in the people, ‘democracy’ is also designated as: the ‘rule 
of the people’, ‘rule of the people’s representatives’, ‘rule of the people’s party’, 
‘majority rule’ etc. Thus it alludes to the structure of government in which the ultimate 
power resides in and exercised by the people either directly by vote of the electorate, 
which is known as ‘direct democracy’; or indirectly through their representatives freely 
and periodically elected and referred to as ‘indirect democracy’ or ‘representative 
democracy’. The latter however is the most common form of democracy in a 
contemporary polity. Yet, direct democracy is still exercised in some local institutions 
or associations having not many populaces. 
 
In spite of such generalized comprehension however, the term democracy is defined in 
various ways at different times, based on distinct socio political beliefs and affiliations, 
historical accounts and other reasons. Discrepancies and discords in definitions also 
allude to the fact that attempts are made to define the term on the basis of either the 
                                                          
21 Desalegne Rahmato, ‘Civil Society Organisations in Ethiopia’, in the Bahru Zewde and Siegfried 
Pausewanf (Eds) The challenge of Democracy from Below (Nordiska Africainstitute and Forum for 
Social Studies2002) 105; Jeffrey Clark, Civil Society, NGOs and Development in Ethiopia: A snap shot 
view (2000) The World Bank, 4-7. 
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basic principles, values and attitudes attached to it; or process and procedures that 
validate it; or substances contained in it; or practices that substantiate or otherwise 
refute it; or results it bears out; or even institutions it encompasses etc.  Generalizing 
this fact Tilly wrote, attempts to define ‘democracy’ take either the ‘constitutional’, 
‘substantive’, ‘procedural’ or ‘process-oriented’ approach each signifying the different 
facet of democracy. 22 
 
According to Constitutional approach the political system or the regime is said to be 
democratic provided the legal instruments of that country guarantee political rights to 
its citizens. Conversely Substantive approach focuses on the substantial attitude of the 
state towards human rights, human welfare, security, equity, social equality, the 
conflict resolution methods, etc. notwithstanding the legal framework. The hub of 
Procedural approach on the other hand lies on genuine, participatory and periodical 
elections but often fails to assay state of affairs in between elections contrasting the 
Process-oriented approach which identifies some minimum set of processes that must 
be continuously in motion for a state and the government to qualify as democratic.23  
 
The different approaches in defining democracy thus give prominence to either one or 
another aspect of democracy and prompt lack of universally accepted definition. 
Nevertheless, several attributes which must exist in order to have a democratic 
government can be deduced. 
  
Basic Attributes of Democracy 
Equality and Liberty 
Amongst the many facets, equality and liberty are often singled out as the two most 
important  democratic archetypes on which the remainder features of democracy are 
based upon. They are the epitome and pillars of polity that ensures both democratic 
processes and democratic outcomes.  Many scholars have provided that political 
governance should endorse freedom and equality to be deemed as democratic and their 
supremacy thereof must be guaranteed by constitutionalism. 24 Thus at a minimum, the 
                                                          
22 Charles Tilly, Democracy (Cambridge University Press 2007) 7. 
23 Ibid. 
24Aristotle, Politics (Oxford University Press1995); Roland Pennock, Democratic Political Theory 
(Princeton University Press 1979); Evelyne Huber and others, ‘The Paradoxes of Contemporary 
Democracy: Formal, Participatory and Social Democracy’ (1997) Comparative Politics 29 (3) 323-42. 
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supreme law of the land needs to avail due recognition and protection for liberty and 
equality. Many of the principles derived from freedom and equality are thus already 
recognized by the constitutions of many countries and the regional and international 
instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHR). 
 
Equality at minimum implies equality before the law, or equal protection of the law.  
In spite of socio economic inequalities, therefore, the state should be required to treat 
everyone equally and evenly.  This signifies that in a democratic state, it is fundamental 
that all individuals are valued equally, have equal opportunities, and may not be 
discriminated against because of their race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, etc. 
A democratic state guaranteeing equality therefore facilitates the flourishing of 
democratic society by inspiring and advancing pluralism and tolerance as individuals 
and groups still enjoy their right to have different personalities, cultures, languages and 
beliefs. 
 
Equality before the law also safeguards two fundamental principles necessary for a 
democracy to exist, namely the rule of law and due process of the law. Thus democracy 
entails that everyone must comply with the law and be held equally accountable when 
the law is violated and that the law be equally, fairly and consistently enforced. Thus 
in most democratic societies equality before the law and non- discrimination are 
emphasised. Few other democratic societies also take equality further beyond equal 
opportunities to also mean equal outcomes and a guarantee to equitable socio economic 
benefits of citizens. The latter which is referred as ‘social democracy’25  over and 
above formal democracy ensure high levels of participation without systematic 
differences across social categories and increase equality in social and economic 
outcomes. 
 
Freedom or liberty is another fundamental facet of democratic society. In a democracy, 
the constitutionality of the bills of rights maximizes the protection of people against 
despotism and abuse of power by setting limits on regime power. It also allows the 
                                                          
25 Evelyne Huber and others, ‘The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: Formal, Participatory and 
Social Democracy’ (1997) Comparative Politics 29 (3) 323-42. 
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enforcement of those guaranteed rights and freedoms in the court of law which must 
entertain judicial independence.  
 
Such fundamental bills of rights include civil, socioeconomic and political rights. Civil 
rights comprises the right to life, liberty and security, freedom of religion, freedom of 
thought and expression, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of movement 
and residence, etc. The bills of rights also include socio economic rights such as the 
right to development and physical wellbeing, the right to housing, the right to 
environmental protection etc. The political right on the other hand involves the right 
to take part in government and includes among others the right to vote and to compete 
as a candidate to run for public office. Thus a political system is said to be democratic 
when it constitutionally guarantees, enforces and protects such fundamental human 
rights as liberty and equality. The enforcement and protection of such fundamental 
rights in particular require the accountability of the government as a procedural 
mechanism to ensure the system of democracy. 
 
Accountability 
The accountability of elected officials is an important mechanism to sustain a 
democratic polity that safeguards such fundamental rights. The accountability of 
elected officials can be sanctioned primarily, through a constitutional mandate. 
Constitutions establish the authority of elected officials that assume public authority 
and set forth the government’s basic operating procedures. Thus constitutionalism 
sanctions accountability by providing clearly defined limits on the power of 
government.  
 
Yet to ensure democratic polity, there must also be procedural safeguards that the 
government does not surpass and abuse its constitutional mandate. This demands a 
vertical and horizontal accountability of officials. Vertical accountability of officials 
to the electorate is ensured through periodical election and active participation of 
citizens. Horizontal accountability on the other hand is maintained through the system 
of trias politica that involves the legislature, executive and judiciary and a check and 
balance system.  
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i. Election  
Most narrow definitions of democracy primarily focus on one of the political rights 
namely, the right to take part in government comprising among others the right to vote 
and the right to run for public office in periodical elections. While some pseudo-
democratic governments run periodic elections merely to legitimize their power as a 
form of procedural minimum, a genuine electoral democracy however entails such 
qualities as competitive, free, fair, participatory, informed and peaceful periodical 
elections. 
 
For a democracy to be sustainable, election should be inclusive, thus allowing all adult 
citizens to have the right to participate in periodical elections either as a candidate to 
run for office, or to cast their vote based on informed choice from alternative sources, 
and free of any form of coercion. A genuine election thus signifies the existence of 
competitive multipartite political system or competing leaders, presenting alternatives 
of public policies; and the institutionalization of the periodical, peaceful competition 
amongst them to win the ballot from all adult citizens having the right to vote and to 
assume public power.26 Hence, for a democracy to exist, more than one political party 
must participate in elections providing voters with a choice of candidates and policies 
to vote for. Political parties must also exist beyond the election period as opposition to 
the winning party.   
 
Electoral democracy also ensures free and fair election that entails uncertainty as to 
who will win. Przeworski argues democracy should be ‘a form of institutionalization 
of continual electoral competition … and of uncertainty of subjecting all interests to 
uncertainty.’27  
 
What’s more, the election and post-election period needs to be peaceful. Thus in a 
democratic system, once the process of election is proven to be fair and vindicated, the 
losing party and its followers must agree with the outcome of the election and work in 
                                                          
26Raymond Aron, Democracy and Totalitarianism (Praeger 1969); Powell Bingham, Contemporary 
Democracies (Harvard University Press 1982); Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political 
and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge University Press 1991); 
Robert Dahl, On Democracy (Yale University Press 1998). 
27 Adam Przeworski, ‘Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy’ in Guillermo 
O’Donnell and others (eds) Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, Part III 
(Johns Hopkins University Press 1986) 58. 
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cooperation with the winning party while they maintain their legal opposition to the 
decisions and ideologies of the latter. This would facilitate non-violence and 
substantiate the system of democracy since popularly elected governments must be 
able to exercise their powers without obstruction or control by unelected officials, for 
example the military.28  
 
Thus a genuine electoral system having those qualities sustains democracy serving as 
a procedural means to guarantee the rule of the majority; and to ensure that the elected 
officials remain accountable to their electorate.  
 
ii. Participation 
Apart from periodical election, citizens’ participation and active engagement in the 
public sphere sanctions the accountability of elected officials. Active participation of 
citizens during and in between elections, in civil society organisations or in community 
or civic meetings, or in any other public arena is an imperative right as well as duty of 
democratic citizenry that facilitates accountability. Such, vertical accountability is a 
crucial facet of contemporary representative democracy as it is the means to enforce 
the ‘rule of the people.’  Morino29 writes,  
 
‘…in moderating the difficulties that objectively exist when there is a shift 
from direct to representative democracy, accountability becomes a truly 
central dimension in so much as it grants citizens and civil society in 
general an effective means of control over political institution.’  
 
Ensuring an active participation and engagement of the electorate in the public sphere 
and the accountability of elected officials, requires the guaranteeing and enforcement 
of freedom of information, expression, and association. Robert Dahl30 argued in the 
same line asserting that in addition to inclusive suffrage; free and fair elections; and 
elected officials that must be met as procedural minimum conditions, the exercise of 
                                                          
28 Philip Schmitter and Karl Terry, ‘What Democracy is ...and is not’ (The John Hopkins University 
Press 2009) 9. 
29  Leornardo Morlion, ‘What is a “Good” Democracy? Theory and Empirical Analysis’ (2002) 
University of Florence < http://ies.berkeley.edu/research/files/CP02/CP02-
What_is_Good_Democracy.pdf> accessed on 10 March 2015  
30 Robert Dahl, On Democracy (Yale University Press 1998) 
11 
 
such freedom are necessary requisites for democracy or as he puts it, “Polyarchy.”31 
Certainly the right to information, expression and association are features of a 
democratic polity that can facilitate electoral democracy.  Further such rights serve as 
means to ensure the participation of citizens and the accountability of the government 
in between elections.  
 
Freedom of information, for instance facilitates informed participation of citizens and 
transparency of the regime. Freedom of information avails alternative channels of 
information and communication to citizens. Moreover freedom of information obliges 
elected officials to open up themselves to the media and the public; and to aware their 
electorate what decisions have been made and why. This ensures that citizens make 
informed public decisions and informed elections. Thus freedom of information 
ensures that institutional power holders elected by the people remain responsible to the 
people and held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens.  
 
Freedom of association also facilitates competitive elections by enabling the creation 
of competitive political parties and interest groups. It also enables the formation of 
civil society organisations that contribute to the democratization process from below 
through educating and empowering citizens; and from above through monitoring and 
controlling authorities. Freedom of expression also ensures the accountability of 
authorities as citizens express themselves, and criticize officials, their decisions or 
ideology without the risk of coercion.  
 
Thus a polity that protects and enforces freedom of information, expression and 
association thus ensures ‘vertical accountability’ of rulers to the ruled which can be 
secured through the facilitation of regular free and fair elections, as well as continued 
participation of citizens in the public governance. 32  The accountability and 
responsiveness of elected officials in turn consolidate democracy. 
 
iii. Horizontal Accountability  
Accountability of elected officials is also maintained through the check and balance 
role of the different state machineries namely the executive, the legislative and an 
                                                          
31 Ibid ; Robert Dahl, Polyarchy, ‘Participation and Opposition’ (Yale University Press 1972) 
32 Larry Diamond, ‘Is the Third Wave Over?’ (1996) Journal of Democracy 3 (3) 23-24 
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independent judiciary.  The existence of independent organs such as the ombudsman 
and human rights commissions, anti- corruption commissions and similar institutions 
also ensure the transparency and accountability of the government. Such institutions 
must be mandated to take action against any illegal deeds by an elected officials or 
government public servants. They also need to have the necessary mandate and 
technical capacity to pressurize government for improved administration, recognition 
and protection of the rights and privileges of citizenry. Such horizontal accountability 
of office holders to one another will result in the protection of constitutionalism and 
the rule of law.33 
 
In sum, democracy is a system of governance which principally upholds 
constitutionally guaranteed liberty and equality of the governed; and the power limits 
of the government. It also encloses such basic attributes as multiparty system; regular, 
free fair and competitive elections; accountability and transparency of the government, 
citizens’ participation in the public sphere; independent and free media; check and 
balance of state apparatus, independent judiciary etc.  Thus, if the regime and citizens 
are exhibiting those attributes of democracy by and large, the country is said to be 
‘democratic’, whereas if a government and its citizens do not parade such 
characteristics it is said to be ‘undemocratic.’ While these are the two extremes for any 
particular country, the back and forth steps towards such characteristics are referred as 
the de-democratization and democratization process, respectively. The following 
section further elucidates on the process of democratization. 
 
 
2.3 Democratization 
Democratization is a political transition to a more democratic political regime. It could 
be a transition from an authoritarian political system to semi-democracy or from semi-
democracy to a full democracy or a stretched stride from an authoritarian political 
system to a full-fledged democracy. In reverse, the relation between states and citizens 
may shift rearward to a direction of autocracy. This is referred to as de-
democratization.  
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According to Huntington, the world has experienced three waves of democratization 
with a wave being defined as a significant number of forward transitions from non-
democratic to democratic political system or governance; but also followed by reverse 
waves where some countries undergo de-democratization leaving fewer cases of 
consolidated democracies behind.34 The first ‘long’ wave that marked the emergence 
of the first democratic regimes runs uninterruptedly from 1826 to 1926. This 
democratization wave was attributed to a number of factors such as industrialization, 
modernization, the socio economic environment of the British Settler countries, the 
victory of the western allies in the World War I, and the resulting break up of 
continental empires. In this a century long wave of democratization that have rooted 
in the American and French revolution, the US and more than 30 countries in Latin 
America and Europe such as France, Great Britain and Switzerland have made 
transition to democracy.35  
 
This was followed by a reverse wave where some countries lapsed to autocracy until 
the Second World War provided the fertile soil for the second wave of democratization 
that lasted until early 1960s. During this wave a number of Latin American countries 
and others defeated by in the Second World War such as Germany and Japan have 
made a transition to democracy as a result of an imposition of democracy by victorious 
allied powers. Numerous other nations decolonized following the end of the war also 
transited to the democratization move. Afterwards, an extensive global sway to de-
democratization occurred for about a decade. 
 
The decade long de-democratization was then succeeded by a third wave of 
democratization, marked by the end of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974 and runs 
until recently. This wave is characterized by a significant increase in the number of 
countries taking the democratization strand, making the total number of countries 
transited to democracy 117 by 1996, from meagre 40 in 1974. Even though not all of 
these countries’ democratization is necessarily consolidated as Huntington has applied 
the minimalist measure to make such analysis, the argument in favour of more 
democratization still holds true as democratization signifies any movement forward.  
                                                          
34 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (University of 
Oklahoma Press1991) 15. 
35 Ibid, 16. 
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Huntington further perceived by the early 90s, the possible signs of the beginnings of 
de-democratization wave, as Haiti, Sudan and Surinam from the third wave of 
democratization had swiftly reverted to authoritarian regimes.36 Although the shift 
from full-fledged democracy backward is rather atypical, nonetheless back and forth 
shift from semi democracy to autocracy or dictatorship has become a common 
phenomenon globally, particularly in the past few years. The 2011 Freedom House 
Report verifies that while nearly 80 countries improved in the aggregate scores towards 
more democratic system from 2002-2005 progressively, nevertheless the years 2006-
2010 successively showed regression and decline of nearly 60 countries.37 In 2010 
alone, the same report38 provides while five countries including Ethiopia has regressed 
to the de-democratization path, only two have taken the trend of democratization as 
authoritarian regimes give way to civilian rule based on competitive elections.  
 
Such course of a democratization process that is mainly characterized by change of a 
dictatorial regime is commonly referred as ‘a transition to democracy.’ Yet beyond 
transition, a shift towards a full-fledged democratization demands the ‘consolidation’ 
of democracy whereby all political actors accept democratic norms (‘rules of the 
game’) with no venture  to revert to a dictatorship and further entrenchment of 
democratic institutions, practices and values. 39  Hence, despite the fact that 194 
countries in the world today have adopted some democratic form of government, only 
87 of them have established a consolidated and sustainable democracy of a varying 
degree.40  
 
The consolidation of democracy roughly speaking is similar in nature and gradual in 
momentum even in countries with different socioeconomic and political settings. 
However, transitions from authoritarian to a democratic government are distinct in 
nature, affected by factors which are specific to a particular country and are either 
gradual or swift in speed. Analysing such distinctiveness in nature and velocity, Share 
                                                          
36 Ibid, 25-26. 
37 Freedom house 2011 report, <http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363andyear=2011> 
accessed on 11 April 2015. 
38 Ibid. 
39Howard Handelman,  The Challenge of Third World Development  (5th ed, Pearson Education 2006)  
40 Freedom house, above n 37.   
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classifies transition to democratization into four namely ‘incremental’, ‘protracted 
revolutionary struggle’, ‘transaction’ and ‘rupture’ (revolution, coup, collapse and 
extrication). 41  According to this model, the first two represent slow process of 
democratization, whereas transaction and rapture democratization are considerably 
swift.42  
 
Whereas incremental and transaction democratization which are top- down in character 
might have better chance to sustain as they are predictably better tolerated by regime 
leaders, transitions through revolutionary struggles, may not consolidate and sustain 
as it is highly likely to meet resistance and cause political instability.43 Scholars further 
argue for the significance of top-down democratization process and the imperative of 
elites’ involvement for the initiation and consolidation of democratic procedures and 
institutions as well as norms of accommodation and cooperation.44 However, empirical 
evidence also alternatively demonstrate that top-down democratization is neither 
entirely free of risk of instability as government elites are less likely to give up their 
previous authority right off. Historical accounts such as the American Revolution and 
the French Revolution also make it evident that an incremental process is not one-off 
approach to consolidated and sustained democracy. 
 
Differences in historical and empirical evidence apparently signify that there is no 
conclusive solo condition necessary or sufficient for democratization.  This is because 
the democratization process and particularly its consolidation thereof are significantly 
affected by various factors, apart from the role played by elites and revolutionaries. 
The variations in the democratization of nations in degree and moment in time also 
signify that democratization is a process that is fluid and impermanent. Two nations 
with similar socio political culture, economic and human development and even 
comparable constitutional framework may exhibit considerable differences in their 
level of democratization.  Therefore any analytical studies and inferences of the 
                                                          
41 Donald Share, ‘Transitions to Democracy and Transition through Transaction’ (1987) Comparative 
Political Studies 19 (4) 530. 
42 Ibid, 530. 
43 Ibid at 525-48; R.J. Rummel, ‘Democratization’ In William Vogele and Roger Powers (edn)  Protest, 
Power, and Change: An Encyclopedia of Nonviolence Action From Act-up to Women’s Suffrag (Garland 
Publishing 1996) 21 <http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/DEMOC.HTM > accessed on 02 April 2015. 
44 Higley John and others, ‘The Persistence of Post-communist Elites’ (1996) Journal of Democracy 7 
(2) 145. 
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factors, institutions, systems or laws impacting the democratization process of a 
country will certainly be complicated to say the least. While giving due consideration 
for this fact, some patterns of economic, social and cultural conditions more favourable 
to the initiation and consolidation of democracy can however be deduced.  Without 
claiming conclusiveness, only few of the favourable conditions for democratization on 
which CSOs may possibly have some bearing on, will be discussed below to lay the 
background facts for the next chapter that in detail discusses the functions of CSOs on 
democratization.  
 
Capable State 
One of the major elements of democratization is the existence of a capable state. 45  
Predominantly, the state is the responsible organ for the protection and the enforcement 
of citizens’ fundamental rights.  Thus devoid of state’s substantial capacity to back 
them, every fundamental right constitutionally granted would be meaningless. CSOs 
may enhance state capability through capacity building programmes such as technical 
support and professional training for parliamentarians, law enforcing officers, the 
judiciary and public servants. Some specialized CSOs such as think-tanks, policy 
advocacy and lobbying CSOs may also build state capacity in policy formulation and 
implementation through applied research and policy analysis. CSOs also help 
strengthen state capability through legitimizing the government. 
 
Culture 
Aside from the role of the state, the cultural and the moral fibre of citizens are also said 
to play major role in the democratisation process. Political and civic cultures play 
either a destabilising or consolidating role in the democratization process. Although a 
view that one culture or religion is better than the other for democratization may be 
criticized as ethnocentric, in general however many agree that political and civic 
cultures, that permit willingness to negotiate, to compromise, to accommodate, and to 
lose are favourable soils for fostering democracy.46 This however does not outright 
exclude that nations which do not cultivate such civic cultures cannot have democracy 
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whatsoever. Pre -democratic civic cultures of Japan, France, Germany, or India for 
instance were favourable for autocracy than democracy. However with the emergence 
of political democracy through revolution and foreign imposition, autocratic civic 
cultures give way to democratic civic cultures. 
 
CSOs which are democratic in structure and nature may contribute to the 
democratization process by influencing the cultural and social values of communities. 
They do so by educating their members, important civic virtues and civic skills such 
as participation, tolerance, and compromise which, when applied in the public sphere, 
could promote the democratization process. CSOs may also influence the civic culture 
through community empowerment programmes. Educated and empowered citizens 
who are able and keen to participate in public life and debate on policies and legislation 
play crucial roles in cultural exchange that promote pluralism and tolerance thus 
sustaining democratization endeavours.  
 
Such political and civic cultures that promote pluralism and tolerance are particularly 
indispensable in multicultural societies for democratization to thrive as they promote 
the prevention, management, resolution  and transformation of ethnic or religious 
conflicts which otherwise would hold back and sabotage democratization. Jean Grugel 
underscored:  
Violent ethnic conflict violates the basic principles of democracy. Civil war 
also implies complete state breakdown, as force become the prerogative of 
particular social group. And finally, its lasting impact can be the embedding of 
ascriptive identities for generations and the triumph of uncivil nationalisms 
which conflict with the democratic ethos.47 
 
Without such civic culture and pluralism, democratization would be disrupted in a 
country with heterogeneity and deep segmentation whether by tribe, ethnicity, religion 
or language as different groups would be more interested in advancing their own 
position than in sharing power with each other. In addition preventing potential 
conflicts by inculcating civic cultures, CSOs may also play a role in conflict 
management and transformation. 
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Modernization 
Another factor that potentially plays a positive role in the democratization of a nation 
is modernization and industrialization. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel48 argue 
that although modernization does not necessarily result in democracy, it would 
facilitate and accelerate democratization by bringing socio economic changes such as 
a rising in specialization, urbanization, education, life expectancy, and rapid economic 
growth which would in turn eventually encourage the establishment of democratic 
political institutions and mass participation in politics. Inglehart and Welzel 
specifically assert  
‘….. privatization and industrialization can cultivate the educated middle-
class, which is one of the biggest impetuses for developing liberal democracy; 
a high level of economic development gives people more economic security, 
which leads to more tolerance and trust of different groups and political 
opinions; with improved living standards, people need channels to express 
their opinions and participate in the government decision-making process.’49  
 
Many others including Lipset and Adam Przeworski also through statistical analysis 
highlight that affluence, economic development and liberalization are indispensable 
for the democratization process as democracy cannot take root and outlive in a country 
where income is low and unequally distributed. 50  Proponents of this view contend 
that it is necessary to facilitate the consolidation of democracy by exerting a stabilizing 
influence between the upper classes that hanker after authority to preserve their 
position and the lower classes that ache for political power to lift themselves up.51  
 
Such statistical or otherwise evidence that demonstrate the requisite of modernization 
for democratization and the entrenchments of democracy in more affluent nations are 
not however absolutely accurate as evidenced by the rating of nations according to 
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49 Ibid, 37. 
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their economic and democratic performances.. Amartya Sen thus strongly challenges 
extreme positions that assert affluence is a necessary prerequisite to democracy, he 
contends that ‘democracy is not a luxury that can await the arrival of general 
prosperity.’52 
 
Notwithstanding such contentious positions regarding the importance of affluence for 
democratization, CSOs may nonetheless play a role in modernizing a nation through 
the implementation of poverty alleviation and sustainable development programmes. 
Such programmes help to enhance the human and the economic development of a 
country. They may also address issues of income inequality by advocating for the 
socioeconomic rights of the poor and advising on policy formulations that can ensure 
equitable wealth distribution. 
 
Vibrant Civil Society Organisations 
Another major factor that impacts the democratization process is the existence of 
vibrant civil society organisations.53 In addition to the indirect impact CSOs may have 
in the democratization process by influencing the capacity of the state, the socio 
cultural values of the community, and the modernization of the nation, CSOs may have 
numerous other democratic functions. For instance, CSOs contribute to the 
democratization process by offering citizenry common purposes and thus inculcating 
unity. They also serve as social channels through which it would be feasible to 
challenge the decisions of elected officials and the power of the state hierarchy. 
Citizens’ engagements in CSOs also prepare and empower them to participate in the 
public sphere and the political regime. Civil societies also facilitate the growth of social 
capital and build trust, thereby offering the mainstay of functioning democratic 
institutions.  
 
Although few, there were instances of CSOs engagement during the first and second 
wave of democratization such as the involvement of civic associations in the U.S. 
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notably, the African American civil rights movement that re-established the U.S. 
democracy after the civil war. However, the democratization function of CSOs has 
been particularly evident during the third wave of democratization. A study by 
Freedom House has concluded that, democratic civil society organisations  has 
contributed for over 70 percent of transitions from autocracy that occurred during the 
third wave of democratization, 54   even in nations where other preconditions of 
democracy were mostly lacking. 
 
Foreign pressure 
Apart from those internal dynamics, foreign intervention or external pressure is another 
factor that plays a major role for democratization of many nations all over the globe 
since the age of colonization until today. Such foreign interventions or external 
pressures that reflect either ‘leverage’ or ‘linkage’ assume different forms such as 
diffusion, diplomatic or military pressure, multilateral political conditionality, 
democracy assistance programmes, and the activities of trans-national human rights 
and democracy networks.55  
 
 For instance, democracies of Canada, New Zealand and Australia that become fully-
fledged and sustained were initiated during the British colonization. With the military 
occupation of Japan and Germany following the end of Second World War, initiation 
of democratic system fell under the supervision of the allied power namely the United 
States, Great Britain and France.56 Of late, the democratization processes of many 
countries post the Cold War were also overwhelmingly influenced by western 
governments, multilateral institutions and regional or international organisations such 
as NATO and the European Union. The latter in particular has played the most 
important role in promoting democracy in Europe mainly by imposing conditionality 
of political reform for potential membership in the organisation and/ or trade and 
financial benefits.57 
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The debate over whether democracy is a direct consequence of any or all of these 
factors, namely wealth, civic culture, homogeneity, non-violence, robust civil society 
organisations, foreign assistance, is far from conclusion. In spite of some historical and 
statistical evidence which prove casual relations, it is worth to underscoring that the 
correlation between these conditions and the democratization process is neither 
unequivocal nor linear. While the fulfilment of the preconditions will not necessarily 
warrant democratization, at times democracy can also surface despite lack of most of 
the favourable socio economic and structural conditions.  
 
It is not, however, the objective of this research to prove whether or not all of such 
conditions contribute to democratization or which conditions better facilitate 
democratization. Simply out of interest and without claiming that it is a better 
precondition for facilitating democratization, this research will examine the functions 
of civil society organisations in the democratization process in chapter 3. However, as 
will be discussed in chapter 4, the democratization functions of CSOs require an 
enabling environment that offers a broader space of operation.   
 
2.4 Democratization in Ethiopia  
Democracy is a new phenomenon in the Ethiopian political history. Before 1991, the 
country had witnessed two violent transfers of power in its modern history. The first 
one took place in 1974 where the Derg58 (A Marxist military junta) overthrew the 
government of Emperor Haile Selassie I (an absolute monarch who ruled Ethiopia for 
40 years). The second happened in 1991 where the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) removed the Derg regime.   
 
After the overthrow of the Dergue regime, Ethiopia adopted a liberal constitution that 
enshrines the fundamental civil, political and socio-economic rights. It also 
experienced a paradigm of constitutionalism, multiparty system, decentralization, and 
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a liberalized economy.59  It also conducted 4 general elections (1995, 2000, 2005, and 
2010) and conducted the fifth one on May 2015.  
 
Ethiopian Transition to electoral democracy 
After the overthrow of the Derg regime, EPRDF called a national conference in 1991 
and invited different political parties which had far longer existence in the country and 
others that are established after the fall of the Derg regime. A Transitional government 
of Ethiopia (TGE) was established that would oversee the transfer of Ethiopia into a 
smooth democratic transition. The conference also adopted a Charter which stipulates 
the TGE’s commitment to respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
particularly the freedom of association, expression and assembly and people’s right to 
engage in any kind of lawful political activity including the formation of political 
parties.60 
 
The 1992 local election 
After the Establishment of the TGE, the first multi-party local and regional election 
was launched in 1992. Unfortunately, the election which was expected to herald the 
new paradigm to plural politics in Ethiopia failed the standard of competitiveness. The 
major political parties like the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) which was the second 
largest party in the Transition Government, withdrew from the Transitional 
Government and the election protesting against what it called increasing EPRDF 
domination and non-conducive political space.61 Subsequently, other political parties 
such as the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO) and the All-Amhara 
Peoples’ Organisation (AAPO) also boycotted the election.  
 
Following the withdrawal of the OLF from the TGE, there was an armed conflict 
between the EPRDF forces and the forces of OLF where the latter was crushed and the 
EPRDF consolidated its power throughout the country.  In the post-election period, 
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several other parties also left the TGE thereby giving the EPRDF an opportunity to 
further consolidate its power in the country without any form of peaceful opposition. 
 
The 1991 local and regional election was therefore conducted in an atmosphere of 
armed conflict in the country and was marred by irregularities, according to the 
international observer’s mission report.62 As some observers suggested, the election 
was conducted when the country was not ready both politically and in infrastructure to 
conduct free and fair elections,63  thus had little or no contribution to the development 
of democracy in the country.64   
 
The 1995 General Election  
Ethiopia conducted the first general election in 1995 which is considered by some as 
‘democratic in formal structure as well as in spirit and practice.’ 65  Yet others 
commented that it did not fulfill any democratic standards. 66  The election was 
conducted in an environment where there was a lack of genuine choice of candidate 
for the electorate67 to choose from as many of the prominent political parties boycotted 
the election.68 Neither was there a proper debate even amongst the few candidates that 
remained in the process. 69  EPRDF was declared winner with a 90% share of the vote. 
Thus, this election like that of the 1991 local election made little contribution to the 
democratic development of the country, since democracy without any genuine 
democratic public debate and unpredictable competition is a futile exercise.  
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The 2000 General Election  
In the 2000 general and regional election, opposition parties abandoned their 
boycotting strategies and several political parties including the All Amhara People’s 
Organisation (AAPO), the Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), the Oromo National 
Congress (ONC) and the Council of Alternative Forces for Peace and Democracy in 
Ethiopia (CAPDE) participated in the regional and national election. This was mainly 
due to a better political space in the country where opposition parties were allowed to 
conduct political rallies and given media outlet to reach their constituencies, although 
in a limited manner. Thus for the first time in the country voters were given alternative 
parties to choose from. Despite the improvement, the 2000 election cannot be said to 
have the qualities of a genuine electorate democracy owing to limited public 
participation and competition. EPRDF and its affiliate parties again won the election 
by a 90% share of the vote. The opposition parties on the other hand won 13 seats out 
of the 547 Federal parliament seats which were shared by AAPO, EDP, ONC, and 
CAPDE. Rather, the 2000 election and the previous two elections failing the standards 
of inclusiveness, competitiveness, and fairness in having access to the public media, 
are said to have helped for the creation of electoral authoritarianism on the part of the 
EPRDF. 
 
The 2005 general election 
The 2005 general and regional election is considered by many the most competitive 
election in the history of Ethiopia. This was mainly due to the unparalleled political 
space opened by the EPRDF for the first time. In unprecedented manner, the opposition 
political parties were allowed to conduct political rallies and were given air space in 
the public media to communicate their political opinion to the electorate. A television 
debate between the ruling party and the opposition parties on national issues provided 
voters with alternative policies on key national issues. For the first time in the history 
of the country, the incumbent political party was genuinely challenged peacefully 
through election.   
 
The local civil society organisations were engaged in voter education and were able to 
train several thousands of election monitors to observe the election. The two main 
opposition coalitions of parties: The Coalition of Unity and Democracy (CUD) and the 
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United Ethiopian Democratic Front (UEDF) were also able to field candidates in most 
of the constituencies in the country and were posed as an alternative to the EPRDF. 
 
The election processes were relatively open, peaceful and democratic until the Election 
Day. After the closing of poll however, a semi- emergency was declared in the capital 
Addis Ababa and the government imposed a ban on freedom of association. The 
Election Board of Ethiopia, declared the EPRDF as a winner of the 2005 election. 
However, the two main political parties, i.e., CUD and UEDF won 109 and 52 seats 
respectively signaling the new parliamentary paradigm in Ethiopia.   
 
Nonetheless, despite an increase in the number of seats from 13 to 161 (a third of the 
parliamentary seats), the opposition parties claimed massive irregularities in the 
election process and refused to accept the result. The European Union (EU) observer 
mission also supported the opposition’s claim and unanimously stated that there had 
been major irregularities at the counting spots and that the election fell short of 
international standards. The population reacted to the result and went out to the street 
opposing the result and more than 200 people were killed by the government forces. 
The leaders of CUD including the mayor-elect of Addis Ababa were arrested and 
charged for attempting to change the government unconstitutionally. Several 
thousands of supporters of CUD and representatives of CSOs were also detained.70  
 
Unfortunately, the election that allowed the Ethiopian opposition parties to win one 
third of the available parliamentary seats and that which made a great number of 
Ethiopians believe in the transition of government power through ballot boxes has 
become a turning point in the democratization process of the country for the worse. 
This is reflected in the 2010 election where the EPRDF won all but two of the 547 
parliamentary seat. 
 
The 2010 General Election 
After the most competitive election held in 2005, the government of Ethiopia enacted 
series of laws that constricted the political space for opposition parties, the media and 
civil society organisations. These laws include the Amended Electoral law 
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Proclamation (2007), the Political Parties Registration Proclamation (2008), the 
Freedom of the Mass Media and Access to Information Proclamation (2008), the Anti-
Terrorism Law (2009), the Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies 
Proclamation (2009), the Electoral Code of Conduct for Political Parties (date?). Each 
of these laws has provisions that narrow the space for political parties, civil society 
organisations and the media. They also contain severe sanctions that many 
international human right organisations including Amnesty international and Human 
Rights Watch criticized as highly restrictive and stultifying.71 
 
The 2010 election was thus conducted in the atmosphere where several prominent civil 
society organisations and media outlets were closed, and the CUD, which was the main 
contender to the EPRDF, was fragmented due to the imprisonment of its members. In 
this condition, the EPRDF and its affiliates were declared as the winner of the 2010 
election with 99.6% share of the vote with only two seats (of the 547 parliamentary 
seats) shared by an opposition party and an independent individual candidate. The 
election was condemned by the European Union observation mission for failing to 
secure a fully democratic electoral process and which declared the election short of 
international standards especially on the transparency of the process of election and 
the lack of a level playing field for all the contesting parties. 72  
 
The 2015 General Election 
In the 2015 general election, EPRDF and its coalition won all the 547 parliamentary 
seat (100% of seats in the parliament)73 .This is a blow to the multi-party system that 
was introduced in 1991 after the overthrow of the Derge regime. This kind of result 
cannot be seen as the approval of the good work done by the incumbent party. Rather, 
taking the results of the 2010 election where the EPRDF won all but one parliamentary 
seat, the fact that the party won all the parliamentary seats in 2015 could be taken as a 
sign that the government is going towards a totalitarianism rather than a democratic 
transition. In a country of 96 million people that has more than 84 ethnic groups and 
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that follows ethnic federalism74 it is very difficult to assume that a single party will be 
able to represent 100 percent of the people. Rather, it can be argued that the result is 
the “the inevitable outcome of a political system in which opposition parties face 
extraordinary challenges and nearly all avenues for citizens to engage in political 
debates are closed.”75 
Since the 2005 general election in which the opposition parties gained a significant 
number of parliamentary seats, the EPRDF government has introduced restrictive laws 
that has crippled democratic institutions such as the political parties, civil society 
organizations and the media. The independent media has been annihilated; the handful 
of civil society groups that decided to work on democracy and good governance issues 
has been virtually reduced to nothing; and peaceful public demonstration has not been 
allowed to political parties and civil societies or quelled with force.  
It has been reported that the in the lead up to the election, the government has cracked 
down on opposition parties and their supporters putting leading members of the 
opposition and media personnel on trial for terrorism charges.76 Political parties also 
reported difficulties in registering candidates and organizing rallies. A few days before 
election several opposition members and candidates were killed in suspicious 
circumstances.77   In its January 2015 report, Human Rights Watch said that ‘the 
Ethiopian government’s systematic repression of independent media has created a 
bleak landscape for free expression ahead of the May 2015 general election.’ The 
report further states that ‘at least 60 journalists have fled their country since 2010, 
while at least another 19 languish in prison”. International elections observers such as 
the European Union election observation missions were absent choosing not to monitor 
the election that has little or no independence78. The African Union election observer 
peaceful, and credible”79 but failed short of saying the election as being free and fair. 
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In one of five polling stations visited, AU observers noted campaigning inside polling 
station, and election officials failed to ensure that ballot boxes are empty before voting 
began.  
Although 58 political parties contested in the election, most of them were weak, 
fragmented or affiliated with the ruling party. According to the national election board, 
More than 38.8 million voters have registered for the election which is a 26 percent 
increase compared to 2010 and the turnout exceeded 90 percent.  
As mentioned above, the enactment of laws that stultify the active participation of other 
democratic actors such as CSOs, the media and political parties from the public arena 
significantly compromised the legitimacy of the democratization movement in the 
country. Thus, despite the high turnout that could demonstrate high participation by 
citizens the fact there is no strong political party, strong and independent civil society 
organization and an independent media has   helped EPRDF to win the 2010 General 
election with 99.6 percent and again the 2015 election with a 100 percent control of 
the Ethiopian the parliament. 
In conclusion, although the electoral democracy of Ethiopia signifies the initiation of 
the democratization process, it fails to consolidate owing to lack of participation, 
competitiveness and legitimacy. Firstly, in terms of Political participation, the overall 
participation of Ethiopians measured through voter turn-out has been notably high in 
all the four elections conducted since 1991, particularly in the 2005 election. Yet, 
although the official data shows a massive turnout (more than 90% for the 1995 and 
2000 election) the opposition and other political observers question the figure 
considering the fact that all the major opposition political parties boycotted these two 
elections. The Electoral board explained the high turnout on the voter education that 
informed the public about the importance of participating in the election. Several 
qualitative research conducted on the 1995 and 2000 election however question the 
Electoral board’s assumption 80  and provides reasons such as coercion by the 
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government. More than 85% of the population of Ethiopia are living on agriculture. 
However as the land ownership vests in the state,81 it gives tremendous power to the 
government over the peasants whose lives and survival depend on the land. Thus, some 
argued that the high turnout is rather due to the government’s threat against the 
peasants who are forced to come out and vote for fear of eviction from their land.82  
 
Secondly, in terms of political competition the country has made progress to a 
multiparty system as there has been a significant increase in the number of parties and 
candidates participating in the elections. Nonetheless the increase in the number of 
political parties and candidates didn’t bring a true multiparty competitive system for 
two reasons. Firstly, although the number of parties participating in the election 
increased every election, a close look on the political parties indicates that many of the 
political parties are either created by the ruling party (EPRDF) or are affiliates to 
it83depriving the electorate genuine alternatives to vote for. Secondly, the fact that there 
was no open and leveled space for competition which impelled some major opposition 
parties to boycott in the 1995 and 2000 elections undermined the quality of 
competitiveness in the electoral process. Uncompetitive electoral system thus led 
EPRDF to hold a monopoly of parliamentary seats in these two elections. The 2010 
election also failed the principle of genuine competition and can only be considered to 
have partial participation owing to the restriction of space available for all and the 
weakening of political parties due to the imprisonment of members and leaders of the 
parties. 
   
Thirdly, the democratization process also failed to grow and take a strong hold for lack 
of legitimacy. The opposition parties have challenged the legitimacy of the elections 
for instance through boycotting the election in 1995; and also refusing to take up the 
seats that CUD won in the parliament in the 2005 election. The lack of acceptance of 
the election result by certain political parties certainly weakened the legitimacy of the 
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election process. The legitimacy of the democratization process was also questioned 
by the public at large mainly during the 2005 election which led to an electoral violence 
that took the life of 200 civilians. 
 
Beyond the flaws of election, Ethiopia stands fourth in the world in the number of 
imprisoned journalists.84 It also stands amongst the leading countries in the number of 
political prisoners85. Freedom of expression is also crippled by the most stringent 
media law, and the monopoly of TV by the government.86  Ethiopia being the lowest 
in access to the internet in Africa and due to the trend of imprisoning social media 
bloggers, the social media also fails to fill the gap created by the state monopolized 
mass media. Freedom of association and participation of CSOs in the democratization 
process is also seriously curtailed by the law governing the sector. All these factors 
indicate the democratization process and phase of the country. 
 
In sum, while the four regional and national elections conducted since 1991, and the 
existence of a multiparty election is a good beginning in the democratisation of the 
country, there is little progress in the development of genuine democratic substance. 
The little progress reflected in the 2005 election was also backtracked by new laws 
enacted subsequent to the aftermath of the election, and which stifled the newly 
emerging democratic institutions such as the media, political parties and the civil 
society organisations.  What has materialized after the four consecutive general 
elections is thus a ‘new electoral authoritarianism’ where the ruling party grips a 
complete power through election.   Election has thus become a means of legitimizing 
the ruling party rather than serving as a means of democratic expression of the people. 
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CHAPTER3 
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS IN 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
3.1.  Civil Societies and Democratization 
 
Historically civil society organisations carry out a host of social, political, economic 
and cultural functions that the state and the market fail to provide. In recent times 
however, CSOs increasingly perform those functions that were conventionally deemed 
the prime affairs of the other two sectors.1 Thus, the belief that civil societies are gap 
fillers has given way in the 21st century. This chapter however focuses on those 
functions of civil societies that either directly or indirectly play a role for 
democratization.  
 
The contribution of democracy to the proliferation and effectiveness of civil society 
organisation through recognition of freedom of association has been categorically 
established.  Nonetheless, the reverse relation in terms of the contribution of CSOs to 
the democratization of a nation has been debatable. Indeed the viewpoint goes from 
one extremity that argues the negative role of civil societies for initiation and 
consolidation of democracy, to another edge that upholds ‘no civil society - no 
democracy.’ 2  Hence, the exact relationship between civil societies and 
democratization remains unclear.  
 
 The view points on the contribution of civil societies for the democratization process 
can be summarized as (i) ‘categorically positive’ (civil society organisations inherently 
engender democratization); (ii) ‘discrete’ (having no causal relation), (iii) ‘negative’ 
(civil society organisations serve as a negative force and rather cause de-
democratization); (iv) ‘conditional affirmative.’ (civil society organisations could play 
a positive role for democratization provided they realize some preconditions or possess 
some mannerism). These four line of argument will be discussed below with special 
focus on the conditional affirmative view point which the approach 
                                                          
1Jonathan Garton, ‘The Regulation of organized Civil Society’ (Hart Publishing 2009) 44. 
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 The first viewpoint upholds that CSOs are inherently good for the democratization of 
a nation as they contribute to pluralizing the public sphere. Literatures in the field 
alluding to historical facts, theoretical justifications and empirical based research tests, 
reiterate the positive role of civic associationalism portrayed by Alexis de Tocqueville, 
and validate that a strong civil society is a defining characteristics of consolidated 
democracies.  
 
 However the second view contends that there is no causal relationship between CSOs 
and democracy. Fisher  for example, argues that ‘the majority of the literatures on the 
role of civil societies sated with hasty generalizations are based more on faith of their 
potentials that remain speculative and rhetoric than their factual input to political 
change and democratization or to political continuity.’3 Jonathan Fox,4 Bermeo and 
Nord 5 also assert that there are no causal mechanisms that determine the patterns of 
civil society organisations’ influence on horizontal accountability and longevity of 
democracy. Sydney Tarrow6 having the same position specifically pointed out that 
while democracy could advance civil society, however reversely, civil societies do not 
necessarily promote democratization. Nonetheless many who assert both the positive 
and the negative role of CSOs for democracy challenge the discrete view. Gill for 
instance strongly argues that civil society organisations and democratic institutional 
performance are mutually reinforcing.7 
 
At the other end, the third view strongly maintains that civil society organisations wield 
a negative force on the democratization process. Those who argue the negative effects 
of civil society assert that CSOs that are unrepresentative, biased or presenting their 
own agenda are particularly threatening to the democratization process.   Joerg Forbig 
in summarizing the possible negative effects of  CSOs points out that firstly, Civil 
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7 Graeme Gill, The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process (St 
Martin’s Press 2000).  
33 
 
society might become rent-seekers and face political co-optation either with the 
incumbent government or opposition parties and turn into societal instruments for 
specific political purpose rather than serving the general public.8 Secondly, although 
civil society is by definition a realm of interest articulation and representation of groups 
in the public sphere, uncompromising CSOs that push for specific interests make 
negotiations of different interests and political decision making process lengthy, 
obscure and complex. 9 The third and probably unintended negative effects of CSOs is 
societal segregation. Although some civil societies may work for the promotion of the 
equality of some disadvantaged groups and the unity of the nation, nonetheless as it’s 
likely that individuals associate with their own socially and economically defined 
groups, they develop their segregated organizational milieus and perpetuate traditional 
socio economic stratification and fortify ethnical and religious segregation. 10  
 
Diamond also points out that a hyperactive, confrontational and relentlessly rent-
seeking civil society can overwhelm a weak, penetrated state with the diversity and 
magnitude of its demands, leaving little in the way of a truly ‘public’ sector concerned 
within the overall welfare or society.11  This is a particularly pressing dilemma for new 
democracies lacking sufficient autonomy, legitimacy, capacity and support to mediate 
among the various interest groups and balance different interests in the face of stiff 
opposition from CSOs. 12 
 
Moreover CSOs cause regime instability, exerting too much influence in policy 
making and usurping the state’s moral imperative to govern in times of crisis thus 
causing inefficient governance. 13  In support of this view, some scholars present 
historical accounts of the negative political activism of CSOs in some new democracies 
of the third wave mainly from the Latin American region. They argue that the 
mobilization of populist societal groups that put forth an undue pressure caused 
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interrupted leadership and facilitated the rise of military juntas and oppressive 
dictatorships in Venezuela and Ecuador; and pulled back to authoritarian leaders in 
Guatemala and Bolivia.14 Civil society organisations thus caused the disruption of the 
democratization process threatening its consolidation and sustainability.  
 
While recognizing such latent de-democratization potential of civil society 
organisations, the relation between civil society organisations and democratization 
should not however be depicted as completely negative for two key reasons. Firstly, 
the argument that asserts CSOs are only negative forces for democratization based on 
experiences from some of the failed democracies in the Latin American countries can 
be refuted by citing other historical accounts which prove otherwise. Cases from other 
regions evoke remarkable contributions of civil societies to a political change.  For 
example, a series of studies focusing on Thailand, Chile and the Philippines establish 
the greatest contribution of the civil society sector for the ‘restoration of electoral 
democracy’, ‘consolidation of political democracy’ and ‘economic development’.15  
 
Secondly, as even admitted by those who argue against the democratic functions of 
CSOs, there are many factors that could affect the interplay between CSOs and 
democracy. In fact many scholars and activists agree that CSOs can have both a 
positive and a negative role as it is conditional on the environment wherein they 
operate, and their own governance and mission.  The political and institutional arena, 
for instance, may cause CSOs to play either positive or negative functions. The 
negative impact of civil societies that has typically played out in the South American 
region could thus be attributed to its shaky and ineffective institutions that are the 
typical marks of new democracies. As elucidated by Rose and Shin 16 whilst first wave 
and second wave democracies had longer experience with democracy and have better 
state institutional performance, third wave states have inherent institutional deficits 
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because they underwent electoral democracy prior to the establishment of the rule of 
law.  
 
Such argument in effect implies that civil society organisations do not contribute to the 
democratization process at least in countries where efficient institutions are lacking. 
The view is supported by others such as Sheri Berman who, citing the rise of the Nazi 
party from strong civic nationalism in Weimar Germany, emphasized that, devoid of 
strong state apparatus, vigorous civil societies facilitate societal discord prompting 
cleavage structures and organisations that are subversive, radical, seditious, insurgent 
and revolutionary.17 Diamond adds, a strong civil society in itself is no substitute for 
solid political and legal institutions, which are a sine qua non for a democratic system, 
however, once they are in place, civil society can and indeed must establish a more 
deeply rooted, legitimate and effective democracy.18 While the importance of other 
democratic institutions is unquestionable for democratization, nonetheless their lack 
thereof would not necessarily and totally impair the contribution of CSOs. NGOs in 
India and the Philippines for instance are considered to have emerged to fill 
the institutional vacuum caused by the weakness of political parties and trade 
unions.19 Similarly, Thailand having had vibrant NGOs and fragile party 
political system during the 1980s, key role of organizing the opposition 
movement was taken over by the former.20 The Indonesian regime change and 
fight for democratization in the late 90s could also be equally attributed to the 
leading Indonesian NGOs as the opposition party.21  
 
Thus an important matter to examine is why are some civil society organisations able 
to bring meaningful and positive results in their democratic functions than others?  
What factors impede or promote the interplay between civil societies and their 
democratic functions?  
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Factors affecting the democratic functions of CSOs 
As seen above different scholars and activists portray the contribution of CSOs for 
democracy as positive; negative; or no contribution at all. However many others 
describe the contribution of CSOs for democracy as ‘conditional affirmative’.22 Thus 
rejecting the inherent worth of CSOs, they assert in order to be able to play a significant 
role at any of the stages in the democratization process, civil societies must exhibit 
certain characteristics that facilitate democracy and deters autocracy.  
 
Those characteristics of civil society organisations that assist the facilitation of 
democracy are generally related to their internal governance (organisational 
characteristic) and external relations (relationship characteristic) with other 
actors notably the state. Diamond for instance stresses that, ‘for civil societies 
to contribute to democratic change and endure, (internally) they must be 
pluralistic, institutionalized, and democratic.23 He further noted that externally CSOs 
need to balance their relation with the state e.g., between autonomy and cooperation, 
vigilance and loyalty, scepticism and trust, assertiveness and civility.24  Fowler25  and 
Mercer26   further added that civil societies should be representative, strong, well 
developed, non-fragmented and uncompetitive. Thus CSOs that are lacking such 
characteristics might impede the democratization efforts causing protract the status quo 
or exerting an unfavourable bearing on democratic consolidation.  
Institutionalisation 
A certain degree of institutionalization in terms of the organizational form or system 
of operation is not only one basic feature for an entity to be considered as a civil society 
organization as discussed above, 27  but it is also an important feature for the 
                                                          
22 Larry Diamond, ‘Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation’ (1994) Journal of 
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23 Larry Diamond, ‘Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation’ (1994) Journal of 
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24 Ibid. 
25 Alan Fowler, `Non-Governmental Organisations and the Promotion of Democracy in Kenya' 
Ph.D. thesis (University of Sussex1993).  
26 Claire Mercer, ‘NGOs, civil society and democratization: a critical review of the literature Department 
of Geography’ (2002) University of Leicester, 7-8. 
27 Larry Diamond, ‘Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation’ (1994) Journal of 
Democracy 5 (3) 4-17,10-13 
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contribution of CSOs to democratization. Diamond argues when CSOs are 
institutionalized (i) they manage to organize interests of those they represent in a 
structured and stable manner that allows bargaining and the growth of cooperative 
networks (ii) reduce the cost of setting up new structures of social forces and (iii) their 
leaders will be more accountable and responsive to push for the interests and policy 
goals of their constituency rather than seeking to maximize short-term benefits in an 
uncompromising manner. 28 
 
Autonomy   
One of the democratic functions of CSOs is ensuring the accountability of authorities 
and those in positions of power.  Civil societies which are autonomous from the state 
in their recruitment, decision making and financial resources are thus able to challenge 
decisions of authorities, and put a check on the power of government invoking legal 
and bureaucratic means available for accountability. Fiscal dependence or political 
allegiance of CSOs to the government or other political parties on the other hand would 
limit their inclination to face the authorities and curtail their role as adversaries to the 
state.29  
 
Further the autonomy of civil societies from a government avail free space for citizens 
as they would be encouraged to be members of institutions that are free from state 
pressure. Hence, they serve as forums where citizens are able to articulate their interest, 
develop it through dialogue and deliberations, and effectively voice it out. Thus 
autonomous CSOs contribute to the democratization process through ensuring 
accountability of governments; and availing space for the aggregation and the 
representation of interests. 
 
 
Representation, Inclusion and Integration:  
The notion of representation, inclusion and integration specifically refers to having a 
larger and diverse constituency and networking. Representation often refers to the size 
of membership or constituency. Inclusion on the other hand connotes more of the level 
of heterogeneity of the members or the heterogeneity of the ideas the organization 
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represents within. On the other hand integration refers to the external relation a CSO 
has with other individuals and organizations and how cooperative and accommodative 
it is to others.  
 
Generally speaking CSOs that have large membership and represent the interest and 
ideas of a larger group of society gain greater legitimacy and louder voice. Thus would 
have a better chance to force their agenda in the public sphere as they can easily 
mobilize their larger constituency to influence policies and government decisions.  
 
The inclusiveness of an organization is also important feature that determines its 
contribution to the democratization process. Firstly, inclusiveness allows CSOs to 
exercise democracy within and to promote tolerance among members. Although 
freedom of association includes the right of individuals to choose with whom they want 
to associate i.e. the right to dissociate, a limiting principle that balances the freedom to 
dissociate with protection against unjustifiable exclusiveness can be stated.  “Freedom 
of association must be limited to secure a regime in which freedom of association can 
flourish.” 30 Hence the right to exclude that ensues from associational freedom must 
be limited if it unduly curtails others’ freedom or jeopardize their equal voice in 
democratic decisions. Such a balance is particularly necessary to protect individuals 
and minorities in CSOs who otherwise may be threatened to be banned merely for 
having a dissenting voice. 
 
Secondly, inclusiveness of an organization may also promote a pluralistic society that 
value tolerance. Indeed, closed membership in an organization would facilitate 
homogeneity in the articulation and aggregation of interests and would increase the 
bargaining power of the organization.  However, the degree of pluralism is also another 
major factor that determines CSOs level of contribution to democracy. If the 
organizational structures of civil society largely follow deep-seated cleavages, it 
creates the segregation and the fragmentation of the social and political community 
and such segregated CSOs, or more precisely several distinct civil societies stand in 
clearly disadvantageous relation to democracy as they cause the fragmentation and 
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potential disintegration of the overall society and polity. 31  This is particularly 
challenging for nations having diverse ethnic and religious groups like Ethiopia. Hyden 
also argues that the test of open recruitment is particularly relevant for the integration 
of multi ethnic or religious society.32  
CSOs that promote integration of their members with others and are themselves willing 
to cooperate and network with other organizations on the other hand better help the 
democratization process. Those civil society organisations that open up their 
membership to as many individuals and groups, and do not restrict members’ 
connection to other associations or to the wider society encourage the flourishing of 
pluralistic societies and facilitate trust and compromise amongst different individuals 
and groups both within and outside a certain associational life. Moreover their 
integration with diverse body of CSOs and the formation of coalition or networks helps 
them to have a louder voice that can influence decisions, policies and the whole 
governance system.  
CSOs with closed membership and organizational structure that do not promote 
inclusiveness and integration on the other hand might encourage polarization33 .Such 
types of CSOs would particularly threaten the democratization process if they have 
anti-democratic missions since the polarization could instigate conflict. Along this line, 
Warren also argues, although civic associationalism is a pillar for good governance, 
CSOs might as well play an off-putting impact in championing antidemocratic 
sentiments – eliciting factional splits and promoting societal cleavages.34   
 
Democratic structure and mission: 
For civil society organisations to have a positive impact in the democratization process, 
it is also imperative that they have democratic missions and exercise democracy 
within. The chances to develop stable democracy improve significantly if civil society 
does not contain maximalist, uncompromising interest groups or groups with 
                                                          
31Joerg Forbrig, ‘The Nexus Between Civil Society and Democracy: Suggesting a critical approach’ in 
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antidemocratic goals and methods.35 Thus both their objectives of formation and the 
course of action they take towards attaining their objectives need to be democratic. 
Having a democratic structure that allows periodical election of the board, greater 
participation of stakeholders and accountability to their own constituencies help CSOs 
to have a pro-democratic impact.36 CSOs that exercise democracy coach their members 
important democratic values that they may employ in the public sphere. On the other 
hand, CSOs that do not parade democracy within, would neither enhance members’ 
capacity for democratic participation nor influence them positively to internalize 
democratic values.37  
 
Though far-fetched to possess all such characteristics to the ideal degree, civil societies 
exhibiting such characteristics to a greater degree are said to have positive roles in 
initiating and consolidating democratization. The following section briefly 
summarizes the functions of CSOs for the initiation and consolidation of democracy. 
 
i. Initiating Democracy 
CSOs can play a role in initiating democracy by criticizing and delegitimizing 
authoritarian regime during pre-transition period, and through lobbying for the reform 
of electoral laws, voter education and election monitoring immediately after transition.  
History proves the role of organized social groups such as students, women’s groups, 
farmers’ organisations, Nongovernmental organisations, trade unions, religious 
groups, professional organisations, the media, think tanks and human rights 
organisations in mobilizing pressure for political change or democratic transitions. 38 
In the context of Southeast Asia for instance, notably in Cambodia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Thailand, NGOs have contributed to the fight for and transition to 
democracy, and have remained a significant political force since.39 
 
ii. Consolidation of Democracy 
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The democratic functions of autonomous CSOs also sustain the post transition period 
and may generally be classified as the (i) pluralist function and (ii) educational 
function. The most direct function of civil societies in pluralizing the political sphere 
is crucial in ensuring government’s accountability and articulating and defending 
interests. The educational aspect also indirectly and consequentially facilitates 
democratization by empowering citizens to internalize and exercise democracy. 
 
a. The Pluralist Function 
One major function of civil societies that greatly contribute to the consolidation of 
democracy is pluralizing the political sphere. Civil societies by virtue of their existence 
as autonomous actors, are said to pluralize (and therefore to strengthen) the 
institutional arena, and bring more democratic actors into the political sphere who 
would share power in society and in political life.40 Strong and dense civil society 
organisations form a bulwark against despotic tendencies in political life (ensuring 
accountability), and serve as a defence against oppressions and discrimination in the 
intercourse of social groups (ensuring interest articulation and representation).41 
 
Advisory functions 
Contemporary scholars underscore that the growth of civil society in its modern form 
plays a decisive political role not solely by challenging authoritarian governments and 
instigating democratic polity but also by enhancing the quality of governance within 
that polity. 42  Thus, beyond initiating and facilitating electoral democracy, civil 
societies play a considerable role in building the capacity of democratic institutions 
such as the police, public prosecutors, parliament and courts through technical and 
material provisions. CSOs also train ‘local and state elected officials and candidates 
emphasizing not only technical and administrative skills but normative standards of 
public accountability and transparency.’43 Civil societies thus contribute to sustaining 
democracy through capacity building of the government.  
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Many writers based on compelling research in Eastern Europe, signify the roles vibrant 
and dense civil societies played through provision of technical advice to state elites in 
promotion of regulatory quality and the efficacy of state-bureaucratic management.44 
Furthermore, organisationally, a strong civil society supports the state machinery by 
providing an unswerving and constant flow of information on the demands of the 
public and how best the state can execute in greater accord, permitting the state to draw 
up actionable and manageable plans of action for better performance.45  
 
Regulatory functions 
Civil societies reinforce accountability through setting a limit to state authority and 
challenging the state at both national and local levels; enhancing regulatory quality; 
and promoting transparency and efficiency.  As the most effective means of exercising 
control, they resort to democratic political institutions and public scrutiny, pressing for 
change and developing an alternative set of perspectives and policies.46  
 
If citizens have to participate and make an informed decision in the policy making 
decision of their countries in a meaningful manner, it is important that they obtain all 
the relevant prima-facie information. By establishing a constant flow of information to 
the masses about government policies, legislations, budget, human right records of the 
government as well as information that can expose governmental mismanagement and 
inefficiency civil society organisations enable the citizenry to make a more informed 
decision and defend their interests and values.47 This way also, civil societies would 
have indirect effects on state apparatus, by checking human rights records, tracking 
budget and challenging the state and ensuring transparency and accountability. In so 
doing, a vibrant civil society can alter the balance of power away from the hegemonic 
state by impelling state officials to use their power more responsibly and contributing 
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to the kind of ‘balanced opposition’ that is held to be characteristic of established 
democratic regimes.48  
 
Monitoring and Disciplinary functions 
Strong and independent civil society organisations also serve as watchdogs against 
violations of the law, potential abuse of political power and corruption. They can 
pressurize the government to act in pursuance of the demands of the public. They can 
also act as an institutional alternative that can scrutinize the transparency and efficacy 
of legislation and can expose to the public the intensity or forms of client-patron 
relations, prebendalism, cronyism, and nepotism in governance at the local or national 
levels.49 Thus, they also challenge the abuses of executive or legislative authority, and 
minimize arbitrary policies imposed by the state and compel properly authorized state 
authorities to prosecute, penalize, sanction, or punish errant public officials.50 Hence 
civil societies also play a disciplinary role by exposing government’s failure of 
standards of public morality and performance.51 
 
Representation function 
In addition to ensuring accountability, the pluralistic aspect of civil societies is crucial 
even in the highly consolidated, non-corrupted, and competent democracy, as the state 
which intrinsically is politically motivated would be inclined to pull off the interests 
of the majority leaving out minorities. Civil societies render political leverage by 
providing the latter with protection mechanisms against potentially alarming decisions, 
policies and legislation affecting their interests as they provide a forum for the 
articulation, aggregation and representation of the interests and grievances of the 
minorities thereby building a solid constituency.52  Civil societies also contribute to 
more effective and equitable economic and political reforms feeding legislators with a 
                                                          
48  Kassis Mudar, ‘Civil Society Organisations and Transition to Democracy in Palestine’ (2001) 
International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organisation 12 (1) 36. 
49Stephan Ndegwa, ‘Civil Society and Political Change in Africa: The Case of Non-Governmental 
Organisations in Kenya’ (1994) International Journal of Comparative Sociology 35, 19-36. 
50 Phillip Schmitter, and Karl T, ‘What Democracy is ...and is not’ in the Diamond, Larry and Plattner, 
Mark (edn) Electoral Systems and Democracy (The John Hopkins University Press 2009). 
51 Kassis Mudar, above n 48 at 36. 
52 Larry Diamond, ‘Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation’ (1994) Journal of 
Democracy 5 (3) 4-17; Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation (Johns Hopkins 
University Press 1999). 
44 
 
greater breadth of information and experience pressure policy formulations in favour 
of the communities that they represent.53 
 
Thus, a rich associational life supplements the role of political parties in stimulating 
political participation and increasing the political efficacy and skill of democratic 
citizenship. Strong, multiple, self-sufficient, self-governing and impartial civil society 
organisations which pluralize the political sphere therefore do certainly contribute to 
the consolidation of democracy through representation of interests and inspection of 
accountability.  
 
b. Educational Function 
Beyond the notion of pluralism, most literatures that examine the relationship between 
civil societies and democratization, base themselves on the extensive consequential 
impacts or instrumental role of civic associationalism echoing the point of Alexis de 
Tocqueville that American civic associationalism promoted a strong sense of 
democratic citizenship.54 It is argued, ‘democracy cannot do without democrats- thus-
no democratic order can be sustained, if not the prime practitioners of this form of 
government, namely the people, is prepared to stand up firmly for the principal rules 
of the game.55  Greatly emphasizing this function of civil society organisations in 
educating the prime practitioners of democracy, Robert Putnam and other social 
capitalists assert that civil society organisations which are ‘schools of democracy’ 
positively impact democratization through the formation of ‘social capital’ that has an 
effect on individuals, communities and the entire nation. Social capital is understood 
as an instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation in groups and therefore are 
related to traditional virtues such as honesty, keeping commitments, reliable 
performance of duties, reciprocity and the like. 56  Thus, while civil society and 
networks may arise as a result of social capital, the formation of civil society 
organizations that practice democracy within may in turn advance the strengthening of 
social capital by inculcating such values as trust, reciprocity, solidarity and tolerance.    
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The very heart of the ‘educational function’ lies on the presupposition that the 
existence of multiple autonomous organisations that bring diversity into a smaller 
communal sphere instils integration of the diverse which in turn promotes tolerance of 
the diverse, negotiating and compromising with the diverse and trusting the diverse 
societal groups which altogether promote democracy within the smaller organisational 
sphere and outside to the higher, wider public political sphere. 
 
Civil society organisation provides space for ordinary citizens to interact with one 
another outside of their closed networks of the family unit.  Therefore as is explained 
by Varshney and confirmed by an empriical study made by Tusalem  states such as 
India with  strong and dense civil societies profit from higher levels of social tolerance 
and political stability, since such interethnic and interfaith networks of civic 
engagement facilitate coexistence, bridge the differences, promote tolerance and 
defuse factional rivalries through intra-group nationalism, and an increased level of 
interethnic contact and develop higher levels of trust despite pronounced cleavages.57  
 
Greater trust, tolerance, and bargaining skills, undoubtedly are important facets of 
democracy. Through such democratic practices, not only citizens would learn to live 
to a reasonable extent with prevailing frictions and controversies; but convergence of 
opinions and integration into a common system of norms would also be more 
feasible. 58  The world bank for instance contends that an active civil society aid 
decentralization particularly in countries with ‘marked ethnic divisions and deeply 
rooted local identities’ through greater participation across all sectors of society and 
bring consensual policies that address ‘social dislocations.’59  
 
Further to promoting pluralism, integration, tolerance and trust, strong civil society 
organisations which themselves are democratic, augment an associational culture 
which can facilitate a network and web of social connectedness that enhances ever 
deeper levels of social capital which in turn promotes a strengthened sense of 
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democratic citizenship and a democratic political culture.60 Central to the process of 
democratization is the promotion of ‘civil culture; the consolidation of a set of values 
that promote civility, deepen the feeling of citizenship, promote egalitarian values and 
a sense of responsibility that stimulates participation.’61 Putnam’s long-term research 
project in Italy also indicates that a vibrant network of community-based voluntary 
organisations builds the ‘social capital-civic virtues, skills, and knowledge-needed for 
the consolidation of democracy.’ 62  The experience of individuals as members of 
democratic civil society organisations such as professional associations, alumni, 
interest groups, bowling leagues, and other organized groups could potentially build a 
strong sense of civic-mindedness. By coming together in civil associations that practise 
democratic norms weak individuals became strong; and the associations they formed 
could either participate directly in political life  as interest group or could serve as 
‘school of citizenship’ where individuals learned the habits of co-operation that would 
eventually carry over into public life.63   
 
Active participation in civic association thus allows individuals to gain capacities and 
interests and enhance the social capital. This creates a more proficient and engaged 
citizenry to engage in a participatory democratic system. The more people participate 
in CSOs that are democratic in nature and structure, the more they internalize the norms 
and behaviour of a participatory democratic citizenry, which can only strengthen the 
institutions and performance of a country’s democratic government. In support of this 
argument, Hadenius and Uggla write: 
‘... the spiritual support for demcoracy’s fundamental principles can be 
created, essentially, in just one way: through the experience gained from a long 
standing participation in democratic sturctures. It is a matter of socialization 
into democratic norms, through a process of learning by doing....and 
organisations of civil society often provide the best soil for this educational 
process.’64 
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Apart from such educational function that any democratic civil organisations can 
impart for their members, Right-based groups, Human Rights Defenders, Advocacy 
Organisations and Lobbying Groups may further contribute to the democratization 
process providing formal and informal education particularly of human rights and civic 
education empower citizenry and enhance democratic citizenship. 
 
In sum, in an effort of initiating and consolidating democracy through interventions of 
assorted nature CSOs play a crucial role as an intermediary political communication 
or transmission-belt between state and society thereby enhancing the performance of 
democratic polity and serving as an alternative principle of representation 
complementary to periodic elections. They also serve as an additional mechanism for 
strengthening democratic accountability. Fisher eloquently expressed this correlation 
stating ‘successful bottom-up democracy’ in many instances, eventually leads to 
‘top-down political change.65 
 
3.2. Civil Society Organisations and Democratization in Ethiopia 
As in many other parts of the world, the end of the cold war proclaimed the breeding 
ground for a large number of civil societies in Ethiopia.  With the fall of the socialist 
regime in 1991 a significant number of local NGOs interest groups and professional 
associations mushroomed.66 The number increased from meagre 24 in 1994 to 246 in 
2000.67 The new aid regime, which channels bilateral aid and social services through 
civil societies, has also rendered the latter as key agents both in the development and 
in the political discourse.68 The approach changed due to the awareness that in wide 
contrast to the state apparatus which is burdened with red tape and infested with corrupt 
officials, civil society organisations are more accountable and more transparent as 
conduits of development assistance. As the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan 
remarked: 
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‘The United Nations once dealt only with governments. By now we know 
that peace and prosperity cannot be achieved without partnerships 
involving Governments, international organisations, the business 
community and civil society. In today’s world, we depend on each other.’69 
 
Thus both regime change internally and Aid policy externally caused the burgeoning 
of Trade unions, peasant cooperatives, youth and student organisations, professional 
associations, non-governmental organisations and advocacy groups in Ethiopia.70 
  
Despite the proliferation of scores of civil societies, however only very few played a 
direct role in the democratization process of the country.71 Many remained focused on 
welfare and service delivery functions. A survey conducted in 1994 proves while 72% 
of all NGOs engaged in relief work in Ethiopia deal strictly with subsidies and service 
delivery activities, 22% concentrate on the capacity building and the improvement of 
the quality of life of its rural clientele.72 In 1995 only 10 out of 350 NGOs operating 
in Ethiopia played a role in the democratization process through human rights 
promotion, advocacy, and democratic awareness etc., 73  and this ratio has never 
improved up until 2009 where only 3% of Ethiopian CSOs were engaged in democratic 
related activities. This is attributed to the fact that the space available for CSOs was 
limited as they ‘were alarmed and suspicious of government that constantly keeps them 
under guard.’74 
 
Yet, even the contributions of those few organisations whose purpose of formation is 
democratic promotion were limited. This is because of both internal and external 
factors. Internally, many of them were small in size, lacked experience, were 
concentrated in the cities and align mostly with elite groups.75 The external factors, as 
some writers argue is attributed to resource deficiency and foreign aid dependency; 
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intricate bureaucracy and prescribed permitted activities both by the government and 
donors; government distrust of their allegiance to political opposition parties. 76  Such 
factors cause the fragmentation of CSOs in Ethiopia and limited their contribution to 
the democratization process at national level.  
 
In spite of such internal and external challenges however, as we shall see below, those 
very few civil society organisations in Ethiopia have played indispensable roles in the 
democratization process of the country for nearly two decades in promoting 
accountability and efficiency of the state machinery and empowering the citizenry.77  
 
i. Empowering the citizenry 
One of the ways in which the Ethiopian CSOs contribute to the democratization 
process is through awareness raising programmes and the advancement of civic 
education. Nearly all of the advocacy organisations sensitized and created community 
awareness through civic education, human rights education, promotion of the 
principles and values of democracy etc. employing different means such as organizing 
public platforms, through mass and mini Medias, dissemination of information …and 
communication (IEC) materials etc.  Those awareness raising projects informed the 
public of their rights and duties thereby enabling them to actively participate in the 
democratic and development agendas of the country that affects their life and enabled 
them to make an informed decision and to demand their rights. 
 
Some advocacy civil society organisations beyond awareness creation facilitate access 
to justice particularly for the poor and other marginalized and vulnerable sections of 
the society through pro-bono legal aid services. Such free legal aid service offered by 
Ethiopian Women Lawyer’s Association (EWLA), Action Professional Association 
for People (APAP), Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO), and others helped to 
protect the rights of citizens who would otherwise had been denied justice for lack of 
financial means and knowledge. 78 It also empowers the community to claim their 
political, social and economic rights in the court of law.  
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ii. Promoting Accountability and Efficiency of the State 
Recognizing the need to build the capacity of the state apparatus to enforce the 
constitutional rights of its citizens, in a new democracy and decentralized system, 
several Ethiopian advocacy organisations have been engaged in building the capacity 
of the democratic institutions of the government including the parliament, the 
judiciary, the police and different executive branches particularly in the regions79. 
APAP, EWLA, OSJE and Forum for street children (FSCE), African Initiative for a 
Democratic World Order (AIDWO) can be cited as very prominent examples.80 
 
Although the primary responsibility of legislation and ratification of international laws 
and treaties lies with the government, the Ethiopian civil societies notably the 
Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWLA), Action Professionals Association 
for People (APAP), Ethiopian Human Rights Council Organisation (EHRCO), 
Organisation for Social Justice in Ethiopia (OSJE), Confederation of the Ethiopian 
Trade Union (CETU), have also played a role in identifying the loopholes or 
predicaments of the laws in addressing the socio economic challenges of the society 
and lobbying for the enactment and amendment of some laws. This has result in the 
amendment of the Ethiopian Family Law, the Penal Code of Ethiopia and the Labour 
law.81 
   
Also conceding the indispensability of peace and amicable ways of resolving conflicts, 
for any viable democracy some civil societies and most remarkably the faith based 
organisations have worked for the advancement of conflict resolution and peace 
building activities. Faith based organisations such as the Ethiopian Orthodox Church-
Development Interchange Church Commission (EOC-DICAC), Ethiopian Evangelical 
Church Mekane Eyesus (EECMY-DASC and EMDA( (EMDA) have managed to 
prevent, resolve, manage and transform a number of inter-ethnic, inter religious, 
resource based as well as intra conflicts82 which otherwise could escalate and affect 
the democratisation process. 
                                                          
79  Dessalegn Rahmato and others, above n 74 at 82-97; Jeffrey Clark, Civil Society, NGOs and 
Development in Ethiopia: A snap shot view (2000) The World Bank, 4-7. 
80 Dessalegn Rahmato and others, above 74 at 82-97; Norwegian Church Aid, above n 78;  Desalegne 
Rahmato, n 21 at 116-118. 
81 Desalegne Rahmato, above n 21 at 106-116. 
82 Norwegian Church Aid, above n 78. 
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In addition to building state capacity and playing a complementary role, civil societies 
occasionally challenge the state in its decisions and policies although in general, they 
have not reached the point of critically challenging government’s policies and plans or 
acts of violations. 83  The Confederations of Ethiopian Trade Unions (CETU’s) 
opposition to the Ethiopian government’s economic reform known as Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1995 84 ; and APAP’s challenge to the city 
administration decision of eviction of hundreds of households devoid of fair 
compensation in pursuance of international standards85; and the challenge by coalition 
of Ethiopian civil societies represented by OSJE, in the court of law against the 
decision of the government forbidding civil societies to monitor the 2005 election and 
the subsequent verdict in favour may be cited as an illustration.   
 
The Ethiopian Human Right Council (EHRCO) has also been very active in its 
watchdog role and stands as the only human right organisation that regularly monitors 
and reports on human right violations of government, political parties or any other 
organ. EHRCO monitors and reports on human rights violations such as extra-judicial 
killings, arbitrary detentions, torture, forced disappearances, unlawful and arbitrary 
confiscation of property, violation of privacy, unlawful dismissal of employees, denial 
of the freedom of conscience, religion, expression and association calling for 
immediate action by concerned organ86. 
 
Further to election monitoring, some advocacy organisations such as OSJE, APAP, 
EHRCO, Inter Africa group (IAG), chamber of Commerce have worked to advance 
free and fair elections through voters’ education and the promotion of human and 
democratic values and culture among the community through trainings and 
information dissemination. In the 2005 national election in particular, a coalition of 
thirty five civil societies were highly engaged in voter education and election 
observation activities mobilizing and training more than 3000 election observers. 
                                                          
83  Sisay Gebre-Egziabher, The Role of Civil Society Organisation in Democratization Process in 
Ethiopia (2002) Paper presented at the fifth International Conference of the International Society for the 
Third-, July 7-10, University of Cape Town, South Africa.  
84 Ibid, 11. 
85 Dessalegn Rahmato and others, above n 74 at 85. 
86 Desalegne Rahmato, above n 21 at 110-111; Sisay Gebre-Egziabher, n 83 at 11. 
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Indeed many people in the CSO sector believe that the most restraining Ethiopian 
Charities and Societies Proclamation is the result of the civil society engagement in 
election related activities in the controversial 2005 national election where the ruling 
party lost a significant number of parliamentary seats. 87  Whatever the motivation 
behind the legislation may be, however, it marked out another epoch in terms of the 
roles the Ethiopian civil societies could play in the democratization process in 
particular and in the development of the country in general. With the advent of the new 
charity law, the greater majority of CSOs have given up their advocacy work .Few 
others such as EWLA, EHRCO, and EBA determined to pursue their advocacy work 
have however downsized their operations in the regions and cutting their human 
resource owing to the financial challenges caused by a restriction imposed on them to 
raise funds from foreign source. Thus, in general, the contribution of CSOs to the 
nascent democracy that Ethiopia experienced since 1991 was interrupted after the 
enactment of the CSP. 
 
As discussed above, civil society organisations have a great role to play in the 
democratization of Ethiopia and elsewhere. Nevertheless, the ability of the civil society 
organisations to carry out their democratic role or any other activities highly depends 
upon the environment in which they operate 88 . Factors which determine this 
environment among others include, the legal environment in which the CSOs operate; 
the ‘socio-cultural characteristics of the society; the political systems of the country; 
economic structures and wealth distribution, institutional division of labour, beliefs 
and values, and historically embedded conventions and norms’,89 the ‘material base 
and resources they generate, access and control’,90 the political will of the government; 
etc. All these factors influence the necessary ‘enabling elements’ that are essential to 
the effectiveness of civil societies. The next chapter discusses such condition necessary 
to create an enabling environment for CSOs. 
                                                          
87 Kassahun, Birhanu , ‘The Role of NGOs in Promoting Democratic Values’ in  Bahru Z and 
Siegfried P (Eds) The Challenge of Democracy from Below (Nordiska Africa institute and Forum for 
Social Studies 2002). 
88 Alan Fowler, ‘An enabling environment for civil societies. What does it mean and how does law fit 
in? (2003) Centre for Civil Society’ Research Report, 3. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid, 6 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
ENABLING LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR CSOs’ ROLE IN 
DEMOCRATISATION 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to lay the groundwork for the forthcoming chapters that 
assess the Ethiopian law against the standards of an enabling legal framework for 
CSOs. The chapter is organized as follows. First, it briefly discusses the notion of an 
‘enabling environment.’ Secondly, it gives a general background on the interplay 
between the legal and non-legal factors affecting an enabling environment for CSOs. 
It also explores what constitutes an enabling legal framework for CSOs i.e. what it 
entails and how the law can create enabling conditions for the democratic functions of 
CSOs. It thus introduces the four pillars by which the law can create the enabling legal 
conditions for CSOs which will be discussed in the subsequent chapters. 
 
4.2.  The Notion of an Enabling Environment for CSOs  
In order to understand the forthcoming discussions on the enabling environment for 
the role of CSOs in democratization, it is necessary to briefly consider ‘what is an 
enabling environment’ or ‘what is to be enabled.’ This may require us to quickly 
examine the direct and indirect roles that CSOs can play in the democratization 
process. As concluded from the previous chapter, CSOs indirectly influence the 
democratization process by serving as a school of democracy and training members 
with civic virtues such as pluralism, public trust, tolerance and; civic skills such as 
participation, and collective and autonomous decision making.1 If such educative role 
of CSOs that Warren has referred as the ‘developmental effects on individuals’2 has to 
be achieved, then, what is to be enabled is simply the flourishing of diverse types of 
CSOs which are internally democratic. As CSOs grow in number and diversity, 
individuals’ affiliation in such organisations may increase as they will have better 
chance to find institutions that represent and defend their interests. Such affiliation 
may in turn increase the capacity enhancement of individuals in internalizing 
                                                          
1 For detail discussion on the direct role of CSOs on democratisation, see Chapter 3 above.   
2 Mark Warren, Democracy and Association (Princeton University Press 2001)97 
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democratic virtues and exercising democratic skills, provided the organisations are 
democratic in nature. As this individual capacity enhancement reaches the public 
sphere, it fosters the democratization process. In short therefore, what is to be enabled 
is the existence of diverse (in size, purpose, forms of incorporation) types of CSOs 
which are democratic in nature and structure.  
 
CSOs also directly contribute to the democratization process of a nation through the 
promotion of the rule of law and the accountability of the government; interest 
representation and articulation of diverse groups; deliberations on public matters; and 
lobbying or advocacy for the enactment or the enforcement of specific policies and 
legislation.3 Such direct contribution of CSOs for democratization, that Uhlin referred 
as the ‘institutional level’ 4  engagements of CSOs, perhaps require activism and 
autonomy of CSOs. Such civic advocacy organisations must have autonomy in order 
to negotiate with other actors in the public sphere and to ensure the accountability of 
the government. They must also exhibit activism in order to be a voice to the groups 
that they represent, to lobby, and to advocate. Such ‘institutional level’ democratic 
functions of civic advocacy organisations, in contrast to the individual capacity 
enhancement function of CSOs, require more space for engagement in the public 
sphere. Thus, for the institutional level democratization functions of CSOs, what is to 
be enabled is CSO’s free engagement in the public sphere. In short, what is to be 
enabled is the right of CSOs to freely choose any lawful purpose that promotes 
democracy as their legitimate purpose of formation and their autonomous engagement 
in the democratization process. 
 
Additionally, the contribution of CSOs to democratization whether indirectly through 
individual capacity enhancement or directly through institutional level engagement, 
requires both human and financial resources. The type and the amount of resources 
each and every organisation requires in order to accomplish its purposes may vary, 
depending on the size of the organisation and the nature of its engagement. However, 
in general the resource capability of CSOs is one factor that determines their ability to 
                                                          
3 For detail discussion on the direct role of CSOs on democratisation, See Chapter 3 above.    
4  Anders Uhlin, ‘Which Characteristics of Civil Society Organisations Support What Aspects of 
Democracy? Evidence from Post-communist Latvia’ International Political Science Review (2009) 30 
(3) 271–295,275  
 
55 
 
contribute to the democratization process. Thus another factor that has to be enabled 
is CSOs resource mobilization and effective utilization. 
 
Hence, what ‘an enabling environment for the CSOs role in democratization’ entails is 
CSOs existence; CSOs resource mobilization; CSOs autonomy and activism in public 
engagement. Indeed, these enabling conditions are not peculiar for CSOs that promote 
democratization as their primary purpose and influence it is the institutional level. The 
facilitation of the enabling conditions i.e. the existence, the resources and the 
engagement of CSOs is essentially the same for all types of CSOs whether engaged in 
the democracy promotion or otherwise. In this sense, the qualification of an enabling 
environment for CSOs role in ‘democratization’ seems redundant.  
 
In terms of the enabling conditions, perhaps, the difference between the democratic 
oriented civic advocacy CSOs that primarily focuses on the promotion of institutional 
level democratization and the other types of CSOs (such as developmental and 
recreational ones) is only a matter of the degree or the depth of autonomy, activism 
and accessibility to the public sphere required to efficiently and directly promote 
democracy.  While all CSOs need to balance autonomy with cooperation with other 
actors, CSOs that aims at controlling state power needs to be more autonomous from 
the government and other political parties as otherwise political co-optation would 
threaten their potential to democratic function. For Developmental CSOs on the other 
hand more of cooperation than autonomy may be required as those organizations are 
essentially providing public and quasi-private goods and services that the government 
is normally providing the public.  Taking this into consideration, although the 
discussion on the enabling law for CSOs role in democratization will highlight the 
enabling conditions necessary for democratic oriented CSOs as deemed relevant, 
nonetheless a general approach is employed. Thus while the discussion raises all 
enabling conditions for CSOs in general, it focuses on those important attributes of 
CSOs necessary for their democratic function. Indeed the general approach is justified 
because an enabling environment for all kinds of CSOs irrespective of their primary 
purpose would help to boost the sector as a whole and thereby indirectly contribute to 
the democratization process through individual capacity enhancement that can have a 
positive spill over effect on the public sphere.  
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4.3. Legal and Non- Legal Factors Affecting the Enabling Environment for 
CSOs  
 
Non- Legal Factors 
The premise of this chapter is that the democratic functions of CSOs can be influenced 
by the legal regime governing the sector. However, it is important to clarify that law is 
but one factor that shapes the enabling environment for CSOs’ contribution to 
democratization. Although the focus of the thesis is on the legal conditions, 
nonetheless the democratization functions of CSOs is often the result of the interplay 
between different factors such as legal, sociocultural, socioeconomic, political 
governance factors, institutional etc.5  
 
Sociocultural factors 
Mercer for instance highlighting the impact of culture argues that traditional norms, 
rituals and patterns of authority are part of the reasons why a strong and viable civil 
society is absent in many third world countries.6 Others also emphasize the impact of 
socio-cultural factors, particularly in countries where tradition, culture and religion 
have a dominant place in the social fabric. Kamrava also, in reasoning out why CSOs 
in third world countries fail to have a political dialogue with the government or to 
influence the political decisions of the government, asserts that the third world political 
orientations are seldom expressed openly and often find expression through religion 
and various cultural forms.7 
 
Socioeconomic factors 
The socioeconomic conditions also have an impact on the democratization role of 
CSOs. Poverty may cause disinterest amongst the marginalized and the vulnerable 
groups within society from participating in public matters. This is evidenced by the 
World Bank research that demonstrates the negative correlation between income 
                                                          
5Lester Salmon and Stefan Toepler, ‘The Influence of the Legal Environment on the Development of 
the Not profit Sector’ (2000) Center for Civil Society Studies, Working Paper Series 17 (2). 
6 Claire Mercer, ‘NGOs, Civil Society and Democratization: a Critical Review of the Literature’ (2002) 
Progress in Development Studies 2 (5). 
7 Mehran Kamarava, Politics and Society in the Developing World (2nd edn, Routledge 2000) 134. 
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inequality and measures of ‘voice and accountability.’ 8  Indeed part of the 
democratization role of CSOs is articulating, aggregating and advocating for the 
interests of such groups affected by economic, gender or political inequality. However, 
the participation of poor people even in CSOs that advocates for their rights and 
equality is limited not only because of disempowerment but also the opportunity costs 
it entails, as active participation in CSOs might force them to trade off the time they 
spend to earn an income. 
 
On the flip side, the negative correlation between income and measures of voice is not 
always true. Poverty and inequality might also prompt people to invest their labour and 
meager resources to fight against a particular governance system or to overthrow a 
tyrant government. Particularly, if poverty and inequality have an ethnic dimension, it 
carries heavy implications on the democratization role of CSOs as such groups that 
represent the disfavoured group might exhibit undemocratic values such as resentment, 
faction and intolerance. Nonetheless exhibiting such seemingly undemocratic values 
may not be necessarily damaging for democratization. Some scholars argue that shared 
grievances of deprivations and generalized beliefs (loose ideologies) about the causes 
and possible means of reducing these grievances are important preconditions for the 
emergence of social movements in a collectivity. 9   Thus, even CSOs that exhibit 
intolerance and resentment might contribute to the democratization process by 
overthrowing a tyrant government that failed to address structural inequalities. Thus in 
general, the socio-economic conditions of a nation affect how CSOs would influence 
the democratization process in an intricate manner.  
 
Political governance factors 
The political context, which includes the governance system, the relation between state 
and CSOs, formal and informal rules that govern the relations among the different 
actors in the public sphere, also affect the democratization role of CSOs. In a 
democracy where the freedom of association is recognized and well respected the 
number of CSOs tends to increase thereby enhancing the civic engagement of citizens. 
                                                          
8 Stefano Migliorisi and Clay Wescott, A review of the World Bank Support for Accountability IEG 
Working Paper (2011) 11 (5)  
9 Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton University Press 1970); Neil Smelser, Theory of Collective 
Behavior (Free press 1963); Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, Collective Behavior ( 2nd edn, Prentice-
Hall 1957). 
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Also where the state- society relation is commanded by a genuine vote cast, CSOs will 
also have better and wider space to cooperate and to challenge the government. Thus, 
in a healthy democratic system, CSOs can influence the formation and implementation 
of policies and legislations by delivering ideas, information and evidence to policy 
makers and legislators through established channels. Whereas in an authoritarian 
regime that has less or no tolerance for autonomous CSOs the operating space would 
be narrowed by formal and informal rules.  
 
Indeed, in an authoritarian regime where there is one party or one person dominance 
in all aspects of political life, the law itself may be used as a legitimizing force to limit 
or to halt the democratization role of CSOs. The recent global trend also shows that 
authoritarian and pseudo democracies are using the law as a tool to narrow the space 
for the existence and the engagement of CSOs.10 The political context and the political 
will of the government are thus particularly powerful in constraining the actual and 
potential role of the law.  
 
Depending on the state-CSOs relation and the political will of the legislators, the law 
may be either enabling or disabling for CSOs. A general presumption is that political 
will yields an enabling law for CSOs and in turn an enabling law brings forth 
democratization. Conversely, lack of a political will causes the enactment of disabling 
laws that can serve as tools to narrow the space for CSOs and stultify their functions. 
Such correlation between the lack of political will of the government and a disabling 
law is particularly feasible in non-democratic regimes having what some scholars 
called ‘puppet legislatures.’11 Despesoto for instance, asserts that many authoritarian 
executives have sought to maintain a façade of democracy by creating ‘puppet’ 
legislatures who support the regime since they would otherwise risk career-ending 
punishments.12 Hence, in such authoritarian regimes where the trias politica principle 
is only symbolic, the law is just nothing but a tool of expression of the will of the 
regime. Thus the governance system also affects the operational environment for the 
democratization functions of CSOs. 
                                                          
10 International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) and World Movement for Democracy, Defending 
Civil Society: Report (2nd edn, ICNL 2012). 
11Scott Desposato, ‘Legislative Politics in Authoritarian Brazil’ (2001) Legislative Studies Quarterly 16 
(2) 287-317, 287. 
12 Ibid. 
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Institutional and structural factors 
The presumption which asserts ‘no political will- no enabling law for the CSOs role in 
democratization’ however, considerably reduces the significances of the law and puts 
it altogether at the mercy of the political context. Nevertheless, law is also bound to be 
more than a dependent variable. In spite of the major place that the political will of the 
government has in shaping the law either as enabling or disabling, the relation between 
the political context, the law and CSOs is nonetheless not always straightforward.  
  
The relation between the law, CSOs and collective actions for democratization is a 
more complex institutional field that constitutes interactions among different actors, 
including CSOs, individual activists, politicians, donors who seek to change the socio-
political dynamics and the public at large. Although the state demands compliance with 
the law, individuals and their associations do not always unreservedly accept all laws, 
particularly disabling ones. Hence, CSOs may disregard, or resist disabling laws. 
CSOs, particularly those that advocate and lobby for a change of law, may exert 
influence to pressurize the government to amend or repeal a disabling law.  
 
Indeed, beyond influencing the content of a specific law, the potential of CSOs might 
even extend to causing a regime change that brings transformation of the governance 
system as a whole that prompts a change of scores of laws including the constitution. 
The role of CSOs in South Africa against apartheid can be cited as a good example of 
the potential of CSOs in changing the governance systems and regimes. 13  The 
strategies or tactics CSOs employ in order to demand the amendment of the law or to 
influence the democratization process however can be reformed either as instantaneous 
revolution or lengthy negotiated process depending on the political contexts wherein 
CSOs operate. 
 
On the other hand, the existence of a political will and an enabling legislation for CSOs 
does not necessarily warrant a democratic contribution of CSOs. The law can shape 
institutional behaviours only to the degree that there is compliance. The compliance 
culture of organisations is again highly dependent on the content of the law, CSOs 
                                                          
13Lester Kurtz, The Anti-Apartheid Struggle in South Africa (1912–1992): Summary of Events Related 
to the Use or Impact of Civil Resistance (International Center on Nonviolent Conflict 2010).  
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relation to the state, the capacity of law enforcing institutions and the severity of 
penalties imposed for non-compliance. 
 
The inference to be made here is, thus the relation between the State, the law and CSOs 
should be conceptualized as overlapping institutional arenas that help to constitute and 
shape one another within a multi-institutional environment.  Although the enactment 
of an enabling legal framework is one of the most important inputs governments can 
make to the development and the active engagement of CSOs, nonetheless the 
enactment of an enabling law does not entirely depend on the political will of the 
government. The vibrancy of CSOs themselves and the public support they can secure 
also influences state action. The empirical test of Pamela Paxton for the ‘reciprocal 
effect’ of democracy upon association also suggests that ‘although more associations 
would be expected to exist when governments allow them to exist as is predicted by 
many political theorists, the effect is nevertheless only modest.’14 This justifies the 
merit of studying how the legal environment could influence the democratization role 
of CSOs notwithstanding the sociopolitical context. 
 
In general, the legal, political, social, cultural and economic contexts and their complex 
interrelation shape CSOs’ operational environment that defines their positions and 
influence in the public sphere and the space available to pursue democratization. While 
recognizing the importance of these variables and their complex interdependence in 
shaping the enabling environment for CSOs role in democratization, the focus of this 
thesis is nonetheless on the legal conditions that are necessary to create an enabling 
environment for CSOs contribution to democratization. The way to do it will thus be 
by proposing some general principles that enabling legal conditions should entail in 
order to facilitate the development of CSOs and their role for democratization. Hence 
for the purpose of this chapter, ‘enabling legal conditions for the democratization role 
of CSOs’ are framed based on what an ideal law should be like.  
 
In addition to stipulating enabling primary rules, an enabling legal framework requires 
an independent, accessible and efficient law enforcing institutions such as a registering 
                                                          
14Pamela Paxton, ‘Social Capital and Democracy: An Interdependent Relationship’ (2002) American 
Sociological Review 67, 254–277, 259. 
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and regulating Agency.15 In assessing the impact of the law on the democratization 
role of CSOs, therefore the thesis recognizes the importance of both what H.L.A. Hart 
called the ‘primary rules’ i.e. those rules governing CSOs behaviour;  and the 
‘secondary rules’ which indicate how, when, and by whom the primary rules are to be 
recognized, construed, and enforced.  However the focus of this thesis is on the 
‘primary rules.’ The contents of the ideally enabling legal framework proposed in the 
subsequent chapters are thus made based on an assumption that there are suitable legal 
and institutional infrastructures including efficient law-enforcing institutions to 
implement the enabling conditions and independent courts to interpret laws and review 
the actions and the decisions of the executive organs.  
 
Legal Factors 
The legal regime affects the role CSOs can play in democratization by enacting both 
substantive and procedural legal guarantees. Laws can influence CSOs’ existence and 
operation by regulating the transaction costs involved in establishing and sustaining 
CSOs.16 The influence of law on CSOs can be explained by the ‘transaction cost 
analytical framework’ derived from a set of ideas embodied in what is known as the 
‘New Institutionalism.’ 17  The central argument of new institutionalism is that 
institutions are necessary because they reduce the transaction cost (the cost of 
negotiation, execution, and enforcement) by creating permanent structures through 
which interactions can take place.18 When it is costly to transact individually, then 
institutions matter.19  It follows that institutions can only arise and persist when they 
confer benefits greater than the transaction cost that is incurred in creating and 
sustaining them.20  
 
By the same token, CSOs can be established and sustained only when the transaction 
cost of forming and sustaining them is minimal. A law may thus affect CSOs either 
positively or negatively by regulating the transaction cost. An enabling law is thus one 
                                                          
15 Leon Irish and others, Guidelines for Laws affecting Civic Organisations (2ndeds, Open Society 
Institute 2004) 32. 
16 Lester Salmon and Stefan Toepler above n 5 at 4. 
17 Ibid.  
18Douglas North, ‘Economic Performance through Time’ in Mary Brinton and Victor Nee (eds.) The 
New institutionalism in Sociology (Russell Sage Foundation 1998) 248. 
19Ibid.     
20 Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, ‘Introduction’ in Paul DiMaggio, and Walter Powell (eds)  The 
New Institutionalism in Organisational Analysis (Chicago University Press 1991) 1-38, 3-4. 
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characterized by and able to reduce the transaction cost to form and to sustain CSOs.  
Lester M. Salmon and Stefan Toepler classified the transaction cost of the law into the 
supply side and the demand side. 21  
 
From the supply side the law is enabling for CSOs by reducing the transaction cost 
which the founders and members may incur in the process of formation and operation 
of CSOs. Where the cost of forming CSOs is easier and cheaper or where working 
without them is costlier, people would be encouraged to establish CSOs. The law plays 
a significant role in this regard by stipulating constitutional or legal guarantees that 
reduces the transaction cost for the formation of CSOs and for the operation of CSOs. 
The constitutional or legal guarantees include the freedom to associate without undue 
interference; the right to form and to attain legal personality status without difficulty; 
the right to freely choose and to pursue the purposes for which CSOs are established 
for; and the right to access diverse financial resources. Such legal guarantees would 
significantly minimize the transaction cost for the founders and the members of CSOs. 
Conversely, where CSO’s right to associate are not guaranteed by the law and where 
it is demanding to gain legal personality, to mobilize resource and to engage 
autonomously in pursuing purposes of formation; or where the accountability 
mechanisms are demanding and too intrusive, people would be discouraged to 
establish CSOs as the cost of forming and sustaining it would be higher.22 Thus, the 
law could create either an enabling or disabling environment for CSOs by determining 
the transaction cost for the formation and operation of CSOs. 
 
From the demand side, the law can reduce the transaction cost which the beneficiaries, 
donors and other stakeholders may incur in the process of assessing and regulating 
CSOs. The law can do this by requiring CSOs transparency and democratic 
governance, and prohibiting profit distribution, private inurement and self-dealing. For 
example, a law that puts the non-profit distribution constraint23  on CSOs has the 
potential to maintain consumer’s trust on CSOs thereby maintaining or increasing the 
demand for civil society organisation. Additionally, a legal framework that puts a 
                                                          
21 Lester Salmon and Stefan Toepler, above n 5 at 7. 
22 Ibid, 7  
23 Non-profit distribution is one of the essential elements of an organized civil society. For further 
discussion on the essential elements of a civil society, see Chapter 2 above. 
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requirement for internal democratic governance structure of CSOs; and that prohibits 
private inurement and self-dealing also has the potential to build trust on CSOs that 
would have impact on the CSOs demand thus increasing the number of people to join 
and to support CSOs. For example, donors want to know that their contributions are 
being used properly and only for the intended purpose. The legal provision that 
regulates CSOs fundraising activity and sanctions financial transparency could 
increase donors’ confidence in the organisation and the sector in general.  
 
The degree that a legal framework is enabling thus depends on the degree that it 
reduces both the demand side and supply-side transaction costs with a necessary 
balance. On the other hand, the legal frameworks that increase the demand and supply 
side transaction costs will negatively affect or will have a disenabling factor.  Hence 
an enabling legal framework for the regulation of CSOs should consider the 
‘transaction cost’ which is associated with the cost of the interaction necessary for the 
formation, operation, resource mobilization and accountability of CSOs. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the Ethiopian laws governing CSOs against 
these sets of enabling legal conditions.  The degree to which a law is enabling thus 
depends on whether or not it guarantees freedom of association; facilitates the 
formation and acquisition of legal personality; allows resource mobilization from 
diverse sources; and ensures accountability of CSOs. The premises of enabling legal 
conditions for CSOs role in democratization thus builds upon the argument that 
constitutional guarantee to the freedom of association and compliance to such 
constitutional right that allows CSOs formation and autonomous engagement in any 
lawful purpose relevant for a democratic society including advocacy, will stimulate 
community empowerment and activism of their associations, which in turn promotes 
the democratization process.   
 
Against these sets of conditions that serve as a parameter of enabling law, the 
forthcoming chapters will assess the Ethiopian legal framework. The primary focus of 
this thesis is thus to make a legal analysis to determine how enabling or disabling the 
existing legal framework of Ethiopia is and how it would potentially affect the role of 
CSOs in democratization. The Charities and Societies Proclamation that governs the 
sector will be the main focus of the assessment. The Constitution and other laws 
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governing aspects of enabling legal conditions for CSOs will also be discussed as 
found relevant. Notwithstanding the source of the law, the legal assessment focuses on 
the areas of legislation which have specific implications for CSOs engagement in the 
democratization process.  
 
The forthcoming four chapters of the thesis will thus discuss the aspects of CSOs that 
are mainly influenced by the law under the ‘four pillars.’ The first pillar ‘the legal 
existence of CSOs’ is discussed in chapter five. It argues that in order to enable CSOs 
existence, the law must provide undemanding requirements for the formation, the 
acquisition of legal personality and the registration of CSOs. A law that protects CSOs 
from unwarranted decisions of dissolution also ensures their existence for perpetuity 
or until they fully attain the objectives they are established for. Such legal conditions 
will help CSOs boost in volume. The increase in number of CSOs means the growth 
of civic associationalism that assists the democratization process through 
representation of diverse interests and capacity enhancement of the community in 
public engagement and decisions making. 
 
The second pillar ‘The Purposes of CSOs’ is discussed at length in Chapter six. It 
argues that in order to enable CSOs engagement, the law must permit the rights of 
CSOs to freely choose their areas of engagement (recreational, developmental, 
political or otherwise); and to pursue the same free of any undue interference or 
pressure. From the perspectives of democracy promotion of an enabling law must 
therefore ensure CSOs, the right to promote human rights and democracy and facilitate 
adequate and equitable access, participation and influence of CSOs in the public 
sphere.’24 
 
Chapter seven deals with the third pillar ‘The Resource mobilization of CSOs’. Its main 
focus of argument is, in order to enable CSOs financial sustainability the law must 
allow resource mobilization from diverse legal local and foreign sources.  Thus, what 
is to be enabled by the law is, in Fowler’s language, the expression of CSOs25. By 
expression he meant the resources that enable CSOs to express and engage themselves. 
                                                          
24 Alan Fowler, ‘An Enabling Environment for Civil Society: What Does it Mean and How Does Law 
Fit In?’ (2003) Center for Civil Society Research Report 7 (7). 
25 Ibid 
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Since establishing CSOs without the necessary financial means to pursue their purpose 
would be in vain, an enabling law must recognize CSOs right to mobilize resource and 
allow them to solicit, to receive and to utilize fund from diverse sources. The law must 
therefore allow CSOs to solicit fund from diverse lawful sources to boost their human 
resources and programme implementation capability. This is expected to increase their 
efficiency in gathering and disseminating information, mobilizing the community, 
lobbying advocacy as well as implementing different other projects that contribute to 
the democratization process.   
 
The fourth pillar ‘the Accountability of CSOs’ is discussed in chapter eight. This 
chapter argues that an enabling law also needs to balance the rights of CSOs with their 
transparency and accountability. It asserts that, a legal and regulatory framework that 
ensures the legality, accountability and plurality of CSOs will enhance the 
democratization role of CSOs by screening corrupt CSOs that serve individual interest; 
or ‘uncivil’ societies that serve as a de-democratization force. On the other hand, an 
enabling law also needs to ensure that the accountability measures will not be 
unwarrantedly demanding to the level of threatening CSOs existence and autonomy.  
It further argues that legal conditions must ensure that sanctions for non-compliance 
are impartial, proportional and justifiable.  
 
The autonomy of CSOs which is specifically crucial for those CSOs engaged in the 
democratization process will also be discussed as a crosscutting issue. Although the 
rights of CSOs existence, expression and engagement embrace CSOs autonomy, it is 
nonetheless important to highlight that an enabling law must also ensure the financial 
and operational autonomy of CSOs, if they have to play a meaningful role in the 
democratization process. Once formed, the autonomy of CSOs is the utmost important 
attribute of CSOs in their role for democratization as it will enable them to hold the 
government accountable; and to pressurize both the ruling and opposition parties to act 
according to the explicit canons of the constitution and thereby ensure respect of the 
rule of the game in a democracy. An enabling law that ensures the autonomy of CSOs 
by prohibiting an undue state interference that threatens CSOs existence and operation 
will empower CSOs and facilitate their role in democratization. Enabling law must 
therefore ensure that the power of the regulating Agency should be limited to non-
intrusive, transparent and legitimate mandate. 
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Each chapter begins with a discussion of enabling legal conditions necessary for the 
democratization role of CSOs based on jurisprudential and constitutional justifications, 
international good practices and related case laws26 for the relevant topic or pillar under 
discussion. The enabling legal conditions stated will be followed by an overview of 
the Ethiopian legislation addressing that specific pillar. Hence, it identifies the 
enabling conditions as well as the shortcomings, loopholes, ambiguities and 
inconsistencies of the existing legal framework governing CSOs in Ethiopia which 
may increase the transaction cost of forming and sustaining CSOs and which may 
undermine the democratization role of CSOs. 
 
However as mentioned above the proposed enabling legal conditions demand the 
existence of efficient and independent courts to interpret laws, to enforce the enabling 
conditions, and review the actions and the decisions of the executive organs. Although 
the recommendations are framed in a general manner taking a simple assumption that 
such efficient and independent courts and law enforcing institutions will be in place, it 
may be worth to briefly mention some of the legal and practical challenges of the 
Ethiopian judiciary system in its current state. 
 
The first legal condition that challenges the efficiency of the courts is their lack of 
mandate to interpret the supreme law of the country, the constitution. Although the 
1995 FDRE constitution provides broad human rights protection in consistent with 
international human rights laws and principles and entrusted the courts with the 
mandate to enforce such fundamental rights, its application is limited as the 
constitutional interpretation is entrusted to the House of Federation (HOF)27 at the 
exclusion of the judiciary. The House of Federation is an organ of parliament that is 
composed of each ethnic group represented by one member, with an additional 
representative per one million of its population.28  
                                                          
26 Although Ethiopia does not have a case law system, relevant decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights made in relation to the freedom of Association will be discussed as Article 11 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights is in effect similar to Article 22 of the ICCPR which Ethiopia 
has ratified and given an equivalent hierarchical status as the supreme law of the country, the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution.  
27 FDRE Constitution, Article 62(1) 
28 FDRE Constitution, Article 61(1)(2) 
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Because the courts are constitutionally independent, the judiciary could have been the 
best option for the interpretation of the constitution. However, the House of Federation 
that is given a constitutional mandate to interpret the constitution failed to interpret and 
to clarify many of the constitutional principles and failed to develop a coherent body 
of precedents on constitutional interpretation. 29  As the mandate to interpret the 
constitution is given to the HOF, an institution that is political in nature and inefficient 
in practice, it has limited the application of constitutional law and has affected the 
protection and the enforceability of the fundamental constitutional rights.30 It has also 
weakened the judiciary denying it the power to review the constitutionality of 
legislations, administrative decisions and actions.   
The second practical challenge is related to the reluctance of the courts in applying 
ratified international treaties that are constitutionally recognized. 31  Although the 
constitution provides the incorporation and the applicability of ratified international 
treaties into the domestic law of the country, however, in practice, uncertainty of the 
courts as to their jurisdiction in applying those treaties, unfamiliarity with the 
provisions, and difficulty in accessing the ratified treaties have also made the 
constitutional recognition for such treaties inapplicable. Even though the court of 
cassation in its breakthrough precedent-setting decision recently invoked the Child 
Rights Convention, yet lower courts are still reluctant to apply international human 
rights instruments in their decisions. 
The lack of independence and efficiency of the judiciary is also another practical 
challenge.32  The FDRE constitution recognizes and protects the separation of powers, 
and the independence of the judiciary33. In practice however the understanding of and 
respect for judicial independence is lacking. The judicial system is also weakened due 
to noncompliance to the constitutional provision that guarantees the judicial tenure, as 
well as poor compensation and working conditions that do not attract qualified and 
                                                          
29 Chi Mgbako and others, ‘Silencing the Ethiopian Courts: Non Judicial Constitutional Review And 
Its Impact on Human Rights’(2008)Fordham International Law Journal 32(1) 259-297 
30 Ibid, at 273 
31 Canadian International Development Agency(CIDA), ‘Independence, Transparency and 
accountability in the Judiciary of Ethiopia’(2008)179-194 
32 Ibid, 174-176 
33 FDRE Constitution, Article 78 and 79 
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experienced judges.  The poor public perception of the courts in terms of their 
independence, impartiality and accountability has also weakened the judiciary system. 
Such challenges certainly call for basic judicial and legal reforms in order to give the 
judiciary a power to interpret the constitution, to exercise judicial review, to enjoy 
independence and to undergo organizational and structural adjustment for efficiency 
and accountability. Nonetheless, the enabling legal conditions that will be proposed 
under the following chapters take the presumption that the courts are or will become 
independent; efficient; and able to interpret laws, to enforce such enabling legal 
conditions and to review legislations and the actions and decision of the executive. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE LEGAL EXISTENCE OF CSOs 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The first pillar of enabling legal conditions for CSOs that we are going to discuss under 
this chapter is related to CSOs legal existence. The coming into existence of CSOs is 
prima facie for CSOs contributions for democratization or otherwise. Notwithstanding 
the type or the purpose of CSOs, their formation is therefore the very first condition 
that needs to be facilitated by the law. Once formed, their perpetual existence also 
needs to be guaranteed in order to protect them from an involuntary and unwarranted 
dissolution. Although other sociocultural factors may affect the existence of CSOs, the 
law may also either positively or negatively influence the legal existence of CSOs by 
stipulating conditions for their formation, acquisition of legal personality and 
dissolution. The discussion on the legal existence of CSOs will therefore focus on these 
three important points.   This chapter examines the features of an enabling law that 
recognizes, ensures and protects the legal existence of CSOs. Thus it discusses ideally 
enabling legal conditions necessary for the formation of CSOs; the acquisition of legal 
personality; registration; and protection from unwarranted dissolution.  It also assesses 
the prevailing rules and procedures governing the legal existence of CSOs in Ethiopia 
in light of the ideal enabling conditions, and their possible impact on CSOs role to 
democracy promotion. 
 
5.2. The Rationale for an Enabling Law for the Legal Existence of CSOs 
A number of rationales can be mentioned why the law should create an enabling 
condition for CSOs formation and sustainability. Firstly, owing to their non-profit 
orientation and efficiency, CSOs can best provide public goods and quasi-private 
goods.1 Public goods by their very nature are ‘non-rivalous’2 and ‘non-excludable.’3 
                                                          
1Henry Hansman,‘The Role of Non Profit Enterprise’ (1980)Yale Law Journal 89,835-901, 863-866;  
Lester Salmon, ‘Of Market Failure, Voluntary Failure, and Third-Party Government: Toward a Theory 
of Government- Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State’(1987) Nonprofit and Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly16(20)39-41; For a general discussion on CSOs provision of public goods and quasi 
private goods, See Jonathan Garton, The Regulation of organized Civil Society (Hart Publishing 2009) 
2 Non-rivalous goods and services are those the consumption of which by one individual does not reduce 
availability to others and have linear cost of production irrespective of quantity 
3 Non-excludable goods and services are those, once availed that no one can be effectively excluded 
from using them. For further detail on the explanation of public goods, See Henry Hansman, above n1   
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Due to these features of public goods individual consumers tend to ‘free ride’,  taking 
benefits without bearing cost, which makes public goods unprofitable thus uninviting 
to the market which is profit driven.4 Nor is the state more efficient in delivery of such 
public goods, notwithstanding its authority to control free riders through taxation 
system, as it is politically driven.5 Even in an established democracy, a state will only 
produce those public goods or services that can command the majority support leaving 
minority groups unsatisfied and urging the latter to turn to CSOs that are insulated 
from political motivations. 6  
 
Furthermore CSOs can provide public goods more efficiently, economically and 
sustainably because of their proximity to the community, voluntarism character and 
smaller size.7 The proximity of CSOs to the community conferring them an awareness 
of the actual needs to take informed actions, render them more efficient than 
government, which is often distant. The size of CSOs also offer them an advantage 
over government in specializing on provision of specific public goods and services 
with better quality;8 breaking off lengthy bureaucratic process and transaction costs.9 
Government on the other hand has to seek endorsement of the electorate for its plan, 
notify officeholders of the decisions, enact a law, and go through other lengthy and 
pricey bureaucratic procedures. Volunteerism and competition among CSOs also play 
a role in the efficiency and economy of provision of public goods. The provision of 
public goods by CSOs is also more sustainable as they would be able to plan long term 
projects not affected by the national or regional elections.10  
 
                                                          
4 Burton Weisbrod, ‘Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Sector in a Three-Sector Economy’ (1986) in S 
Rose-Ackerman (ed),The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions: studies in Structure and Policy ( Oxford 
University Press 1986)26; for detail explanation on the four theories of Market failure, contract failure, 
government failure and voluntary failure, See Jonathan Garton, The Regulation of organized Civil 
Society (Hart Publishing 2009) 49-68. 
5 Lester Salmon, ‘Of Market Failure, Voluntary Failure, and Third-Party Government: Toward a Theory 
of Government- Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State’(1987)Nonprofit and Voluntary 
Sector Quarterly16(20)49   
6Ibid, 39 
7Ibid, 39-41; see also Jonathan Garton, The Regulation of organized Civil Society (Hart Publishing 2009) 
49 
8 Jonathan Garton,‘The future of Civil Society organizations: towards a theory of regulation for 
organized civil society’ in Myles McGregor-Lowndes and Kerry O’Halloran (edn) Modernizing Charity 
Law 212-14 
9 Jonathan Garton, above n7 at 57  
 
10 Lester Salmon, above n 5 at 39-41; see also Jonathan Garton, above n 8 at 213 
71 
 
Moreover the state and the market simply cannot and do not anticipate and provide all 
of the public goods and services that are desired by the citizenry. The extreme 
heterogeneity of citizens’ interests and desires in sport, music, art, politics etc. simply 
render the government incapable to recognize them all and to satisfy those needs in a 
responsive, adequate, and evenhanded manner. Those interests may not be satisfied at 
all if there are no economic incentives that attract the market. Enabling legal 
environment for CSOs can thus be justified as CSOs are best placed in delivery of 
public goods11  and the development of the sector is beneficial to the public at large.  
 
Moreover, the law also needs to create an enabling condition for CSOs owing to their 
contribution to the democratization of a nation. By recognizing, enforcing and 
protecting CSOs existence, the law may possibly bring a direct or an indirect bearing 
in the democratization role of CSOs mainly for the following reasons. Firstly, enabling 
legal conditions for the formation of CSOs could encourage the formation of 
associations and thus boost the number of CSOs that in turn build builds the social 
capital. The growth of the social capital in turn assists the democratization process 
through community capacity enhancement in public engagement and decisions making 
process. Secondly, with the flourishing of diverse (in size, membership, purpose, forms 
of incorporation) types of CSOs, the articulation and the representation of different 
interests increases thus contributing to the democratization process by rectifying the at  
drawbacks of democracy through the principle of majority rule, minority protection.  
Thirdly, an enabling law that protects CSOs from unwarranted involuntary dissolution 
and ensures their sustainability helps CSOs to grow strong, autonomous and vibrant, 
which are essential attributes for their contribution in the democratization process 
through advocacy, lobbying, and watchdog.  
 
Thus if CSOs should contribute to the democratization process, the law should first, 
recognize the right to form various types of CSOs pursuing a lawful purpose, 
(advocacy, developmental, recreational etc.) It would be trite to add that if CSOs 
should contribute to the democratization process, the law needs to ensure that the 
process of formation and registration as well as the protection against dissolution 
should not discriminate against human rights and advocacy CSOs whose main 
                                                          
11Henry Hansman, above n 1 at 848; Jonathan Garton, above n 7;  Lester Salmon, above n 5                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
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objective of formation is pursuing democracy promotion. Yet it is still important to 
underscore the non-discrimination rule against advocacy CSOs since as it is noted by 
the ICNL that ‘particular legal and non-legal barriers against the formation and the 
sustainability of advocacy CSOs has come to be the trend in a number of countries in 
Africa and elsewhere.’12  
 
Second, the law should also enforce the right to form various types of CSOs by laying 
down clear, uncomplicated and undemanding process for their formation and 
acquisition of legal personality. The law also needs to grant CSOs the freedom to be 
incorporated either informally or formally. Where registration at the relevant 
government office is required for the attainment of legal personality, as in the case of 
Ethiopia, it is important that the registration process is easy, uncomplicated and not at 
the discretion of the government. Thirdly, the law should also protect the perpetual 
existence of formed CSOs from unwarranted involuntary dissolution by providing 
specific legal grounds for dissolution that are only necessary for a better cause. 
Fourthly, it also ought to provide them with the right to judicial appeal in the event of 
administrative grievance on any matter that can affect their existence. The following 
sections of the chapter will provide a closer look at such enabling legal conditions for 
CSOs formation, acquisition of legal personality and sustainable existence. 
 
5.3. Enabling Legal Conditions for the Formation of CSOs  
Some of the enabling legal conditions for the formation of CSOs are thus the 
constitutional guarantee for freedom of association; the right to choose the form of 
incorporation including informal existence; undemanding, clear and non –
discriminatory requirements of formation of CSOs and their coalition. 
 
Constitutional Guarantee for the freedom of association 
The first basic issue relating to the legal treatment of civil society organisations in the 
country involves not the specific laws governing CSOs but the broader legal context 
                                                          
12International Center for Non-Profit-Law (ICNL) and World Movement for Democracy,  Defending 
Civil Society (ICNL 2008); for detail discussion on the global trend of governments limiting CSOs 
formation, operational activity and financial resource, See generally the ‘The Legal and Regulatory 
Framework for Civil Society: Global trend in 2012-13’ Global Trend in NGO Law, ICNL < 
http://www.icnl.org/research/trends/Global%20Trends%20in%20NGO%20Law%20Final%20October
%2016.pdf > accessed 10  February 2015. 
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within which the legal treatment of CSOs is rooted. The law may put the underlying 
enabling condition for CSOs by providing a constitutional guarantee to the freedom of 
association. With the constitutional guarantee for the freedom of association, due 
process of the law requires that any other subordinate laws, policies or government 
decisions will necessarily comply with the freedom to associate.  
 
Freedom of association in principle is the right to form new association and/or to join 
existing associations with the purpose of pursuing a particular rights and interests.13 
Such freedom to associate ensures individuals to interact and organize among 
themselves; and to collectively express, promote, pursue and defend common interests.  
The essence of freedom of association indeed lies in the fact of accession which 
characteristically enable the association achieve goals which an individual would not 
be able to attain single-handedly, or at least not effectively; as associations offer 
solidarity, safety and identity. More and more the individual, in order to realize his 
own capacities or to stand up to the institutionalized forces that surround him, has 
found it imperative to join with others of like mind in pursuit of common objectives.14 
This is particularly true for CSOs that promote democracy because at least in pluralist 
model of democracy interest groups play an essential role by filling gaps left by 
political parties and thus availing adequate representation for the full range of diverse 
interests that influence the public governance.15  
 
Freedom of association guarantees ‘everyone’ (natural or legal) to form and join 
association. 16  Underscoring the universality of the freedom of association, the 
international and regional treatises including the ICCPR, and International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination specifically stipulate 
provisos that ensure freedom of association to everyone without distinction of any kind 
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or 
social origin, property, birth or other status.17 Such safeguards oblige governments to 
                                                          
13 ICCPR, Article 22; ECHR, Article 11 
14 Thomas Emerson, ‘"Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression”’ (1964) Faculty 
Scholarship Series. Paper 2797, 1 <http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/2797. Accessed 14 
April 2015 
15 Manfred Nowak, , ‘U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: ICCPR Commentary’(2005) Engle, 
385 
16 ICCPR, Article 22(1); ECHR, Article 11.  
17 The right to freedom of association is a fundamental human right guaranteed by many of the major 
international and regional legal instruments without any discrimination. See, The Convention on the 
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recognize and to take all appropriate measures as to enable ‘everyone’ to enjoy their 
freedom of association.  Thus, firstly, an enabling law as a matter of principle should 
guarantee the enjoyment of freedom of association to all individuals without 
distinction of any kind. 18 
 
Where the rights of individuals to form and to join associations are explicitly 
guaranteed in the supreme law of a nation, it obliges governments to recognize and to 
take all the appropriate measures as to enable the formation of CSOs. Such measure 
will reduce the ‘transaction cost’19 of incorporating CSOs  as it offers organisations 
and their members a constitutional shield against any form of interference except on 
certain compelling legally prescribed grounds, necessary in a democratic society to 
protect the rights and safety of the state and the public.  
 
Thus, where the freedom of association for a lawful purpose is constitutionally 
guaranteed and enforced, it likely prompts persons who are interested to promote a 
particular private or public purpose, including the promotion of human rights and 
democracy, to come forward and form CSOs. Thus the legal recognition and protection 
for the freedom to associate could allow a much broader range of associations to 
flourish. On the other hand, where individuals’ right to form associations are not 
guaranteed or are highly restricted, it is highly likely that people will be discouraged 
to form CSOs. The central issue at the heart of an enabling law is therefore the 
constitutional recognition of the freedom of association, not as a privilege that the 
government can give or take away at it pleases, but as a fundamental right. 
 
                                                          
Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (1989), Article 7; Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (1990), Article 15; UN Declaration on the Rights and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups 
and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (Declarations on Human Rights Defenders), (1998) Article 5; The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN, 1966), Article 15; ICCPR, Article 22(1); ECHR, Article 11  
18 The major international legal instruments protects guarantees freedom of associations to different 
sections of the society. See, The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (ILO Convention No. 169) 
(1989), Article 6;  The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families (UN, 1990), Articles 26, 36 and 40; The Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (UN, 1995), - Articles 3, 7, 8, 15, 17 and 18; The Convention on the 
Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level (CoE, 1992), Articles 3 and 4; The Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN, 2006), Article 29; The Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees (UN, 1950), Article 15; The Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (UN, 
1960), Article 15 
19 For a detail discussion on the transaction cost, see Chapter 4 above. 
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The right to choose the form of incorporation  
The most important aspect of the right to freedom of association is the ability to create 
a legal entity in order to act collectively in a field of mutual interest, since ‘without the 
right to form, the freedom of association would have no practical meaning.’20 Thus, at 
the most basic level a law must allow the formation and incorporation of diverse types 
of CSOs. Generally, the public benefit CSOs that are outward looking, and 
membership CSOs that are more representative could have a greater potential to 
influence the democratization process. Yet the flourishing of different types of CSOs 
irrespective of their membership size or benefit orientation could help for the 
democratization process by representing different interests and enhancing civic virtues 
and civic skills.  
 
An enabling law therefore allows CSOs to be incorporated either as formal or informal; 
membership or non-membership; public benefit or private benefit organisation; 
network organisation etc. Depending on their purposes of formation and resource 
capability, they can also be constituted either at the grassroots, district, local, national, 
regional or international level.  
 
Formation of CSO coalitions 
Besides the rights of individuals to form and to join CSOs, an enabling law also permits 
and facilitates the formation of a coalition or network of CSOs who wish to join hands 
to pursue or defend common objectives. The formation of coalitions or networks will 
help CSOs to share resources and experiences and join more hands for the 
accomplishment of a common goal. In addition to the collaboration and horizontal 
learning among themselves, the formation of coalitions of CSOs is also particularly 
important for the democratization process since the joining of hands of different 
organisations can help them to become stronger, gain more voice and create a strong 
pressure group. Thus the law can create enabling legal conditions for the formation of 
CSOs by allowing diverse forms of incorporation including the formation of coalition 
or network of CSOs. 
 
Undemanding, Clear and Non –discriminatory formation requirements 
                                                          
20 Sidiropoulos and Others V. Greece 10 July 1998, para 40. 
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In addition to allowing different forms of incorporation, the law may also facilitate the 
formation of CSOs by putting undemanding and non-discriminatory minimum 
requirements. The legal prerequisites for establishing a CSO should be limited to 
minimum conditions that are necessary for the legitimate exercising of the fundamental 
freedom of association. Thus for instance the law should not be onerous on the number 
of persons required to form CSOs as it would discourage the formation of CSOs. From 
the perspective of individuals’ rights to form associations, it can be argued that at least 
theoretically the minimum number of persons to form associations is two. Neither 
should it be cumbersome on the value of material resources required to establish 
endowments and trusts as it would otherwise deter the formation of CSOs. 
Furthermore, an enabling law demands that states must refrain from restricting 
formation of association (freedoms of association) through vague, imprecise and 
overly broad regulatory language.21   
 
An enabling law does not either discriminate on who can form CSOs and on the 
conditions of formation. The freedom of association entails that all persons should be 
entitled to form and to join CSOs without any discrimination whatsoever as to sex, 
political or other opinion, ethnic or social origin, language, religion etc.22 However, a 
case that is often in contest is that of foreigners, particularly in pursuing purposes such 
as democratization. Although the engagement of foreigners in democratization can be 
seen as interventionist in terms of the elements of internal sovereignty, nonetheless 
coalitions formed among foreign and domestic CSOs could be particularly relevant for 
democratization for two reasons. First, in terms of funding advocacy groups within 
countries where local funding is deficient, foreign CSOs might strengthen the local 
                                                          
21 The International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law and World Movement for Democracy Secretariat at 
the National Endowment for Democracy, Defending Civil Society: A Report of the World Movement for 
Democracy (World Movement for Democracy and ICNL 2008) 4. 
22 International standards also indicate that the freedom of association is given for ‘every person’ 
notwithstanding any discrimination whatsoever. Underscoring the universality of the freedom of 
association, the international and regional treatises including the ICCPR and International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination specifically stipulate provisos that ensure 
freedom of association to everyone without distinction of any kind as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, birth or other status. See 
also, The Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (1989), Article 
7; Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990), Article 15; UN Declaration on the Rights and 
Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally 
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Declarations on Human Rights Defenders), 
(1998) Article 5; The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN, 1966), 
Article 15; ICCPR, Article 22 (1); ECHR, Article 11.  
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resource pool. Secondly, because internal advocates of democratization are so 
vulnerable, mutually beneficial networks of local and foreign CSOs would allow actors 
and institutions across borders to cooperate directly and work collaboratively. 23 
Moreover the rights of individuals to form associations with a person of their own 
choice should be extended to include foreigners as long as the purpose their association 
is lawful and remain within the legal bounds.  
 
5.4. Formation of CSOs under the Ethiopian Legal System 
Under the Ethiopian legal system, the major laws governing the formation of CSOs are 
found in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution and the 
Charities and Societies Proclamation (the CSP) that specifically governs charities and 
societies. Article 31 of the FDRE constitution provides the legal recognition for the 
freedom of association. The constitutional guarantee for the freedom of association 
primarily provides an enabling legal condition for the formation of CSOs.  However, 
as we shall see below, highly demanding requirements of formation of CSOs at 
national level, and the limitations imposed on forming coalitions of CSOs stipulated 
under the CSP, however, makes the formation of CSOs and their coalition rather 
challenging. 
 
Constitutional Guarantee for freedom of association 
The Ethiopian legal framework has taken the fundamental step towards an enabling 
environment that creates a legal space for the existence of CSOs by providing a 
constitutional guarantee for the freedom of association that upholds the right to form 
and to join CSO for any lawful purpose.  
 
Article 31 of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution reads: 
‘Every person has the right to freedom of association for any cause or purpose. 
Organisations formed, in violation of appropriate laws, or to illegally subvert 
the constitutional order, or which promote such activities are prohibited’  
 
                                                          
23 Timothy Sisk, ‘Global Networks for Democracy Promotion’ UN Vision Project on Global Public 
Policy Networks <http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/Sisk_Local_Governance.pdf> accessed 12 April 
2015. 
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The constitution provides enabling legal conditions for the formation and the 
flourishing of CSOs by (i) recognizing the universality of the freedom to associate 
allowing the formation of diverse types of CSOs pursuing any lawful purpose and (ii) 
barring uncivil and illegal organisations that could discredit the sector from the public 
sphere.   
 
Firstly, by recognizing the ‘universality’ of the freedom to associate, the constitution 
guarantees the right to form and to join CSOs for every person. One may plausibly 
argue that the term ‘every person’24 signifies that the FDRE constitution guarantees 
freedom of association without distinction of any kind as to sex, language, religion, 
ethnicity, nationality, property or other status. One may also argue that the term 
‘person’ implies that both natural and juridical persons are envisaged as having the 
right to associate and thereby to form CSOs and networks or coalitions of CSOs. The 
constitution also lays the general enabling legal basis for CSOs by guaranteeing the 
freedom to associate for any lawful cause or purpose.25 This ensures the rights of 
persons to form CSOs as long as their cause or purpose is within the legal bounds of 
the country. Such universal recognition of freedom of association for any cause is not 
only in parallel with the principle of democracy that enshrines individuals’ freedom, 
but also promotes the democratization process as it also boosts the formation of CSOs 
promoting different interests that enriches social and political capital.  
 
Secondly, the constitution creates an enabling condition by reducing the demand side 
transaction cost by putting a ban against the operation of CSOs formed in violation of 
‘appropriate laws’. Illegal CSO may wreck the perception and relation of CSOs with 
the community and the government. Moreover CSOs with such traits are unfit for 
democratization as they produce ‘negative social capital’ and have a tendency of 
destabilizing the democratization effort.26 Thus, by ruling out ‘illegal’ or ‘uncivil’ 
CSOs formed for illegal purposes that have the potential of discrediting the sector as a 
whole, the constitution  helps to reduce the demand side transaction cost which the 
beneficiaries, donors and other stakeholders would have otherwise incurred in the 
                                                          
24 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution, Article 31. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Monga Célestin, ‘Uncivil Societies: A Theory of Socio-political Change’ (2009) Policy Research 
Working Paper 4942 2, The World Bank, Development Economics Policy Review Unit.  
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process of assessing and regulating CSOs. It thus helps the public to count on CSOs’ 
trustworthiness which is the key facet for their functions. This in turn enhances an 
enabling space for the operation of CSOs, and builds their relationship with other 
actors in the public sphere. 
 
 Although the constitution is said to be enabling for guaranteeing the freedom to 
associate, it nonetheless lacks clarity on its limitation clause.  As the freedom of 
association is not an absolute right, the constitution provides two grounds for limitation 
of the freedom. Thus the violations of ‘appropriate laws’ or ‘subversion of the 
constitutional order’ can be grounds to justifiably restrict the formation of CSOs or to 
dissolve existing ones.   
 
However the first constitutional limitation on the freedom of association is not very 
clear as the wording ‘appropriate law’ is not markedly defined. Neither has the Council 
of the Constitutional Inquiry, which is mandated to interpret the constitution 
interpreted the provision under consideration, to date.27 Issues such as what are the 
facets of the laws that gives it a characteristic of ‘appropriateness’ to justify restriction 
on the freedom to associate or under what grounds the ‘appropriate’ law can limit the 
right to form or to join CSOs are far from clear from a mere reading of Article 31 of 
the constitution.  
 
Although this provision in general signifies that the state may interfere in the legal 
existence of CSOs, the term –‘appropriate law’- is open to subjective interpretation. 
As the constitution does not provide the grounds and factors that the law maker shall 
consider in the enactment of the respective ‘appropriate law’,  it could give a loophole 
for legislative manipulation leaving the limitations on the freedom of association at the 
mercy of the legislator and/or even the executive.28  
 
Nonetheless it can be argued that the concept of ‘appropriate law’ can be clarified 
through interpretations that are in line with international human rights instruments that 
                                                          
27  FDRE Constitution,  Article 83 and  84 (The mandate of the Council is limited to giving 
recommendations to the House of Federation, the upper house of the bicameral Federal Parliamentary 
Assembly, which has the ultimate power to determine the case). 
28 Because appropriate law is not clearly defined, it may refer to a proclamation promulgated by the 
parliament or a regulation and directive enacted by the executive branches of the government.   
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Ethiopia has ratified such as the ICCPR.29 According to Article 9 and Article 13 of the 
FDRE Constitution, international human rights instruments ratified by Ethiopia form 
an integral part of the law of the land; and the fundamental rights and freedoms 
specified in the constitution, including freedom of association shall be interpreted in a 
manner conforming to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and other 
international instruments adopted by Ethiopia. 30  Therefore, these instruments may 
serve to indicate the qualifying factors that ‘an appropriate law’ should consider in 
imposing limitations on the freedom of association 
 
Therefore, it can be implied that a law can be considered as an appropriate law when 
it sets a limitation on the formation and operation of CSOs only when doing so is 
necessary for the protection of the public safety and security as necessary in a 
democratic society.31 This interpretation is also in line with the spirit of the constitution 
that establishes a Democratic State. 32  Hence ‘an appropriate law’ that limits the 
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association should be applicable only to the 
extent that it is necessary to promote democratic practices and culture and to enable 
the well-functioning of democratic institutions. 
 
The second limitation clause provided by the FDRE Constitution on freedom of 
association provides that organisations formed to defend ‘illegal subversion of the 
constitutional order’ or those found engaged in such activities are denied the freedom 
to associate. This limitation clause is quite similar to the limitation provided under the 
UDHR, ICCPR and other International human rights frameworks ‘to protect the 
national security, public safety public order and the protection of rights of others.’33 
This is also in line with the traditional function of state. A State has an ultimate power to 
deal with the problems of survival and security and defend the constitutional order in order 
to maintain the established constitutional order from any sort of subversive act which 
threatens or endangers it.  
                                                          
29 Ethiopia ratified the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1993 and is also 
a party to the African Charter of Human and People’s Right (ACHPR) signed in 1981. 
30 FDRE Constitution, Article 9 (4) and 13 (2).  
31 ICCPR, Article 22 (2) 
32 FDRE Constitution, Article 1. 
33 ICCPR, Article 22(2); ECHR, Article 11(2) 
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State of emergency is also a conventional standard in limitation of rights. Thus the 
fundamental rights of CSOs may also be suspended in case of a state of emergency.34 
Furthermore, Article 9 (2) of the constitution states the supremacy of the constitution 
as the prevailing law of the land, and specifies that political or any other association 
and their officials have the duty to ensure observance of the Constitution and to obey. 
Hence when CSOs are formed in contravention of the constitutional order, for instance 
to engage in a terrorist act, the state may rightfully restrain or dissolve CSOs.  
 
However, an enabling legal environment demands that exceptions to the fundamental 
freedoms should be construed narrowly and judiciously not to infringe upon the 
fundamental rights of individuals to form CSOs and to express themselves. Thus while 
an intent or attempt to subvert the constitutional order will justify the state to curtail 
freedom of association, for a greater good of protecting the public, the enforcement of 
this exceptional proviso will however be justified only when there is a legitimate 
showing of an imminent and serious threat that warrants the need to protect 
constitutional order.  
 
In sum, the FDRE constitution has laid the general enabling legal framework for the 
formation of CSOs by recognizing the freedom of association, although in a qualified 
manner. However since the country endorses international human rights treaties such 
as the ICCPR as constituting part of the law of the country and as a guiding principle 
to interpret the fundamental rights, if the qualifying conditions that could possibly 
serve as grounds to limit the freedom of association are applied consistently with such 
principles the right to form and to join CSOs would be facilitated. Thus along the lines 
of the protections that the ICCPR offers for the freedom of association, restriction 
against the formation of CSOs will be justified only when it is necessary to protect the 
constitutional order  as is justifiable in a democratic society.  
 
While the Ethiopian legal framework provides a constitutional guarantee to form and 
to join CSOs, below we shall examine how the Charities and Societies Proclamation 
                                                          
34 FDRE Constitution, Article 93. 
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(CSP) translates the right to form and to join CSOs in light of the constitutional right 
of freedom of association and the enabling legal framework criteria discussed above.   
 
Formation and Forms of Incorporation 
The CSP envisages the incorporation of CSOs either as charity, society or charitable 
society. Apart from religious organisations, traditional grassroots self-help 
organisations such as Edirs; Credit association such as Ekub; and societies such as 
trade unions, which are governed by distinct laws, all CSOs that are governed by the 
CSP shall be constituted either as charity or society.35 Those that are inward looking 
i.e. benefiting only members are established as Societies and those that are outward 
looking i.e. benefiting the public at large are established as Charities.  Thus all forms 
of CSOs such as NGOs, professional associations, research institutions, think-tanks, 
social (non-diaconal) wings of religious institutions, alumni, clubs and leagues of 
different interests etc., should be formed either in the form of charities or societies.   
 
According to the CSP, a Charity is an institution, which is established exclusively for 
charitable purposes and gives benefit to the public.36 Article 14(2) of the CSP lists out 
charitable purposes and include: (i) the prevention or alleviation or relief of poverty or 
disaster; (ii) the advancement of the economy an social development and 
environmental protection or improvement;(iii) The advancement of animal 
welfare;(iv)The advancement of education;(v) the advancement of health or the saving 
of lives;(vi) the advancement of amateur sport and the welfare of the youth;(vii) the 
relief of those in need by reason of age, disability, financial hardship or other 
disadvantages; (viii) the advancement of capacity building on the basis of the country’s 
long term development directions; (ix) the advancement of human and democratic 
rights; (x) the promotion of equality of nations, nationalities and peoples and that of 
gender and religion; (xi) the promotion of the rights of the disabled and children’s 
right; (xii) the promotion of conflict resolution or reconciliation; (xiii) the promotion 
of the efficiency of the justice and law enforcement services, and (xiv) any other 
purposes as may be prescribed by the directives of the Agency. 
 
                                                          
35 Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP) Ethiopia, Article 3 (2) (a). 
36 CSP, Article 14 (2). 
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A charity may thus be incorporated in different forms as charitable endowment, 
charitable trust, charitable institution or charitable society to be engaged in any one of 
the abovementioned charitable purposes.37The CSP recognizes that charities can be 
constituted either as universitas personarum, as membership organisations or 
association of persons; or as uniersitas rerum by which a specific property will be 
donated and administered by trustees or boards to promote a specific charitable 
purpose. Charities can be formed by virtue of which specific property is constituted 
solely for a charitable purpose by donation, or will or other instrument constituting the 
charitable property either perpetually and irrevocably as forming Charitable 
Endowment or only for a specific period forming a Charitable Trust.38  
 
Society, on the other hand, is defined as association of persons organized on non-profit 
making and voluntary basis for the promotion of the rights and interests of its members 
and other similar lawful purposes.39 Structurally the CSP envisages societies to be 
membership organisations mandatorily constituting the General Assembly, officers 
and an auditor. 40  As these are membership organisations promoting the legally 
prescribed charitable purposes and any other similar lawful purposes, the law focuses 
on the internal structure and the management of such types of CSOs in order to ensure 
the legality and transparency of such organisations. 
 
However CSOs may also be formed having a structure of a society but also having an 
outward looking charitable purpose of serving the public at large. Such types of CSOs 
are referred to as charitable societies. 41  This form of incorporation allows the 
formation of closed membership based organisations but having an outward looking 
objective of benefiting the public at large. Although there are no specific provisions in 
the law that governs charitable societies, Article 47 (1) and (2) state that all appropriate 
provisions of the CSP concerning the structure and working of societies as well as 
those applicable to charities shall apply to charitable societies.  
 
                                                          
37 CSP, Article 15 (1). 
38 CSP, Article 16 and 30. 
39 CSP, Article 55 (1). 
40 CSP, Article 58. 
41 CSP, Article 46 (1). 
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Thus in general the CSP recognizes the rights of persons to form or to join CSOs 
incorporated as charity, society or charitable society. While the incorporation of CSOs 
can assume these three different forms, the CSP further divides Charities and Societies 
on the basis of their source of income, as “Ethiopian Charities or Societies”, “Ethiopian 
Resident Charities or Societies” and “Foreign Charities.” According to Article 2 of the 
CSP 
 
“Ethiopian Charities" or “Ethiopian Societies" shall mean those Charities or 
Societies that are formed under the laws of Ethiopia, all of whose members are 
Ethiopians, generate income from Ethiopia and wholly controlled by Ethiopians. 
However, they may be deemed as Ethiopian Charities or Ethiopian Societies if they 
use not more than ten percent of their funds which is received from foreign 
sources.”42 
 
“Ethiopian Residents Charities” or “Ethiopian Residents Societies” shall mean 
those Charities or Societies that are formed under the laws of Ethiopia and which 
consist of members who reside in Ethiopia and who receive more than 10% of their 
funds from foreign sources”43  
 
“Foreign Charities” shall mean those charities that are formed under the laws of 
foreign countries or which consist of members who are foreign nationals or are 
controlled by foreign nationals or receive funds from foreign sources”44. 
 
While the recognition of the different ways of incorporation is appreciable, the major 
flow of the CSP is the unprecedented classification of the Ethiopian Charities and 
Societies on the ground of their source of income.This classification has two major 
implications.45 First, whereas the legislation allows Ethiopian Charities or Societies to 
engage in any of the charitable purposes enumerated above, it nonetheless bans 
Ethiopian Resident Charities and Societies as well as Foreign Charities from 
undertaking the following charitable purposes:  the advancement of human and 
                                                          
42 CSP, Article 2(2)  
43 CSP, 2(3)  
44 CSP,  Article 2(4)  
45 For further discussion on the implications see chapter 6 below 
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democratic rights; the promotion of equality of nations, nationalities and peoples and 
that of gender and religion; the promotion of the rights of the disabled and children’s 
right;  the promotion of conflict resolution or reconciliation and  the promotion of the 
efficiency of the justice and law enforcement services.46   
 
Secondly, the CSP recognizes the right to judicial appeal only for the Ethiopian 
Charities and Societies.47 Accordingly, ‘Ethiopian Charities and societies’ which are 
not satisfied with the decision of the Agency may lodge an administrative appeal to the 
Director General of the Charities and Societies Agency, and a judicial appeal to the 
Federal high court.48 Whereas Ethiopian Resident Charities and Societies and Foreign 
Charities, can only appeal to the Board of Charities and Societies, whose decision is 
final.49   
 
Coalition of CSOs 
Despite individuals’ experience of working collectively that can be evidenced from 
traditional institutions such as Edir and Ekub, networking of organisations is a recently 
new phenomenon in Ethiopia. The inexperience and also lack of legal regime 
governing networks affected its development. The CSP, by expressly permitting the 
formation of networks or consortium of two or more charities and societies, addresses 
the long-time uncertainty of the legal status of networks.50 The Charities and Societies 
Consortium Directive that regulates the registration and operation of networks also 
provides that consortia can be established to support members to attain common 
objectives, facilitate exchange of information, ideas and experience among members 
and build their capacity as well as enhance the integrity and professional competence 
of members.51 Hence it facilitates the conditions for charities and societies to advance 
through information exchange, experience sharing and cooperated and coordinated 
engagement in addition to their individual efforts. 
 
                                                          
46 CSP, Article 14(5) 
47 CSP, Article 39 
48 CSP, Article 104(3) 
49 CSP, Article 104(2). 
50 CSP, Article 15 (3). 
51 Charities and Societies Consortium Directive, Article 5 (1) and (2). 
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Nevertheless the legislation has put a number of restrictions on the formation of 
consortiums. First, charities cannot form consortiums with societies; and secondly 
‘Ethiopian charities and societies’ who are not allowed to receive more than 10% of 
their annual income from foreign sources cannot form a consortium with an ‘Ethiopian 
resident charities and societies’ who are allowed to receive foreign funds and/or 
foreign charities. 52  The government did not provide any official reason for the 
restriction, however a closer analysis of the CSP and the purpose for which the law 
was enacted provide us a plausible explanation of the restriction. The CSP classified 
Ethiopian CSOs as ‘Ethiopian charities and societies’, ‘Resident charities and 
societies’ and foreign charities on the basis of their source of income and the purpose 
for which they are formed. So, the only plausible justification inferred from the purpose 
of the law is that the restriction on the formation of coalition between and among these 
groups of charities and societies is that Ethiopian charities and societies that are 
allowed to engage in advocacy should not join and make a coalition with Resident 
charities and societies and Foreign Charities who are prohibited from engaging in 
advocacy works in the country. The justification against this restriction on coalition is 
therefore based on the government’s argument that the promotion of human rights and 
democracy and other similar activities that the government deems ‘political’ in nature 
should be done exclusively by Ethiopian CSOs and the creation of coalition between 
different groups of CSOs will defeat the very basis for which they are classified as 
such. There seems to be no convincing justification for such restriction that threatens 
inter-organisational collaboration among the different types of CSOs. Such restriction 
would therefore seriously curtail the advocacy roles of charities and societies as such 
fragmentation would render them unable to share information and experience, to 
advocate in a coordinated manner and to serve as a pressure group by joining hands.  
 
As Hansenfeld and Gidron noted, the greater the connectedness of advocacy CSOs to 
other organisations that control important resources (e.g., members, funds, legitimacy, 
and technical expertise) the greater their chances for survival. 53 Yet in contrast to this, 
the restriction imposed on consortiums has affected advocacy CSOs significantly. 
                                                          
52 Charities and Societies Consortium Directive, Article 9 (1) (2) and (3). 
53 Yeheskel Hasenfeld and Benjamin Gidron, ‘Understanding Multi-purpose Hybrid Voluntary 
Organisations: The Contributions of Theories on Civil Society, Social Movements and Non-profit 
Organisations’ (2005) Journal of Civil Society 1 (2) 97–112, 106.  
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Following the enactment of CSP a number of networks which had all sorts of member 
organisations had to make a hard choice of determining their status and did so mainly 
according to the size of their membership.54  Hence, since many charities and societies 
decide to be re-registered as Ethiopian residents, those few advocacy CSOs had no 
choice but to withdraw membership from the consortium. In another single instance 
however the Network of Ethiopian Women Association (NEWA) a network that was 
working on women rights and economic development decided to remain an Ethiopian 
society despite loss of more than 75% of its member organisations due to the fact that 
they are either charities or Ethiopian resident societies. 55   Yet, the remaining 26 
members re-registered as Ethiopian resident established another network, Union of 
Ethiopian Women Charitable Associations (UEWCA). Other small size networks and 
coalitions of advocacy CSOs, such as Networks of Legal Aid providers and Coalition 
of human right organisation for the parallel UN Universal Periodic Review report 
writing, however ceased to be functional when some of their members became 
Ethiopian resident changing their original objective. 
 
Another restriction provided by the CSP is that consortiums are allowed only to 
coordinate the activities of their members but not allowed to implement projects by 
themselves. This, first of all is a violation of the rights of a legally established body to 
choose its own objectives; and secondly it will prevent CSOs from being organized for 
the purpose of pushing their objectives as a powerful force. Such restrictions on 
consortium membership and project implementation could therefore drastically affect 
those advocacy CSOs for which networking would have had a paramount importance 
conferring them with collective civic assertiveness to become as Fowler said ‘agents 
of change and the foundation, guardians and instruments of accountable governance.’56 
The absence of effective networks of advocacy CSOs which coordinate their 
engagements, speak for members and represent their interests would also render it 
                                                          
54 334 out of 348 member organisations of the largest consortium in Ethiopia, Consortium of Christian  
Relief and Development Association (CCRDA) are re-registered as Ethiopian resident thus few 
withdrew membership from the network (Annual reports of the CCRDA, 2010). Similarly, other 
consortiums such as Poverty Action Network Ethiopia (PANE), Basic Education Network (BEN) etc. 
became consortium of Ethiopian Resident charities and societies (Charities and Societies Agency’s 
report, 2010).  
55Kumelachew Dagne and Debebe Hailegebriel, Assessment of the Impact of the Charities and Societies 
Regulatory Framework on Civil Society Organisation in Ethiopia (Task Force on Enabling Environment 
for civil societies in Ethiopia 2012) 28. 
56 Alan Fowler, ‘An enabling environment for civil societies: What does it mean and how does law fit 
in?’ (2003) Centre for Civil Society, Research Report 7, 1. 
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difficult to make collective demands and to establish coherent voice at national level 
thereby significantly weakening their contribution to democratization.  
 
Requirements of Formation  
Although the requirements of formation set by the CSP are generally on a par with the 
enabling conditions that we saw earlier, requirement on membership for CSOs working 
at national level are cumbersome. 
 
Cumbersome Membership requirement 
There are two membership requirements that are particularly challenging for the 
formation of CSOs. One of the conditions of formation that is particularly cumbersome 
is the formation of National CSOs that work in more than one regional state. Ethiopia 
is a federal state, where the regulation of CSOs is within the jurisdiction of the regional 
states.  Charities and Societies may thus be established having a federal status for the 
two cities administered by the federal government, namely Addis Ababa and Dire 
Dawa. Charities or Societies that operate in more than one regional state or Societies 
whose members are from more than one regional state are also deemed as having a 
federal status.57 CSOs having Regional status can be formed and be operational in any 
of the Regional States. However, the formation of CSOs working at the federal or 
national level is demanding as it requires either the representation of members from at 
least five regional states or operational branch offices in five of the nine regional states 
and two federal cities 58 covering almost 50 percent of the country. 
 
The representation requirement is quite demanding as it increases the transaction cost 
of establishing a CSO that works at national level. Firstly, it violates the rights of 
individuals to associate with people of their own choice with whom they want to 
promote a lawful purpose. Secondly, it makes formation cumbersome since it is 
difficult to organize individuals from five regions. Third even if formed, efficient 
promotion of purposes will be difficult as it will be challenging to have regular 
meetings and decision makings, where technology is not advanced; and increases the 
operational cost of the organisation.  
 
                                                          
57 CSP, Article 3. 
58 CSP, Article 57 (6) and 69 (5). 
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Such requirement implies that citizens cannot work on issues where they are not 
permanently physically present. Nonetheless, there is no persuasive reason to oblige 
physical presence of CSOs. For instance the advocacy work of a CSO that aims at 
researching and influencing the changes of federal laws and policies but has its office 
only in the capital might still be successful given that it offers opportunities for the 
participation of beneficiaries and other key stakeholders from the regions in the 
development of its advocacy work. As a matter of fact, the federal law makers that 
such CSO desire to make frequent contact with and to lobby could have their principal 
working place in the Capital and there may be no good reason for it to permanently 
establish five branch offices that certainly would escalate its administration and 
operational costs.  There is also no good reason to demand membership representation 
from five regions or the opening of branches in five regions, when for instance a charity 
wishes to serve only in three of the less served regions of the country.  
 
It is worth noting that Ethiopia is constituted based on ethnic federalism. Thus the 
demanding rule of members’ representation will also have ethnic dimension thus 
denying a group of people in Region 1  regardless of their number to support and 
advocate for the rights of people in Region 2 and vice versa. It is not also clear whether 
residence or place of birth is required to prove representative membership. For instance 
if place of birth is required to show representation then a CSOs formed by a group of 
people who are originally from five different regions but currently living in the Capital 
is said to fulfill the legal criteria. If however, current place of residence is required as 
a proof of representation, then it would mean that only people that reside in five diff 
Regional States can form and operate at federal level. This would make the formation 
and operation of CSOs very demanding and costly. The opening of operation offices 
in five regions is particularly demanding having regard to the legal maximum ceiling 
of 30% administration cost imposed by the CSP.59  
 
The mandatory requirement of opening five branch offices, while it is possible for 
CSOs to have an office in one region and coordinate their lobbying and advocacy 
activities in different regions, is demanding and even unwarranted. Thus in effect the 
                                                          
59 CSP, Article 88.  For further discussion on Administration Cost see Chapter 7.   
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CSP limits CSOs right to independently determine their place of formation and 
operation.  
 
5.5. Enabling Conditions for the acquisition of Legal Personality of CSOs 
A law also plays a role in either enabling or hindering the existence of CSOs by 
governing the acquisition of legal personality of CSOs. Legal personality refers to the 
legal capability of having rights and obligations. It may be very useful for individuals 
to know that once they organize themselves and draw specific internal rules, they may 
qualify as CSOs in the eyes of the law, with all the legal consequences it entails. The 
rights and obligations that legal personality confers to CSOs may vary in different legal 
systems. In general however, obtaining juridical personality offers CSOs the ability to 
enter into a legally binding transactions or contracts. It thus gives them the capability 
to open bank accounts, to hire staff, to own property, and to mobilize resource. The 
acquisition of legal personality therefore facilitates the smooth operation of CSOs as it 
offers them the capability to undertake legal transactions necessary in pursuing their 
objectives. It also enables them to interact and to network with other organisations. 
The denial of legal personality could thus in essence amount to a violation of CSOs 
existence and operations.60 
 
With rights, certainly come corresponding obligations. Thus, legal personality also 
enforces the corresponding obligations of CSOs that ensure their legitimacy, 
transparency and accountability.61 The transactions of CSOs should not detrimentally 
affect the rights and interests of third parties and their own members. The law therefore 
may impose specific obligations on CSOs for the protection of third parties with whom 
CSOs interact such as the beneficiaries, the donors and other creditors of CSOs. 
Without legal personality that protects third parties, private and public organisations 
may be reluctant to work with CSOs for lack of clear lines of accountability. Lack of 
legal personality may thus possibly have a negative impact on the resource 
                                                          
60 The idea that the denial of legal personality could amount to a violation of freedom of association has 
also been recognized by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Sidiropoulos and Others V. 
Greece  where  the refusal to register which results the denial of legal personality was held as an 
interference with freedom of  association. See Sidiropoulos, above n 20 at 31. 
61 Richard Fries, ‘The legal Environment of Civil Societies’ in Helmut Anheier and others (eds) Global 
Civil Society 2003 (LSE 2003) 224. 
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mobilization, constituency building and networking of CSOs.  Therefore, it is 
necessary that the law guarantees CSOs the right to attain legal or juridical personality.  
  
In general, the legal obligations of CSOs offer protection for third parties by making 
CSOs and their founders or managers legally liable for the debts or wrongdoings of the 
organisation. The liabilities however vary in different legal systems.  In some 
instances, even though legal personality is bestowed to CSOs in order to enable them 
undertake legal transactions, the founders or persons designated to manage will assume 
joint and several liability for the obligations and debts arising out of the activities of 
the organisation. In other jurisdictions, legal personality further offers CSOs with what 
is commonly referred as a separate legal personality that confers juridical personality 
to the organisation distinct from the founders. In such jurisdictions where CSOs have 
distinct legal personality from the founders, the legal personality of the organisation 
offers a corporeal veil to the founders and members and limits their liabilities for the 
debts and obligations of the organisation.  
 
The distinct legal personality of CSOs that offers limited liability for the founders may 
encourage individuals to form and to join CSOs, thereby helping the growth of the 
sector.  However, it is important that the law also ensures that the distinct entity 
principle is not abused by founders, members or officers of CSOs and flagrantly 
opposes justice or the rights, interests and securities of third parties (individuals or the 
public at large). The law therefore needs to ensure that the distinct personality of CSOs 
be regulated in a stricter manner. It is thus reasonable that CSOs that seek distinct legal 
personality be registered with authorities assigned for this purpose and the registry is 
made accessible to the public. While access to the public registry of such CSOs would 
enable third parties to make an informed decision, it also helps authorities to ensure 
that the purpose of the organisation is lawful. Hence, although registration should not 
be considered as a precondition for the legal existence of CSOs, the enjoyment of 
distinct legal personality that limits the liability of founders may serve as a motivation 
for CSOs to be formally incorporated. 
 
Another common motivation for CSOs to seek distinct legal personality and to 
incorporate formally is to become eligible for tax concessions. Since tax benefits 
should be systematically regulated, if given for CSOs, organisations seeking tax 
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concessions need to be formally registered. Nonetheless tax concession varies 
depending on tax and welfare policies as well as the financial capability of States. Thus 
the choices needs to be given to individual CSOs to thoroughly examine the distinct 
advantages and disadvantages of being formally incorporated and to make the decision 
of either being registered or remaining informal and minimize the transaction cost of 
formation.  
 
On the other hand however, the mandatory requirement of registration would increase 
the transaction cost of forming associations and dissuade many from forming and 
participating in CSOs, particularly if registration requirements are cumbersome and 
open to wide discretion of the government. Where registration requirement is not 
clearly set out and authorities have absolute power with no room for further judicial 
challenge, CSOs existence will be put at the mercy of the discretion of the government. 
This in turn would negatively affect the growth of the social capital and CSOs activism 
which is essential for democratization. This will also compromise the potential of 
CSOs to play their role of regulation and watchdog. 
 
Moreover the freedom of association being one of the fundamental rights that can be 
limited only for compelling reasons that amount to threats to public safety and 
democratic society, CSOs informality alone cannot satisfy such prerequisites for the 
denial of such fundamental freedom. Hence CSOs which are civil in character and 
legal in action should be given the freedom to associate informally. The freedom to 
informal association does not, however, preclude the possibility that certain 
institutional forms may be required if particular benefits such as tax concessions are to 
be enjoyed. On the other hand, should the association wish to incorporate formally and 
possibly get distinct benefits from its registration, it has to fulfil certain legally 
prescribed rules and procedures of registration and incorporated with a body assigned 
for such purpose.   
 
A law is thus enabling when it allows individuals to make a choice of forming either 
informal CSOs, i.e. without a formal filing with any government agency for official 
registration, or formal CSOs established through formal incorporation. For instance 
some small organisations with few properties and transactions might prefer to stay 
informal for fear of burdensome reporting or other requirements which are associated 
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with the registration process. Reasonably, registration may be sought by CSOs only 
when it brings specific advantages to them. Nonetheless, the law should not impose 
the registration process on CSOs as a necessary precondition to exercise the freedom 
of association.  
 
Thus, a law is enabling for the existence of CSOs when it provides the freedom of 
CSOs to exist as an informal legal entity. Mere ‘notification for authorities’ or 
‘declaration of the formation of a distinct legal entity in the statutes of the organisation’ 
is thus the simplest options that a law may offer for the acquisition of legal 
personality. 62  Hence if the association wishes to incorporate informally, its mere 
formation after the fulfilment of the minimum requirements of formation should 
suffice for the acquisition of a legal personality to enter into legally binding 
transactions. Some legal systems such as Switzerland for instance have adopted the 
use of a mere private action or ‘declaration’ of status as CSOs in the statutes of the 
organisation or ‘notification’ of formation for concerned authorities.63 
 
5.6. Legal Personality of CSOs under the Ethiopian Legal System 
Compulsory registration  
After fulfilling the minimum requirements set forth in the law for their formation,64 
charities and societies are deemed to be formed. However, Article 65 (1) of the CSP 
states that merely formed charities and societies shall not have legal personality.65 
Charities and societies that are deemed to be formed fulfilling the minimum legal 
requirements may undertake only limited legally enforceable transactions such as 
raising fund and owning property the value of which may not exceed 50,000 Ethiopian 
Birr. The legal recognition is given for formed CSOs for a maximum period of 3 
                                                          
62Leon Irish and others, Guidelines for Laws affecting Civic Organisations (2ndeds, Open Society 
Institute 2004) 27. 
63The Swiss Civil Code, Article 60. The article runs as ‘Associations which have a political, religious, 
scientific, artistic, charitable, social or any other than an industrial object, acquire the status of a person 
as soon as they show by their constitution  their intention to have a corporate existence’. 
64 The minimum requirements include among others preparation of bylaws or rules of the organisation 
when applicable; the selection of the board of management, auditor, trustee or any other departments 
that form the structure of charities and societies as required by the law; the act of constituting of a 
charitable trust or charitable endowment and determination of beneficiaries for the formation of 
charitable endowment or charitable trust etc. 
65 It is important to note that some traditional cultural or religious associations such as ‘Edir’ and ‘Ekub’ 
which are not within the legal scope of the CSP as per Article 3 (2) (c) may exist informally as long as 
they remain as self-help organisation. However even Edirs are expected to be registered if they are 
involved in other socio economic and development activities.  
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months.66 During this initial period, the founders of charities and societies assume an 
individual legal liability for the organisation.67  
 
Despite existing international enabling practices that the decision to get registered 
should be the prerogative of an individual organisation, the CSP nonetheless obliges 
all charities and societies to subject themselves to compulsory registration within 90 
days of their formation. Once formed, all charities and societies are required to be 
registered within three months from formation time, with the Charities and Societies 
Agency established for the registration and regulation of Charities and Societies, under 
a sanction of cessation of the formed organisation.68 While it is essential that the law 
should provide the means to get registered for CSOs that so desire, it should, however, 
never condition the exercise of the right to freedom of association on the registration 
or acquisition of formal status whatsoever. However, the CSP denies Charities and 
Societies the right to be constituted and to remain an informal organisation.  
 
The registration process, although mandatory, confers upon the charities and societies 
a distinct legal personality. Upon registering and thus acquiring legal personality, the 
rights and duties of the Charity or Society formed shall accrue to the registered Charity 
or Society.69 The only exception to this general rule of distinct legal personality of the 
charity is applicable on Charity Committees, 70  perhaps owing to their temporary 
nature. Unlike charities and societies the rights and duties of the charity committee are 
not transferred to the registered Charity committee despite being registered by the 
agency. Rather, According to Article 51 of the CSP, the members or officers of a 
Charity Committee shall be jointly and severally liable for obligations and debts arising 
out of its activities.71  
 
                                                          
66 CSP, Article 65 (3). 
67 CSP, Article 65 (1) and (2). 
68 CSP, Article 64 (2) and Article 65 (4). 
69 CSP, Article 65 (2). 
70Charitable Committees are defined as a collection of five or more natural persons who have come 
together with the intent of soliciting money or other property from the public for purposes that are 
charitable but transient in nature, although they may be converted to a lasting charitable endowments 
where the money collected is significantly larger than the attainment of the proposed specific purpose, 
See CSP, Article 46 (2) and Article 54 
71 CSP, Article 51 (2), the article provides that any donor, member, beneficiary, the Agency, or the 
Sector Administrator can have a legal standing against Charity Committees. 
95 
 
While conferring a distinct legal personality for many of the charities could be an 
advantage, nonetheless the hitch of the CSP is that it has made registration compulsory 
for the very legal existence of all charities and societies. The mandatory registration 
requisite however indicates that registration can be used as a process to check and 
control CSOs instead of offering them a benefit of attaining legal personality. This can 
also be drawn from the draft versions of the CSP that suggested harsh penalties for 
informal existence of Charities and Societies beyond the permitted period of 3 months. 
The draft versions of the CSP outlawing informal existence of Charities and societies 
stipulated a penalty that reached up to 15 years of imprisonment for ‘participating in 
the management of or disseminating information in the interest of an unregistered 
charities and societies’ or ‘allowing a meeting of unregistered CSOs on one’s 
property.’ 72Although such harsh penalty was omitted in the final law, yet the CSP 
replaced it with a single broad provision stating that ‘any person who violates the 
provisions of this proclamation shall be punishable in accordance with the provisions 
of the criminal code’.73 The problem with this provision is not only penalizing failure 
to register but its lack of clarity on the demarcation between informally organized 
CSOs and other types of informal associations such as Edirs which are not within the 
scope of the CSP. This is particularly challenging in recent time since Edirs that were 
traditionally engaged as burial and other self-focused services have widened their 
scope to engage in other charitable purposes.  
 
However a charity or society may be relieved of the penalty of cessation of the formed 
organisation and still apply for registration notwithstanding that the time limit has 
passed if it proves to the Agency the existence of good cause for failing to meet the 
deadline.74 Yet another drawback is that there is no interpretative guidance or case law 
on good cause in Ethiopia due to Ethiopia’s civil law system and the law fails to 
enumerate or even indicate circumstances that can possibly be deemed as good cause, 
thus leaving a wide open discretion for the Agency which could be manipulated and 
used discriminately.   
 
                                                          
72 The first draft of the CSP circulated by the Ministry of Justice, Article 14. 
73 CSP, Article 102. 
74 CSP, Article 64 (3). 
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5.7. Enabling Legal Conditions for the Registration of CSOs  
Enabling legal conditions related to the registration of CSOs are related to the right to 
seek legal personality and to register; clear, undemanding and non-discriminatory 
requirements of registration with the right of appeal; speedy process of registration and 
independent registering authority with limited discretion to decide on the right to 
register.  
 
The Right to get registered 
Where registration is a process whereby CSOs attain their legal existence75 or other 
benefits such as tax concession, the law needs to ensure that the rules governing 
registration facilitate the process of registration. Freedom of association dictates the 
right to form CSOs and the right to seek and to obtain legal personality. Thus once the 
conditions of registration are fulfilled registration should be automatic since the 
process of registration should serve as a process to facilitate but not impede the 
freedom of association. Hence the denial of registration, delay in registration or 
cumbersome procedures for registration is deemed as violation of the freedom.76  
 
The right to be formed and to have legal personality entails the protection from 
unwarranted discretion of authorities to determine the formation and acquisition of 
personality. Thus for example the required documents for registration should be clearly 
defined and be limited to the principal governing documents such as the constitution 
or statute, bylaws or articles of association. These documents in addition to providing 
relevant information for third parties 77 also avails the opportunity for authorities to 
check the legality of the intended purposes of the organisation. Any other additional 
requirements for registration if at all necessary should also be based on ‘clear and 
objective’ criteria so that discretional measures will not affect the existence and the 
independence of CSOs.78 
                                                          
75 This refers to the case where mandatory registration is required for CSOs existence as in the case of  
Ethiopia (Charities and Societies Proclamation No 621/2009, Article 64 (2) and 65 (4) ) , Zimbabwe 
(Zimbabwean Private Voluntary Organisations Act, Article 6 (1) (a) and (b) , Uganda (Republic of 
Uganda Non-Governmental Organisations Registration Act (Amended 2006), Article 2 (5) and (6) , 
Kuwait (State of Kuwait, Law 24 of 1962, Article 2. For a comparison, see Paragraph 28 of the Council 
of Europe’s Recommendation CM/Rec (2007) 14 on the legal status of NGOs in Europe.  
76 See Sidiropoulos above n 20. 
77 Public Interest Law Initiative, Enabling Civil Society: Practical Aspects of Freedom of Association, 
source book 89 <http://pilnet.org/public-interest-law-resources/30-enabling-civil-society-practical-
aspects-of-freedom-of.html> accessed 14 April 2015. 
78 Ibid, 90.  
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Once CSOs are registered enabling legal conditions demand that its existence is 
protected for perpetuity. The registration process should thus be limited only as a 
process to facilitate the rights of individuals to form CSOs as a means of exercising 
their freedom to associate. Thus there should not be any process of repeated re-
registration unless the organisation has made major amendments in its bylaws for 
instance regarding its purposes or structure; or the laws governing CSOs are changed 
and conditions demand the same.  
 
Clear, undemanding and non-discriminatory registration requirements 
A law will be enabling if it ordains that the registration process is undemanding and 
impartial.  It therefore should be un-bureaucratic with no or limited discretion of 
authorities, expeditious and inexpensive to the extent that is possible and practical.79  
The law itself that governs the registration process should also be well-defined with 
the utmost level of precision that avoids vagueness and ambiguity not to leave 
unwarranted discretion for decisions by authorities. Furthermore, the law must give 
CSOs an opportunity of a day in court to challenge the decisions of the registering 
authorities. 
 
Expeditious registration process    
As legal personality is the most important expression of freedom of association that 
enables individuals to jointly pursue a common interest, the facilitation and promptness 
of the process is just as important as the acquisition. An enabling law thus needs to 
ensure that the process of registration is not lengthy. 80   It needs to provide the 
maximum time that the registration decision should take as it would otherwise expose 
CSOs to the exercise of the discretion of authorities and compromises their 
independence. Thus, there needs to be a prescribed time limit within which the 
responsible state agency should decide the application for registration. A law will be 
more enabling if it clearly provides that failure to decide within such prescribed period 
should be treated as a grant of legal personality with no additional requirements.81 This 
                                                          
79 Council of Europe’s Recommendation on the legal status of NGOs in Europe CM/Rec (2007) 14, s 
IV 28-29;  See also, Leon Irish above n 62 at 26.  
80 Richard Fries, ‘The legal Environment of Civil Societies’ in Helmut Anheier and others (eds), Global 
Civil Society 2003 (LSE 2003) 221.  
81 See Public Interest Law Initiative, above n 77 at 90; See also Leon Irish, above n 62 at 27.  
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is an important procedural guarantee for the exercise of the freedom of association 
since otherwise if CSOs registration would depend on the discretion of authorities, the 
existence and the autonomy of CSOs would be compromised. The right of an automatic 
presumption of registration is nonetheless not practical, if the purpose of registration 
is not to attain legal personality but to be qualified for some benefits as tax concessions.  
 
Inexpensive Registration Fee 
Registration fee should not pose a serious obstacle for the registration of CSOs. An 
enabling law must therefore ensure that the registration process should not demand 
unreasonable application processing fee. This is particularly important in jurisdictions 
where registration is mandatory, since the unaffordability of registration should not 
deny one to exercise one’s freedom of association. Unaffordability will also contradict 
the ‘universality’ of the freedom of association. Although the freedom to associate is 
a right that must be guaranteed to ‘everybody’ irrespective of the economic status or 
otherwise, the imposition of an unreasonable registration fee would systematically 
deny the rights of those people who are economically disadvantaged. Yet perhaps, the 
formation of CSOs is particularly relevant for those groups, from the democratization 
perspective, as the right to associate would offer them the chance to join hands and 
pool their limited resources to set the imbalance in interest representation influenced 
by money politics. Expensive registration fee will also generally deter the formation 
and the flourishing of CSOs. Moreover, in order to avoid subjectivity and partiality, 
the amount also needs to be predetermined and made known to the public to enable 
individuals make an informed decision before they start out the formation of CSOs.  
 
Independent and Accountable Registering Authority  
One of the enabling conditions for the registration of CSOs and their autonomous 
operation is the existence of a registering authority, which is transparent, efficient and 
independent of the government. The independence of the authority from the executives 
will enable CSOs engage autonomously. The most enabling legal approach is the 
establishment of a single specialised regulatory agency whose staff develop 
appropriate expertise and whose sole task is regulating CSOs. Such a specialised 
agency eliminates all too frequent inter-ministerial conflict and inconsistency. In 
addition, by developing a centralized expertise it helps ‘improve the understanding of 
the law affecting CSOs and enhances the professionalism of civic organisations by 
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offering courses and training sessions.’82 This model is adopted in England and Wales 
where an independent specialized agency- The Charity Commission regulates the 
activities of Charities. Establishment of a specialised independent agency that may be 
constituted of representatives from government, CSOs and the public at large also 
ensure the continuity of policy despite changes of party. 83  
  
Thus, although it is not necessarily the only way, the registration and regulation of 
CSOs by specialized regulatory agency is deemed as a sound model. It is also important 
that its decisions should be subject to judicial appeal.84 Regulation by a specialised 
agency under a court review system facilitates the coordination and continuity of 
policies made by the executive while ensuring political insulation and unwarranted 
intrusion of its decisions on the rights of CSOs existence and engagements. Thus, an 
enabling legal environment for the registration of CSOs requires the establishment of 
a specialized registration body and a well-functioning independent court that could 
entertain appeals from the decision of the registering authority.  
 
All these enabling conditions for registration are crucial since the process of 
registration that is unwarrantedly demanding and subjective affects the potential role 
that CSOs can play in democratization. Firstly, the demanding registration procedure 
discourages the formation of Charities and Societies and thus limits the growth of the 
social and political capital that could help the process of democratization through 
diverse interest representation and the nurturing of civic and democratic values. 
Secondly, the more vague and subjective the registration process is with unrestrained 
discretion of authorities, the more it risks the inherent autonomous quality of the sector 
that is indispensable for the democratization process. When the registration process 
highly impinges on the autonomy of CSOs, their capacity and role in holding the state 
apparatus accountable becomes doubtful. Moreover, if the right to form and the right 
to attain legal personality are left to the discretion of authorities, the registration 
process could be used as a screening mechanism for the state to filter out CSOs with a 
potential of influencing or challenging state action from entering the public sphere. 
                                                          
82 Leon Irish above n 62 at 33. 
83 Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice, (Oxford 
University Press 1999) 7. 
84 Leon Irish above n 62 at 33. 
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5.8. Registration of CSOs under the Ethiopian Legal System 
As explained above, the registration of Charities and Societies in Ethiopia is a 
mandatory precondition to attain legal existence and legal personality.85 Since legal 
existence is not an automatic consequence of the formation of charities and societies, 
it is thus crucial that the rules governing the registration process should meet the 
aforesaid enabling criteria since otherwise it would be tantamount to the denial of their 
very existence and the violation of the freedom of association. Nonetheless, as we shall 
see below, the particular challenges related to the process of registration under the CSP 
are vague with open ended rules that give unfettered power for the registering and 
regulating Agency in registering and demanding requirements of registration  that 
suggest a move towards a narrowing of the space for CSOs existence. The CSP is 
premised on an officious intent by the state in the regulation of the existence and the 
operation of CSOs and provides for overstated and unchecked administrative 
discretion to the registering authorities. 
 
Registering and regulating authority 
The Charities and Societies Agency (hereinafter the Agency) represented by its 
officers and the Director General, the Board of the Charities and Societies Agency 
(hereinafter the Board) and the Sector Administrators are assigned with the 
responsibility of registering and regulating charities and societies in Ethiopia. Their 
structure that does not maintain their independence and wide discretionary mandate 
unchecked by the court however fails to fully comply with the standards of enabling 
legal conditions explained above. 
 
The Charities and Societies Agency 
The CSP establishes a specialized registering and regulating Agency, the Charities and 
Societies Agency.86 Among others, the Agency has the power and functions to license, 
register, and supervise; to publish and distribute information about the registration of 
Charities and Societies in the Gazette; to take decisions, in cooperation with the 
concerned Sector Administrator, on the application of Charities and Societies for 
registration and license; to collect fees for the services it renders; and to ensure that 
                                                          
85 CSP, Article 64 (2); Article 65 (1) and (2). 
86 CSP, Article 4 (1). 
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Charities and Societies operate legally.87 The Agency is organized having a Charities 
and Societies Board hereinafter referred to as the ‘Board’; a Director General to be 
appointed by the Government; and other staff.88 
 
The Board of Charities and Societies 
The Board constitutes seven members, including its Chairperson to be nominated by 
the government; and two persons nominated from the Charities and Societies 
representing the sector.89 Some of the powers and functions of the Board include 
making policy recommendations to the Minister on policy matters; and hear appeals 
from the decisions of the Director General including decisions on the registration of 
charities and societies.90 Neither does the law say anything as to how the CSOs are 
selected. Yet even if nomination is made in a proper manner, the representation of the 
sector would only be nominal in a majority decision. 
 
Sector Administrators 
In addition to the Agency, the CSP also gives for Sector Administrators the powers of 
making decisions on the registration and regulation of Charities and Societies.91 Sector 
Administrators are relevant Federal Executive Offices designated by the Justice 
Minister to provide the necessary support to the Agency in the process of registration 
and regulation of Charities and Societies.92 For those CSOs whose activity did not fall 
within any of the government ministries (sector administrator) and for whose activity 
falls within two or more ministries, the Agency will serves as Sector Administrator.93  
 
The sector administrators are given a wide mandate in the registration and supervision 
of charities and societies as they are given the mandate to evaluate and recommend on 
the Charities’ and Societies’ programmes and projects; to supervise and control 
operational activities of Charities and Societies and take necessary measures; to 
develop criteria that have to be followed by the Agency which shall assure the 
maximum benefits of the public from the activities of Charities and Societies; and 
                                                          
87 CSP, Article 6. 
88 CSP, Article 7. 
89 CSP, Article 8. 
90 CSP, Article 9. 
91 CSP, Article 66. 
92 CSP, Article 66 and Article 67. 
93 CSP, Article 66 (2). 
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make arrangements with Charities for coordinated efforts towards the achievement of 
the common goals of the Charities and the said Sector Administrator. 
 
Sector Administrators, having specialization in different sectors, evaluate and give 
specific recommendations on the programmes and projects of Charities and Societies 
before and during their registration and supervise and control operational activities of 
charities and societies. What this means in practice is that individuals who wanted to 
establish a charity or society working on Education should get their proposals and 
planned activities approved by the Ministry of Education (as a relevant sector 
administrator) before they get registered by the charities and societies agency. They 
are also expected to get approval from the Ministry of any new programs and project 
activities before they start implementing the programs and project activities. This gives 
a tremendous power to the Ministry of Education on the formation and regulation of 
CSOs working on Education to the level that it may prevent the formation of CSOs 
advocating for the change of the educational policy of the incumbent government. This 
could amount to the violation of citizens’ right to form CSOs to promote their interest.  
 
In general, although the establishment of a specialized Charities and Societies Agency, 
whose sole task is registering and regulating Charities and Societies, is a positive 
aspect to facilitate the registration process to develop the expertise and master the 
implementation of the law, the fact that it is answerable to the executive however puts 
its independence in question.  Similarly, the Sector Administrators that assist the 
Agency in the registration and regulation process could enhance the specialization and 
the expertise of the Agency. Nonetheless, as will be discussed below the wide power 
of the Sector Administrators and the Agency that allows them to encroach into the 
detail programmes and activities of Charities and Societies is threatening to the 
autonomy and even to the very existence of CSOs.   
 
Barriers to Registration  
Excessive Scrutiny 
The requirements of registration as laid down under the CSP include, but are not 
limited to, particulars concerning the organisation’s goals, objectives and activities 
outlined as per the guideline prepared for the same purpose; a copy of its rules or 
bylaws; document showing the act of constituting of a charitable trust or endowment 
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etc.94 In addition to these documents foreign charities are also required to present a 
certificate of registration and recommendation letter from the Embassy of its country 
of origin or other competent government organ; letter of recommendation and proof of 
ability to operate in Ethiopia from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FDRE as well 
as the power of attorney of the country representative.95  
 
The requirement of these principal governing documents is pertinent in order to enable 
the Agency to check the legality of the intended purposes of the organisations and also 
to provide relevant information for third parties. This helps the public to know about 
the organisation and to make informed decisions in its dealings with the organisation 
for example to volunteer or to fund; and to have trust in the organisation.  However, 
the law further stipulates that the Agency may require all charities and societies to 
provide ‘similar documents and duly completed forms’ in addition to those principal 
governing documents.96 Such required documents for registration are not however 
clearly and objectively defined by the law thus leaving the registration and thus the 
acquisition of legal personality of organisations at the mercy of the Agency’s 
discretional measures. Such wider discretion that could compromise the registration of 
CSOs might increase the transaction cost of establishing charities and societies, and 
threaten their autonomy hence their efficiency to play a role in democratization.  
 
One of the documents that the regulating Agency requires formed organisations to 
submit, apart from the bylaws, is a project proposal demonstrating detailed activities 
and budget plan with a maximum of 30% administration cost.97 This requirement, 
added to the fact that associating informally is not encouraged, demands even very 
small charities to necessarily have a qualified personnel to write a project proposal. 
The proposal will be submitted to and evaluated by either the Sector administrator or 
the regulating Agency. This causes censorship of CSOs activities right from the very 
beginning even before they assume a legal status. If the ministry or the Agency does 
                                                          
94 CSP, Article 68 (3). 
95 CSP, Article 68 (4). 
96 CSP, Article 68 (3) (b). 
97In addition to the by rules and the application form required by the CSP, the Agency lists the following 
as requirements for an application for registration: project proposal of the charity revealing its intended 
activity, the list of founders, their Identification card, photograph, logo of the charity if any with its size, 
content and objective of the logo and details of the cost of registration. < 
http://www.chsa.gov.et/web/guest/local-charity>   accessed on 12 May 2015> accessed on 25 May 
2015.  
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not approve the project, the CSO will not be permitted the license, notwithstanding the 
lawfulness of the activities.  
 
Thus, in effect the CSP has given the sector administrators and the Agency immense 
power that would determine the very existence of an organisation. Such censorship is 
particularly burdensome for advocacy CSOs as it could be likely that a sector 
administrator will not approve a project proposal that would challenge the policy that 
the government has enacted and is enforcing. For example, a charity that works on the 
promotion of quality education needs to get the approval of the sector administrator, 
in this case the Ministry of Education. Thus if that charity plans to advocate for the 
change of the existing education policy, it could be highly unlikely that the Ministry 
of Education will approve of the plan of the charity that challenges its own policies. 
This might result in the formation/ registration of only those CSOs that work in line 
with the government policies without any substantial challenge whatsoever. The CSP 
did not provide a specific ground on which the Sector administrators approve or 
disapprove a program or project activity. They are also not bound by the law either to 
give a written explanation of the ground on which they approve or disapprove a 
program or project activity. As a result, it is difficult to get information on the number 
of programs or project activities that are approved or disapproved by the ministries. 
Practically however, CSOs submit their programs and/or project activities for approval 
and where the ministry did not approve their programs, they will amend their programs 
and/or projects until they satisfy the recommendations of the ministry and will get the 
ministry’s approval.   
 
Once the necessary documents are presented or requirements are fulfilled, an enabling 
legal environment requires that registration should simply be a procedural matter 
instead of authorities’ discretion.98 The role of authorities should thus be limited only 
to verifying the fulfillment of basic legal conditions.  Hence rules governing 
registration should be precisely defined to avoid discretional power of authorities 
whose bureaucracy could suppress the fundamental freedom of formation and function 
of CSOs. Thus, while it could be appropriate that the registering authority checks the 
objectives of the formed charities and societies are lawful, it is nonetheless very 
                                                          
98 See Leon Irish above n 62 at 27. 
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intrusive to require charities to submit the details of their activities and put their actions 
and registration at the mercy of authorities’ discretional decision. However the 
registration requirement added by the prerogative of the Agency to require the 
submission of the project proposal and to oversee and direct the activities of the 
charities and societies is a serious threat to the operational autonomy of the sector.    
 
Discretion of the Agency  
The approval of the registration application and the issuance of the certificate endorse 
the acquisition of legal personality and thus the rights and duties of the charity or 
society formed shall accrue to the registered organisation. 99  This will enable the 
founders and officers to undertake transactions such as entering into binding contracts, 
purchasing assets, opening bank accounts etc. in the name of the organisation. 
Obtaining legal personality also helps the organisations to attract funding from the 
public and private companies and to procure tax benefits. It also ensures the continuing 
identity of the organisation distinct from the founders. 
 
On the other hand, the Agency may either require making the necessary amendments 
or refuse to register the charity or society. Article 69 exhaustively listed the grounds 
on which registration may be denied. The Agency thus may deny registration where 
the rules/bylaws of the organisation, or its nomenclature, or its application do not 
comply with the necessary legal conditions.100 It may also deny registration where the 
proposed charity or society is ‘likely to be used for unlawful purposes or for purposes 
prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good order’ in Ethiopia.101  
 
The exhaustive listing of the grounds for denial of registration is good as it limits an 
unwarranted discretionary power of the Agency.  Yet the discretion of the Agency is 
not entirely ruled out owing to the vagueness of the conditions for the denial of 
registration such as ‘purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good order.’  The 
vagueness could still leave room for subjective interpretation of the Agency whose 
bureaucracy could stifle the acquisition of legal personality. As Ethiopia follows a civil 
law legal system, there is no precedent recorded for judges to follow as to what it means 
                                                          
99 CSP, Article 65 (2) and Article 68 (1). 
100 CSP, Article 69 (1) (3) (4) (5). 
101 CSP, Article 69 (2). 
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by ‘purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good order’ However, the 
interpretation of the Agency should be guided by the constitution and international 
human right instruments ratified by Ethiopia as laws higher in the hierarchy of the 
country’s legal system.  If the Agency guided by these documents still found that the 
proposed organisation does not meet the legal prescriptions and the standards 
necessary for a democratic society, it should prohibit registration in order to protect 
the public and salvage the sector from those that discredit it and communicate its 
decision within 30 days.  
 
Unlimited registration period  
According to the CSP, once the charity or society successfully applied for registration, 
the Agency is required to register the applicants as a charity or a society and issue a 
certificate of legal personality within 30 days from the date of application.102 Once the 
governing documents are presented or conditions are fulfilled, the process of 
registration should simply be a technical routine or a procedural issue instead of 
authorities’ discretion. The Agency should thus be limited merely to checking the 
satisfaction of those prescribed prerequisites. Therefore, once the Agency verifies the 
fulfillment of the conditions prescribed by law or the conditions that it deems necessary 
and also confirms the lawfulness of the objectives of the association it needs to register 
and issue a certificate, within 30 days. 103  Although longer than what it takes to register 
profit making entities, this still compares acceptably to the 22 days that take to register 
a business in Ethiopia.104 Yet, the fact that a specific time limit is prescribed for the 
decision of the Agency is commendable on its own.  
 
The failure of the Agency to decide within such period cannot however be deemed as 
the granting of legal personality. Thus, where the Agency does not issue a certificate 
of legal personality or does not make known that it will not do the same; the applicant 
may apply to the Board within 15 days from the end of the 30th day limit prescribed 
for the decision making of the Agency.  However the law is silent on the conditions 
whereby the Board may review the decisions of the Agency and it is not clear whether 
                                                          
102 CSP, Article 68 (1). 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ameha Bekele and Zemedeneh Negatu, Company Registration in Ethiopia, (The Addis Ababa 
Chamber of Commerce and the Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation (SIDA) 
Research Team, 2005) 19. 
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or not the appellant would have the right to be heard before the board or represented 
by a lawyer as it would in the court of law.105  
 
One challenge related to the appeal process is related to evidence. As the law does not 
require the Agency and the Board to provide the fact of denial of the registration 
application and the reason for denial in writing, the denied applicant could face 
evidentiary challenge to lodge an appeal to the Board or to the court of law as the case 
may be. A written and clear communication of denial in addition to giving an 
opportunity for the proposed organisation to amend the oversight would have made the 
Agency answerable in case of misuse of power. Moreover, the law does not require the 
Agency and the Board to record and make their decision available to the public. As a 
result, it is difficult to know how many applications has been denied and the grounds 
of the denial.  
 
In addition, specific timeframe is lacking for the decision of the Board on the appeal 
made against the decision of the Director General of the Agency. The fact that the 
board can keep the application of the CSO for unlimited period of time would impede 
CSOs existence, especially for Ethiopian Resident and foreign Charities that are not 
allowed to go to a court to challenge the board’s indecisiveness. Even the Ethiopian 
charities and societies that have the right to appeal may be in a difficult position to go 
to court without having a written decision of the Board thus leaving the appellant to 
wait for undefined time period before it makes a further appeal to the court.  This might 
also cause the relinquishment of a formed organisation and the funds it solicited before 
registration as a formed organisation must be registered within three months period. In 
practice there were instances during the re-registration period where the Board took 
more than six months to decide on the appeal of four local and international 
organisations. 106  As registration is mandatory under the Ethiopian law, delay in 
registration is an unjustifiable denial of the right to exercise one’s freedom of 
association. 
 
                                                          
105 The mandate of the Board may be compared to that of the Council in Malawi as section 18 of the 
Malawi’s Non-Governmental Organisation Act of 2001 provides a more enabling legal environment. 
The Council which has comparable mandate as the Ethiopian charities and societies Board represents 
seven out of ten members and its decisions are subject to review by a court of law. 
106 Kumelachew Dagne and Debebe Hailegebriel above n 55 at 12. 
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Unreasonable Registration Fee 
Article 58(6) of the CSP provides that the necessary registration fee shall be paid where 
an application for registration is made. Directives issued based on this provision 
require local charities to pay an approximate equivalent of 30-50 US dollars for 
registration and licensing excluding the publication cost that will depend on the market 
value.107 This is however not favourably compared to the registration fee of business 
companies as it costs three to five times double for charities.108 This increases the 
transaction cost of forming CSOs and might discourage their formation. 
 
Requirement for Re-registration  
Even after an organisation is registered, the Agency has the authority to interfere in its 
legal existence since the law requires CSOs to re-register disregarding the principle of 
perpetual succession for legal entities.  Aside from the registration process, the CSP 
requires charities and societies to renew their licenses every three years not later than 
two months after the expiry date.109 Thus, in addition to the process of acquisition of 
legal personality that undermines the existence of CSOs and subjects them to arbitrary 
procedures; their sustainable existence is also continuously challenged by the 
unwarranted process of renewal of license.  
 
The preconditions for renewal as provided on the CSP are payment of renewal fee; 
complete and accurate performance and audit reports; and non-violation of the 
provisions of the CSP or regulations and directives issued thereunder.110 Charities and 
Societies are not required to resubmit their current or future programs and activities as 
they are expected to get approval of their projects from the agency or relevant sector 
administrator every time they have a new program or project activity. The renewal 
requirement serves no purpose since the Agency can dissolve any charity or society at 
any time if any reason that warrants their dissolution occurs.  The sense of uncertainty 
about their existence continues even after registration, since their license can be 
                                                          
107 The Agency website in addition to the by rules and the application form required by the CSP lists 
out the following as requirements for an application for registration: project proposal of the charity 
revealing its intended activity, the list of founders, their Identification card, photograph, logo of the 
charity if any with its size, content and objective of the logo and details of the cost of registration. The 
information is available on the official website of the Charities and Societies Agency at 
<http://www.chsa.gov.et/web/guest/local-charity> accessed on 10 April 2015.   
108Amha Bekele and Zemedeneh Negatu, above n 104 at 19. 
109 CSP, Article 76 (1) and (2). 
110 CSP, Article 76 (3). 
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suspended or even cancelled even for a minor infringement of the provisions of the 
CSP, with no distinction made between first-time and repeat offenders. Yet the 
requirement that all charities and societies should undergo renewal is however an 
unnecessary measure to scrutinize their existence again and again and adds needless 
transaction cost.  
 
The registration of CSOs is thus at best a temporary license to operate for a fixed period 
rather than a process that facilitates individual’s freedom of association. It therefore 
compromises CSOs autonomy and activism for democratic promotion in their role as 
monitoring, disciplinary and pressure group as it allows repeated bureaucratic hurdles 
and an opening for the Agency to harass organisations that are critical of official 
policies.  
 
In sum, although the registration process is mandatory for charities and societies, the 
process is nonetheless bounded with a number of disabling legal conditions that allows 
the registering authority to exercise unfettered discretion before and after the 
registration process thereby putting CSOs’ legal existence at its mercy. 
 
5.9. Enabling legal conditions governing the dissolution of CSOs 
The legal existences of CSOs come to an end through dissolution. CSOs could be 
dissolved voluntarily by the decision of CSOs governing body; and involuntarily by 
the decision of the CSOs regulating Agency or court order. The founders of charities 
should be allowed to voluntarily dissolve the organisation on the basis of their bylaws. 
On the other hand, the protection for the legal existence and autonomy of CSOs entails 
their protection not to be unwarrantedly dissolved without due process, since otherwise 
the right to exist would be a hollow right. The European Court of Human Rights 
underscores this when it decides that if the right to form did not include the right not 
to be dissolved, then freedom of association would be in vain.111  
 
Hence the dissolution of CSOs or their restriction in any form can be justified when 
the following three grounds are fulfilled simultaneously: (i) when the restriction is 
prescribed by law; (ii) in the interest of national security, public safety, public order, 
                                                          
111 Sidiropoulos and Others V. Greece 10 July 1998, para 40. 
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public health, morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others and (iii) 
necessary in a democratic society. 112  
 
Thus, to begin with, any legitimate restriction on CSOs should have a legal basis and 
accountability measures should be in conformity with a law duly promulgated in 
advance. The law should also have specific substantive and procedural qualities. From 
the statutory law perspective, the law that restricts the freedom of CSOs should pass 
the test that by limiting CSOs autonomy it will attain a greater good of protecting the 
safety and security of the public and/ or the nation. The test validates the setting of the 
necessary equilibrium between CSOs autonomy and their accountability.  
 
Also from the legal drafting perspective, the law that puts the restriction measures 
should have a quality of sufficient precision in order to enable CSOs and their members 
assess whether or not their intended action could amount to a breach of the law and 
thereby ensure them with certainty and foreseeability. 113  The certainty and 
foreseeability of the law will likely reduce the transaction cost for the formation and 
operation of CSOs. It thus encourages the formation of CSOs as their incorporation 
would not be placed at the mercy of authorities as long as they fulfil the minimum legal 
requirements. It also gives CSOs confidence that they will be free from undue and 
arbitrary intrusion in their governance and operation; and free from unwarranted 
dissolution on the grounds that have not been specifically prescribed by law.  On the 
other hand, laws that are precisely defined will give the government a valid authority 
to check on the accountability of CSOs. 
                                                          
112 ICCPR, Article 22; ECHR, Article 11. 
113 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Office for democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights Office (OSCE/ODIHR), ‘Key Guiding Principles of Freedom of Association with an Emphasis 
on Non-Governmental Organisations’4 <http://www.un.org.kg/en/publications/document-
database/article/Document%20Database/UN%20System%20in%20Kyrgyzstan/Human%20Rights%2
0and%20Human%20Rights%20Based%20Approach/115-Governace/2129-osce-odihr-note-outlining-
key-guiding-principles-of-freedom-of-association-with-an-emphasis-on-non-governmental-
organisationorganisations-eng> accessed on 11 March.2013; N.F. v. Italy, App no37119/97(ECtHR 
2August2001).In this case, a judge against whom disciplinary measure was taken for being a member 
of an association, ‘Freemason lodge’ based on two laws which read:  ‘any judge who fails to fulfil his 
duties or behaves, in or outside the office, in a manner unworthy of a trust and consideration which he 
must enjoy will incur a disciplinary sanction’ AND ‘judges’ membership of associations imposing a 
particularly strong hierarchical and mutual bond through the establishment, by solemn oath, of bonds 
such as those required by Masonic lodges, raises delicate problems as regards observance of the values 
enshrined in the Italian Constitution.’ The ECHR highlighting the vagueness of the term ‘raises delicate 
problem’ to indicate prohibition of membership in such association and the fact that it is not adequately 
foreseeable to enable the applicant to adjust his conduct ruled that the applicant’s right to freedom of 
association had been violated. 
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Secondly, the enforcement of laws that restrict the freedom of CSOs is justified only 
when there is a legitimate showing114of an imminent and serious threat that warrants 
the need to protect the rights of individuals, the safety of the public and the security of 
the nation.115   Certainly, the government as one of its oldest and notable mandate 
should protect the public from any perils. The actions of CSOs should not be an 
exception to this rule. Thus the government may take any legal action including 
dissolution in response to illegitimate actions of CSOs that jeopardizes the rights and 
securities of individuals, the public or the nation.  
  
However, government should not abuse such mandate to arbitrarily control CSOs or 
to silence those that challenge the government under the pretext of protecting the 
public. Hence the freedom of association sanctions that the state action against the 
autonomous operation of CSOs will be justified only when the threat posed by CSOs 
against the public is ‘serious and imminent.’ It therefore is necessary that the 
government will not restrict the freedom of association for a merely ‘local or relatively 
isolated threat of law and order.’116  Unsystematic and incidental threats posed by 
CSOs should thus not cause a limitation on the freedom of CSOs. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
The third criterion that must be present, in concert with the foregoing ones, is the 
absolute necessity of the restriction for a democratic society. This implies that any 
measure that limits freedom of CSOs should be not only proportionate to the legitimate 
purpose of protecting the public but also necessary for a democratic society. For 
example, a group of individuals who want to form a charity or society that promotes 
the change of government from secular to a religion state led by a religious leader may 
not pass the test of ‘necessity for a democratic society’ as democracy requires plurality 
                                                          
114Izmir Savas Karsitlari Dernegi and Others v Turkey, App no.46257/99 (ECtHR, 02 March 2006) 
115 ICCPR, Article 22 (2); ECHR, Article 11 (2) 
116 The ‘Siracusa Principles’ [United Nations, Economic and Social Council, U.N. Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and 
Derogation of Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/1985/4 (1985)  <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/siracusaprinciples.html> accessed 20 
April 2015. This principle was adopted in May 1984 by a group of international human rights experts 
convened by the International Commission of Jurists, the International Association of Penal Law, and 
the American Association for the International Commission of Jurists, the Urban Morgan Institute for 
Human rights, and the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences. Though not legally 
binding, these principles provide an authoritative source of interpretation of the ICCPR with regard to 
limitations clauses and issues of derogation in a public emergency.  
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of ideas and interests, the tolerance and acceptance of others and their ideas and for 
this reason, a country like Ethiopia whose constitution clearly provide to follow a 
democratic form of government may refuse to register such kind of CSOs. The 
restriction of the autonomy of CSOs should thus pass the strict test of both legality and 
necessity.  
 
The imposition of strict requirements against the infringement of the freedom is 
necessary as ‘freedom of association  would be largely theoretical and illusory if it 
were limited to the establishment of CSOs’,  but if state authorities could 
unwarrantedly dissolve CSOs without having to comply with the guarantees CSOs and 
their member are entitled to.117 Such guarantees help CSOs to maintain their autonomy 
– an essential ingredient for their role in democratization.  
 
5.10. Dissolution of CSOs under the Ethiopian legal system 
The CSP provides both voluntary and involuntary dissolution. Charities and Societies 
may thus be voluntarily dissolved by the decision of the appropriate organ (such as the 
Boards or trustees or the General Assembly) in accordance with its rules. Freedom of 
association entails not only the right to associate but also the negative right of the 
freedom not to associate. Hence, when the members of the association decide to 
dissolve their association they can appoint a liquidator on whom the property of the 
organisation vests for the purpose of winding up the dissolution without affecting the 
rights of third parties.118 CSOs may also be dissolved for a reason of insolvency.119  
 
CSOs may also be involuntarily dissolved by the decision of the Charities and Societies 
Agency or a court order. According to the constitution the freedom of association may 
be limited only when CSOs disrupt the constitutional order or an appropriate law. Also 
as per Article 9 and 13 of the FDRE constitution that qualifies the ICCPR as forming 
part of the law of the land, the grounds of involuntary dissolution of any charity or 
society should be guided by three set of principles outlined above. Hence it must be 
                                                          
117United Communist Party of Turkey and others v Turkey ECHR 1998-I, 33. In this case, ECHR 
provides that ‘the protection afforded by Article 11 [freedom of association] lasts for an association’s 
entire life and that dissolution of an association by a country’s authorities must accordingly satisfy the 
requirement of paragraph 2 of that provision’. 
118 CSP, Article 94 (1). 
119 CSP, Article 93 (1) (c). 
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legally prescribed; be limited only to protecting the safety and security of the public 
and the nation; and be relevant in a democratic society.   
 
In line with the first condition, the CSP prescribes potential grounds for dissolution of 
charities and societies providing predictability.   A charity or society may be dissolved 
by the Agency where it has become insolvent or where the appropriate organ of the 
Charity or Society decides to dissolve it in accordance with its bylaws.120 A charity or 
society may also be dissolved where the Agency cancels its license for a reason of 
violating the CSP or the penal law; registering fraudulently, failing to renew license; 
failing to rectify the causes for suspension within the time limit set by the Agency; and 
for having purposes which are unlawful, and prejudicial to public peace, welfare or 
security.121  
 
However, beyond the legal prescription, when the grounds of dissolution are assessed 
against the abovementioned standards of an enabling law that should be fulfilled in 
concert, not all may be considered justifiable. For instance, fraudulent acts, criminality 
or the violation of the penal law, and an imminent threat to public peace, security and 
welfare could be considered reasonable grounds for dissolution, assuming the content 
of the law is justified as reasonable enough to be relevant in a democratic society. On 
the other hand dissolution for other non-flagrant grounds such as failure to renew 
license within two months period or using more than 30% of the income for 
administrative cost etc. even without taking the degree of deviation into consideration 
and without a notice that offers a chance to rectify errors is out of all proportion and 
amenable to abuse. This is particularly true for instance for an organisation that fully 
complies with all the requirements of the CSP but failed to renew its license within the 
prescribed time which could be easily rectified as renewal does not serve any 
significant purpose in the first place. Same holds true for an organisation which uses 
for instance only 31% of its income for an administrative cost, given the ambiguity of 
what constitutes administrative cost and the fact that the deviation from the rules of 
30% is so minimal, particularly for those having insubstantial amount of annual 
income.  
 
                                                          
120 CSP, Article 92 and 93 (1).  
121 CSP, Article 93 (1) (b). 
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In general, given the contribution of charities and societies for public good, the grounds 
for dissolution should be strictly in compliance to the requirements of legality, and 
necessity for a democratic society. Each individual case should be carefully examined 
to verify the absolute necessity of the dissolution for a democratic society, without 
however opening loophole for arbitrariness and discrimination.  
 
In sum, an enabling law first of all should facilitate the formation and the attainment 
of legal personality. Among others an enabling environment requires the right to 
associate informally; the right to seek and obtain legal personality; the right to have 
uncomplicated, impartial, inexpensive and speedy registration process before a 
specialized registering agency; and the right of judicial appeal for any administrative 
grievance. The more enabling these conditions, the lesser the transaction cost and the 
greater chances that people would be motivated to form associations which can thicken 
the social fabric or the social capital. This in turn facilitates the democratization 
process as CSOs fill that space between the state and citizens and serve as channels or 
as transmitters of citizens’ interest.  
 
In conclusion, the registration requirements provided under the CSP do not adequately 
pass the test of enabling legal condition as the process entails cumbersome procedures 
beyond the constitutional restrictions and thereby increasing the transaction cost of 
CSOs legal existence. As can be presumed from such taxing procedure that is amenable 
for the Agency’s discretion, it is reported that organisations and mainly advocacy 
CSOs were challenged during the registration process due to the subjectivity, 
unpredictability, rigidity of the application of the law and even imposition of 
requirements beyond the requirement of the law, by the Agency.122  
 
Hence in general the registration and dissolution process brimmed with numerous 
vague and subjective requirements that are subject to the application of wider 
discretionary power of the registering authority with limited control from an 
                                                          
122 Kumelachew Dagne and Debebe Hailegebriel, above n 55 at 7 and 29.  In this report that took sample 
from the different types of CSOs 93% of advocacy CSOs and 47% of development CSOs (among the 
sample organisations) responded that compliance with the re-registration process were challenging 
because the officers ‘ were not well versed with the law and did not share a uniform understanding’ of 
the law; ‘were not willing to have constructive dialogue and to explain unclear matters pertaining to re-
registration’; ‘were not adequately trained in appraising projects presented as part of the re-registration 
requirement’. 
115 
 
independent judiciary, infringes on the ideal notion of CSOs autonomy. Such 
threatened autonomy added to the already prevailing state of fear caused by continuous 
intimidation makes advocacy CSOs role in democratization rather unpromising.  
 
The process also tends to increase the transaction cost and undermine the growth of 
the sector. The cumbersome procedures of existence and the narrowing of the legal 
space for operation perhaps partly contributed to a significant decrease of the number 
of CSOs from 3822 just before the year the CSP was enacted to 1655 in 2010.123 
Although the exact reasoning for the extinction of each of these organisations is not 
precisely known nonetheless there are some evident cases whereby CSOs such as 
Heinrich Böll Foundation, a foreign charity involved in promoting human rights and 
democracy pulled out of the country owing to limited space of operation. 124 Hence, 
the CSP fails to adequately satisfy the standards of an enabling legal framework for 
CSOs role in democratization, that we discussed at the beginning of the chapter, as it 
largely compromises the existence, growth and autonomy of CSOs and thereby deter 
citizens’ engagement and activism in the democratization process.
                                                          
123 The Charities and Societies Agency of Ethiopia, 9 months report presented to the FDRE House of 
Representatives available at < 
http://www.chsa.gov.et/web/guest/;jsessionid=E34D984DC7C307B36EC7D97B36E6EA44> accessed 
19 April 2015. 
124 HeinRich Böll Foundation, ‘Closure of the HeinRich Böll Foundation office in Ethiopia’ Press 
Release, November 29, 2012 <http://www.boell.org/web/145-Closure-of-HBF-Ethiopia-Office.html> 
accessed on 12 February 2015. 
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Chapter 6 
Engagement of CSOs in Lawful Purposes 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed what an enabling law should be in terms of protecting 
the rights of CSOs for formation and acquisition of legal personality. The mere 
protection of the bare right to form and to acquire legal existence however has more of 
a symbolic that a practical relevance. The existence of CSOs is given legal protection 
mainly because CSOs are formed in order to pursue a particular legitimate purpose that 
benefits either their own members or the public at large. Thus a legal regime governing 
the purposes of CSOs is most important as it can significantly influence the sector and 
the role it can play in society.  
 
The thesis also gives special focus for this chapter and discuss it in length as it is an 
important pillar of the Ethiopian experience that affects the democratization element 
of CSOs functions in the country. It also needs comparison to other legal systems, as 
the Ethiopian government seeks to legitimize the legal approach it has taken in 
governing the matter by taking the approach from other legal systems and notably the 
United Kingdom. 
 
Generally speaking, a law is said to be enabling when it recognizes that CSOs can be 
formed to serve a myriad of purposes. In general, the less legal limitation on the types 
of purposes the better for the sector. This also has a particular relevance for the 
democratization of the nation as the permission to pursue diverse purposes would 
pluralize the public sphere and enhance better representation of ideas and interests of 
societies. Yet, it would be too simplistic to claim that CSOs can pursue any objective 
of their own choice as one cannot assume that all CSOs are inherently good and that 
their purposes are intrinsically good. Thus it is necessary for a law to have clear 
standards or principles to determine permissible purposes which CSOs can be engaged 
in. By way of introduction, it may be relevant to point out that this chapter suggests 
two different sets of tests that can be applied in determining the permissibility of 
purposes of CSOs: a general test and a supplementary test. The first general test refers 
to the very minimum condition that must be fulfilled in order for a purpose to be 
qualified as permissible. This refers to the ‘lawfulness’ of the purpose which the CSO 
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aimed at pursuing.  All CSOs irrespective of their nature should pass the general test 
of ‘lawfulness’ of purposes. What constitutes a lawful purpose will be discussed 
hereunder in section 5.2.  
 
While the rule is that CSOs must be allowed to engage in any ‘lawful’ purpose, 
nonetheless some specific exceptions can be made to some CSOs by virtue of their 
unique organisational characteristics or social functions.  The supplementary test refers 
to such additional conditions that must be met to qualify the purpose as permissible. 
The supplementary condition that is applicable in a number of legal systems is non-
partisanship. Charities and Public Benefit Organisations that are deemed to benefit the 
public at large need to pass the supplementary test and thus are required to prove that 
their purposes are not only lawful but also nonpartisan. CSOs need to meet this 
qualifying condition to attain a distinct status that brings with it a social prestige and/or 
other pecuniary benefits for instance in the form of grants and tax concessions. What 
constitutes a nonpartisan purpose will be discussed below by way of comparison of the 
Ethiopian law which is the main focus of this study with other countries. 
 
6.2 Engagement of CSOs in Lawful Purposes  
What does lawful purpose mean? 
One of the guiding principles that need to be taken into consideration in determining 
the permitted purposes of CSOs is the individual rights of the founders or the members 
of CSOs. A law would be enabling when it permits CSOs to choose and to pursue any 
purpose that their members or founders can pursue in their individual capacity. Thomas 
Emerson argues: 
‘The one general principle of association which can be expressed in terms of 
constitutional doctrine is that an association or its members acting in concert 
are entitled to do what an individual can do to the extent the associational 
conduct is merely an extension of individual liberty, and the government can 
compel through the medium of compulsory association only what it can compel 
directly.’1 
 
                                                          
1 Thomas Emerson, ‘Freedom of association and freedom of expression’ (1964) The Yale Law Journal 
74 (1). 
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This assertion entails that what an individual can do in his individual capacity he must 
be able to do it with his associates, to the extent practicality of the application of rights 
permits. This also signifies that the purposes of CSOs are not limitless as neither are 
the rights of individuals. The limits on the rights of the founders and their organisations 
can be made based on a very pervasive conception that rights can only be limited in 
order to secure the rights and freedoms of others.2 Similar to what some authors prefer 
to refer as the Newtonian law of inertia: a right will continue to be in force as long as 
it does not collide with another right which conflicts with it.3 Thus CSOs right to 
choose and to pursue a purpose will be limited only to the extent that it affects the 
rights or interests of other individuals or organisations. Terrorist groups, Mafia triads 
and gangs may thus be disqualified as they threaten the rights, the security and the 
peace of others. This principle can also be validly extended to non-membership CSOs 
such as foundations since, as mentioned above, the right recourse theory validates that 
the exercise of a right will be limited if it collides with another right which conflicts 
with it. 4 
 
A similar limitation that takes the health, safety and security of the public is also 
provided as a limitation on the freedom of association under international laws.5 The 
freedom of association entails that CSOs can be engaged in any purpose except in those 
that by the standards of a democratic society, would threaten the safety and security of 
the public and the state. The standard of a democratic society among others include the 
respect for human rights, equality before the law, justice, state accountability, citizens’ 
participation, tolerance, accommodation, pluralism, diversity and peace. 6  Then it 
follows from the above principles that an enabling law ought to allow CSOs to pursue 
any purpose as long as such purposes promote such democratic values as rights, 
equality, justice, peace and pluralism as such values would rather promote the safety 
and security of the people. Thus the permissibility of the promotion of democratization 
by CSOs would only be self-evident. For the purpose of simplicity, when this chapter 
                                                          
2 Andrei Marmor, ‘On the Limits of Rights’ (1997) Law and Philosophy 16 (1) 1-18, 1. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid.  
5 International Convention for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 22; European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) Article 11. 
6 For detail discussion on the substantive contents of democracy, see Chapter 2 above. 
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refers to such permitted purposes of CSOs that is not in conflict with the rights and 
freedoms of other people, it will use the term ‘lawful purposes’ of CSOs.   
 
What does lawful purpose signify? 
Once such general principle on the lawful purposes of CSOs that pertains to the 
morality or political issue is established, it is conventional in the rights discourse to 
ask the analytical question of what it means to have such rights. This is also relevant 
from a practical point of view since legislation that concede with the rights of CSOs in 
promoting any lawful purpose may not otherwise be translated in practice to actually 
enable CSOs exercise the right of pursuing such purposes. In addressing the analytical 
question of what it means to have the right to pursue any lawful purpose the following 
fundamental propositions that merit focus can be made.   
 
Firstly, at the most basic level the right to pursue any lawful purpose shall signify the 
autonomous freedom of CSOs to choose and pick their own purposes of formation as 
long as such purposes are lawful. An enabling law that allows CSOs to choose and to 
pursue any lawful purpose thus has got a relevance of guaranteeing CSOs the freedom 
to promote democratization as a fundamental right rather than a privilege that a 
government can permit or restrict as it wishes.   
 
The freedom to pursue any lawful purpose also pertains to the autonomy of CSOs to 
pursue their lawful purposes without undue interference from state apparatus, political 
parties, the business or any other institution. Autonomy is a very important feature of 
CSOs particularly for those engaged in the democratization process, as without it CSOs 
may not be able to hold governments into account. Joerg Gorbig argues along these 
lines asserting  
‘If CSOs are to function as an efficient control mechanism over the 
exercise of state and political power, their crucial organisational property 
is autonomy from both the state apparatus and political society more 
broadly.  This autonomy extends beyond mere technical independence, 
that is the existence of separate organisational structures and the 
availability of resources required for the pursuit of an organisation’s 
specific interest. More broadly, it can be described as a relationship of 
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mutual acceptance and respectful cooperation without any claims for 
superiority on either side.7 
 
Thus, imposition or restriction of purpose (s) or unwarranted interference in their 
engagements would not only threaten their inherent quality of autonomy, but also 
compromise CSOs efficiency and the balance of power. 
 
Secondly, the right to pursue any lawful purpose signifies the right to seek, to receive 
and to utilize the necessary resource that enable CSOs pursue such purpose. The right 
to pursue any lawful purpose would only be hollow, if the resource to achieve such 
purpose cannot be attained. Thus, an enabling law would not only grant the right of 
CSOs to promote any lawful purpose but also to mobilize resources that allows them 
pursue such purpose. This topic will be discussed in length in the forthcoming chapter. 
 
Thirdly, the freedom to pursue any lawful purpose also signifies the right of CSOs to 
choose their own approaches, strategies or activities that can help them attain the best 
possible result in accomplishing their purposes of formation. CSOs freedom to pursue 
any lawful purpose thus focuses not only on the content or the substantive right but 
also signifies the rights of CSOs to choose the modus operandi or the approach that 
they can take. It therefore encompass the right to possess the capability to undertake 
any lawful strategy and activity as having the right would otherwise be meaningless 
without the necessary tools that can translate the right into a reality. In short, what an 
enabling law entails is not only to recognize CSOs freedom to pursue democratization 
as their purpose of formation, but further to guarantee the means to exercise such right 
in an effective manner. 
   
From the perspective of democratic promotion for instance, CSOs might employ 
different strategies such as the promotion of government accountability; the 
empowerment of citizenry; the representation of the rights and interests of vulnerable 
groups; the capacity building of democratic institutions; the promotion of reforms of 
                                                          
7 Joerg Forbrig, ‘The Nexus Between Civil Society and Democracy: Suggesting a critical approach’ in 
Reichel, Walter (edn.) Political Priorities between East and West. Europe's rediscovered wealth – What 
the accession-candidates in Eastern and Central Europe have to offer (2002) 2, 79-103. 
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systems, laws, policies, and actions or decisions of actors in the public sphere; etc.8 In 
order to implement such strategies that enable them to attain their purpose of promoting 
democratization, CSOs could carry out different activities. For example, in order to 
promote government accountability, CSOs might carry out election monitoring, budget 
tracking, human rights monitoring, and corruption control. The citizenry 
empowerment programme might also involve activities such as community 
mobilization, civic and human rights education, voters’ education, etc.  In order to 
articulate and represent the interests of their clients CSOs may offer them probono 
legal aid services or be involved in public interest litigation. They may also employ 
lobbying, advocacy, peaceful demonstration in order to defend the rights of groups 
they represent.  The capacity building of the democratic institutions might also involve 
human rights and other technical trainings or material provisions for the democratic 
institutions such as the police, the public prosecutor office, the judiciary and the 
parliament. On the other hand, the promotion of reforms may also involve the 
undertaking of research that provides alternative policies and legislation and 
deliberations, lobbying, advocacy, demonstrations etc.  
 
Yet it is only logical to expect that not only CSOs purposes of formation, but also their 
strategies and activities should be lawful. Thus, consistent with the line of argument 
made above in defining lawful purpose, any activity that does not come in conflict with 
the rights and interests of other individuals, groups or institutions in a democratic 
context shall be deemed as a lawful activity for CSOs. As the purposes of CSOs can 
be legitimately limited by the protection of the rights and security of other people as is 
necessary in a democratic society, the permissibility of the activities of CSOs should 
also pass a similar test to ensure that it does not collide with any other rights and 
freedoms as recognized in a democracy. 
 
Thus, what it means to have the right to pursue any lawful purpose is having the right 
to employ any lawful strategies or the right to carry out any lawful activities that will 
facilitate the attainment of such purpose. Emphasising the importance of ensuring not 
only the purpose but also the strategies and activities of CSOs, Diamond writes ‘CSOs 
chances to consolidate democracy improves significantly if CSOs do not contain 
                                                          
8 For detail discussion on the role of CSOs on democratisation, See Chapter 3above 
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illegal or antidemocratic goals and methods.’9  In sum, an enabling legal framework 
therefore entails not only the recognition of CSOs’ right to pursue any lawful purpose 
in its crudest form, but its construal that recognizes the capability of CSOs to employ 
such different strategies or activities as long as they do not employ a violent or an 
illegal means that could threaten the rights, interests, safety and security of others.  
 
Lastly, the freedom to pursue any lawful purpose may also entail the need to equip 
CSOs with the necessary legal backing that allows better implementation of their 
programmes to attain their purposes. From the point of view of promoting 
democratization for instance, a law may be enabling if it recognizes and enforces such 
rights as the freedom of expression, the freedom of assembly, the freedom of 
information and communication and networking etc. Such rights will reinforce CSOs 
activism and enable them to carry out democratic functions. Although it is not meant 
to claim that these are the only legal guarantees that facilitate CSOs promotion of 
democratization, they nonetheless deserve brief explanation owing to the degree of 
importance they have particularly for CSOs promoting democratization.  
 
Freedom of Expression and Assembly 
The recognition and the enforcement of the freedom of expression is an important 
condition for the democratization role of CSOs as it allows them to successfully 
undertake a number of democratic functions. Firstly, it enables them to be vocal in 
their advocacy activities to continuously push for a more inclusive public sphere; to 
criticize government actions and policies; and to lobby for better policy alternatives 
and legislation. Secondly, freedom of expression empowers citizens and their 
associations. Freedom of expression includes communication of ideas of all kinds 
without ‘frontiers’10 and includes not only ideas regarded as inoffensive or a matter of 
indifference but also those that ‘offend, shock or disturb’ since pluralism is essential 
for democratic society.11 The enforcement of freedom of expression is thus a very 
important vehicle for CSOs in their role of resistance and control of the state apparatus 
without fear of prosecution.  
 
                                                          
9 Larry Diamond, ‘Toward Democratic Consolidation’ (1994) Journal of Democracy 5 (3)11. 
10 ICCPR, Article 19; ECHR, Article 10. 
11 Socialist party and others v. Turkey ECGR 1998-III 41. 
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Thirdly, freedom of expression is also crucial for CSOs role of deliberation and 
representation. It permits CSOs to contribute to a genuine democracy that relies on the 
exchange of different ideas by guaranteeing their right to freely express their views in 
important public decision-making. Freedom of expression also enables CSOs to play 
a role of representation as it guarantees their freedom to speak on behalf of the rights 
and interests of the less served minority groups.   
 
The freedom of assembly on the other hand facilitates CSOs role in mobilizing 
communities and giving them avenues to voice issues to the public. It allows 
individuals and CSOs to come together, to consolidate their opinions through 
discussions and debates and to lobby and assert their agendas for discussions or 
actions. The freedom to express and assemble are also significantly related to the very 
purpose of forming or joining CSOs since their existence would be inconsequential 
without the freedom of individuals and their organisations to assemble and to express 
themselves. Indeed the exercise of the freedom of association, expression and 
assembly are ‘more than linked’ and so ‘inextricably bound up’ that the infringement 
of one of them is an infringement of the other.12 An enabling legal framework for CSOs 
should therefore essentially uphold the freedom of expression and assembly in an 
unequivocal manner. 
 
Freedom of Information, Communication and Cooperation 
The freedom of information is also an important right that an enabling law should 
recognize and enforce because to begin with, it facilitates the right to join CSOs.  
Information offers individuals and groups with greater prospect to identify and 
communicate with those having similar interests and outlooks to be organised for a 
shared aim. Moreover the freedom of information and communication would allow 
CSOs to seek, to obtain and to receive, public information; as well as to disseminate 
information. Thus the right to communication serves as important instruments for the 
democratic functions CSOs could play at the grassroots level w by inspiring civic 
engagements through awareness raising, educating, empowering and participating 
communities in public agendas. 13 
                                                          
12Ezelin v. France (1991) Series A, no. 202. 
13 The right to information and communication has been recognized as one of the fundamental rights by 
several international and regional human right instruments. See for example, ICCPR, Article 19 (2); The 
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Moreover, access to information held by the State, subject to constitutional and legal 
norms, including those on privacy and confidentiality, is an indispensable condition 
for citizens’ participation.  The freedom of information and communication thus serves 
CSOs in getting access to government policies and decisions on which they can make 
informed deliberations. Ensuring the accountability of government also requires 
having reasonable access to governmental decision making processes, human rights 
information and other public data and reports.  The right to access information thus 
facilitates CSOs’ role of monitoring human rights violations and corruption. Hence, an 
enabling law which allows access to broader and more diverse sources and channels 
of information and permits dissemination of information would enhance CSOs 
contribution to democratization. 
 
The freedom of information is also important for CSOs to enable them hold the 
Charities and Societies Agency and other regulating authorities accountable for their 
decisions that affect the existence and operation of CSOs. As the Charities and 
Societies Proclamation has left a number of loopholes that leaves the regulating 
Agencies with wider discretion with no legislative obligation to explain the reasons for 
its decisions, the freedom of information that is  enshrined in the constitution will be a 
very important guarantee for CSOs in being able to know the reasons for decision 
making. The publication of the decisions of the quasi-judicial and judicial authorities 
is very important not only from the perspective of the freedom of information of a 
particular CSO but also for the purpose of building up bodies of case laws that could 
potentially help to attain consistency and non-discrimination in decision making 
process. 
 
An enabling law should also allow CSOs to form and to participate in networks and 
coalitions in order to pursue their legitimate purposes and to impart information and 
ideas of all kinds through their networks and coalitions. Networks and coalitions are 
crucial mediums for exchange of information, experience sharing and awareness 
raising particularly for CSOs engaged in advocacy works. Indeed the power of CSOs 
to negotiate with the government and the private sector and in bringing changes mainly 
                                                          
American Convention on Human Rights, Article 13 (1) and The Declaration on Human Rights 
Defenders, Articles 5-9. 
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lies in their collective civic assertiveness through strengthened networking and co-
operation. As Fowler argues, ‘civic assertiveness wired on networking of different 
actors connected from local to global levels enable stimulation of the rights, roles, 
responsibilities and capabilities of citizens to become agents of change and to become 
the foundation, guardians and instruments of accountable governance and corporate 
responsibility.’14 
 
CSOs should also have access to a negotiation platform to enable them to articulate the 
interest of groups that are left out by party politics. Their aptitude to communicate, 
cooperate with, negotiate and influence state and non-state actors including 
individuals, CSOs, business community, international organisations both within and 
outside of their home countries determines the place they have in the democratization 
process. Therefore, CSOs need to have a reasonable access to public information, 
policy process and negotiation forums with public authorities, inter-governmental 
organisations and private corporations.  
 
Freedom to access justice 
While recognizing all the fundamental freedoms discussed above is the first important 
step for the active engagement of CSOs, their enforcement is indispensable as all those 
freedoms on paper would remain theoretical and illusory. The interpretations and 
applications of such fundamental freedoms among others require the right of CSOs to 
access an independent judiciary. Thus the right of access to justice should also be 
guaranteed by the law in order to enable CSOs assert their freedoms and contribute to 
the democratization process.  
 
The courts should also be accessible to CSOs not only to defend their own institutional 
rights but also the rights and privileges of the community they represent. An enabling 
law should therefore permit CSOs to have a legal standing to appear in court to 
undertake public interest litigation. Public interest litigation is just one, but very 
important, process whereby CSOs represent the interests of communities challenge 
authorities in the court of law. Thus an enabling law should uphold the right of CSOs 
                                                          
14 Alan Fowler, ‘An enabling environment for civil societies: What does it mean and how does law fit 
in?’ (2003)  Centre for Civil Society, Research Report 7, 1. 
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to access the court in order to allow them defend their own rights and the rights of the 
community they represent in a court of law.  
 
By way of conclusion, it may be relevant to underscore that the freedom to form CSO 
would be totally meaningless without CSOs freedom to choose and to pursue a specific 
purpose. The purposes they choose however must pass the general test of ‘lawfulness’ 
and thus not undermine the rights and interests of other individuals and groups. As is 
expected in a democratic society, an enabling law must therefore recognize the rights 
of CSOs to freely choose and to autonomously pursue any lawful purpose, including 
the promotion of human rights and democratization. This entails CSOs freedom to be 
protected from any unwarranted government restrictions or intrusions; and the freedom 
to solicit funds that enable them to implement their programmes that aim at 
contributing to democratization. The genuine recognition of CSOs right to choose and 
to pursue any lawful purpose also demands the enforcement of the freedom of 
expression, assembly, information and communication, since without such freedoms 
CSOs would be lack the necessary conduits for democratic activism.  
 
6.3 Lawful Purposes of CSOs under the Ethiopian Legal system  
6.3.1 The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution 
Article 31 of the FDRE constitution provides the general framework for the 
engagement of CSOs in ‘any lawful purpose’ as long as it does not violate any 
appropriate laws or disrupt the constitutional order. Hence only two constitutional 
limitations are imposed on CSOs freedom to choose and to pursue any purpose: Non 
violation of an appropriate law and non-disruption of the constitutional order. 
 
The first constitutional limitation is similar to the general test of ‘lawfulness’ that we 
discussed above as the legality of CSOs’ purpose of formation is required as the bare 
minimum. Hence any purpose that is in violation of ‘any appropriate law’ can be 
legitimately restricted. The constitutional qualification ‘appropriateness of the law’ is 
far from clear from the mere reading of the provision. However it seems to suggest 
that not all laws are adequate enough to suspend the freedom of association. Thus, an 
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appropriate law may be understood to be any regulation that has a merit of suspending 
the fundamental right of freedom of association.15  
 
The qualification of an appropriate law may be clarified through the interpretation of 
the provision in line with the international human rights treaties ratified by Ethiopia, 
since Article 13 of the constitution permits the interpretation of the fundamental rights 
in line with such treaties. For instance, if we take the ICCPR, one of the international 
treaties ratified by the country, any limitation on the freedom of association to pursue 
a self-chosen purpose always needs to pass the validity test of ‘necessity in a 
democratic society to protect the rights of others or the safety and security of the state.’ 
16 Thus interference in CSOs engagement due to nonconformity to the law can be 
justified only to the extent that the contents and the applications of such law are valid 
in a democratic society.    
 
The second ground for the limitation of CSOs engagement is related to the disruption 
of a constitutional order. Although a very broad concept, a constitutional order may 
be understood as a set of institutions through which the nation’s fundamental decisions 
are made, and the fundamental principles that guide those decisions.17 Thus in line with 
the ICCPR, CSOs engagement may be deemed to have disrupted the constitutional 
order only when it threatens democratic institutions, that makes democratic decisions, 
necessary in a democratic society. This may be an important qualification for the 
limitation provided by the constitution since otherwise CSOs will not be able to play 
their role of monitoring and challenging the actions, decisions and policies of the 
government, if any opposition would be deemed as a disruption of a constitutional 
order.  
 
Thus the reading of the constitutional provision that guarantees the freedom of 
association in concert with the ICCPR that forms the integral part of the law of the land 
provide that CSOs have the right to engage in any lawful purpose that is in line with 
the constitutional order as is relevant in a democratic society. The FDRE Constitution 
                                                          
15 Mark Tushnets, ‘The New Constitutional Order’ (Princeton University Press 2003) 1. 
16 ICCPR, Article 22 (2); for further detail discussion on the limitation of freedom of association, See 
chapter 3 and 4 above. 
17 Mark Tushnets, above n 15 at 1.   
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is therefore substantially in harmony with the enabling legal framework that we 
discussed above, and signifies the right of Ethiopian CSOs to be engaged in the 
promotion of democratization as a lawful purpose as long as they employ lawful 
strategies and activities. 
 
The FDRE constitution also facilitates CSOs activism for democratization as it 
recognizes the freedom of information and expression 18  as well the freedom of 
assembly and demonstration.19 The issue of whether these freedoms are given only for 
individuals or can also be invoked by CSOs can be a point of a legal argument.  
However as has been stressed earlier, an association or its members acting in concert 
need to be entitled to do what an individual can do to the extent the associational 
conduct is merely an extension of individual liberty.20 Thus it will also be reasonable 
to argue that if CSOs are entitled to do what their individual members are entitled to 
do then they must also possess the same rights and capabilities that their members are 
entitled to have to the extent practicality of the application of such right permits. If we 
follow this line of reasoning, it may be argued that the freedom of expression, 
assembly, information and communication can also be invoked by CSOs. 
 
Article 29 of the constitution guarantees every individual the right to freedom of 
expression including the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or 
through any media of his choice without any interference.  It also facilitates their role 
in agitation and mobilization of community to get public support towards a specific 
reform.  CSOs freedom of expression also facilitates their role in policy deliberations 
and dialogue. The recognition of the freedom of expression enables CSOs to play a 
role in interest representation through lobbying, advocacy, public interest litigation. 
The Constitution also allows the public interest litigation role of CSOs as it allows any 
association representing the collective or individual interest of its members or the 
groups it represents ‘to bring a justiciable matter to and to obtain a decision or 
judgment by a court of law or any other competent body with juridical power.’21  
                                                          
18 Ethiopian Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP), Article 29. 
19 CSP, Article 31. 
20Thomas Emerson, above n 1. 
21 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) constitution, Article 37. 
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The FDRE constitution also provides the right to petition, to peaceful assembly and 
demonstration having regard to the rules that stipulate the requirements for the 
protection of democratic rights, public morality and peace during such a meeting or 
demonstration.22 The right to peaceful assembly enables CSOs to mobilize community 
either for education and awareness raising purposes or to voice demands to the 
government or any other institution. Peaceful assembly and demonstrations might help 
CSOs to be vocal and to get public attention and public support which can help them 
to achieve a desired policy outcome.    
 
Thus in general, the Constitution upholds fundamental freedoms that enable CSOs to 
pursue democratization. The integration of international human right treaties such as 
the UDHR and the ICCPR as constituting part of the law of the country and the 
acceptance of a liberal interpretation of the constitution in line with such treaties ensure 
the setting of an enabling constitutional framework for CSOs formation and 
engagement in democratization and any other lawful purposes. Nonetheless, as we 
shall see below such liberal and enabling constitutional guarantee is not wholly 
translated in the Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP) that was issued to 
specifically govern the civil society sector.  
 
6.3.2 The Charities and Societies Proclamation 
The CSP classifies CSOs as societies that pursue legitimate private interests of its 
members and as charities constituted to promote public purpose i.e. charitable purposes 
having public benefit.   Similar to the general standard of permissibility of purposes, 
the CSP requires that all charities and societies are lawful. Charities can pursue any 
one of the thirteen different charitable purposes designated by Article 14 (2) of the 
proclamation: (a)the prevention or alleviation or relief of poverty or disaster; b) the 
advancement of the economy and social development and environmental protection or 
improvement; c) the advancement of animal welfare; d) the advancement of education; 
e) the advancement of health or the saving of lives; f) the advancement of the arts, 
culture, heritage or science; g) the advancement of amateur sport and the welfare of 
the youth; h) the relief of those in need by reason of age, disability, financial hardship 
                                                          
22 FDRE Constitution, Article 30. 
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or other disadvantage; i) the advancement of capacity building on the basis of the 
country’s long term development directions; j) the advancement of human and 
democratic rights; 
k) the promotion of equality of nations, nationalities and peoples and that of gender 
and religion; 
l) the promotion of the rights of the disabled and children’s rights; m) the promotion 
of conflict resolution or reconciliation; n) the promotion of the efficiency of the justice 
and law enforcement services; and o) any other purposes as may be prescribed by 
directives of the Agency. 
 
The CSP also permits the engagement of societies in any one of the charitable purposes 
listed above and also ‘in any other similar lawful purposes.’23 Nevertheless charities 
and societies can pursue any/or all of the above listed charitable purposes provided 
they earn not more than 10% of their annual income from a foreign source. Income 
from a foreign source is defined in Article 2(5) of the CSP as ‘a donation or delivery 
or transfer of any article, currency or security from the government agency or company 
of any foreign country; international agency or any person in a foreign country.’ The 
charitable purposes are thus further classified into two. From among the enumerated 
13 charitable purposes Ethiopian resident charities, Ethiopian Resident societies and 
foreign charities are excluded 24  from being engaged in the following five set of 
charitable purposes: (a) the advancement of human and democratic rights; (b) the 
promotion of equality of nations, nationalities and peoples and that of gender and 
religion (c) the promotion of the rights of the disabled and children’s right (d) the 
promotion of conflict resolution or reconciliation (e) the promotion of the efficiency 
of the justice and law enforcement services.  
 
These set of charitable purposes are reserved only for ‘Ethiopian charities and 
societies’ that receive not more than 10% of their total annual income from foreign 
source.25  The application of this provision precludes nearly 79% 26 of Ethiopian CSOs 
                                                          
23 CSP, Article 55 (1) and Article 14 (5). 
24 CSP, Article 14 (2). 
25 CSP, Article 14 (5). 
26 The Charities and Societies Agency, ‘Nine months report of the Charities and Societies Agency 
presented to the law and administrative standing committee of the FDRE House of representative’. The 
full report is available on the official website of the Ethiopian Charities and Society Agency at 
<www.Chsa.gov.et> accessed on 13 February 2015.  
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who are currently receiving more than 10% of their annual income from foreign 
sources  and registered as Ethiopian Resident charities and/or societies from engaging 
in the promotion of human rights and democracy, equality of gender, ethnicity and 
religion; peace building and efficiency of the democratic institutions. Looking at the 
nature of those charitable purposes that are proscribed for Ethiopian resident charities, 
such as the promotion of rights, equality, justice and peace, it can be asserted that the 
majority of charities are systematically excluded from exerting direct and immediate 
impact on the democratization process in practice. This is to say that although any 
organisation has an opportunity to engage in any of the charitable purposes provided 
it does not take more than 10% of its budget from foreign funds and so not totally 
excluded from democratic promotion, the reality however was that all those that were 
re-registered as Ethiopian resident might not exist otherwise if they were not foreign 
funded.    
 
This is not however to imply that the other charitable purposes listed under Article 14 
(2) (a-i) do not contribute to democratization. Any form of independent civic 
association may contribute to democratization by pluralizing and strengthening the 
institutional arena and ‘thickening the social capital.’ 27  Furthermore ‘education, 
healthy society and economic mighty having the benefit of laying a fertile ground for 
democratization’,28 the contribution of charities and societies engaged in any of the 
charitable purposes enumerated above, should not be underestimated. However, the 
CSP by outlawing the promotion of rights, equality, justice and peace by Ethiopian 
resident CSOs and foreign charities that receive more than 10% of their income from 
foreign sources, significantly stultifies the pluralistic contribution of CSOs for 
democratization through interest representation and rights promotion of vulnerable 
groups such as children, women and ethnic minorities; the promotion of government 
accountability and the capacity building of democratic institutions. 
 
Government’s Justification: 
                                                          
27Jonathan Fox, ‘How Does Civil Society Thicken? The Political Construction of Social Capital in Rural 
Mexico’ (1996) World Development 24 (6) 1089-l103.  
28Adam Przeworki and others, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in 
the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge University Press 2000). 
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One of the justifications made by the government is that the right to freedom of 
association is not a human right but a democratic/political privilege that is reserved for 
citizens alone29. The logical result of this position is that since freedom of association 
is merely a privilege that a government can bestow, limit or deny for foreigners, it has 
validly done so by limiting the areas of engagement of foreign CSOs and those which 
are assimilated as foreign by the reason of substantial funding from foreign sources. 
 
Secondly, the CSP also seems to imply that not all Ethiopian charities and societies 
have equal rights to engage in the democratization process when it singles out only 
mass based organisations to have the legitimacy to monitor elections. The government 
also argues that in order for CSOs to have the legitimacy to work on democratization 
and more notably on electoral democracy, they should necessarily have a larger 
constituency.  
 
Third, the Ethiopian government also justifies the outlawing of the listed charitable 
purposes for foreign and Ethiopian resident CSOs as it deems such purposes are 
‘political’ in nature. 30  It argues that the engagement of foreign charities in such 
‘political purposes’31 might cause a threat to the sovereignty of the nation as it gives 
leeway for foreigners to meddle in the internal affairs of the country. 32 Likewise, 
Ethiopian resident charities and societies that receive a substantial amount of their 
income from foreign source are prohibited since their engagement in such charitable 
purposes that are deemed to have a ‘political’ feature might still open an opportunity 
for an illicit foreign intervention.33 The overall tone of such politicized argument is 
that CSOs involved in the areas that are deemed as ‘political’ must truly represent 
national interests and are not vulnerable to direct or indirect manipulation by 
                                                          
29 Ethiopian Ministry of Justice, Mabrarya (Explanatory note) on the draft CSP (2009) 16 
(Amharic version) Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The Charities and Societies 
Proclamation and national and international Non-Governmental Organisations in Ethiopia’ 
<http://www.mfa.gov.et/internationalMore.php?pg=59 > accessed 10 March 2015. 
30 Ibid. 
31 As per Article 14(2) of the CSP, Purposes that are deemed ‘political’ include ‘(a) the advancement of 
human and democratic rights; (b) the promotion of equality of nations, nationalities and peoples and 
that of gender and religion (c) the promotion of the rights of the disabled and children’s right (d) the 
promotion of conflict resolution or reconciliation (e) the promotion of the efficiency of the justice and 
law enforcement services’. 
32 Ethiopian Ministry of Justice, above n 29 at 16. 
33 Amnesty International, Stifling Human Rights Work, the Impact of Civil Society Legislation in 
Ethiopia (Amnesty International 2012) 27. 
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foreigners. This was clearly spelt out in the ruling party policy document issued 
immediately after the most contested national election held in 2005. The document 
provides:   
‘NGOs are not organisations established by citizens to protect their rights. 
These organisations are rather established by individuals mainly for personal 
benefit, accountable to, and advancing the interests of foreign agencies. Their 
leaders are not accountable to the staff of the organisations and the 
beneficiaries. As a result, they cannot have a democratic nature and role.… 
Therefore, the government has to confront the ‘rent seeking’ nature of NGOs, 
for example, by considering those organisations receiving 15% of their income 
from foreign sources as foreign organisations and denying them recognition as 
a means of expression of freedom of association as well as democratic 
forums.’34 
 
Here, it is good to note that the Ethiopian ruling party (EPRDF) has been in power 
since 1991 with a firm grip of power to the point that in the last two elections (2010 
and 2015) it won 99.6 % and 100% of the federal parliamentary seats respectively. 
Where the ruling party controls 100% of the legislative mandate, any ideas and 
doctrines reflected in the party document will be enacted as a law without any 
challenge. In such a condition, where there is very little difference between the party 
documents and the government documents, the rationale behind the CSP can be 
inferred from The EPRDF’s party document issued prior to the passing of the CSP. 
 
Fourthly, in addition to such justifications provided by the Ministry of Justice in the 
Explanatory notes of the CSP, it is also asserted that the underlying motivation behind 
the prohibition of such charitable purposes is the perceived-necessity to control the 
partisan role of CSOs.  For instance, Hailegebriel writes:  
‘The Government accuses some of the human rights CSOs and their leaders of 
abandoning their impartiality and aligning themselves with the Opposition. 
Consequently the Government resorts to vindictive measures toward the CSO 
leaders, whom it has labeled as ‘angry elites’ in league with Opposition 
                                                          
34Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), ‘Revolutionary Democracy and Struggle 
for the Development of Democratic Rule’ (EPRDF 2006).  
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leaders. The restrictive legislation also seems to be a manifestation of these 
vindictive measures.’35 
 
As these four points constitute the main justifications provided (both officially and 
unofficially) for the effective exclusion of nearly 80% of charities and societies from 
the role of democratization, it is important to evaluate them in terms of the enabling 
legal framework standards that we set above and the possible impacts of such 
restriction in the democratization process of the nation. Thus it is relevant to assess 
whether or not these arguments are sound enough to outlaw the contribution of CSOs 
in terms of enabling legal conditions that facilitate the democratization role of CSOs. 
The assessment will therefore raise the following three questions. Firstly, is it 
constitutional to argue that foreigners do not have the right to freedom of association 
but only a privilege that the government can restrict as it deems necessary? Secondly, 
should CSOs necessarily have larger constituency in order to be engaged in the 
democratization process? Thirdly, even if averting foreign influence can be warranted 
in order not to disrupt internal politics, can one still plausibly argue that the 
advancement of human and democratic rights, the advancement of equality, the 
promotion of conflict resolution and the development of efficiency of the justice sector 
are ‘political’? Thus the underlying issue to answer in relation to the third point will 
be what is political purpose?  Fourthly, how does this across- the-board prohibition on 
charities and societies receiving more than 10% of their fund compare with the non-
partisan requirement that could be imposed on charities owing to their distinct 
organisational feature? 
 
Freedom of Association: A Human or a Democratic Right?  
As stated above one of the justifications for the exclusion of the Ethiopian resident 
charities and societies and foreign charities results from the narrow conceptualization 
of the freedom of association as a democratic right than a human right.36 The fact that 
the right to freedom of association is found in the section of the Ethiopian Constitution 
dealing with democratic rights is also raised to support such justification.  
 
                                                          
35 Debebe HaileGebriel, ‘Restrictions on foreign funding of civil societies’ (2010) The International 
Journal of Not-for-Profit-law 12 (3).   
36 Ethiopian Ministry of Justice, above n 29. 
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Despite the constitution that guarantees freedom of association for ‘everyone’ 37 the 
Ethiopian government maintained that constitutionally guaranteed democratic rights 
including the freedom of association, unlike human rights, are citizens’ privileges that 
foreigners cannot invoke outright. The preamble of the CSP also reflects the same 
outlook when it provides that the purpose of the proclamation is to facilitate the 
freedom of association of ‘citizens.’ 38  This is further construed to entail that the 
government can impose any kind of restriction on foreign charities or local charities as 
they do not have constitutionally guaranteed freedom to associate. Consequently the 
CSP prohibited foreign charities engagement in democratization- oriented purposes.  
 
 However, the argument that the freedom of association is a political right that only 
‘citizens’ are entitled to, does not seem to be a compelling justification.  Article 31 of 
the FDRE Constitution provides that ‘everyone’ has the right to freedom of 
association. Although the FDRE constitution puts freedom of association under a title 
of ‘Democratic Rights’,  it is nonetheless difficult to argue that all rights stipulated 
thereunder are systematically organized to be restricted to citizens alone. This can be 
evidently beheld from the reading of other provisions such as the right to movement 
and the right to marital, personal and family rights which are also mentioned under 
democratic rights but also referring to foreigners. Moreover, the inclusion of such 
fundamental rights as child rights and women’s rights under the same section will also 
justify that the fact the freedom of association is provided under a specific section of 
the constitution cannot by itself deprive its status as a human right. 
 
In fact the constitution specifically uses the terminology ‘Every Ethiopian citizen’39 in 
provisions that are conventionally the rights of citizens such as the right to own 
immovable property, the right to vote and to be elected. Whereas it uses general terms 
as ‘every person’40 while referring to such rights as freedom of association, freedom 
of thoughts etc. which are also enshrined as universal rights under international treaties 
such as the ICCPR. This shows that the stipulation of freedom of association under the 
                                                          
37 FDRE Constitution, Article 31. 
38 CSP, Paragraph 1 of the preamble. 
39 FDRE Constitution, Article 38 and 40. 
40 FDRE Constitution, Article 31. 
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title of ‘Democratic Rights’ does not necessarily imply that freedom of association is 
a right given only for citizens’ rights.  
 
Furthermore, Article 13 of the constitution also provides that the fundamental human 
and democratic rights enshrined in the constitution should be interpreted in agreement 
with the international human right instruments ratified by Ethiopia such as the ICCPR 
and the UDHR.  Hence, also in line with the interpretation of such treaties, it can be 
concluded that freedom of association is a basic right granted to ‘everyone’ 
notwithstanding nationality. Thus the legal argument invoked by the government to 
restrict the engagement of Ethiopian resident organisations and foreign charities based 
on the narrow abstraction of freedom of association is not plausible. Thus the existence 
and operation of foreign charities and Ethiopian resident charities receiving foreign 
fund should not be threatened on the ground that the government can impose ‘any kind 
of restriction whatsoever’ on foreign charities as they do not have constitutionally 
guaranteed freedom.  
 
The practical contribution of local and foreign charities and foreign funding for the 
development and the democratization of the country cannot be questioned.41 A study 
shows that just before the enactment of the CSP the civil society sector was mobilizing 
much more resource from foreign funding than the export of coffee, the country’s 
major export item.42  Thus it is evident that the prohibition of foreign funding for the 
democratic promotion; and the exclusion of Ethiopian resident and foreign charities 
that constitute 79% of the total of registered CSOs from pursuing democratization-
oriented purposes, would stultify the democratization process that was lately initiated. 
 
State Sovereignty  
The limitation on the democratic-oriented purposes of CSOs is also justified by the 
government as constituting political purposes that threaten state sovereignty. Indeed 
this argument is not new to Ethiopia, as there is an ‘inevitable contradiction’ between 
a core promise of a traditional sovereign that excessively guards the sovereign 
                                                          
41 For detail discussion on the role of CSO’s on democratization of Ethiopia, see Chapter 3 above. 
42  Dessalegn Rahmato, and others, CSOs/NGOs in Ethiopia- Partners in Development and Good 
Governance (Ethiopian CSO/NGO Task Force 2008).  
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prerogative and international activities to protect human rights.43 However, as the 
concept of the state is evolving, so must the notion of sovereignty that defines the 
nature and the scope of state authority. Khatryn Sikkink writes:  
‘If sovereignty is a shared set of understandings and expectations on the 
authority of the state and is reinforced by practices, then a change in 
sovereignty will come about by transforming understandings and practices. In 
this sense, the expansion of human rights law and policy in the postwar period 
represented a conscious, collective attempt to modify this set of shared 
understandings and practices.’ 44 
 
The democratization process that was initiated in Ethiopia and the quest of CSOs for 
more operational space is also part of the process of redefining the new contour of state 
sovereignty, similar to the global trend that recognizes global governance and human 
rights. However, in this era where governance and human rights have a wider global 
implication, the introduction of the CSP to exclude international organisations and to 
limit local CSOs from the realms of governance and human rights serves no purpose 
other than reinforcing human rights violation and uncontrolled state action which 
would result in the de-democratization of the nation.  
 
The CSP, which is enacted to jealously guard the state sovereignty, has thus come at 
the cost of democratization and the protection of the rights of vulnerable groups such 
as children, women, ethnic and religious minority groups, the poor unable to afford 
defending their rights and victims of conflicts. The CSP that is so penetrated by state-
centric rationality also contradicts the constitutional principle of ‘people’s sovereignty’ 
as it limits the participation of local CSOs in the democratization process. 
 
This is also part of the global trend practiced by pseudo democracies, which only gives 
lip service to the protection of human rights and democratic principles. As evidenced 
by the FDRE constitution the Ethiopian government accepted the legitimacy of 
international human rights practices and recognizes that the ICCPR, UDHR and other 
                                                          
43Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America’ 
(1993) International Organisation 47 (3) 411-441 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706982> Accessed on 
01 May 2015. 
44 Ibid. 
138 
 
international treaties ratified by Ethiopia form the integral part of laws of the country. 
However, the human rights violation and lack of enabling environment for the 
operation of CSOs makes the ratification of the human rights treaties more of a lip 
service than a genuine recognition to the international human rights practice. However 
with the introduction of the CSP, the government even took a backward step in the 
continuum of the human rights realm by denying the legitimacy of international 
organizations and local CSOs that raise more than 10% of their income from foreign 
sources. While the CSP could legitimately exclude foreigners and foreign funding from 
purely partisan purposes for the purpose of safeguarding sovereignty from foreign 
intervention, the general prohibition of cooperation with international organizations 
for the promotion of human rights and democracy is nonetheless unwarranted.  
 
This is not, however, to simplify the argument that the promotion of democratization 
and the involvement of CSOs in the process will be justified at the cost of state 
sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty evolves but will never disappear. So the 
important thing that an enabling legal framework for CSOs must take into account is 
finding the right balance between state sovereignty and the rights of CSOs to engage 
in the public domain. The international human right treaties such as the UDHR and the 
ICCPR shall still serve as a guiding principle setting the balance. Hence in line with 
the FDRE constitution that permits the interpretation of the fundamental rights as per 
the UDHR and the ICCPR the freedom of association may be regulated and restricted 
under the following circumstances. First, foreign charities may be subjected to such 
formalities, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interest of national security, territorial integrity or public 
health and safety, and for the protection of the reputation or rights of others.45  
 
Secondly, the freedom of foreigners to associate may also be subjected to further 
restriction in time of emergency as is required by the exigency of the situation.46 
Article 93 of the FDRE constitution provides that state of emergency could be declared 
where the council of ministers believe that there is an external invasion, a breakdown 
of law and order which endanger the constitutional order and which could not be 
controlled by the regular law enforcement agencies and personnel, a natural disaster, 
                                                          
45 The FDRE Constitution, Article 9 (4) Article 13 and Article 31; ICCPR Article 22, ECHR, Article 11 
46 The FDRE Constitution, Article 93 
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or an epidemic occurs.’ The constitution further gives power to the council of ministers 
under Article 93(4) (b) to suspend political and democratic rights contained in the 
constitutions.  Thus, a threat to state sovereignty in the context of these two conditions 
shall still serve as a ground to limit CSOs engagement.  
 
Mass Based Organisations 
The law also seems to suggest that participation in the democratization process requires 
CSOs to have a large constituency. In spite of the general unwelcoming approach to 
CSOs engagement in democratization, it is however interesting to note that the CSP 
specifically favours and encourages the Ethiopian Mass Based Organisations to be 
engaged in electoral democracy and the strengthening of democratization process of 
the country. Article 57 (7) encourages the Ethiopian Mass Based Organisations ‘to 
actively participate in the process of strengthening democratization and election, 
particularly in the process of conducting educational seminars on current affairs, 
understanding the platforms of candidates, observing the electoral process and 
cooperating with electoral organs’.47  This provision brings forward a number of issues 
worth discussing. Firstly, what are mass based organisations? Second why are they 
singled out for such purpose and how does this provision fit in with Article 14 which 
allows all Ethiopian charities and societies to be engaged in the promotion of human 
and democratic rights? Thirdly, do they possess the necessary structure, capacity and 
even motivation to pursue democratization purposes? 
  
What are mass based organisations is far from clear. Article 2(5) of the CSP defines 
only what constitutes Mass Based Societies. It defines mass based societies 
illustratively as to include ‘professional associations, women’s associations, youth 
associations and other similar Ethiopian societies. The definition does not clearly 
provide which organisations are considered mass based societies thus leaving the 
discretion for authorities to decide on the status of an organisation. The proclamation 
however does not define mass based charities, if any exist. Thus, although Article 57(7) 
of the CSP uses a more general term ‘mass based organisations’ rather than mass based 
societies, it is not clear whether Ethiopian charities can invoke this particular provision 
to support their engagement in election related activities. 
                                                          
47 CSP, Article 57 (7) 
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Related to this, it is relevant to ask if there are any organisations that can be considered 
as ‘mass based charities? Or is it intentional that the CSP does not define mass based 
charities and limited itself to mass based societies assuming that there exists no mass 
based charity? If one answers the latter question to the positive it might imply that the 
basic feature of mass based organisation is mainly related to ‘representation of 
membership’ since ‘societies’ are by definition interest groups or membership 
organisations promoting the interest of their members.  Thus it follows that mass based 
societies are deemed to have the legitimacy to have active participation in the 
democratization process because they represent their members’ interests. 
 
Nevertheless, Article 57(7) of the CSP uses a more general term ‘mass based 
organisations’ rather than mass based societies. If this would more straightforwardly 
refer to, any ‘organisation having mass membership’ it can also be invoked in favour 
of Ethiopian charities to allow their engagement in the democratization process 
including voters’ education and election monitoring, notwithstanding lack of definition 
for ‘mass based charities.’ According to this line of reasoning, CSOs legitimacy for 
active participation in the democratization process tends to relate to having a larger 
constituency or membership regardless of whose interest they are pursuing. In either 
case what constitutes a mass is not clear. So the practical question of what is the 
minimum number of membership to be considered as a mass based organisation and 
to have a greater space to be engaged in democratization remains murky. The inclusion 
of professional associations in the definition adds to the ambiguity as there are many 
professional associations which have only few memberships and do not meet the 
requirement of a mass.   
 
Notwithstanding the imprecision of what constitutes mass based organisations there is 
no doubt that larger constituency and representation enhances the role of advocacy 
CSOs in democratization having a great outreach. Many of the Ethiopian mass based 
organisation also have such structure that outreaches from the regional administrations 
down to the village and group level. Such outreach has a potential in stirring 
democratization from below and stimulating activism through their representatives in 
the local governance structures.  
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While not doubting the greater contribution CSOs can tap from having wider 
constituency and representation, yet the purpose of Article 57 (7) in singling out mass 
based organisations is not clear.  Although no definition is provided by the law and or 
explanation is given by the regulating Agency as to what constitute ‘the promotion of 
democratic rights’ Article 14 allows the engagement of all Ethiopian charities and 
societies to pursue such charitable purpose.  The promotion of democratic rights 
among others include activities listed under Article 57 (7) such as ‘active participation 
in the process of strengthening democratization and election, particularly in the process 
of conducting educational seminars on current affairs, understanding the platforms of 
candidates, observing the electoral process and cooperating with electoral organs.’ 
Thus this would raise a question why does Article 57 (7) specifically provide mass 
based organisations with such right? Is the clause redundant since all Ethiopian 
charities and societies receiving less than 10% of their fund can engage in those 
activities and many more that promote democratic rights? 
 
Nevertheless there is no sound justification for the discriminatory selection and 
privileging of mass-based organisations to engage in such activities. Firstly from a 
constitutional law perspective it is the right of citizens to be engaged in any lawful 
purpose including taking active part in the public affairs. Secondly, constituency is just 
one characteristic that can stimulate the democratization role of advocacy CSOs. Other 
traits such as autonomy and resourcefulness of CSOs are also at play for the 
contribution of the sector in the democratization process.  However, many of the mass 
based organisations currently operating in the country lack the autonomous structure, 
the human and material resource  and also the experience to play an active role in the 
democratization process. 
 
Notwithstanding, their well-entrenched organisational structure many of these 
organisations with the exception of few operating in the capital city and the Tigray 
region have very limited capacity in collecting membership fee, fundraising, proposal 
writing and project implementation.48 Those organisations also have no or very limited 
                                                          
48 The TECS team, ‘Tracking Trends in Ethiopia’s Civil Society (TECS): Mass Based Societies in 
Ethiopia: Prospects and Challenges’ 2 < 
http://www.dagethiopia.org/index.php?option=com_docmanandtask=doc_downloadandgid=293andIte
mid=120> accessed on 21 May 2015. 
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experience in such activities as voters’ education and election monitoring and 
democratization and their engagements in such areas are, ‘to date no different than was 
the case prior to the proclamation.’49 Even the very few organisations with a relatively 
developed organisational capacity are however registered as Ethiopian resident 
societies in order to access foreign fund for their development engagements.50 Thus 
the contribution of mass based organisations for democratization (at least in the current 
state) is trifling, if any. Indeed, many of the mass-based organisations being affiliated 
with the government lack autonomy, an important trait of advocacy CSOs. Indeed in 
the language of some critics mass based organisations ‘being essentially run by the 
ruling party may rather serve as ‘impostors of democracy’. 51   Thus, beside the 
ambiguity of what constitutes mass based organisations that the government desires to 
empower and engage in the democratization process, their contribution to democracy 
is however minimal due to their capacity and lack of autonomy. 
 
On the other hand however, the most active advocacy CSOs in Ethiopia do not have 
mass constituency, thus being excluded from the realm of this provision. In fact the 
government often raises small membership base of elite driven approach as the reason 
for their lack of legitimacy to be engaged in the democratization process.  It is true that 
part of the aspects that seem to have the relevance to explain the role of CSOs in 
democratization in Ethiopia is the ‘elite agency approach’ and the ‘donor-driven’ 
approach. 52  This is not however peculiar to advocacy organisations. Most CSOs, 
development and advocacy alike, that are often referred to as NGOs are founded by 
local elite groups in bringing about change in the development and democratization of 
the country. While the necessity of participation of grassroots organisations for the 
consolidation of the democratization process cannot be overstated, the contribution of 
professional oriented organisations or elite formed advocacy CSOs that can push for 
specific political or legal reforms or decisions and actions of the government should 
                                                          
49 Ibid.  
50 For example, the Addis Ababa youth Association and Addis Ababa Women Association which have 
a large number of members and have been in operation for several years are both registered as ‘Ethiopian 
Resident Societies’. 
51 Mark Tran, Ethiopia Curb on Charities Alarms Human Rights Activities, The Guardian, Jan. 26, 2009 
< http://www.guardian.co.UK/world/2009/jan/26/ethiopia-charities-human-rights>; see also Carl 
Gershman and Michael Allen, ‘New Threats to Freedom: The Assault on Democracy Assistance’ (2006) 
7 (2) Journal of Democracy 36-51, 44.  
52John Higley and others, ‘The Persistence of Post-communist Elites’ Journal of Interdisciplinary studies 
(1996) 18 (2) 133-147.  
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also be recognized. Firstly, such activist groups being in a good position to access 
information and to understand the impacts of policies and legislations may forward 
alternative ideas for deliberations by all stakeholders and the government. Such 
deliberations which engage stakeholders are also indispensable to nurturing 
democratic culture. Moreover the elites who themselves have a right to form 
associations and pursue any lawful objective should not however be curtailed to 
exercise their constitutionally guaranteed freedom even if their contribution to 
democratization would be minimal, if at all. 
 
Additionally it is also necessary to pay heed to the particular difficulty of advocacy 
organisations to get a mass support owing to the sometimes intangible nature of their 
objectives. As R. Allen Hays explains succinctly, the goals of such advocacy 
organisations contribute to the ‘free rider’ problem- that is, an individual can benefit 
from the efforts of advocacy groups’ without however being a member or at least 
without being heavily involved. 53  Moreover, with the declared intention of the 
government against advocacy organisations, people would be deterred to become 
members of active advocacy organisations, to fund them or to be associated with them. 
This therefore stifles the contribution of active advocacy organisations in the 
democratization process by restricting their role in the promotion of rights of the 
vulnerable groups, equality of the marginalized society, resolution of conflicts and 
strengthening the justice sector. 
 
6.4 Political Purposes of CSOs  
 The justification for the prohibition of some of the charitable purposes such as the 
promotion of rights, equality, justice and peace on the ground that they are political 
also need further examination on what are political purposes?  So the focus of the 
discussion in the forthcoming sections of this chapter are what constitutes political 
purposes? And why are CSOs prohibited to promote political purposes? The main 
objective is however to find out how an enabling legal framework should govern the 
matter. For such purpose, this chapter takes on the experiences of England and wales 
                                                          
53 Allen Hayes, ‘The Role of Interest groups’ 
<http://www.ait.org.tw/infousa/zhtw/docs/demopaper/dmpaper9.html > accessed 11 March 2015. 
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as one of the jurisdictions from which, the government claims,54 that the CSP has 
drawn its basic canons. It will show how the restriction of the advancement of political 
purposes by charities in England and Wales is distinct from the CSP and discuss points 
that can, perhaps, be taken as good practices from this legal system.  It also refers to 
the laws of other countries notably the USA and Australia deemed to have an enabling 
environment to clarify the notion of ‘political purposes’ and to take good practices that 
can form an enabling legal environment for CSOs engagement in democratization.  
 
What constitutes political purposes has been subject to a range of interpretations in 
different jurisdictions. Despite the lack of a precise definition, political purpose has 
been broadly defined by many jurisdictions to include  ‘supporting or opposing 
candidates for public office, supporting particular political parties, lobbying for or 
against specific laws, engaging in public advocacy, pursuing interest-oriented 
litigation, or engaging in policy debates on virtually any issue.’55 Many countries 
including old democracies such as UK, USA, Australia, and France govern such 
‘political’ purposes of CSOs distinctly from other purposes.  In these countries the 
notion of ‘public benefit’ is an important litmus in determining the engagement of 
CSOs in political purposes. In such legal systems, while pursuing political purpose is 
in general lawful, nonetheless, as we shall see below, charities or public benefit 
organisations that benefit from tax concessions or public grant are restricted from 
engaging in partisan political purposes. 56   
 
 
                                                          
54  Ethiopian Ministry of Justice, Mabrarya (Explanatory note) on the draft CSP (2009). In this 
document, the Ethiopian Ministry of Justice gives an explanation and claimed that the CSP has drawn 
the practice from other common law countries notably England, Canada, Singapore and Uganda. See 
the CSA online newsletter on the agency’s official website < www.chsa.gov.et > accessed on 1 May 
2013.  
55 International Centre for Non-for-profit law, ‘Political Activities of NGOs: International Law and Best 
Practices’ (2009) Internal Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 12 (1) 8. 
56In the US, political activity is defined as ‘participate[ing] in, or intervene[ing] in (including the 
publishing or distribution of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any 
candidate for public office.’ (IRC 501(c) (3); in England and Wales, the term political activity were 
defined by Slade J in  Mc Govern v Attorney-General as (1) to further the interests of a particular political 
party; or (ii) to procure changes in the laws of this country; or (iii) to procure changes in the laws of a 
foreign country; or (iv) to procure a reversal of government policy or of particular decisions of 
governmental authorities in this country; or (v) to procure a reversal of government policy of or 
particular decision of government authorities in  a foreign country’: McGovern v Attorney-General, 
[1982] Ch 321 at 340. See also Charity Commission, Speaking out Guidance on Campaigning and 
political activities by Charities (CC9) (Charity Commission 2008)<http://www.charity-
commission.gov.UK/Publications/cc9.aspx> accessed 10 April 2015. 
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England and Wales  
In England and Wales, political purposes is understood as constituting (i) furthering 
the interests of a particular political party; or (ii) procuring changes in the domestic or 
foreign laws or (iii) procuring a reversal of domestic or foreign governments policies 
or decisions.57    
 
Although everyone’s liberty to advocate or promote a change in law by any lawful 
means is recognized, the pursuit of political purposes by charities is however restricted 
by a body of case law in England and Wales for three reasons. (i) The incapacity of the 
judiciary to determine public benefit- it was asserted that the court has no means of 
‘judging whether a proposed change in the law will or will not be for the public 
benefit.’ 58 (ii) The separation of power argument –builds on the judicial incapacity 
argument and holds that the restriction on political purposes of CSOs (specifically an 
advocacy for a change of law) is justified because the power of determining reform of 
laws should solely lie with the legislator. Thus ‘even if the evidence suffices to enable 
the court to form a prima facie opinion that a change in the law is desirable, it must 
still decide the case on the principle that the law is right as it stands, since to do 
otherwise would usurp the functions of the legislators’.59 (iii) The stultification of the 
law argument- ‘the law could not stultify itself by holding that it was for the public 
benefit that the law itself should be changed’.60  
  
The definition of what constitutes political purpose as provided under the laws of 
England and Wales is by far liberal compared to Ethiopia. Moreover, it should be 
underscored that the charity laws of England allow the engagement of non-charitable 
CSOs to be engaged in any lawful purposes including political purposes. The 
prohibition of political purposes thus lies only against charities which are provided 
with special tax privileges owing to the public benefit they offer. Yet, the cogency of 
                                                          
57 Historically the restriction on political purposes, particularly the limitation of charities in lobbying for 
the change of laws came from decisions of the English court in the early part of the twentieth century 
passed by Lord Paker in Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [1917] AC 406 [442].  Later, decisions made 
by Slade J in McGovern v Attorney-General, holding that Amnesty International was not charitable, 
further expounded the restrictions on political purposes of charities by extending what constitutes 
political activities in McGovern v Attorney-General [1982] Ch 321 [340]. 
58Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [1917] AC 406 [442]; McGovern v Attorney-General [1982] Ch 321 
[340].  
59 McGovern v Attorney-General [1982] Ch 321 [506]. 
60 Anti-Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1948] AC 31 [50] (Lord Wright) and [62] 
(Lord Simonds). 
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the argument which has been advanced for the restriction on political purposes of 
charities in the English legal system is still highly questionable.  
 
Firstly, the rationale that courts lack the capacity to determine whether or not political 
purposes are of public benefit is unsound because, as Leslie Sheridan noted, ‘there are 
few people better qualified than judges to assess whether a change in the law would be 
for the public benefit.’61 It is what they are established for and in fact, there are many 
examples of the court judging whether or not a proposed change in the law will be for 
the public benefit.62  Sheridan further argues:   
‘Judges must decide cases on the basis of the law as it stands, it does not have 
to approve the eternal correctness of all our laws…Nothing could be more 
stultifying of the legal system than the judges always sticking to precedent, 
never breaking new ground, taking no notice of changing social conditions.’63 
 
The second ground for the restriction on political purposes of CSOs for a reason that 
the power of determining reform of laws should solely lie with the legislator not to 
impinge upon the mandates of the legislature is also a superfluous concern. The 
proposal of a reform in law or policies by CSOs would simply call the attention of the 
legislature or policy makers and provide them with alternatives. And a mere 
determination of public benefit in attempts of the law reform does not necessarily 
imply giving effect to that reform, as the persuasiveness and subsequent legislative 
actions are not influenced by the court.64  
 
Additionally, the court at minimum could recognize that the initiation of public 
discussions and debates in public discourses are to the public benefit without deciding 
on the merit of the substance as to whether a particular law or policy reform being 
sought is for the public benefit or not.65 As it cannot be determined in advance which 
opinion will make the most important contribution to the debate, all ideas should be 
                                                          
61 LA Sheridan, ‘Charity versus Politics’ (1973) 2 Anglo-American Law Review 47, 58. 
62The commissioner’s factual findings in the Anti-vivisection case are a good example. See, Anti-
Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1948] AC 31 [50] (Lord Wright) and [62] (Lord 
Simonds). 
63 LA Sheridan, above n 61at 47, 57. 
64Adam Parachin, ‘Distinguishing Charity and Politics: The Judicial Thinking Behind the Doctrine of 
Political Purpose’ (2008) 45 (4) Alberta Law Review 871, 884. 
65 Charles Rickett, ‘Charity and Politics’ (1982) New Zealand University Law Review 10, 169,171. 
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assumed to have equivalent importance and to compete in free and transparent public 
discourse to find the truth.66 
 
The third judicial justification for the prohibition of political purposes of charities on 
the ground that the ‘law could not stultify itself’ 67 is not plausible either, because law 
is not static in nature and its amendment is always anticipated. Indeed dissenting 
judgments, law reform commissions and rules of statutory interpretations are designed 
or permitted by law itself recognizing the imperfection of laws.   
 
Thus the rationale for the prohibition of political purposes particularly the restriction 
of charities advocacy for a change of law or policy even under the English legal system 
is not justifiable. However, the distinction made between ‘political purposes’ and 
‘political activities’ in the laws of England and Wales can be taken as a good practise 
in determining the rights of CSOs in political engagements. Recent developments of 
the charity law jurisprudence from a mixture of cases, Charity Commission guidelines 
and good practices in England endorse that the prohibition on political purposes of 
charities does not necessarily mean an absolute ban on their political activities. 
Meaning, even though charities cannot pursue ‘political purposes’ directed at 
furthering the interest of any political party; or securing, or opposing, any change in 
the law or in the policy or decisions of  authorities, they can however be legally 
engaged in ‘political activities’.68 
 
Thus, as long as political activities are not the continuing and sole purpose of a charity 
in England and Wales, it can undertake a range of political activities or campaigning69 
for either a change in the law or implementation of existing laws necessary to further 
or support its charitable purpose. 70  Thus campaigning by charities, ‘calling on a 
government to observe certain fundamental human rights and for the practice of torture 
to be abolished; or calling on authorities to ensure that all children with special 
                                                          
66 Christopher McCrudden, ‘The Impact of Freedom of Speech’ in Basil Markesinis (eds), The impact 
of the Human Rights Bill on English Law (Oxford University Press 1998) 85,105. 
67 Anti-vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1948] AC 31(HL) 62. 
68McGovern v Attorney-General [1982] Ch 321 [340]; see also Charity Commission, CC9, C5. 
69Campaigning is referred to as ‘awareness-raising, educating or involving the public by mobilizing 
their support to address a particular issue or to influence or change public attitudes.’ Campaigning also 
refers to activities which aims to ensure that existing laws are observed (Charity Commission, CC9 C4) 
; See  also Re Koeppler's Will Trusts [1986] Ch 423. 
70 Charity Commission, CC9 D1. 
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educational needs receive the support they are legally entitled to; are lawful charitable 
activities.’71 Charities can also support or oppose a bill introduced by the parliament if 
linked to their charitable purpose; provide alternative bills or publish comments on 
proposed bills or proposed changes in the law or government policy; provide members 
of parliament or party representatives regarding the implication of proposed laws or 
government policies which can be an instrument for a debate on particular political 
issues or promote a change in the legislation or public policies both in the country and 
abroad.  
 
Thus, charities may carry out political activities related to change of the law or policy 
and devote their resources thereto provided it is not the charity’s sole purpose and it is 
made to support and further its primary charitable purpose. Indeed a charity can 
lawfully invest most or even all of its resources on political activities in furtherance of 
its charitable purpose, for a particular period of time if it believes that its charitable 
purpose can be most effectively pursued in that manner.72The test is that political 
activity is not and does not become the only reason for the charity‘s existence. Thus, 
if the trustees believe that the purpose of the charity will be best served or succeed with 
the change in the law or policy of the government, they can involve themselves in 
campaigning or public awareness activities investing all or most of their resources on 
political activities.73 
 
Nevertheless, when it comes to a more ‘partisan’ facet of political activities of CSOs 
that is related to directly or indirectly supporting political parties, the law is less 
compromising. Charities cannot directly support any particular political party or 
candidate; provide financial or in kind support; or organise a campaign against or in 
support of any candidate to a public office or a political party before an election.74 
However, it does not mean that they are not allowed to engage with political parties at 
all. A charity can support a particular policy advocated by a political party or candidate 
as long as the policy is in support of its charitable purposes.75 Charities therefore can 
                                                          
71 Charity Commission, CC9 C4. 
72 Charity Commission, CC9 D8. 
73 Charity Commission, CC9 D8. 
74 Bonar Law Memorial Trust V IRC (1933) 49 TLR 220 (Conservative Party); Re Hopkinson [1949] 1 
ALL ER. 346 (Labour Party); Webb v O’Doherty (1991) (1991) 3 Admin LR 731. 
75 Charity Commission, CC9 E2. 
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invite political parties or individual candidates to speak at public meetings on public 
issues the charities are campaigning for; invite party representatives or candidates to 
debate on issues which the charities are pushing for; invite party representatives to 
speak at their conference organised in support of their purposes; publish the views of 
politicians and of government ministers and election candidates where these views 
relate to and support the charity’s purposes in some way76 or make their facilities 
available for political parties or candidates to hold public meetings charging them a 
reasonable amount of money.77 Hence in general charities can engage in any activity 
that promotes their purposes other than those activities which are categorically 
partisan. 
 
In supporting a policy advocated by a government or opposition parties however, 
charities should always maintain their neutrality not to lose their reputation as 
independent organisations. In dealing with the political parties, the only thing a charity 
should do is to ensure that they are not encouraging or supporting any particular 
political party or candidate as that would amount to engaging in a ‘partisan’ political 
activity which is prohibited for charities.78The principle is therefore that ‘charities can 
try to influence the policies of political parties to the advantage of their constituencies 
or beneficiaries but they must not assist any political parties or candidates to be 
elected.79 
 
United States  
 In the United States, the restrictions on political purposes of charities are rather 
statutory and are essentially related to the U.S tax system.  The U.S legal system 
defines political purposes to constitute political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition 
to) any candidate for elective public office; and lobbying for a change of law.80Thus, 
                                                          
76 Charity Commission, CC9 E3. 
77 Charity Commission, CC9 G5. 
78 Charity Commission, CC9 E1. 
79 Chariy Commission, CC9 E2. 
80The absolute statutory prohibition on political campaign has been stressed on several occasions by the 
court: See for example,  The Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. v. Comm’r, 858 F. 2d876, 881 (2d Cir, 
1988) cert denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989); United states v Dykema, 666 F.2d1096, 1101 (7th Cir 1981) 
cert denied, 456 U.S.983 (1982);  the IRS (See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem.99-07-021 (May 20,1998) 
(‘The prohibition against participation or intervention in a political campaign is absolute’) and the 
Congress: See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 13270 (1969) reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 200, 221; S. REP. No. 91-
552, at 47 (1969) reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 454 (stating that ‘no degree of support for an individual’s 
candidacy for public office is permitted’). 
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contributions to political campaign funds; or public statements of position (verbal or 
written) made on behalf of the organisation in favour of or in opposition to any 
candidate for public office; engagement of the charitable organisation agent in political 
activities at its official functions or through official publications clearly violate the 
prohibition against political campaign activity and may result in denial or revocation 
of fiscal privileges81and imposition of tax on the ‘political expenditures’ i.e. expenses 
incurred in the engagement of prohibited political activities.82 The tax is imposed not 
only on the charitable organisation but also on its managers.83  
 
Although sharply restrictive on political campaigning public charities are nevertheless 
permitted to be engaged in activities such as ‘voter education, presenting public forums 
for candidates, publishing voter education guides, voter registration and get-out-the-
vote drives, distributing information about candidates, recording votes’ if conducted 
in a nonpartisan manner.84  
 
Furthermore, public charities can also be engaged in lobbying activities as long as they 
devote merely an ‘insubstantial’ part of their activities to attempt to influence the 
legislation.85  By ‘insubstantial’ it is meant up to 20% of the overall purpose related 
expenditures for small organisations; and a slightly more than 5% but at any case not 
more than one million dollars for large organisations. 86  However ‘insubstantial’ 
activities may also be defined case- by- case by the concerned authorities (Internal 
Revenue Service) for all other charitable organisations that didn’t opt for the specific 
expenditure test.87 Appeals to the public to contact their legislator (known as grass-
                                                          
81 Treasury Regu, s 1.501 (C) (3)-(iii) (2006); See also, IRS. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-17-001. 
82 IRC, s 4955 (d) (1) (2006) defines Political expenditure as ‘…any amount paid or incurred by a 
s501(c) (3) Organisation in any participation in, or intervention in (including the publication nor 
distribution of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for 
public office’.        
83 Sec IRC, s 4955 (a) (1) (2006). 
84  IRS, ‘The restriction of Political Campaign Intervention by Section 501 (C) (3) Tax exempt 
organisations’ < <http://www.irs.gov/Charities-and-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organisations/The-
Restriction-of-Political-Campaign-Intervention-by-Section-501(c)(3)-Tax-Exempt-Organisations>   
accessed 08 March 2015. 
85  IRC, ‘Lobbying’<http://www.irs.gov/Charities-and-Non-Profits/Lobbying> accessed 06 March 
2015. 
86 Internal Revenue Service (IRS), ‘Publication 557, Tax Exempt Status for your Organisation’ (2011) 
49 http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf> accessed 13 May 2015. 
87 IRC, s 501(h) (2000). 
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roots lobbying) are subject to a separate cap one-fourth the size of the restriction on 
direct lobbying.88 
 
Unlike charitable organisations, social welfare organisations can be engaged in 
lobbying activities or activities designed to influence legislation89 in furtherance of 
their public policy purposes with no restriction.90 Social welfare organisations can also 
engage in election campaigning although it should not be their primary purpose.91 
However social welfare organisations can be fully engaged in political campaigning at 
a cost of losing the tax deduction offered to their donors. 
 
In general, the subsidy rationale underpins the legal system of the U.S.A on matters of 
political engagement of public benefit organisations. The subsidy rationale asserts that 
public benefit organisations receive tax benefits as an effective way of indirectly 
subsidizing public benefit purposes. 92  One of the major arguments against CSOs 
political engagements therefore rests on the basis that states must not subsidise political 
activities.93 This rationale known as the ‘non-subvention principle’ was first set out by 
Justice Learned Hand in Slee v Commissioner of Internal Revenue: ‘Political 
agitation… must be conducted without public subvention; the Treasury stands aside.’94 
According to the ‘subsidy argument’, charities should not be involved in political 
activities as there is no way of knowing whether the tax payer who indirectly 
subsidized their activity by contributing to the public fund supports or oppose their 
political activities.95 
 
                                                          
88See the IRC official website at <http://www.irs.gov/charities/article/0,,id=163392,00.html> accessed 
06 March 2015. 
89Legislation in this case among others include actions by Congress, any state legislation, any local 
council, or similar governing body, with respects to acts, bills, resolutions, or similar items but does not 
include actions by executive, judicial, or administrative bodies: IRS, ‘Lobbying 
<http://www.irs.gov/Charities-and-Non-Profits/Lobbying> accessed on 2 April 2015. 
90 Rev Rul 68-656 1968-2 CB 216- (i) contacting, or urging the public to contact, members or employees 
of a legislative body for the purpose of proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation, or (ii) advocating 
for the adoption or rejection of legislation’. 
91 Rev Rul 69-385, 1969-2 CB 123; See also Rev 81-95, 1981-1 C.B.332. 
92 Laura Chisolm, ‘Politics and Charity: A proposal for Peaceful Coexistence’ (1990) 58 George 
Washington Law Review 308,320. 
93Ibid, 338-41. 
94Slee v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 42 F 2d 184 (2nd Cir 1930) at 185. 
95 Perri 6, Restricting the Freedom of Speech of Charities: Do the Rationales Stand Up? (Demos 1994).  
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Even this argument is not without criticism. Firstly, the non-subvention principle 
seems unrealistic as it is not practical to say that a subsidy should be given only to 
causes that all tax payers approve of. 96  Though mandated through elections, 
governments also spend tax payers’ money on programmes which many voters 
including their own constituency may not agree or approve but the subsidy argument 
fails to recognise this. Secondly, charities are not the only institutions which receive 
subsidies from government in the form of tax cuts or other privileges. Individuals and 
commercial enterprises also receive subsidies from government but the latter are not 
restricted from engaging in political activities whether the tax payer supports or 
opposes the view expressed by them.97 Thus the law by restricting only charities from 
political engagements should not unwarrantedly apply double standards as there should 
be equality between organisations and fiscal policies should address equality.   
 
Hence, the limitation on the political purposes expenditure particularly on advocacy or 
lobbying activities is unwarranted since the private benefit rationale is not utterly 
compelling. Nonetheless, as best practice the Ethiopian legal system can take the 
example of differentiating between what constitutes partisan and non-partisan political 
purposes; and the ‘insubstantial engagement’ rule only for CSOs that receive financial 
concessions from the public fund, if at all.  
 
Australia 
A more enabling practice in governing the political purposes of CSOs can be taken 
from Australia.  Influenced by the English law, charities in Australia were not allowed 
to have a political purpose without sacrificing their charitable status. 98 However, the 
High court in its landmark decision in Aid/Watch Inc v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation (‘Aid/Watch’) held that an organisation was not necessarily excluded from 
charitable status because it had a main or a dominant political purpose. 99 
 
                                                          
96 Elias Clark, ‘The Limitation on Political Activities: A Discordant Note in the Law of Charities’ (1960) 
46 Virginia Law Review 439, 462-463. 
97 Ibid.  
98 Royal North Shore Hospital of Sydney v Attorney General [1938] 60 CLR396. 
99 Aid/Watch Incorporated v. Commissioner of Taxation [2010] HCA 42. The case was instituted by 
Aid/Watch an incorporated association that research, monitors, reports and campaigns on the 
effectiveness of Australian Government’s and multilateral overseas aid programmes when denied 
charitable status by the Australian Taxation office for its ‘political activities’. 
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The High court in this case has decided two things with certainty. First, the rule that 
political purposes may not be charitable was repealed. Secondly, the court held that 
‘the generation by lawful means of public debate…concerning the efficiency of foreign 
aid directed to the relief of poverty’ is a charitable purpose100 within the fourth head of 
the Pemsel charitable purposes, as it contributes to purposes beneficial to the 
community.  
 
However, the court has refrained from going further to discuss on the generation of 
debates about the activities of government falling outside the four Pemsel charitable 
heads. One may therefore argue that it is still debatable whether the generation of 
public debate about matters not falling within the four chartable heads could be 
considered as charitable purpose.  
 
Secondly, the court’s decision did not go further and decide that generating public 
debate about any or every government activity or policy on a particular subject matter, 
would fall within the fourth Pemsel/head. As a result, it is difficult to know whether 
the generation of public debate about a particular government activity or policy that is 
beyond existing heads of charity can be a charitable purpose.  
 
Nonetheless, what needs to be underscored and what is remarkable of this case that it 
qualifies as a good state practice is the fact that the High Court refers to the 
constitutional provision in deciding the case. The court in a majority vote determined 
that the purpose for which the charity was established although political is within the 
constitutional realm of Australia and advances a ‘public benefit’ to the community. 
 
Explaining the need of public debate between the government and electorate in a 
constitutional democracy, the court held that even if Aid/Watch employed political 
tactics in its operations as a charity, it benefited the public by contributing to public 
welfare. The court in particular determined that activities and purposes of Aid/Watch 
are charitable because the generation of public debate on aid efficiency was beneficial 
                                                          
100 AID/WATCH [2010] HCA 42, [47]. 
154 
 
to the community101 and ‘do not contradict any established system of government and 
the general public welfare.’102  
 
Thus the Australian high court decision fundamentally challenged the underpinning 
and long-established rationale behind the notion of disqualification of charities from 
political purpose’ that assert ‘the court has no means of judging whether a proposed 
change in the law will or will not be for the public benefit. It did so, by establishing in 
this particular case, the existence of the public benefit of the political purposes of 
Aid/Watch and deciding that the purposes and activities of Aid/Watch should not fall 
within the ambit of an exclusion of ‘political objects.’  
 
Apart from undermining the rationale behind the rule against political purpose, the 
court has taken an advanced position that underlies the supremacy of the constitution. 
It relied on the importance of communication on matters of government and politics, 
enshrined in the Australian Constitution and held that in Australia, political purposes 
of charities are permitted because there is no general constitutional doctrine which 
excludes ‘political objects’ from charitable purposes.103 The court was of the view that 
the origin of the apparent disqualification of ‘charities’ from pursuing political 
purposes was decided in a context which did not take the Australian Constitution into 
account, including the inherent rights of constituents for agitation and communication 
about matters affecting government, politics and policies.  The court noted that the 
constitution was based on representative and responsive government, including a 
universal adult franchise, and provided for constitutional change through popular 
referenda, and thus assumed as an ‘indispensable incident’ communication between 
the executive, legislature and electors on matters of government and politics.104 The 
system itself therefore requires ‘agitation’ for legislative and political change, and 
assumed that this would contribute to public welfare.105 Thus, the long-established 
rationale that asserts ‘allowing agitation by charities for a change of laws would 
‘stultify’ laws’ has been well challenged by the decision of the court based on 
constitutional arguments. 
                                                          
101 AID/Watch (2010) 241 CLR 557 [47]. 
102 AID/Watch (2010) 241 CLR 557 [46]. 
103 AID/Watch (2010) 241 CLR 557 [47]-[49]. 
104 AID/Watch (2010) 241 CLR 539 556 [44]. 
105 AID/Watch (2010) 241 CLR 556 [45]. 
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The court also stressed that the pursuit by charities for the enactment, amendment or 
nullification of laws rather than ‘stultifying’, would allow dynamism of the law as it 
fits the society. It noted that the law of charities has evolved to accommodate new 
social needs in addition to providing services such as food for the poor, and shelter for 
the homeless. In the modern political world charities also monitor and comment on 
government policies regularly and are consulted by governments ‘to take a view’ on 
policy initiatives and make submissions.  
 
The High Court judgment confirms that it is sensible that a charity assisting the 
homeless could provide an important contribution to public policy in relation to public 
housing. As such the distinction between politics and charity is not clear; and it is no 
longer possible to imagine a charity that would abstain from policy debates and the 
pursuit of charitable purposes has become inseparable from policy advocacy. Even 
though charities in England can pursue the same ‘charitable activity’ the Australian 
court decision has taken an advanced step towards the increased capacity of charities 
in campaigning and advocacy activities by allowing them to have an advocacy role as 
their sole purpose. 
 
Hence it empowers charities to have an increased ability to carry out campaigning and 
advocacy activities, rather than just participating in government-led reforms or 
providing educational information on relevant issues. Such activities include advocacy 
for improvement in the effectiveness of government policies relating to relief of 
poverty, advancement of education, advancement of religion or other purposes 
recognised as beneficial to the community. These activities must however be directed 
towards public benefit purposes since ‘disqualification of charitable purpose may still 
occur where a purpose does not contribute to public welfare, probably by reason of the 
particular ends and means involved’ as noted by the court.106 
 
It has been a long requirement of the common law that activities and purposes of 
charities that offend public policy principles are not charitable.107 An entity’s purpose 
                                                          
106 AID/Watch (2010) 241 CLR 557 [49].  
107 Gino Dal Pont, Law of Charity (Lexisnexis 2010) 72-75. 
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is not beneficial if it is contrary to public policy,108 is unlawful or is carried out by 
unlawful means.109 Thus, objects which threaten national security such as terrorist 
activity, religious purposes that place its adherents at risk or which are illegal in some 
way, education for illegal or harmful purposes or to encourage illegal activities and 
discrimination against particular classes of people which goes beyond what is allowed 
by law110 are all deemed not to have public benefit, thus prohibited to be carried out 
by charities. 
 
In general, the High court decision of Australia adds a practical significance to the 
sector as it allows formation of advocacy charities whose sole purpose is advocating 
for changes in the law, government policies or any other political objectives and their 
open and active engagement without fear of the loss of their charitable status. The 
decision also broadens up the scope an organisation can advocate on behalf of 
members’ interests. 
 
 Moreover, from a point of view of development in jurisprudence, it clearly spotlighted 
that the supremacy of constitutional and democratic principles is indispensable in 
determining whether charities should or should not have political purposes. The 
constitutional supremacy can be taken as a best practise in Ethiopia, in the 
implementation of the CSP in line with the FDRE constitution. Hence any subordinate 
laws of Ethiopia should be framed within a context that CSOs should be permitted to 
advance any lawful purpose that ‘does not subvert the constitutional order’ or that 
threatens the public safety and security. 
 
Hence in general the following can be selectively taken as a best practice from the 
above- discussed legal systems. Firstly and most importantly, CSOs should be allowed 
to be engaged in any lawful purposes; and any restriction on the engagement of CSOs 
should be made only in accordance with the constitution of the country. To this one 
may also add the international human right treaties such as the ICCPR which as a 
                                                          
108 Perpetual Trustee Co (Ltd) v Rovins (1967) 85 WN (Pt. 1) (NSW) 403, 411. See also Thrupp v. 
Collett (No 1) (1858) 53 ER 844.  
109 Auckland Medical Aid Trust v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1997] 1 NZLR 382,395. 
110 Gino Dal Pont above n 107. 
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matter of principle upholds that CSOs should be allowed to pursue any lawful purpose 
that does not ‘threat public safety or disrupt the values of democratic society.’111  
 
Hence in Ethiopia, similar to Australia political purposes of charities should be allowed 
because there is no general doctrine in the FDRE constitution which excludes ‘political 
objects’ from charitable purposes.112 To the contrary, all those charitable purposes 
proscribed for Ethiopian resident charities such as the promotion of rights, equality, 
justice and peace are within the realm of the FDRE constitution and advance a ‘public 
benefit’ to the community.  
 
Nonetheless reasonable legal exceptions could be made to this general principle. 
Although such constitutional guarantees exist for all sorts of associations including 
political parties, its application for autonomous CSOs should be practically limited. 
The notion of CSO as we have conceptualized it under the second chapter refers to 
those that do not compete for political power and do refrain from any partisan politics. 
The rules and regulations that govern autonomous CSOs should thus be distinct from 
the laws that regulate political parties for a number of reasons including the financial 
concessions to which independent CSOs are often entitled to. This is also reflected in 
the statutory laws or precedents governing political purposes of CSOs we have seen 
above. 
 
Thus, the second point that we can draw from the abovementioned practices is that 
charities or public benefit organisations benefiting from tax concessions or public grant 
may be restricted from pursuing only partisan political purposes. Restricted political 
purposes should therefore be narrowly defined to include only partisan purposes such 
as supporting or opposing candidates for public office and supporting particular 
political parties.  The restriction or exclusion of charities should thus be limited only 
against such narrowly construed partisan purposes. However charities should still be 
allowed to have constructive engagement with political parties or individual candidates 
or organize a debating sessions for them to debate on matters that the charities are 
campaigning for while keeping their neutrality.  
 
                                                          
111 ICCPR, Article 22 (2). 
112 AID/Watch (2010) 241 CLR 557 [47]-[49].  
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They should also be permitted to engage in public advocacy or lobbying for or against 
specific laws, pursuing interest-oriented litigation, or engaging in policy debates 
should not be restricted even for charities or public benefit organisations receiving 
benefit from the public purse. This is because as the Australian court argues, the 
purpose of such CSOs as communication channel between the electorate and the 
legislators or the executive is indispensable for the democratization process. Thus, 
allowing any non-partisan activity is relevant to give a wider space of operation for 
charities in the public affairs and democratization process of the country without 
however undermining their independence by indulging in party politics which is 
conventionally the realm of political parties.  
 
The allegation of the Ethiopian government that CSOs cannot resist the neoliberal 
ideology of their foreign donors is not substantiated by any evidence. Yet, even if this 
assertion is assumed to be true, it would only be constitutional to bring all different 
sorts of economic and socio-political ideologies including neoliberalism to a public 
debate as the public should be the final decision maker in choosing not only policies 
and legislations but also the system of governance. Indeed, this feature of constitutional 
democracy that engages the public on matters of government, politics and policies is 
what the FDRE constitution upholds as the rights of citizens. The mere reasoning that 
charities and societies would bring neoliberal ideology shall not therefore fall within 
the ambit of an exclusion of ‘political objects.’ Thus CSOs should be allowed to openly 
advocate for changes in the law, government ideologies and policies. Hence, it is 
constitutional for any charity or society not only to implement service-delivery projects 
in accordance to the development policies of the government but also to challenge such 
policies 
 
6.5 Political Purposes of CSOs under the Ethiopian Legal System  
As mentioned above the CSP outlaws the engagement of Ethiopian resident charities 
and societies and foreign charities from pursuing democratization-oriented charitable 
purposes on the ground that they are ‘political purposes’. The construal of political 
purposes and the rationale for the restriction is nonetheless different from what we 
have seen above in other legal systems because among other reasons, even the very 
definition of charities in the Ethiopian context does not imply an organisation receiving 
any financial concession from the public purse. Any civil society organisation 
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exclusively established for charitable purpose and gives benefit to the public is 
considered as a charity under the CSP.113  However these organisations cannot be 
compared with charities in England and Australia or public charities of the USA as 
they do not receive any particular tax concessions or other benefits.  This is also true 
for societies. Indeed there is no systematic tax concession or public grant benefit for 
the sector as a whole.  
 
Thus there is no legal ground that justifies a precise parallel argument that the 
Ethiopian resident charities and societies should be restricted from pursuing political 
purposes owing to the benefits they receive from the public purse. Yet, a comparable 
analogy can be made between public fund and tax concession granted to the public 
benefit organisations in other countries with that of foreign funding in Ethiopia. Thus, 
it may be argued that foreign fund solicited and received in the name of the Ethiopian 
public at large through international cooperation agreements can be treated as a public 
fund. Hence with the same reasoning as above, it can be asserted that foreign fund 
should not be expended to promote ‘partisan’ political purpose, notwithstanding the 
legality of such purpose. If the public fund of the state should not promote partisan 
objects, so should be foreign fund perhaps for a stronger reason of state security. Even 
with such an extended analogy drawn between foreign funding for Ethiopian CSOs 
with that of the financial concession granted to charities and public benefit 
organisations elsewhere, the prohibition of foreign fund will be justified only for 
partisan political purposes.  
 
Nonetheless the main problem with the CSP lies in the definition of what constitutes 
political purpose. Certainly the promotion of rights, equality, justice and peace as we 
have seen above do not constitute political purposes, and cannot be considered as 
partisan. Indeed it can be argued that there is no other notion as rights, equality, justice 
and peace that have universal value to the level that they constitute the cornerstone of 
the universal declaration of human rights. Hence such concepts being conventionally 
representative they are by definition non-partisan. Therefore, even if the argument that 
prohibition of foreign aid for the promotion of partisan political purpose can be 
justified, receiving aid for the promotion of such charitable purposes as rights, equality, 
                                                          
113 CSP, Article 14 (1). 
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justice and peace should not be restricted. Although the advancement of such purposes 
by their nature engages the public it is nonetheless non-partisan public engagement. 
 
Moreover,  the restriction on the advancement of such charitable purposes cannot pass 
the test that needs to categorically ensue in order to justify the constitutional restriction 
imposed on freedom of association; i.e. legal prescription, threat to public safety or 
security and necessary in a democratic society. Generally speaking, the advancement 
of such charitable purposes cannot be a threat to public safety and security. To the 
contrary, it can be assumed that they have public benefit. This can be challenged since 
the CSP itself stipulates such acts as charitable purposes presumed to have public 
benefit as long as such purpose can generate an identifiable benefit to the public 
without exclusion of those in need. 114  Indeed charitable purposes such as the 
promotion of rights, equality, justice and peace by their very intangible nature benefit 
the public at large without necessarily excluding any person or group who is in need 
of it even if they are not actively involved or specifically targeted by the activities of a 
particular charity pursuing such purpose. Therefore, any advocacy work for the 
promotion of human rights and equality, peace and justice having a public benefit as 
per the CSP, cannot be considered as having public security threat.  
 
Furthermore, the promotion of rights, equality, justice, as well as conflict resolution 
and reconciliation being the underpinning of democratic principles and democratic 
culture the restriction of CSOs engagement in such purposes cannot be justified as a 
‘necessity for a democratic society’.115 Hence the restriction of such purposes cannot 
be considered as justified as political to deny the right of people to associate for such 
purpose.  
 
On the other hand it is worth noting that as the CSP does not specifically rule out 
partisan politics such as support to a particular candidate or party, it rather opens a 
leeway for at least the Ethiopian societies that constitute 12% of the Ethiopian CSOs 
to engage in partisan purposes so long as they do not receive foreign fund. This implies 
for example, that an Ethiopian society raising not more than 10% of its fund from 
foreign source for the promotion of women’s rights, may support a political party that 
                                                          
114 CSP, Article 14 (3). 
115 ICCPR, Article 22 (2). 
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pledges better policy for women and lobby for its election.  Hence, the CSP fails to 
effectively limit the engagement of Ethiopian societies from pursuing partisan politics 
that could compromise the political insulation of societies that raises funds locally. On 
the other hand, however it unwarrantedly restricts nearly 80% of other CSOs from 
what was supposed to be non-partisan charitable purposes116.  
 
With the wider interpretation of what constitutes political purposes and the exclusion 
of the majority of CSOs from engaging in such purposes, in no doubt would stultify 
the contribution of CSOs to the democratization process. It is the aim of the following 
section to merely illustrate in brief, the possible implication of the CSP on 
democratization because of the restrictions imposed on CSOs engagement on the (i) 
promotion of human and democratic rights and the rights of vulnerable groups; (ii) 
conflict resolution and reconciliation; equality of gender, (iii) the promotion of gender, 
religious, and ethnic equality; and the promotion of the justice and law enforcement 
services.  
 
Promotion of human and democratic rights  
The CSP affects the democratization process as it prohibits many of the CSOs from 
being engaged in the promotion of human and democratic rights, and the rights of 
children and the disabled. 117  The importance of recognition, protection and 
enforcement of human rights cannot be overstated as a prerequisite for enhancing the 
democratization process. Indeed the respect of civil and political rights and fair and 
free election are the preliminary requisites for a democratization process of a nation. 
In this regard the contribution of many of the advocacy CSOs is substantial. Just to 
mention an example of their contribution it would suffice to state that the Ethiopian 
Women Lawyers Association, Action Professional Associations for People (APAP) 
and Ethiopian Human Rights Council reached 22, 189 most vulnerable segments of 
society who otherwise would have suffered serious human rights violation, through the 
provision of probono legal aid services, only in just a year before the enactment of the 
                                                          
116 The Charities and Societies Agency  report, < 
<http://www.chsa.gov.et/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=92111137-7114-4fce-92d3-
53b9cd550242andgroupId=10136>  accessed June 2013>  accessed  on 15 May 25, 2015 
117 CSP, Article 14 (2) (J) (l). 
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CSP.118  However a year after the coming into force of the CSP, APAP was forced to 
completely forgo its legal aid programme and the whole of its human rights promotion 
objective and the remaining two organisations were affected from the considerable 
reduction of their financial and human resource. Thus the promotion and respect of 
rights of citizens will be seriously curtailed. Also with the closing down of many of 
the regional branch offices of the Human Rights Council (the former EHRC), the only 
charity that investigates, monitors and reports on human rights violations in the 
country, and the human rights violations that are rampant in the regions might continue 
unabated and hence threaten the democratization process of the country. 
 
 Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation 
The CSP also affects the democratization process as it restricts major actors in the 
peace process from engaging in conflict resolution activities. Ethiopia is a country that 
experienced active conflict in each of the ten years between 2002 and 2011 and is still 
classified as one of the fragile states until 2012.119 Thus the contribution of any actor 
including CSOs in conflict resolution and reconciliation is enormous. Although there 
does not seem to be a universal consensus on the contribution of CSOs for the 
democratization process, most agree that they have the potential to serve as a space 
where values such as trust, tolerance and cooperation can be cultivated. Such values 
are particularly pertinent for multi-ethnic, multi-religious country like Ethiopia where 
reconciling differences is indispensable.120 Reconciliation process and peace would in 
turn help to advance the democratization process through the development of pluralism 
and tolerance.  
 
The contribution of the development wings of the major religious institutions in 
Ethiopia such as the Ethiopian Orthodox Church Development and Inter Church Aid 
Commission (EOC/DICAC), the Ethiopian Evangelical Mekane Yesus Church 
(EECMY) Peace Office and the Ethiopian Muslim Development Association (EMDA) 
having both the largest constituency as part of the religious institution and having the 
                                                          
118 Summarized from the 2009 Annual Reports of the three Organisations 
<http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/PageFiles/787/%C3%85rsrapport_Etiopia_2009.pdf> accessed on 11 
May 2015. 
119 Global Humanitarian assistance, 
<http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/Ethiopia? > accessed 12 April 2015. 
120 Ethiopia's population is highly diverse, containing over 80 different ethnic groups. It also represents 
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technical expertise as a charity had a great role to play in the conflict resolution and 
peace building process. In individual and concerted effort they addressed a number of 
inter-state ethnic and religious conflicts, and mediated in intra-state conflicts with 
neighbouring nation. 
 
However, the CSP seriously curtails the conflict management and peace building 
activities of these organisations owing to the treatment of the development wings of 
these religious institutions as distinct entities from the diaconal part and the consequent 
application of the 90/10 local fundraising requirement.  Owing to the fact that these 
organisations relied on foreign aid for their development and peace projects, similar to 
other charities, the peace projects are seriously compromised owing to the financial 
constraints. 121 As Jean Grugel puts it, ‘violent ethnic conflict violates the basic 
principle of democracy as it results in the embedment of ascriptive identities and 
triumph of uncivil nationalism which conflict with the democratic ethos.’122 Hence 
with the effective exclusion of such important actors, who have both the moral 
influence and the technical expertise, of the peace building process, the 
democratization of the country could be decelerated as violent conflicts threaten the 
essence of democratic culture and principles.  
 
The promotion of gender religious and ethnic equality 
The restriction of promoting religious, ethnic and gender equality for the majority of 
CSOs in Ethiopia is also another factor that affects the democratization process. The 
strengthening of democracy demands that the rights of minority groups within the 
country are constitutionally guaranteed; and that diverse ethnic groups coexist 
peacefully. Indeed, CSOs are particularly suitable for the representation and interest 
articulation of the minority groups whose interest could often be marginalized by the 
state that is influenced by the majority vote. Ethiopia, in particular hosting more than 
eighty ethnic groups; and a population with Christianity, Islam and traditional beliefs 
CSOs could have economized the transaction cost of democratization by identifying, 
                                                          
121 Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, in accordance with 
paragraph 15 (c) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1 – Ethiopia, Section 5, Parg 43 
<   http://www.refworld.org/topic,50ffbce51b1,50ffbce5208,4acc63fc0,0,,,ETH.html  > accessed on 
May 01, 2015. 
122 Jean Grugel, ‘Democratization: A Critical Introduction’ (Palgrave 2002) 79. 
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articulating and communicating the socio-economic and political demands which 
otherwise might remain dormant or be expressed in ineffective or non-peaceful ways. 
 
The diversity of the nation also particularly demands the promotion of equality of the 
different groups for their peaceful coexistence. The harmony and solidarity of such 
diverse group is quite indispensable since internal stability is an essential prerequisite 
to strengthen democratization. It is argued that conflict can pose serious dilemmas for 
any county trying to democratize, and impedes further consolidation.123 Hence, the 
restriction of CSOs who have the great potential of promoting equality and pluralistic 
society through representation and promotion of interests and rights of religious or 
ethnic minority groups would seriously affect the democratization process of the 
country.124   
 
The promotion of Efficiency of the Justice and Law Enforcement Services  
Another role of CSOs in the democratization process of the country is involved in 
making the decentralization system work. The importance of decentralization that 
involves and empowers local government is indispensable for the democratization of 
the country. CSOs greatly contributed to facilitate the decentralization system by 
building the capacity of local law enforcement organs of the governments which were 
seriously lacking technical expertise. The contribution of local CSOs such as 
Management Development Forum (MDF), APAP and foreign charities such as Action 
Aid-Ethiopia and Save the Children in training the local government officials and 
offering technical expertise was significant.  
 
Corruption jeopardizes the democratization of any nation but could be worse in 
countries such as Ethiopia which are already challenged by the many facets of poverty. 
Ensuring the accountability of public officials and sanctioning corrupt practices is 
therefore essential. The role of CSOs advocating for transparent and accountable 
governance system and the monitoring of corrupt practices will therefore minimize the 
risk of undermining the democratization process. In this regard, the contribution that 
                                                          
123Tina Mavrikos-Adamou, ‘Challenges to democracy building and the role of civil society’ (2010) 
Democratization, 17 (3) 514-533, 524. 
124 This however takes the premises that our definition of CSOs has ruled out ‘uncivil’ entities like ethnic 
or religious fundamental organisations. 
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was made by Transparency Ethiopia and Human Rights Council (formerly Ethiopian 
Human Rights Council) in sensitizing the public and monitoring corrupt practices was 
enormous. However the CSP inroads the contribution of these and similar other 
charities as many face financial challenges after getting re-registered as an Ethiopian 
charity. The role of other organisations such as APAP which contributed to the fight 
against corruption through their government accountability programmes have also 
been discontinued with their new Ethiopian resident status.  
 
Community Sensitization and Empowerment  
The CSP also has an implication on the democratization process by affecting the role 
of CSOs in community empowerment. One of the most important roles of CSOs is to 
purposefully create and cultivate a sense that citizens have a role to influence the 
development and the political agenda of the nation and to make a difference in the 
public arena as is envisaged in the constitution. The role of network organisations such 
as Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA), Poverty Action Network 
Ethiopia (PANE) and Network of Ethiopian Women Association (NEWA) was notable 
in the participation of local community in the initial stages of the national development 
strategies of the country. The initiation of Action Professionals Association for People 
(APAP), Organisation for Social Justice in Ethiopia (OSJE) and other advocacy and 
developmental CSOs to work with and build the capacity of grassroots CSOs such as 
Edirs was also a very good initiation to create a home-grown version of democracy 
and to entrench and sustain democratization from below. However with the restrictions 
imposed by the CSP, the role of CSOs in cultivating the demand side of 
democratization through community empowerment is also seriously curtailed. 
 
These illustrations merely represent just some of the significant work that some of the 
advocacy organisations were undertaking and contributing for the democratization 
process but stifled due to the disabling features of the CSP. It is nonetheless beyond 
the scope of this paper to make an impact assessment of the law on each of these 
organisations. However, these few illustrations can demonstrate how the 
democratization process is strategically stifled by restricting the space for the 
engagement of active advocacy organisations. 
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In sum, it can therefore be concluded that although a law may justifiably prohibit the 
engagement of CSOs from partisan politics and the involvement of foreigners in the 
internal political affairs of the country, the measure taken by the CSP is nonetheless 
unwarranted and ineffective for such purposes; but instead becomes a tool for 
suppressing the democratization role of CSOs. It is also unconstitutional in many 
regards.  
 
Firstly, the CSP in effect debases the promotion of rights, equality, justice and peace 
as ‘unlawful charitable purpose’ for Ethiopian resident charities and societies and for 
foreign charities that constitute nearly 80% of the sector.   Such restriction on the 
operational freedom is in contradiction of Article 31 of the Constitution that guarantees 
the freedom ‘of everyone’ to associate for ‘any cause or purpose.’125 Thus although 
CSP was meant to give effect to constitutional guaranteed freedom of association, it 
however fails to be in conformity with the letter and the spirit of the constitution. It 
therefore rendered the freedom of association meaningless denying individuals their 
liberty to choose the objectives that they want to pursue.  
 
Secondly, the CSP also fails to meet the ‘non-discriminatory standards’ of an enabling 
legal framework by allowing foreign funding for all charitable purposes, but for 
democracy promotion. This in effect discriminates between the rights of individuals 
who choose to promote democratization and their fellows who choose to defend other 
interests.  
 
Thirdly, the CSP can also be said to be unconstitutional as it contravenes the 
sovereignty of citizens. According to the FDRE constitution, the sovereignty of the 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia, shall be expressed through their direct 
democratic participation.126 International human rights instruments to which Ethiopia 
is a party also provide the right of everyone to engage in the public affairs of their 
country.127 However the CSP contravenes these principles as it limits the right of 
citizens to participate in the democratization process of the nation for the reason that 
                                                          
125 ICCPR, Article 22.  
126FDRE Constitution, Article 8. 
127 ICCPR, Article 25; See also Article 8 of the International Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women,  which provides the right of women ‘to participate in nongovernmental 
organisations and associations concerned with the public and political life of the country’. 
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their associations is accessing foreign fund including fund from their countrymen 
residing abroad.  
 
Fourth, by restricting the freedom of association and the democratization roles of 
charities and societies, the CSP has also significantly impinged on other 
constitutionally guaranteed rights such as freedom of expression as those two rights 
are inextricably related. For instance, by restricting the promotion of human and 
democratic rights the CSP in effect limits the rights of citizens to ‘seek, receive and 
impart human rights information and democratization ideas’ in violation of the 
freedom of expression enshrined in the FDRE constitution and other international 
human rights instruments.128  
 
Lastly, the legislative impediments on the promotion of rights in general contradicts 
the international commitments Ethiopia has ratified as binding, as member countries 
to those treaties are obliged to promote the rights enshrined therein.129 The restriction 
on the promotion of rights also infringes other non-binding commitments of the 
country such as the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders which asserts the 
right of everyone to promote and to strive for the protection and realization of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international level either 
individually or in association.’ 130Nevertheless, the reluctance of the government to 
comply with its international commitments has also sustained even after a number of 
the UN Committees,131  which oversee the implementation of international human 
rights law at country level, have formally called for the amendment of the CSP to 
safeguard freedom of association to the fullest and to ensure that any limitations on the 
right to freedom of association strictly adhere to the international human rights 
                                                          
128 FDRE Constitution, Article 29; ICCPR, Article 19 (2). 
129 ICCPR, Article 2. 
130  ‘Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to 
Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’, Resolution 
53/144 adopted by the UN General Assembly, 1999, 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Defenders/Declaration/declaration.pdf>   accessed on 18 
February 2015.  Even if the Declaration is not legally binding, its unanimous adoption by the General 
Assembly signifies a very strong state commitment towards implementation.  
131 The committees include the UN Committee on Human Rights, the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, the Committee Against Torture and, the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination.  
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instruments ratified by the country. 132 Neither do the recommendations to amend or to 
repeal the CSP made by countries such as Canada, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, 
Switzerland, UK and USA based on the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process 
which involves a review of the human rights situations of all UN Member States, 
receive any consideration from the government of Ethiopia. 133 Emphasizing on the 
issue, the UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of 
association, Mr. Maina Kiai, has also commented that ‘the enforcement of these 
provisions has a devastating impact on individuals’ ability to form and operate 
associations effectively, and has been the subject of serious alarm expressed by several 
United Nations treaty bodies.’ He further went on to recommend that ‘the Government 
revise the 2009 CSO law due to its lack of compliance with international norms and 
standards related to freedom of association, notably with respect to access to funding.’ 
134  
                                                          
132  See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Ethiopia, 25 July 2011, 
<http://daccessods.un.org/TMP/4400946.7959404.html> accessed 12 April 2015;  See also, Concluding 
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women: Ethiopia, July 
2011,  <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/co/CEDAW-C-ETH-CO-7.pdf>   accessed 
on 10 May 2015;   Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination: Ethiopia, Sept 2009 <http://daccess-
ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/448/34/PDF/G0944834.pdf> accessed on 10 May 2015    Open 
Element; Concluding Observations of the Committee Against Torture: Ethiopia, Jan 2011, 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/cats45.htm> access on 10 May 2015. Report of the Working 
Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Ethiopia, Jan 2010, <http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/9098610.28194427.html> accessed on 10 May 2015. 
133   Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Ethiopia, Jan 2010, < 
http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/9098610.28194427.html> accessed on 10 May 2015.  
134 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, April 24  <http://freeassembly.net/rapporteurreports/funding-
report/ > accessed on 12  May 10 2015.  
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CHAPTER 7 
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION 
 
7.1 Introduction  
Resource mobilization of CSOs is the third pillar that can be influenced by the legal 
regime. As in any other organisational setting both the effective delivery of CSOs 
mission and the growth and vibrancy of the sector heavily relies on their ability to 
mobilize and access sufficient human, material and financial resources. Particularly, 
influencing the democratization process, which is one of the key expected roles of 
CSOs, demands deploying huge financial and human resources for initiatives related 
to mobilizing supporters for a social cause, use of mass media for advocacy, organizing 
policy initiation and deliberation forums, gathering and synthesising information for 
interest representation, monitoring of corruption and human rights violation. To meet 
these demands and attain their mission as not- for profit institutions CSOs need to 
mobilize and solicit various tangible and intangible resources through a process of 
resource mobilization from various sources.   
 
The types and nature of resources that CSOs can mobilize and utilize may range from 
tangible to intangible resources. By tangible resources we mean resources such as 
financial, material and human resources. The possible sources and forms of tangible 
resources that CSOs can mobilize ranges from membership contribution to soliciting 
direct financial support through public collection; commercial income generating 
activities; tax concessions; funding agencies and public grants. Intangible resources on 
the other hand refers to the ‘moral and cultural resources.’ Moral resources include 
such intangible notions as ‘legitimacy, integrity, solidarity support, sympathetic 
support and celebrity.’1 Cultural resources also include tacit civic knowledge and skills 
such as ‘enacting a protest event, holding a news conference, running a meeting, 
forming an organisation, initiating a festival, or utilizing new social media required to 
either mobilize, produce events, or access additional resources.’2   
 
                                                          
1 Bob Edwards and McCarthy John, ‘Resources and social  movement mobilization’  (2004) in 
Snow David and others (eds) The Black-well Companion to Social Movements  (Blackwell 
Publishing 2007) 116–152 
2 Ibid.128 
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Two critical factors influence CSO’s ability to mobilize resources: a) their internal 
capacity including the nature of their mission, leadership capacity and legitimacy; and 
b) the regulatory environment. This chapter focuses on the second factor, i.e. the legal 
regime governing CSOs resource mobilization and utilization. Thus the chapter 
discusses the basic legal conditions or features of an enabling law that could potentially 
enhance CSOs resource mobilization capability to ensure their sustainability and the 
growth of the sector at large. In light of such enabling legal conditions, it examines the 
extent to which the prevailing legal environment in Ethiopia, particularly the Charities 
and Societies Proclamation (CSP) enables resource mobilization by CSOs. 
 
7.2 The rationale for an enabling law for resource mobilization  
A number of rationales can be mentioned why the law should create an enabling 
condition for CSOs resource mobilization. Primarily, the underlying justification for 
the rights of CSOs to mobilize resources ensues from their non-profit orientation.3 No 
institution can be sustained without resources. Governments earn revenue from taxes 
or non-taxable sources such as government owned corporations, and capital receipts in 
the form of external loans. Businesses are sustained from the profit they earn. Whereas 
CSOs lack the mandate of collecting revenue from tax; and are not essentially profit 
making entities although some can be engaged in income generating activities. Thus, 
they should rely on distinct resource mobilization strategies that heavily depend on 
provisions from individuals, the business sector and the government. The ability to 
mobilize resources is therefore a necessary condition for the continued survival, 
effective operation and the development of CSOs. Achieving this requires an enabling 
regulatory legal environment which allows CSOs to mobilize access and utilize 
resources from various sources.  
 
The rationale for CSOs resource mobilization particularly those that attempt to 
influence the democratization process can best be explained by the resource 
mobilization theory of social movements. The capacity of social movements to engage 
in collective action is inﬂuenced greatly by the type, amount and distribution of 
                                                          
3For a detailed discussion on the non-profit distribution constraint of CSOs, see chapter 3 of this paper 
;See also Jonathan Garton, The Regulation of organized Civil Society (Hart Publishing 2009) 38. 
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resources within the movement. 4  Thus, the success of CSOs in influencing the 
democratization process through collective action depends on the amount and types of 
resources that they are able to mobilize. Thus, an enabling law that allows CSOs 
engagement for the democratization process must recognize the right of CSOs to 
mobilize resources.  
 
Secondly, the rational for providing an enabling legal environment for resource 
mobilization goes even beyond the idea of enabling the sustainability of CSOs and the 
development of the sector and its contribution to democratization.  In a sense CSOs 
ability to mobilize resources has a far reaching power balancing effect in society as it 
aids to maintain the inherent worth of democracy through counter balancing the 
possible adverse effects of money-politics on the financially disadvantaged majority.    
 
Thirdly, as the freedom of mobilizing resources is pivotal to CSOs engagements, 
continued existence and independence of all types of CSOs, it is a necessary 
precondition to exercising the fundamental freedom to associate. Without the required 
means to pursue a legitimate objective forming an association becomes of a diminished 
or no value.5  When a legal environment sets a condition that denies or sets restriction 
on their ability to mobilize resources it could amount to a violation of their right for 
freedom of association as it would nullify their mission or at the least affect the growth 
of the sector in general by way of discouraging their formation or forcing their 
dissolution.  It follows therefore that a limitation on resource mobilization could be 
justified only when there is a ‘legitimate state concern necessary in a democratic 
society.’6 Thus the true exercise of freedom of association entails the freedom to 
mobilize resources from any legal source either within or outside the country.  
 
                                                          
4 Bob Edwards and Patrick Gillham, Resource mobilization theory (The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia 
of Social and Political Movements 2013). 
5 Several international and regional legal instruments have recognized the importance and relationship 
between freedom of association and the right to access to funding. See International Service for Human 
Rights (ISHR) ‘Right to Access Funding, Human Rights Defenders Briefing Papers Series’ (2009) 3 < 
www.ishr.ch/.../346-hrd> accessed 23 April 2012; See also,  The UN Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Article 6; The UN 
Declaration on the Rights and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote 
and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Declarations on 
Human Rights Defenders), Article 13. 
6 ICCPR, Article 22 (2); for a detailed discussion on the limitations of freedom of association, see 
chapter 3   
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In sum, an enabling legal environment that allows CSOs to mobilize, access and utilize 
resources from various sources is not only congruent  with the intent of the law that in 
the first place established them but also will demonstrate respect for their rights of 
association and their valuable contribution to the  overall democratization process.  
 
The law may create an enabling condition for CSO’s resource mobilization mainly 
under the following three conditions. First, the law needs to recognize and facilitate 
CSOs right to solicit funds as a right that is consequential to exercising the fundamental 
freedom to associate. Thus the right to mobilize financial resource must be generally 
recognized and any limitation to such right needs to be made in parallel to the necessary 
conditions made to exercise the freedom of association. Thus, an enabling legal 
environment should operate under the premise that any source of funding should be 
considered lawful unless it is legally proscribed and it should not be limited unless the 
limitation is a necessity in a democratic society for the protection of the public good 
or the national security. 
 
Second, in order to create enabling conditions for resource mobilization, the law needs 
to broaden up CSOs potential sources of funds. It should therefore allow resource 
mobilization by CSOs from diverse local and foreign sources including individuals, 
the private sector and public funds.  The law thus needs to allow them to receive 
donations and to conduct public collections; to offer them various forms of tax 
concessions; to enable them access public grants and contracts; and to permit them to 
self-generate income through commercial engagements.  
 
Thirdly, the law also needs to balance CSOs right to solicit funds with the necessary 
conditions that ensure their financial transparency. The legal framework is thus 
considered enabling when it recognizes the fundamental right of CSOs to solicit funds 
from any ‘lawful source’, and does not impose cumbersome procedures in resource 
mobilization and utilization, and when it is well-defined, undemanding, and not 
dependent on the discretion of authorities.  
 
The following sections of this chapter will provide a closer look at enabling legal 
conditions for CSOs ability to mobilize and access the different possible forms and 
sources of resources.  
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7.3  Human Resources 
The law may take across-the board measures such as creating an enabling legal 
environment for CSOs to enhance the quantity and the quality of human resources in 
the sector. Enabling legal environment for CSOs may possibly encourage people to 
volunteer and/or to be employed in the sector. The growth of volunteerism and 
attraction of highly qualified professionals to the sector in turn increases the human 
resource capability of CSOs and enables CSOs to accomplish their purposes 
efficiently. On the other hand disabling conditions such as harsh penalties for even 
minor faults, or a general bad outlook of the government against the sector would 
discourage people to volunteer, to get employed, or to associate themselves with the 
sector in any other manner.  
 
With enabling environment for CSOs, the sector is one of the most appropriate arenas 
in which massive volunteerism can be developed and effectively managed.7 While 
culture has a predominant role, the law may also contribute to the development of 
volunteerism by encouraging the mobilization of volunteers. 8  The law can boost 
volunteerism and encourage their participation in CSOs by creating incentives to 
volunteers and making the operational space of CSOs conducive.9 The law may for 
instance take some specific legal measures such as allowing volunteers tax privileges 
on the amounts they may receive as subsistence support.  
 
Moreover, the growth of participation of volunteers and the association of many with 
the sector also boosts the constituency of CSOs and their legitimacy, which is 
particularly advantageous for the democratization role of CSOs. Social movements 
mobilize bystanders into adherents and subsequently adherents into constituents and 
ultimately mobilize constituents to active participation. 10 By the same token, as the 
law protects volunteerism, it encourages the level of participation of individuals in 
CSOs turning them from ‘bystanders’ who watch from the sidelines to ‘adherents’ who 
                                                          
7 UN Volunteers and others, ‘Voluntarism and Legislation: A Guidance Note’(2004) 
<http://www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/volunteer_en.pdf> accessed 20 August 2013. 
8 Ibid. 
9 UN Volunteers, ‘Drafting and Implementing Volunteerism Laws and Policies A Guidance Note’ 
(2003). 
10 Bob Edwards and Patrick Gillham, above n 4 at 1. 
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share the values of democratization; and from ‘adherents’ to ‘constituents’ who 
contribute their time and finances to help the movement of democratization; and 
ultimately from ‘constituents’ to ‘active participants’ and activists of the 
democratization process. 
 
7.3.1 Human Resources under the Ethiopian Legal System  
Neither the CSP nor any other legal framework specifically governs volunteerism. The 
lack of a legal framework may discourage the participation of volunteers and causes 
the treatment of volunteers as any other officer employed in the sector.  Despite the 
absence of a legal framework for volunteers, Article 70 of the CSP that governs the 
human resources of CSOs provides that any capable person can be engaged as an 
officer in charities and societies except those persons who have been convicted of a 
crime that involves fraud or dishonesty or have been convicted of any crime which 
causes the deprivation of his/her civil rights. Such requisites could possibly enhance 
the trustworthiness of the sector which is a necessary attribute for their function in 
democratization and the provision of public and quasi private goods. 
 
7.4 Financial Resources   
Finance is one of the most tangible and widely used form of resources that CSOs access 
and use for the achievement of their objectives. CSOs use different processes and 
methods to mobilize financial resources such as membership contributions, public 
collections, commercial activities, and public funds in the form of grants or contracts, 
and foreign funding sources.  
 
7.4.1 Membership Contribution  
CSOs may or may not rely on only their own members’ contribution depending on 
their purposes, size and the financial ability of their membership. Membership dues 
cannot however be the only source of funding for CSOs because to begin with not all 
CSOs are membership based, which suggests that, other forms of resource 
mobilization would still remain necessary for non-membership based CSOs.  
Moreover even membership based CSOs may have broader goals that cannot be fully 
sustained by members’ contributions. What’s more, a total reliance on members’ 
contributions may effectively contradict the ‘universal’ nature of the freedom of 
association as uneven wealth distribution in society would deny the economically 
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disadvantageous groups of the society not to pursue their objective for lack of sufficient 
resource. This therefore warrants that CSOs need to mobilize resources from diverse 
sources other than membership fees. An enabling law must thus recognize this need 
and cater for possibilities for CSOs to use other forms of fund raising or resource 
mobilization from funding agencies and the public at large.  
 
7.4.2 Membership Contribution under the Ethiopian Legal System 
Members’ contribution is one source of funding for CSOs but an area on which the 
stretch of the law is limited. Thus understandably the CSP does not govern membership 
contribution as a source of funding for charities and societies. However, as long as the 
purposes of CSOs are lawful, it would only be reasonable that members who joined 
the organisation to pursue such purpose would be allowed to invest their own material 
and human resource onto the accomplishment of such purpose.  
 
7.4.3 Public Collection 
While it might be possible for small informal associations to largely rely on the 
voluntary human resource contribution of their members, the same will be difficult for 
large formally organized CSOs with numerous transactions to sustain their operation 
and existence through the use of membership contribution. Hence, in order to create a 
strong and independent CSO, it is important that CSOs have diversified source of 
funding including fundraising from the public at large 
 
An enabling law should therefore allow CSOs to engage in all kinds of public 
collection activities such as door-to-door, telephone, direct mail, television, 
campaigns, lotteries, raffles, auctions and other fundraising strategies. 11  However 
unlike other sources of funding such as membership dues and donations from private 
and public institutions that can easily be accounted through receipts and official 
documents from formal financial institutions such as banks, accounting some form of 
public collection can prove rather difficult. Thus, for the purpose of ensuring financial 
transparency of CSOs it is important that the law puts as a requirement for any public 
solicitation a prior registration with a CSOs regulating agency, which will issue 
                                                          
11 Benedict Iheme, ‘The Legal and Regulatory Framework for Civic Organisations in Namibia’ (2009) 
11 (2) IJNL 76; See also Leon Irish and others, Guidelines for Laws affecting Civic  Organisations 
(2ndeds, Open Society Institute 2004) 62. 
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permits, badges, and other identification materials to the fundraisers, provide 
information to the public, and sanction inappropriate conduct.12 A robust regulatory 
regime will help to ensure the transparency of CSOs and to maintain the public 
confidence in the sector which in turn assists fundraising.  However, the transparency 
mechanisms should not be bureaucratic or burdensome to the level that would inhibit 
CSOs ability to solicit fund from the public. Thus it is important that the fundamental 
right of CSOs to mobilize resource through public solicitation is clearly recognized by 
the law. The details of the regulations that sets out to ensure the financial transparency 
should not have a purpose of more than informing the regulating Agency to enable it 
undertake its supervisory role and any limitation on public collection should pass the 
test of ‘necessity to limit the freedom of mobilizing resources.’ Standards of 
fundraising should thus be clearly set out in advance in order to ensure predictability 
and objectivity of authorities on the one hand and legality and accountability of CSOs 
on the other. 
 
7.4.4 Public Collections under the Ethiopian Legal System 
The Charities and Societies proclamation clearly recognizes the fundamental right of 
CSOs to mobilize resource through public solicitation. In an ideal situation where the 
public has both the financial capability and the tradition of giving, public collection is 
the best means of fundraising compared to government grants or contracts, foreign 
grants or corporations funding in order to keep the independence of charities and 
societies.  Currently however, such economic and social requisites are lacking in 
Ethiopia, forcing many of the CSOs to raise funds from foreign sources. Yet, public 
collection remains to be the major source of fundraising for Ethiopian charities and 
societies working on the institutional level of democratization since such groups are 
not allowed to raise more than 10% of their funding from foreign sources.  Resource 
mobilization through public collection may also bring an incidental opportunity for 
CSOs to publicize themselves and their mission and thereby procure other intangible 
resources such as solidarity and sympathetic support. It may also help them grow to 
acquire the skill of initiating and running public events, and using new forms of social 
media that form essential moral and cultural resources for social movements. 
 
                                                          
12 Ibid, 63-64. 
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The CSP provides that, charities and societies can ‘appeal in any public place or by 
means of visits to places of work or residence; for money or other property whether 
for consideration or otherwise and which is made in association with a representation 
that the whole or any part of its proceeds is to be applied for charitable purposes.’13 
The CSP also sets out the details of conditions that CSOs need to fulfil for public 
fundraising in order to ensure their financial transparency. Charities and societies may 
thus conduct public collections only after applying to the Agency and being granted 
permission.14 Upon receiving the application, the Agency may make inquiries as it 
deems fit and can determine to refuse or to issue a permit with or without conditions.15 
If a positive decision is made the Agency will decide the purpose of public collection, 
duration, place and any other criteria that the Agency deems relevant.16  
 
The CSP also sets in advance the grounds whereby the Agency may deny CSOs a 
permit for public collection or revoke a permit. Thus, where the public collection is 
not going to be utilized for the purposes of the Charity or Society as determined during 
registration; where information provided by the applicant is false or misleading; and 
where any of the persons who are to conduct the fundraising do not fulfill ‘the 
requirements of the CSP’ set under article 70, ( i.e., where the person who is to conduct 
the fundraising has been convicted of a crime that involves fraud or other crimes that 
involves dishonest acts,  or  has been convicted of any crimes as a result of which 
he/she has been deprived of his/her civil rights and his/her civil rights has not been 
restored,  or is an able to act by reason of incapacity within the meaning of the law, or 
has been interdicted by the court, or has been outside of Ethiopia and his/her absence 
impedes the proper administration of the charity,17) the Agency may refuse or grant 
conditional permission to the application and notify its decision to the applicant in 
writing.18 Improper administration or failure to comply with the legal requirements and 
with the conditions set by the Agency could also be grounds for revocation of the 
public collection after the granting of permission.19 Any money or property collected 
                                                          
13 CSP, Article 103 (1). 
14 CSP, Article 98 (1). 
15 CSP, Article 99 (1). 
16 CSP, Article 98 (2). 
17 CSP, Article 70 
18 CSP, Article 99 (2) and Article 100 
19 CSP, Article 101 (1) 
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in contravention of the CSP may thus be confiscated by the Agency and applied to 
similar charitable purposes.20 
 
The exhaustive listing of the grounds for refusal or revocation of public collection 
facilitates non-bureaucratic process as it would not leave the Agency with a discretion 
that could affect the right of charities and societies to solicit fund. The requirement that 
the law puts on the Agency to notify the applicant of ‘its decision and the reasons for 
its decision’21 on the application and to do it in writing is also appropriate as it would 
help the applicant CSO to take the necessary action and also to have an evidentiary 
document in hand if it decides to make an appeal against the decision. These legal 
requirements in general are enabling as they would ensure the predictability of the 
process; and the objectivity and answerability of authorities for their decisions. On the 
other hand, such standards will also help to ensure the legality and accountability of 
charities and societies. 
 
Despite these enabling factors that balance CSOs right to mobilize resource with their 
fiscal transparency and accountability, however some of the legal conditions set by the 
CSP could pose a potential challenge for CSOs in their endeavor to mobilize resource 
through public collection. Firstly, the directive governing public collection provides 
that public collections can be made only when the charities and societies are able to 
prove that they are not able to raise funds by other means and that public collections 
should be their last resort to enable them discharge their purposes of establishment.22 
The directive did not provide how charities and societies would be able to prove their 
inability to raise fund by other means and that public collection is their last resort. 
Rather, the directive however put the burden of prove on the charities and societies. It 
is a difficult job to prove for charities and societies that would discourage them from 
applying for public collection. Thus, public collection is not encouraged by the law, 
although it is an ideal form of resource mobilization to keep the independence of CSOs 
and to solicit public support provided the social and economic requisites are available. 
 
                                                          
20 CSP, Article 101 (2) 
21 CSP, Article 99 (2) 
22 Charities and Societies Public Collection Directives No5/2011, Article 5 (4) 
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Secondly, there seems to be a wider discretion for the Agency. Although some form 
of regulation and control on CSOs public collection is required to serve the purpose of 
protecting the public from illicit acts under the cover of charity fundraising, yet much 
discretion seems to be given to the Agency to decide the purpose, the place and the 
duration of public collection. Once a CSO is registered as per the requirement of the 
CSP having either one of the legitimate charitable purposes set out by the law,  public 
collections to accomplish such purpose must be a guaranteed right of CSOs. Thus the 
mandate of the Agency to determine the purpose of public collection seems an 
unwarranted discretion. The discretion of the Agency to determine the place and the 
duration of fundraising if at all necessary must also be limited to conditions necessary 
for the Agency to undertake its supervisory role and pass the test of ‘necessity to limit 
the freedom of mobilizing resources.’  
 
Thirdly, the prohibition of anonymous funding 23  also challenges CSOs public 
collection. Apart from the general economic reality of the country, the prohibition of 
anonymous donations prevents those few who are able to donate for charities ‘because 
of fear that they might get reprisals for giving financial support particularly for 
advocacy CSOs.’24  Although it is expected that the prohibition of anonymous funding 
is a procedural necessity in order to discern the citizenship and residence of donors, as 
funding from foreigners and Ethiopian Diasporas is prohibited, for advocacy CSOs it 
also brings negative repercussions on potential local funding. 
 
In sum, while the legal recognition for public collection is commendable, lack of the 
social and economic requisites for public fundraising, prohibition of anonymous 
funding and wider discretionary power of the Agency might pose a challenge for 
CSOs. Given such challenges and the lack of experience of fundraising through public 
collection by the sector, an enabling condition demands that the Agency applies its 
discretion reasonably and encourages charities and societies to be engaged in public 
collection without difficulty. This is particularly relevant for advocacy organisations 
that should be raising 90% of the funds locally, and would much bank on public 
collection. Hence, if advocacy CSOs should have financial capability and autonomy, 
                                                          
23 CSP, Article 77 (3). 
24 Yoseph Mulugeta, former Executive Director of the Ethiopian Human Rights Council 
<http://news.bbc.co.UK/1/hi/world/africa/7736417.stm > accessed 14 August 2014. 
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the granting of permission should be as swift as possible and the grounds of denial and 
revocation of the permission should be narrowly construed to the extent possible and 
made effective only upon failure to rectify errors. 
 
7.4.5 Commercial Activities 
Engaging in economic activities is also another form whereby CSOs raise financial 
resources. This method is particularly crucial in countries where the accumulation of 
capital and philanthropic giving is limited. Engagement in economic activity gives 
CSOs two major advantages. Primarily, any kind of commercial activities helps CSOs 
to be financially sustainable thereby reducing the influence of external bodies be it 
donor agencies or government. Financial dependence on government and/or donors, 
not only will compromise CSOs’ independence and their contribution to the 
democratization process but will also make them lose track of their strategic mission 
as they will try to appease their donors or focus their energy on where grants are 
available.   
 
Secondly, some of the economic activities of CSOs, if related to their purpose, could 
indirectly help CSOs accomplish their intended objectives. For instance, when a think 
tank CSO that works on policy advocacy publishes and sells policy research it benefits 
financially while at the same time promoting its purpose of information dissemination 
and initiating public debates on policy matters.   Hence  CSOs that pursue not-for- 
profit activities and that do not distribute potential profits for founders, board or other 
members and employees should therefore be allowed to engage in lawful commercial 
activities.25  
 
The breadth of this privilege may either be limited to related or incidental business 
activities or be unconstrained and include any economic activities permitted by the 
commercial law of the country. An enabling law should in general uphold the idea that 
the wider the economic activities CSOs can be engaged in, the better the opportunity 
                                                          
25 The experience of countries varies when it comes to economic activities of CSOs and the tax from 
their economic activities. For example, in England and Wales, a charity may engage in a trade or 
business but only indirectly, through a subsidiary. See Charity Commission CC35<http://www.charity-
commission.gov.UK/publications/cc35.asp> accessed 1 August 2013; In Poland, a foundation may 
engage in a trade or business directly. See, The Law on Foundations of the Republic of Poland, art. 5 
(5) < http://www.icnl.org/library/cee/laws/polfoundations1984(eng).htm> 56. 
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for them to enhance their financial capabilities and autonomy.  However, the 
engagement of CSOs in any economic activities just like the private sector might pose 
some risks. First CSOs may neglect or abandon the very purpose for which they are 
established for and focus more on the income generating activities.  Secondly, 
unlimited engagement of CSOs in wider commercial activities may also threaten 
healthy business competition because of differential tax treatments that CSOs are 
likely to enjoy. Thirdly, unless properly regulated it also poses a risk of promoting 
fraudulent commercial entities with no genuine intention of promoting public purposes 
establishing themselves as CSOs in order to avert tax duty.  
 
An enabling law for CSOs therefore needs to strike the right balance between providing 
enabling provisions for CSOs to mobilize resources through engaging in commercial 
activities and promoting a healthy competitive business environment in the society. 
The way to attain such a balance is by putting a maximum amount of money a CSO 
could involve in commercial activities or applying the rule of Principal purpose test. 
The Principal purpose test determines whether the organisation is principally or mainly 
commercial or non- commercial. According to this test, the volume of resources spent 
on the purposes indicates which purpose is the principal purpose of the organisation. 
Thus, under this test a CSO that consistently spends a significant part of its resources 
in commercial activity will be declared as a commercial organisation than a CSO and 
thus lose its tax benefit status.   However, the particulars of the law regarding the 
ceiling need to be clearly and objectively determined depending on, among others, the 
economy of the country and the accessibility to other sources of funding. 
 
7.4.6 Commercial Activities under the Ethiopian Legal System 
The CSP stipulates that upon a written approval of the Agency charities and societies 
can be engaged in income generating activities that are incidental to the achievement 
of their purposes in accordance with the requirements and procedures laid down in 
other laws that govern the registration and licensing requirements of business entities.26 
The fact that the CSP for the first time permits CSOs to raise fund through engagement 
in commercial activities creates an enabling condition and broadens up the space for 
resource mobilization by CSOs in the country. In a country where there is limited 
                                                          
26 CSP, Article 103 (1). 
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philanthropic provisions and a law that constrains fundraising from foreign sources, 
the engagement of CSOs in income generating commercial activities is crucial.  
 
The CSP also caters for sufficient protection to ensure the accountability of CSOs for 
their mission and a healthy business competition. Firstly it promotes healthy business 
competition by subjecting CSOs to others laws concerning the registration and 
licensing requirements for activities related to trade, investment or any profit making 
activities.27 Secondly it ensures that the engagement of CSOs in commercial activities 
is merely to finance the charitable purposes for which they are established for by 
putting a nonprofit distribution constraint. 28  Since the purpose of their commercial 
engagement is to plough back the income and to further the charitable purposes for 
which they are established, the law requires that the proceeds shall not be distributed 
among the members or beneficiaries. Thirdly, in order to ensure CSOs accountability 
the CSP also requires that any charity or society engaged in income generating 
activities shall keep separate books of account with respect to such commercial 
activity. 29  Failure to comply with these requirements may entail cancelation of 
license.30 
 
Despite these enabling factors that balance CSOs right to mobilize resource with their 
fiscal transparency and accountability, some of the legal conditions make resource 
mobilization through commercial engagement difficult for CSOs. Firstly, while the 
legislation requires CSOs to seek approval for commercial engagement from the 
Charities and Societies Agency, it nonetheless fails to state the grounds that the Agency 
must consider in approving or denying income generating activities. Neither has it 
required the agency to give reasons for its decision. It therefore leaves significant room 
for unpredictability, arbitrariness and discrimination in decisions. Such condition that 
could be amenable to abuse by authorities compromises not only CSOs fundraising 
through commercial engagement but also their operational independence and poses a 
threat to their contribution to the democratization process. 
 
                                                          
27 CSP, Article 103 (4). 
28 CSP, Article 103 (1). 
29 CSP, Article 103 (2). 
30 CSP, Article 92 and Article 103 (3).  
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Secondly, owing to the very nature of the charitable purposes they pursue which are 
not marketable the proviso that commercial engagement is limited only to activities 
that are incidental to the main objective of charities and societies is particularly 
restrictive for advocacy organisations. For instance, a charity that is engaged in 
economic empowerment of women through provision of technical and material 
assistance to open small scale enterprises or agricultural production may earn some 
resource from the sale of the production of those materials. Whereas another charity 
aimed at pursuing the promotion of women’s rights would be highly restricted to be 
engaged in income generating activities owing to its very purpose of establishment. 
Thus in effect the law perhaps inadvertently limits advocacy CSOs from income 
generating activities, despite the fact that those organisations are the utmost financially 
challenged ones due to their disqualification for foreign aid.  
 
7.4.7 Tax Concession 
The tax regime has significant impact on the fiscal aspects of CSOs.  A tax regime may 
enhance CSOs financial capability by providing tax concessions to CSOs and their 
donors. The amount and type of tax benefits that can be offered for CSOs often depends 
on the economic wealth of a nation, and fiscal policy considerations including the type 
of tax rationale the country is enforcing. Four different tax rationales are often 
forwarded for tax concessions for CSOs.  
 
Firstly, a tax concession for donors to CSOs is justified on the basis of the underlying 
justification for taxes. Donors need to have tax concessions because people should only 
be taxed on the personal consumption or wealth accumulation, and money donated to 
charity does not count as either.31 Hence it is reasonable to allow people to choose to 
contribute for social goods directly through charitable gifts rather than through paying 
their tax dues into government account. This encourages philanthropic giving for CSOs 
from individuals and corporates.   
 
Second, akin to the first rationale applicable to donors, tax concession for public 
benefit CSOs can also be justified on the same ground of lack of personal consumption 
                                                          
31 Boris Bittker, ‘Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?’ (1972) Tax Law 
Review 28, 37; Williams Andrews, ‘Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax’ (1972) Harvard Law 
Review 86 (2) 309.  
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and wealth accumulation. Owing to the non-profit distribution orientation of CSOs, a 
tax privilege needs to be given for CSOs since any income they earn does not count 
either as personal consumption or wealth accumulation as it is reinvested to promote 
the purposes that are deemed to benefit the general public.  
 
The third justification for tax concession for CSOs alludes to the shared responsibility 
of government and CSOs. Hence, tax should be appropriated to CSOs as they promote 
societal values32 and provide public goods and quasi private goods that the government 
was supposed to provide. 33  Because CSOs are supporting the government in 
discharging its duties, they also need to share its revenues. Though very similar to the 
second rationale mentioned above in offering tax benefit for public benefit CSOs, this 
rationale however focuses on shared responsibility.   Hence, for instance, corporate 
organisations whose main objective is the provision of public goods and quasi private 
goods may still benefit from tax concessions although such organisations may share 
out dividends to their members.  
 
The fourth rationale for tax concession, that can be referred as the pluralism rationale 
is made on the basis that CSOs are themselves inherent public goods that promote 
plurality and hence deserve tax concessions.34 This last justification for tax concession 
does not take the nature or purposes of CSOs into account. Thus according to the 
pluralism rationale tax concessions should be offered both for public benefit 
organisation or private interest organisation. 
 
Thus the degree to which a law is enabling in terms of tax concession depends among 
others on which of the abovementioned tax rationale the government employs in 
regulating the tax regime of CSOs.  The minimum a tax regime can tender for CSOs is 
income tax exemption from membership contribution because imposition of tax 
thereon could discourage the formation and the growth of associations.  On the other 
hand, a liberal tax regime may offer tax concessions for all types of tariffs that are 
hypothetically due on CSOs and their donors for all types of CSOs irrespective of their 
                                                          
32 Ibid, 3. 
33 James Fishman and Stephan Schwarz, Nonprofit Organisations: Cases and Materials (3rd edn, 
Foundation Press 2006) 328. 
34 Reich R, ‘Toward a Political Theory of Philanthropy’ department of Political Science, Stanford 
University 3-10), 3. 
185 
 
purpose or membership, based on the pluralism rationale. Generally, a tax regime may 
offer one or more of such tax benefit as:   
i. Tax exemption or reduction for donors, i.e. individuals or corporations, for 
their charitable contributions of property or cash; 
ii.  Income tax exemption or deduction for any revenue that CSOs receive i.e. 
incomes either in cash or other items of value earned from membership 
dues, from private and corporate donations, and funding agencies;  
iii. Tax exemption or deduction from incomes earned through CSOs 
commercial activities;  
iv. Any other exemption or deduction on taxes payable by CSOs necessary to 
run the organisation such as excise tax, customs tax, VAT, property tax, 
taxes from interests, dividends, or capital gains earned on assets or the sale 
of assets.  
 
A liberal tax benefit for donors is important because it promotes individual and 
corporate benevolence, a social virtue in itself in addition to catering as financial aid 
for CSOs. Moreover, it enhances a ‘tripartite partnership’ among government, business 
and CSOs. 35  A liberal tax benefit for CSOs is also crucial for CSOs financial 
sustainability and the growth of the sector. This in turn contributes to the 
democratization process by promoting strong vibrant CSOs that pluralize the public 
sphere.  Notwithstanding such benefits of a liberal tax concession for CSOs and their 
donors however, an enabling law must give due regard that such tax concessions for 
CSOs may not bring any negative repercussions on other institutions and societal 
values.  Two examples of possible negative implications of an unsystematic tax 
concession can be given here.   
 
First, tax concession for CSOs may affect healthy business competition. When a 
business entity competes with CSOs benefiting from tax concessions there is a risk that 
such tax benefit would cause a market distortion that could possibly force the private 
sector out of business. Thus a ceiling for the amount of tax concession for CSOs related 
to their commercial activities must be clearly and objectively determined considering 
the accessibility to other sources of funding for CSOs, the size of their commercial 
                                                          
35 Paul Bater, ‘Evaluating Incentives for Donations to Public Benefit Organisations’ (2000) 2 IJNL 3 < 
http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol3iss2/art_2.htm > Accessed 10 August 2012. 
186 
 
engagement, their profit margin etc. since it would otherwise affect the business 
community.  
 
On the other hand, an enabling legal framework for CSOs should also ensure that taxes 
imposed on any type of CSOs should not be higher than their business counterparts, as 
it would otherwise significantly undermine their contribution.36 The imposition of 
more onerous taxes on CSOs than their business counterparts might render the 
rationale of market-failure theory unworkable as it adds cost to the public goods and 
services that CSOs provide. Moreover it significantly undermines the contributions of 
CSOs by adding the transaction cost of establishing and sustaining CSOs. 
 
Second, uncontrolled and unwarranted tax concession for donors of CSOs may also 
affect democratic electoral competition. According to the plural rationale there is no 
doubt that even CSOs working on partisan politics must benefit from tax concessions 
as they also contribute to pluralize the public sphere. Yet allowing tax benefit to 
partisan politics poses a risk as it may lead to the distortion of the rules of the game in 
a democracy by unbalanced money politics. Although the role of CSOs in 
democratization through public policy deliberations and voters education is 
considerable, nonetheless ‘campaign-related speeches distort open, honest political 
discourse.’37  Privately financed election campaigns have always given the wealthy 
minority disproportionate power.38 Hence, tax deductions for contributions to partisan 
CSOs would make such disproportionate power even worse. Because the tax deduction 
for charitable contributions offers the greatest nominal financial benefit to taxpayers 
in higher income tax brackets, the electoral politics of charities favoured by the rich 
would likely receive a disproportionately large subsidy. 39  Hence no tax deductions 
should be given for donors supporting CSOs pursuing partisan politics since such tax 
concessions system would distort the procedure of fair election system. Thus a tax 
                                                          
36 Leon Irish above n 11 at 78. 
37 FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 409 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (‘Elected 
officials may remember how their elections were financed. By enacting the statutory provision that the 
Court invalidates today, a sophisticated group of legislators expressed a concern about the potential 
impact of Government funds on pervasive and powerful organs of mass communication.’). 
38 Marty Jezer and Ellen Miller, ‘Money politics: campaign finance and the 'subversion of American 
democracy’ (2012) Notre dame journal of law ethics and public policy, 8 (2)8. 
39FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 409 (1984). 
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regime should set the right balance between the benefit of tax concession for CSOs 
and other societal values. 
 
The tax regime should also be clear, objective, predictable, accessible and non-
discriminatory. An enabling law therefore needs to ensure that tax concessions for 
CSOs are clearly provided and widely disseminated in order to enable objectivity and 
predictability. The predictability of rules governing tax privileges is very important to 
counteract arbitrariness and discrimination by authorities thus safeguarding CSOs 
particularly those that are deemed unpopular by the government.40 The decision of 
authorities on tax concessions should also be subject to judicial appeal as it will give 
CSOs the chance to challenge arbitrary decisions.41 
 
An enabling law must also recognize that tax concessions are voluntary that can be 
waived by CSOs, when some conditions that compromise their freedom are attached. 
For instance, where tax concession brings with it more strict regulation or prohibition 
of undertaking certain activities, CSOs should be able to choose more freedom than 
tax privileges. Tax privilege for CSOs should thus remain essentially voluntary 
allowing CSOs that prefer to operate without higher level of scrutiny to opt themselves 
out of such scheme.42  
 
7.4.8 Tax Concessions under the Ethiopian Legal System 
The legal provisions governing the tax duty of charities and societies in Ethiopia are 
found scattered in different legislation of the country posing challenges for consistency 
and reconciliation.   
 
Income Tax 
The FDRE Income Tax legislation provides CSOs with tax concessions for the income 
they earn from donations and membership dues. 43 This is reasonable as such income 
does not constitute personal consumption and wealth accumulation by CSOs as it is to 
be reinvested on charitable purposes.   
                                                          
40 Leon Irish, above n 11 at 78. 
41 Statement of the Sixteenth Annual John Hopkins International Fellows in Philanthropy Conference, 
‘Towards an enabling legal Environment for Civil Society’ (2005) IJNL 8 (1) 3,4. 
42 Leon Irish above n 11 at 78. 
43 Income Tax Regulation No 78/2002, Article 11. 
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The same legislation also provides demarcated tax concessions for donors of CSOs. 
Thus, gifts and donations that do not exceed 10 percent of the taxable income of the 
donor are deductible. 44   This is commendable as it encourages philanthropy. 
Nonetheless, while one can clearly see the intent of the law for the provision of tax 
concession for donors of CSOs, unfortunately however the tax regime is far from clear 
and is amenable to unpredictable and discriminatory application.  
 
Article 11 of the Income Tax Regulation provides that deductibility of donations or 
gifts is allowed in three situations:  
‘If the recipient of the donation is registered as a welfare organisation and 
the registering authority has certified that the organisation has a record 
of outstanding achievement, and its use of resources and accounting 
systems are transparent; 
If the contribution is made in response to an emergency declared by the 
government to defend the sovereignty and integrity of the country, to 
prevent man-made or natural catastrophe, epidemic or for any other 
similar cause; or 
If the donation is made to non-commercial education or health facilities.’ 
45 
 
Firstly, in pursuant to the above provision, tax concession is permitted to ‘welfare 
organisations.’ However, it is not clear which organisations are considered welfare as 
the regulation fails to define the same. On the other hand, the CSP does not refer to 
any charity or society as welfare organisation. Since the tax regime is not reconciled 
with the provisions of CSP, what constitutes ‘welfare organisation’ is unclear and open 
for interpretation. Unfortunately, there is neither a case law nor any legislative 
guidance on the interpretation of ‘welfare organisations’. Thus if only ‘welfare 
organisation’ can be interpreted broadly to include all charities and societies, advocacy 
                                                          
44  Income Tax Proclamation No. 286/2002 Article 21 (1) (n) provides that in principle gifts and 
donations are not deductible from income tax.  Nevertheless Sub Article 2 of the same provision gives 
the mandate for the Council of Ministers to issue a regulation to exempt charities and societies from the 
application of Article 21 (1) (n) and to exempt gifts and donations that are provided for public use. 
Accordingly Article 11 of the Income Tax Regulation No 78/2002 of the Council of Ministers has made 
conditional income tax exemptions for gifts and donations contributed to specific types of charities and 
societies.  
45 Income Tax Regulation No 78/2002 of the Council of Ministers of Ethiopia, Article 11 (1) (a). 
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CSOs would be able to benefit from such tax concessions offered to their donors. Yet 
as the law stands now clarity is lacking, failing the standard of an enabling fiscal 
administration and its application could be amenable to arbitrariness and 
discrimination. 
  
Secondly, the merit - based condition requires charities and societies to adduce 
‘certification of outstanding achievement’ from the registering authority (Agency) in 
order to benefit from income tax deductibility.46 However the CSP does not mandate 
the Agency to assess and grade achievements of charities and societies. Neither does 
it contain any objective criteria to assess ‘outstanding achievement. Lack of case law 
from the cassation court which only forms a precedent in the country and lack of 
legislative guidance on the interpretation of ‘outstanding achievement’ leaves charities 
and societies to authorities’ discretion. This could also be amenable to abuse and 
discrimination particularly against those CSOs that are deemed unpopular by the 
government. The law also fails to stipulate the right to appeal against the decision of 
authorities in relation to the certificate, although the general ‘claims and appeals’ 
provision in the CSP can be invoked for the case and an administrative appeal can be 
made to the Director General of the Agency and the Board; or to the court as the case 
may be. Even so, it would be doubtful if the court can order the Agency to issue a 
certificate that is not so mandated by the legislation thereby rendering the applicability 
of the tax concession difficult. 
 
The second and third conditions where deductibility of donations or gifts are allowed 
are less controversial in nature. They are contributions made in response to an 
emergency declared by law and donations made to non-commercial education or health 
facilities. Unfortunately, the tax deductibility of donations or gifts are limited to only 
these three kinds of organisations and the great majority of CSOs in Ethiopia are not 
benefiting from this tax deductibility provision which is disabling in substance.  
 
Value Added Tax 
The Value Added Tax (VAT) law singles out humanitarian organisations as 
beneficiaries of VAT concession. The VAT law did not define which organisations are 
                                                          
46 Ibid.  
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considered humanitarian organization, however, the practice in the country indicates 
that those CSOs working on emergency relief and rehabilitation programs are 
considered humanitarian organization. The Value-Added Tax (VAT) proclamation 
provides that any activity that involves the supply of goods and services which is 
carried on continuously or regularly by any person in Ethiopia or partly in Ethiopia 
whether or not for a pecuniary profit should pay VAT.47 Thus, based on this provision 
as a matter of principle all Ethiopian and foreign charities and societies should pay 
VAT charges whenever they purchase goods and services locally.  
 
However the VAT law also exempts the supply of some specified goods and rendering 
of services notwithstanding whether they are undertaken by charities and societies or 
business entities. Hence some charities and societies may indirectly get VAT relief 
from the provisions of these exempted goods and services such as the rendering of 
medical, educational and child care services; the supply of goods and services in the 
form of humanitarian aid, as well as import of goods transferred to state agencies of 
Ethiopia and public organisations for the purpose of rehabilitation after natural 
disasters, industrial accidents, and catastrophes.48 In practice a list of charities that are 
exempted from VAT due to their objectives of provision of relief aid are identified by 
the Disaster Prevention and Control Authority and submitted to the Tax Regulating 
Authority, VAT department.49 Other charities and societies however will be exempted 
through bilateral or multilateral agreements or understandings with the government.50 
 
In general, it is commendable that the tax regime that governs the fiscal aspect of 
charities and societies offer them and their donors’ with tax concessions. However, the 
fact that funding privileges do not benefit the majority of charities and societies 
registered as ‘Ethiopian’ pursuing the objective of multi-sectoral socio-economic 
development and democratization is rather limiting. In general international 
comparisons show although the national wealth of countries could be one factor that 
affects liberality in tax concessions, it does not necessarily match up with economic 
                                                          
47  Value Added Tax Proclamation No. 285/2002, Article 6  
48 Value Added Proclamation Tax No. 285/2002, Article 8 
49 Bekure Herouy, ‘The VAT Regime Under Ethiopian Law with Special Emphasis on Tax Exemption: 
The Ethiopian and International Experience’ (2004) Christian Relief and Development Association 18. 
50 Value Added Proclamation Tax No. 285/2002, Article 8 (4). 
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welfare. It is rather a matter of policy orientation that relies increasingly on the 
credence that policy makers have on the contribution of CSOs.  
 
In conclusion, although the elements of the prevailing laws represent the intentions of 
providing an enabling environment, the vagueness of the relevant provisions governing 
the tax regime render the intents unserviceable. Moreover, when gauged vis-à-vis the 
absence of a culture of public giving and the restriction on foreign funding for 
Ethiopian charities and societies, one may argue that more generous tax concessions  
should have been  set to enable CSOs contribution to democratization. 51  The 
reconsideration of policies on a more liberal tax rationale and the revision of the tax 
regime in line with the recent CSP in a manner that integrates more systematic tax 
concession for charitable purposes to which foreign funding is restricted are necessary 
to create a more meaningful and enabling environment. 
 
7.4.9 Public funds 
Public funds either in the form of government contracts or grants that ‘support socially 
responsible civic endeavours’52 are another source of funding for CSOs. CSOs can bid 
on state contracts or be granted projects on the ground that they are more efficient and 
cost effective than private for profit organisations.  However this source of funding 
often strongly and unduly politicizes the relation between the government and CSOs.53  
This might compromise the independence of CSOs and make them submissive. This 
poses a particular challenge on the effectiveness of CSOs working in democratization 
as they could show reluctance in monitoring and holding government accountable in 
fear of losing access to public funds. Although the law does not have a concrete and 
effective way to remedy this challenge, some contractual remedies that depends on the 
                                                          
51 A privilege for instance comparable to that of the Ireland, Australia, UK and USA will be more 
enabling. Ireland and Australia put a minimum threshold but no upper limit on donations eligible for tax 
relief applies; UK tax-deductibility is given for any amount if donations are made through Gift Aid or 
payroll giving schemes. USA also makes all donations fully tax deductible for those itemizing their tax 
returns. For further detail, See, ‘International comparison of charitable giving’ (2006), CAF briefing 
report, 10< 
http://www.cafonline.org/pdf/International%20Comparisons%20of%20Charitable%20Giving.pdf> 
accessed 03 September 2014. 
52 Alan Fowler, ‘An enabling environment for civil societies: What does it mean and how does law fit 
in?’ (2003), Centre for Civil Society, Research Report 7, 3. 
53 For discussion on the influence of CSO’s financial dependency on government fund, See Morris 
Debra, ‘Charities and the Contract Culture: Partners or Contractors? Law and Practice in Conflict’ 
(1999) Charity Law Unit, University of Liverpool, < 
http://www.liv.ac.UK/media/livacuk/law/cplu/clurep1.pdf> accessed 2 August 2014. 
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political will of the government adopted by some countries can however be taken as 
best practice. A very good example is that of England where  there is a specific 
agreement commonly known as ‘COMPACT’ between the government and 
representatives of CSOs whereby the former specifically undertakes to ‘Respect and 
uphold the independence of CSOs to deliver their mission, including their right to 
campaign, regardless of any relationship, financial or otherwise, which may exist.’54 
 
Although the impact of the law in safeguarding the trading of autonomy for financial 
reliability is limited as access to public funds is primarily detected by the will of the 
government, it may at least proscribe that government contracts should not contain any 
gagging order or provisions that would prevent CSOs from pursuing their purposes 
autonomously including advocacy and campaigns against the policies of the 
government. Such legal stipulations may clarify the relationship between government 
and CSOs and thereby create more constructive partnerships to solve increasingly 
complex socio economic and political problems efficiently. 
 
7.4.10 Public fund under the Ethiopian Legal System 
The CSP does not envisage public resources either in the form of government contracts 
or grants as a source of funding for charities and societies. However recently, there 
was an instance whereby the Human Rights Commission gave funds for the two most 
leading charities55  that provide probono legal aid. The funding is however limited to 
such specific activity and cannot be used for any other activity that help them pursue 
their general charitable purposes. 
 
The selection of the two most prominent advocacy organisations could be attributed to 
their expertise. The funding from public account could also help them pursue their 
objectives amidst very challenging shortage of budget they faced after the enactment 
of the CSP that limits foreign funding. Nevertheless such arrangement could stultify 
the autonomy of the most vocal advocacy organisations in the long run and impair their 
                                                          
54  The full version of the COMPACT agreement is available on < 
http://www.compactvoice.org.UK/sites/default/files/the_compact.pdf> accessed 14 April 20143. 
55 EWLA and EHRCO has for the first time received fund from the Human Rights Commission, a human 
right institution established by the Ethiopian parliament. The fund was only for the year 2010 and has 
not been continued (2010 Annual reports of EWLA and EHRCO). 
193 
 
effectiveness in the monitoring of government actions.56 Yet with well-defined rules 
and procedures that define the relationship between the government and the charities 
in such a manner that their autonomy would not be compromised, enhancing positive 
relationship and more funding opportunities could create a more enabling operational 
environment for those charities and societies whose function is affected by the CSP 
restriction on foreign funding. 
 
In sum, the funding privileges of advocacy CSOs in the form of tax concessions and 
public funds is very minimal and unsystematic, and does not boost their financial 
capability and efficiency. The reconsideration of policies to offer public funding 
particularly for charitable purposes to which foreign funding is restricted could create 
a more enabling environment provided such schemes are made free of any gagging 
clauses that compromise CSOs independence. Yet a more enabling approach that 
enables CSOs to withstand the pressure that compromises their operational autonomy 
due to public funding can be attained by broadening the sources of funding from 
individuals, corporations, and other local and foreign funding agencies. 
 
7.4.11 Foreign Funding 
In addition to ensuring the financial sustainability of CSOs from local sources, an 
enabling law may also broaden CSOs ability to solicit resources from overseas. 
However the issue of access to foreign source is the most contentious sources of 
funding for CSOs. It carries with it a controversy between the freedom of CSOs to 
solicit fund on the one hand, and the unwarranted influence of foreign governments or 
foreign companies on the other. Some governments such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Zimbabwe and Russia for instance restrict access to foreign fund on grounds of 
protecting national security and sovereignty. 57  
 
                                                          
56 The Human Rights Commission although constituted to be an independent institution, the fact that it 
is highly influenced by the government would still make the apprehension of challenging the autonomy 
of the charities plausible. 
57 Many countries including Ethiopia bans foreign funding on the pretext of national security and state 
sovereignty. For the global trend on the restriction of foreign funding, see The International Center for 
Not-for-Profit Law and World Movement for Democracy Secretariat at the National Endowment for 
Democracy, Defending Civil Society: A Report of the World Movement for Democracy (World 
Movement for Democracy and ICNL 2008) 10-20. 
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Thus the main issue that an enabling law needs to address regarding foreign funding is 
how the concern of the government on unwarranted foreign influence can be addressed 
without compromising the freedom of CSOs to solicit funds. Such balance is 
particularly relevant in countries where foreign funding is particularly crucial due to 
the poverty of the nation and/ or limited local philanthropy owing to social or economic 
reasons.  Thus, particularly in countries where local sources of financing are very 
limited, it is imperative for CSOs to broaden their resource base and solicit fund from 
foreign sources including bilateral and multilateral donors and international funding 
institutions.  
 
Relatedly, the Special Representative of the Secretary General on Human Rights 
Defenders has recommended that CSOs be entitled to access foreign funds to the same 
extent as governments, as part of international cooperation given that mechanisms that 
ensure transparency are in place.58 What is stressed under this recommendation and 
what an enabling law thus needs to ensure is the placement of safeguards to ensure the 
financial transparency of CSOs.  Indeed financial transparency of CSOs is one of the 
major areas that an enabling law needs to ensure regardless of the source of funding. 
The placement of a system that ensures the financial transparency of CSOs through 
periodical financial reporting and auditing safeguards the public and the nation from 
any illicit acts by CSOs, while at the same time protecting the freedom of CSOs to 
solicit fund, which is an important aspect of the freedom to associate.  
 
It is legitimate that the state would inspect the legality of the sources and purposes of 
foreign funding as national interests and security might be threatened as terrorists and 
extremist groups could be funded through CSOs or money laundering could be done 
under the cover of CSOs. While such covert acts would compromise the credibility of 
the sector, it would also endanger the democratization process of a nation as a whole. 
Hence, foreign funding needs to be well regulated to ensure the legality of foreign fund 
flow as well as its lawful usage.59 Yet states must not interfere with overseas financial 
transfers for CSOs as long as the source of funding is legal and the fund is used for 
                                                          
58Hina Jilani, ‘Report submitted by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights 
defenders, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 58/178’  22; See also, Fundamental 
Principles on the Status of Non-governmental Organisations in Europe, Article 50. 
59 For further discussion on financial accountability see Chapter 8 below. 
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lawful purposes. Thus CSOs right to access funding may be restricted only on the same 
grounds that their purposes could be restricted i.e. where there is a legitimate state 
concern that warrants restriction for the protection of the public and the nation as is 
deemed relevant in a democratic society. An enabling law however should 
simultaneously encourage diversified local funding from corporate giving, tax 
concessions and commercial engagements to avert foreign aid-dependence. 
 
7.4.12 Foreign Funding under the Ethiopian Legal System 
The CSP limits Ethiopian Charities and Societies whose purposes are the promotion 
of rights, equality peace and justice not to solicit more than 10 percent of their funds 
from foreign sources.60 The restriction on foreign aid has in effect violated the right of 
individuals to freely choose their purposes of associations, as it forces some CSOs to 
abandon some or all of their objectives. For instance, some of the prominent advocacy 
organisations such as APAP and OSJE which were previously involved in the 
promotion of democracy and human rights had to abandon their historic objectives for 
lack of funding and re-registered themselves as Ethiopian Resident Charities. This 
limitation is nonetheless against the commitment of the Ethiopian state ‘to protect the 
right of everyone to solicit, receive and utilize resources either individually or in 
association with others for the express purpose of promoting and protecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms through peaceful means.’61 
 
Ethiopia is a very poor country that stands 211th from 214 countries with a meager 
US$380 Gross National Income per capita (2009-2013).62  Reports also show that the 
country is one of the nations that still receives gross amount of foreign aid in 
humanitarian assistance. In 2011 alone the country received US$3.6 billion in total 
assistance out of which US$681 million constitutes a humanitarian assistance thus 
making Ethiopia the fifth largest recipient of official aid in the world.63 Although the 
UN Agency recommends that CSOs be entitled to access foreign fund to the same 
                                                          
60 CSP, Article 2 (2). 
61UN Declaration on the Rights and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to 
Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Declarations 
on Human Rights Defenders), Article 13. 
62  The World Bank, ‘GNI Percapita, Atlas method)(2009-2013),  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD>  accessed on 1 December 2013 
63  Global Humanitarian assistance, 
<ttp://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/Ethiopia?> accessed 12 January 2014. 
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extent as governments as we have seen above,64 nonetheless the CSP puts a disabling 
measure against such recommendation denying Ethiopian charities and societies an 
entitlement to access foreign fund from international cooperation. The rejection of 
foreign aid for CSOs while the state itself is the major recipient of foreign aid simply 
under the pretext that CSOs unlike government cannot withstand undue pressure from 
foreign donors appears hypocritical. The restriction of foreign funding placed on CSOs 
by the CSP is nonetheless justified by the government as a necessary precaution 
measure to prevent meddling of foreigners in the internal political affairs of the country 
by pushing a model of democratization influenced by the neoliberal ideology. 65 When 
the restriction imposed on CSOs from accessing foreign fund is viewed in parallel with 
the fact that a significant percentage of the country’s national budget is donor funded, 
it reveals that the government is not totally against foreign funding, but holds a 
presumption that the capacity of the sector is not strong enough to similarly withstand 
foreign pressure, unlike government. 
 
Yet, given the socio economic reality of the country where local sources of funding 
are almost nonexistent66 and also given the constitutional commitment made by the 
Ethiopian government to respect freedom of association, the CSP should have 
broadened the ability of charities and societies to solicit fund from overseas. 
Nevertheless, the restriction of the CSP on foreign funding is unbounded as it also 
excludes fundraising from Ethiopian Diaspora and UN Agencies which are assumed 
to operate independent of any foreign forces. The CSP defines income from foreign 
sources as ‘a donation or delivery or transfer of any article, currency or security from 
the government agency or company of any foreign country; international agency or 
any person in a foreign country.’67 Based on this definition, the CSP prohibits even 
Ethiopians living abroad from making contributions to Ethiopian charities and 
societies to accomplish charitable purposes, such as the promotion of democracy and 
                                                          
64 Hina Jilani, above n 58 at 22; See also Fundamental Principles on the Status of Non- governmental 
Organisations in Europe, Article 50. 
65  Amnesty International ‘Stifling Human Rights Work, the Impact of Civil Society Legislation in 
Ethiopia’ (Amnesty International 2012) 27. 
66 Ethiopia is one of the poorest country in the world with a per capita income of just 380 US dollar, 
lower that the average per-capita income of other Sub-Saharan countries which is 515 US dollar. 
Ethiopia is also the second most populous country in Africa with a population of 91.73 million (2012) 
with a GDP of 41.61 billion US dollar. The country’s Poverty head count ratio (PPP) at national poverty 
line (% of population) is 29.6%. For detail poverty index and other data related to Ethiopian economic 
condition, See, World Bank website http://data.worldbank.org/country/ethiopia > accessed 1 Jan 2014.  
67 CSP, Article 2 (15).   
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human rights, equality, peace and justice. This particularly denies Ethiopian Diasporas 
who could have contributed better owing to their financial capacity and their freedom 
against fear of possible intimidation by the government. Moreover, the CSP also 
prohibits funding from International organisations such as UN Agencies that operates 
independent of any foreign forces unless they manage to procure an agreement with 
the Federal Government.   
 
During the law crafting and consultation process the CSOs Taskforce that represents 
the sector presented alternative proposals  which included considering a graduated self-
sufficient scheme that starts from receiving 90% foreign aid for the first year and goes 
progressively towards reaching the 10% maximum foreign aid rule. Another proposal 
was to allow charities and societies to be a partner in the tripartite project agreement 
with government and the funding agency so that the transfer of the fund will be made 
through the government that enables it to have a direct control over foreign fund for 
CSOs68. Although these proposals could have brought the necessary balance between 
the rights of CSOs to solicit funds with that of the prevention of unnecessary foreign 
intervention, neither of these recommendation were accepted and no reason was given 
by the government why the recommendation were not accepted but the legislation was 
enacted without incorporating the proposals recommended by the coalition of CSOs.  
 
Thus in a country where there is excessive reliance upon overseas donors; where there 
is nearly no opportunity to generate revenue from local source for charitable purposes; 
and where it is unrealistic to presuppose that there will be in the near future, setting a 
prohibitive law with a  far-reaching implications on even citizens and independent 
institutions such as UN from making contributions, not showing   willingness to accept 
plausible recommendations  from the sector that enable sufficient government control 
and overseeing of such funds with no explanation, leaves one to discern   that  the 
concern or intention of the law goes far beyond  what is being espoused as concerns of 
national security to possibly also curbing the role of charities and societies  in the 
democratization process.   
                                                          
68 Taskforce for an Enabling Environment for CSOS in Ethiopia, Comments and Recommendation on 
the draft Ethiopian Charities and Societies Proclamation (2008) (Prepared in Amharic language). The 
author of this thesis had been working for the Taskforce and was  one of the drafters of the comments 
and recommendation proposed by the Ethiopian CSOs 
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7.5 Resource Utilization  
The financial capability of CSOs is affected not only by the source and the amount of 
funding they solicit but also by the regulatory framework governing its utilization. The 
right to mobilize resources would be meaningless if CSOs do not have the freedom to 
utilize the resource that they solicited to accomplish their purposes of establishment. 
Thus CSOs right to utilize the fund to cover their administrative and operational costs 
necessary to run the organisation need to be recognized and enforced. Nonetheless the 
right to utilize funds also needs to be balanced with CSOs financial accountability. 
This requires among others that CSOs utilize the fund prudently and effectively in a 
manner that can best serve the charitable purposes. One way that a law may ensure the 
effective utilization of funds is by giving guidelines to determine a ceiling for 
administrative costs and operational costs. However, as what would be a reasonable 
administrative cost may vary depending on the purpose and the size of CSOs an 
enabling law may only give a flexible guideline as to what should constitute an 
administrative cost and what should be the maximum ceiling for administrative costs. 
 
7.5.1 Resource Utilization under the Ethiopian Legal System 
In addition to the challenge of soliciting fund, the CSP also affects the operation of 
CSOs by the rigid administrative cost proviso that should not exceed 30 percent of 
their total budget. 69  ‘Administrative costs’ are defined to constitute those costs 
incurred for emoluments, allowances, benefits, purchasing goods and services, 
travelling and entertainments necessary for the administrative activities of a Charity or 
society.70 
 
The stipulation of the ratio of administration cost and programme cost as a matter of 
principle is commendable to regulate that the charities and societies are investing the 
funding they solicit to the purpose or to the programme goal they claimed they would 
achieve. Even compared to other standards such as that of the Charity Watchdog71 that 
considers 25% administration costs ratio as acceptable the CSP can be considered as 
reasonable. Nonetheless, beyond what constitute the conventional running costs of the 
                                                          
69 CSP, Article 88 (1). 
70 CSP, Article 2 (14). 
71 Charity Watchdog is a USA based NGO that monitors the activities of various charities to help one 
make informed donating decisions.  
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organisation, the CSP considers salaries, allowances and benefits of programme and 
project directors and coordinators; consultancy fees, monitoring and evaluation costs, 
and training costs except for preparation of training materials, allowance, and 
accommodation, and travel costs constitute administrative cost.72 Hence the inclusions 
of costs which are necessary to implement the projects render this stipulation to be 
more impeding to realize the objects of CSOs. 
 
On the other hand the directive governing the matter provides that the following costs 
are considered as operational cost for charities and societies working on human and 
democratic rights and conflict resolution:  ‘costs incurred in relation to per diem 
payments to beneficiaries, training materials preparation, publication of human and 
democratic rights materials; materials purchased for survivors of human rights 
violations, following up and election observation and air time payments to the media; 
the provision of material and financial support for local institutions engaged in conflict 
resolution and reconciliation.’73 
 
The much stretched definition of what constitutes administrative cost and the 
inflexibility standard of the 30% administrative cost ratio for all types of charities and 
societies particularly affect the operation of advocacy organisations as most of their 
expenses are considered administrative and are limited by the 30 percent rule. This is 
often related to the fact that advocacy organisations inevitably expend much of their 
budget on human resources. For example, the expenses related to the collection, 
investigation and dissemination of human rights monitoring are mainly related to the 
salary and benefits of the officer, cost of transportation during investigation and 
publication which are deemed administrative cost as per the Ethiopian legal 
framework. 74  Although such disbursements are made in order to achieve the 
programme of investigating and publicizing human rights information their 
classification as administrative critically affects advocacy CSOs to pursue such 
activities which are crucial in attaining their charitable purposes. The application of 
the 30% administrative cost would be challenging even for an organisation that has 
                                                          
72 Charities and Societies Operational and Administrative costs Directive No 2/2011, (2011), Article 8 
(1) (a) and (b). 
73 Ibid, Article 6 (7) and 6 (8). 
74CSP, Article 2 (14); See also  Charities and Societies Operational and Administrative costs Directive 
No 2/2011 ( 2011) Article 6 (7)  and 6 (8) 
200 
 
only legal aid service in focus since even the cost for the programme coordinator 
employed only for such purpose or project would constitute an administrative cost. 
 
If we however compare this with a charity engaged in humanitarian relief, despite 
expenses related to the salary and benefits of the officers the procurement of materials 
and services such as food, shelter etc. which are considered programme cost would 
make the percentage of administration cost appear lower than 30 percent. Hence 
although the administration cost requirement may not be a serious impediment to some 
development-oriented organisations owing to the nature of their engagement, it 
however adversely and systematically affects the operation of Ethiopian charities and 
societies that play the role of promoting rights and democratization. 
 
Moreover, the one-size-fits all application of the 30/70 ratio would affect smaller 
organisations with smaller number of projects worse than those bigger organisations 
with more funding. This also incidentally puts advocacy CSOs in a far worse situation 
since they will not have more projects and plenteous funding because of the financial 
limitation they would face regardless. Thus the inflexible administrative cost ratio 
exacerbates the challenge for advocacy CSOs. 
 
The law also imposes a penalty against the organisations and individual officers for 
failing to meet this administrative cost- and operational cost ratio requirement. Failure 
to comply with the 30% administrative cost entails a criminal liability punishable with 
a fine not less than five thousand and not exceeding ten thousand birr on the 
organisation. 75  Officer(s) responsible for such failure are more liable than the 
organisation and face penalty with fine not less than ten thousand and not exceeding 
twenty thousand birr notwithstanding the applicability of the relevant provisions of the 
criminal code prescribing a penalty of imprisonment.76 Although which officer would 
be responsible is not clearly designated and perhaps remains to be a matter of evidence, 
nonetheless, even a very slight non-compliance to the 30-70 administrative cost ratios 
entails such serious penalty including incarceration. This might bring practical 
complications as even a single project might involve many different officers such as 
the project coordinator, the programme manager, the accountant, the head of finance 
                                                          
75 CSP, Article 102 (2) (d) 
76 CSP, Article 102 (3) 
201 
 
or the executive director. The management also becomes more and more complicated 
with the increase in number of projects. While restricting administrative cost is 
important in spite of such complications, the penalty is however unjustified as it is 
comparable to most of the penalties imposed against a person. Moreover, the liability 
that is beyond administrative charge could possibly deter qualified individuals not to 
join the sector for fear of excessive penalty thereby limit the human resource 
mobilization capacity of the sector. 
 
Nonetheless, ‘much less than 50% compliance to this requirement was witnessed’77 by 
charities and societies owing to both unclear application of what constitutes 
administrative cost and impracticability of project implementation during the first year 
of implementation of the proclamation. Although no prosecution was instituted by the 
Agency against those who failed to meet this legal proviso hitherto, nonetheless the 
level of non-compliance shows the onerous nature of the legal framework that exposes 
many in the sector to excessive penalties. 
 
In sum, an enabling law recognizes the inherent linkage between the right to associate 
and the right to resource, since freedom of association would be of a diminished value 
if CSOs would be impelled to abandon some or all of their purposes and activities due 
to an inability to generate or access resources. Therefore, an enabling law governing 
the fiscal aspects of CSOs should primarily uphold a guarantee for CSOs to solicit, 
receive and utilize funds from any lawful sources for any legitimate purpose.  
 
In order to enforce the CSOs right to resource mobilization, an enabling law may need 
to protect the workforce in the sector and to provide incentive to volunteers; to 
facilitate public collection; to permit commercial engagements of CSOs; to provide 
liberal tax concessions for CSOs and their donors; to facilitate their access to public 
financial resources such as grants or contracts; and to allow access to foreign resource. 
The freedom to mobilize resource to ensure CSOs financial sustainability and financial 
autonomy also needs to be balanced with their fiscal transparency and accountability.  
 
                                                          
77 Development Assistance Group-Ethiopia, ‘Guideline to determine operational and administrative 
(70/30): early evidence of impact’ Tracking Trends in Ethiopia’s Civil Society, Policy Brief 5, 2-3 
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The Ethiopian legal framework gives recognition for CSOs right to mobilize resource 
and allow resource mobilization through public collections, commercial engagement, 
tax concessions and foreign funding sources. Although such elements of the prevailing 
legal framework signify the intentions of providing an enabling environment, some 
enabling legal conditions are still lacking. CSOs right to raise funds locally through 
public collection and income generating activities is challenged as the provisions are 
snagged with vague and subjective criteria that opens room for arbitrary decisions that 
could compromise the autonomy of CSOs and put them at the mercy of the Charities 
and Societies Agency. The vagueness of the relevant provisions governing the tax 
regime also renders the limited tax concessions available for CSOs unviable. The 
funding rights of advocacy CSOs is limited as they are precluded from accessing 
overseas fund including fund from Ethiopians living abroad. This rule added to the 
tremendous challenge of local fundraising manifestly affects the overall operation of 
advocacy CSOs. Moreover the application of a 30% administrative cost ceiling with 
overextended list of what constitutes administrative cost impedes the effective 
utilization of the hard-fetched fund.  
 
All these factors limit the financial capability and the autonomy of CSOs and critically 
undermine their efficiency and effectiveness. Thus the prevailing legal framework of 
the country creates an impediment for CSOs effort to contribute to democratization.  
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CHAPTER 8 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY OF CSOs 
 
8.1 Introduction  
The fourth and the last pillar of enabling legal conditions for CSOs that we are going 
to discuss under this chapter focuses on CSOs accountability. CSOs accountability is 
a mechanism by which CSOs are held answerable for their action and/or as a means 
by which they take internal responsibility for shaping their organisational mission and 
values, for opening themselves to public or external scrutiny, and for assessing 
performance in relation to goals. Thus accountability has both an external dimension 
in terms of ‘an obligation to meet prescribed standards of behaviour’1 and an internal 
dimension motivated by ‘felt responsibility’ to act in concert with organisational 
mission and values to attain prescribed goals.2 The focus of the chapter is on the 
external dimension of accountability that can be regulated by the law. 
 
The previous chapters of this thesis concluded that laws governing CSOs may enable 
the sector by recognizing and enforcing the fundamental freedom of CSOs to form, to 
mobilize resources and to pursue any lawful purposes. The recognition of such 
freedoms reduces   the supply-side transaction cost for CSOs thereby facilitating their 
existence, operation and financial sustainability. The purpose of the law is not however 
limited to reducing the supply-side cost and sanctioning wider rights and freedoms to 
CSOs. With rights certainly come responsibilities as the freedom to associate is not an 
absolute right. Therefore an enabling law should also regulate the accountability of 
CSOs. Although independence that allows CSOs to exercise autonomy and to self- 
govern their own internal business is one of the basic facets of CSOs, nevertheless 
information asymmetry between CSOs and their beneficiaries demand a need to 
regulate some broad internal governance arrangements by the law to promote their 
fiscal transparency and operational accountability for their stakeholders and the public 
at large. 
  
                                                          
1 Laura Chisolm, ‘Accountability of nonprofit organisations and those who control them: The legal 
framework’ (1995) Nonprofit Management and Leadership 6 (2) 141 
2 Roland Fry, ‘Accountability in organisational life: problem or opportunity for nonprofits?’ (1995) 6 
(2) Nonprofit Management and Leadership 181-195, 189  
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This chapter examines the features of an enabling law that ensures the accountability 
and transparency of CSOs without however undermining CSOs freedom of formation, 
operation and sustainability. Thus it discusses ideally enabling legal conditions 
necessary to ensure the good governance of CSOs; and their operational and fiscal 
transparency.  It also assesses the prevailing accountability rules provided under the 
Charities and Societies Proclamation of Ethiopia in light of the ideal enabling 
conditions. 
 
8.2  The rationale for an enabling legal conditions for the accountability of 
CSOs 
The legal regimes that govern the accountability of CSOs are important to ensure the 
credibility of individual CSOs and the trustworthiness of the sector as a whole. Such 
regulation firstly promotes the trustworthiness of CSOs which makes them a preferred 
institution in the provision of public goods and quasi private goods. Secondly, 
regulations that ensure the financial accountability of CSOs could save the public 
money obtained from public collection and tax concession from embezzlement. 
Thirdly, regulation helps to screen out uncivil organisations that could disguise 
themselves as CSOs and cause a threat not only to the democratization process but also 
to a public safety and security. While the potential roles of CSOs for the 
democratisation of a nation are asserted, it would however be naïve to assume that all 
CSOs are inherently good. Indeed, some CSOs that are sectarian, undemocratic and 
fanatic could undermine the democratisation of a nation as they work against 
pluralism, tolerance and other democratic principles.3 An enabling law in governing 
CSOs accountability must therefore provide the public reasonable reassurance that 
CSOs are what they say they are, and in particular that they are not covertly abusing 
their position or finance in ways that go beyond the legitimate exercise of individual 
freedom.4 Hence, in general an enabling legal framework in addition to granting CSOs 
with the necessary freedoms for the best realisation of their objectives should also 
ensure that they are accountable.  
 
                                                          
3 Larry Diamond, ‘Toward Democratic Consolidation’ (1994) Journal of Democracy 5 (3) 4, 11. 
4 Richard Fries, ‘The legal Environment of Civil Societies’ in Helmut Anheier and others (eds) Global 
Civil Society 2003 (LSE 2003) 226. 
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Moreover, the accountability of CSOs is also particularly important for those working 
on the promotion of democratization for two reasons. Firstly the aptitude of CSOs to 
contribute to pluralism and democracy depends on certain internal governance 
dynamics that inculcate democratic norms and consensus building such as 
participation, transparency, voluntary and open recruitment membership, and 
accountable and responsive leadership.5 Thus if CSOs should serve as a school of 
democracy, they need to exercise good governance and ensure their accountability to 
the public at large. Secondly, accountability of CSOs to the public promotes their 
legitimacy which is essential in broadening stakeholders and mobilizing the 
community for a social cause.  
 
It is important, however, that the laws should not over-regulate and over-restrict the 
sector in a manner that compromises the autonomy of CSOs. Accountability 
mechanisms should not be used as a tool for the government to harass CSOs. Thus 
while the law needs to provide the government with specific tools necessary to regulate 
the sector, it must also put a limit to it not to exercise excessive control and not to 
impose unwarrantedly excessive penalties. Hence, the legal framework should not be 
rigid and must balance the value of non-interference by the state in the internal affairs 
of the organisation and the need for CSOs to be publicly accountable.6 While ensuring 
accountability may help to minimize the demand-side transaction cost, by enhancing 
CSOs legitimacy and credibility, unwarranted intrusion against CSOs freedom to 
associate and operate would increase the supply-side cost. Hence the transaction cost 
analysis may be taken into consideration in determining the equilibrium between 
accountability and autonomy.  Questions raised in relation to the accountability of 
CSOs such as: to whom should CSOs be accountable; and what are the mechanisms of 
accountability, should thus be answered within the context of this necessary balance. 
  
                                                          
5 Axel Hadenius and Fredrik Uggla, ‘Making Civil Society Work, Promoting Democratic Development: 
What Can States and Donors Do? (1996) World Development 24 (10) 1621-1639; Mark Robinson and 
Steven Friedman, ‘Civil society, Democratisation and Foreign Aid in Africa’ (2005) Institute of 
Development Studies, IDS Discussion paper 383, 6 < http://www.ids.ac.UK/files/dmfile/Dp383.pdf> 
accessed on May 2013. 
6 Lester Salmon and Flaherty Susan, ‘Nonprofit Law: Ten Issues in Search of Resolution.’ in Lester 
Salmon and Helmut Anheier (edn), In Working Papers of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit 
Sector Project, (1996) 20 (6) The Johns Hopkins Institute for Policy Studies. 
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Thus the first underlying principle of an enabling law in the regulation of CSOs 
accountability should be balancing the fundamental freedom of CSOs to associate, 
express themselves, communicate, network and negotiate with their accountability. 
Striking the right balance between recognising and protecting the rights of CSOs on 
the one hand and ensuring their accountability on the other, first and foremost 
necessitates a legal framework that objectively stipulates standards in line with the 
constitutional guarantee provided for the freedom of association. Thus the 
implementation of any accountability mechanism should pass the test of ‘necessity for 
a democratic society.’7  
 
Secondly, the rules governing the sector should also be, undemanding, clear and simple 
enough for an administration free of abuse and discrimination.8 Furthermore, the law 
should provide for the right to a judicial appeal to challenge adverse decisions by 
administrative agencies. 
 
Thirdly, the rules should also consider the diverse nature of CSOs when governing 
their accountability. CSOs have a diverse nature in terms of their size, issues and 
mandate. 9  For instance, while it may be easier to establish an accountability 
mechanism for small community based organisations working on single issues, the 
same may not be true for large national and international organisations that work on a 
variety of issues. 10 The accountability of public benefit organisations may also be 
treated differently from those that pursue private interests as the resource mobilization 
and financial governance of the two may be distinct. Hence, an enabling law must 
consider that there cannot be a universal approach and ‘one size fits all’ set of 
accountability mechanisms applicable to all kinds of CSOs.   
                                                          
7The requirement of ‘necessary for a democratic state’ is well recognized in many international legal 
instruments such as the ICCPR, Article 22 (2), ECHR, Article 11 (2). For further explanation, See 
Klingelhofer Stephan and Robinson David, ‘Law And Civil Society in The South Pacific: Challenges 
and Opportunities; International Best Practice and Global Development’, International Center for Not-
for-profit Law (ICNL) 8-9 
<http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/sol_adobe_documents/world/icnl/klingelhofer2.htm > accessed 4 April 
2015. 
8 Klingelhofer Stephan and Robinson David, above n 7 at 12.  
9 Mark Ginsburg, ‘NGOs: What’s in an Acronym?’ (1998) Current Issues in Comparative Education 1 
(1) 2-5. 
10 Hetty Kovach and others, ‘Power without accountability? Execute Summary of the Global 
Accountability Report’ (One world Trust 2003) <http://www.oneworldtrust.org/htm1GAP/>   accessed 
2 March 2015. 
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Fourthly, an enabling legal framework should also recognize the unique feature of the 
sector and provide tailor-made accountability mechanisms that are different from those 
designed to govern corporate accountability. CSOs accountability is a complex notion 
due to their multi-level accountability to several actors: downwards to their 
constituents;11 upwards to the government and donors12 and internally to themselves 
and their missions.13 Thus accountability mechanisms of CSOs should be designed 
taking the distinct nature of the entities to which they are accountable to. 
 
Furthermore, an enabling law should also be designed considering the multiple 
purposes of accountability.  CSOs are expected to be accountable for different but 
interrelated matters such as accountability to their mission, performance, governance 
and finance.14 Accountability for mission increases CSOs’ legitimacy; performance 
accountability enhances efficiency; governance accountability increases 
organisational reliability; and financial accountability encourages transparency.  This 
can be achieved through different accountability mechanisms.  For example, 
‘participation’ serves to inform and engage stakeholders in a meaningful way, thereby 
increasing CSOs legitimacy.15 ‘Evaluation’ and ‘performance assessment’ can also 
demonstrate the performance of CSOs (efficiency).16 On the other hand ‘disclosure of 
statements’ ‘reports’ and auditing builds organisational reliability, and transparency.17  
 
                                                          
11  Michael Edwards and David Hulme, ‘Too close for comfort? The impact of official aid on 
nongovernmental organisations’ (1996) World Development 24 (6) 967. 
12 Adil Najam, ‘NGO Accountability: A conceptual framework’ (1996) Development Policy Review 
14, 342. 
13 Michael Edwards and David Hulme, Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability 
in the Post-Cold War World, West Hartford (Kumarian Press 1996); Kevin Kearns, Managing for 
Accountability: Preserving the Public Trust in Nonprofit Organisations (Jossey-Bass 1996); Adil 
Najam, ‘NGO Accountability: A conceptual framework’ (1996) Development Policy Review 14, 342; 
Mark Lindenberg and Coralie Bryant, Going Global: Transforming Relief and Development NGOs 
(Kumarian Press 2001). 
14 Robert Behn, Rethinking Democratic Accountability (Brookings Institution Press 2001); Alnoor 
Ebrahim, ‘Placing the Normative Logics of Accountability in 'Thick' Perspective’ (2009) American 
Behavioral Scientist 52 (6) 885-904. 
15Alnoor Ebrahim, ‘Accountability in Practice: Mechanism for NGOs’ (2003) World Development 31 
(5) 813-829, 816. 
16 Ibid, 816-818. 
17 Alnoor Ebrahim, above n 15 at 816. 
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8.3  Regulation of CSOs Accountability  
Although an enabling legal framework should encourage as different accountability 
mechanism as possible, nonetheless, not all of these accountability mechanisms can be 
equally influenced by the law. Evaluation and performance assessment for instance are 
accountability mechanisms that are often used by CSOs themselves and their donors 
to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.18 Self-regulation by CSOs and networks of 
CSOs is also another strategy to ensure accountability. As the role of internal 
accountability is almost as important as that of external accountability the sector itself 
can play an important role on its own to ensure ethical and responsible conduct19. The 
idea behind self-regulation mechanisms is therefore that the sector itself should be 
actively engaged in promoting certain set of values and norms as part of maintaining a 
public reputation for transparency, professionalism and high ethical behavior.  
However, such forms of accountability mechanisms though may be encouraged by the 
law cannot however be specifically and thoroughly governed by the law.  
 
Baldwin and Cave recognize models of regulation of CSOs such as: (i) disclosure 
requirements (ii) command and control regulation (iii) incentive based regulation such 
as tax concessions and public grants and contracts (iv) public ownership (v) regulation 
through rights and liabilities; and (vi) regulation by means of advice and education. 20 
The third paradigm of regulation i.e. incentive based regulation has been discussed in 
detail in chapter 7 above. We may also reject the fourth model that suggests the 
nationalization of CSOs extremely ‘threatens their role in democratization and other 
social functions as it compromises their independence’ and thus not considered as 
enabling condition for CSOs regulation.21 The last model, education and advice, if at 
all can be considered as a model of regulation is least influenced by the law. Since the 
focus of this chapter is however to look into accountability mechanisms that can be 
specifically governed by a legal regime, it singles out the first two types of strategies 
of regulation i.e. (i) accountability through disclosure requirements; and (ii) 
accountability by means of command and sanctions.   
 
                                                          
18 Alnoor Ebrahim, above n 15 at 816. 
19 Klingelhofer Stephan and Robinson David, above n 7 at 8-9. 
20Robert Baldwin and Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (Oxford 
University Press 1999) 34-62, 97.  
21Jonathan Garton, The Regulation of organized Civil Society (Hart Publishing 2009) 207. 
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The first type of accountability strategy, regulation through disclosure, requires CSOs 
to disclose and report on their operational and financial performance so as to reduce 
the information asymmetry between the public and the organisations. In this chapter 
we will have a closer look at the requirements of disclosure and reporting that ensures 
CSOs transparency without infringing their autonomy. 
 
The second, command and sanction type of accountability strategy, requires CSOs 
either to perform or to refrain from certain activities that enforce accountability goals 
such as those that promote CSOs legality and civility, transparency, legitimacy, 
reliability and efficiency. It is not the intent of this chapter to discuss all possible rules 
that require CSOs to perform or to refrain from certain activities. It focuses upon the 
fundamental elements of good governance that could be commanded or recommended 
to CSOs and enforced through legal sanction in order to promote CSOs legality and 
accountability. Yet it may be important to underscore that all rules that we discussed 
under chapters 5-7 related to CSOs existence, engagement and resource mobilization 
also constitute part of the command and sanction forms of regulation to ensure CSOs 
accountability.  
 
Nonetheless this section focuses on the enabling rules that promote CSOs 
accountability by requiring them to practice good governance and report on their 
financial and operational activities. It also sees to reasonable sanctions that may be 
enforced on CSOs for failure to comply with the legal rules. It also assesses the rules 
under the Charities and Societies Proclamation of Ethiopia governing CSOs good 
governance, disclosure and reporting, sanctions and the right to judicial appeal in light 
of the enabling legal conditions. 
 
8.3.1 CSOs Governance  
The law may ensure the accountability of CSOs by putting requirements that ensure 
functioning governance of CSOs. Governance of CSOs entails the totality of functions 
that are required to be carried out in relation to the internal functioning and external 
relations of organisations. 22  The governance of CSOs as related to their external 
relations with the government and the community pertains to their civility and legal 
                                                          
22Rajesh Tandon, ‘‘Board Games’: Governance and Accountability in NGOs’ 2<http://www.wtrc-
tmed.org/resources/Board%20Games.pdf >Accessed 20 July 2014. 
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compliance as well as effective functioning and performance in society. The internal 
functioning of the governance of CSOs on the other hand is related to such dynamics 
as: vision, mission, goals and strategies (shared values); institutional governance 
system (power structure of the leadership); internal programming, financial and human 
resource management; professional and ethical norms and values for institutional 
functioning.23   
 
The level of influence the law may have on these dynamics varies. Generally, however 
an enabling law may regulate the governance of CSOs either by detecting mandatory 
minimum provisions in the governing documents of CSOs; or recommending optional 
provisions by giving broad discretion to set and change the governance structure and 
operations of the organisation within the limits provided by the law.24 We will discuss 
below what such rules that regulate the internal and external governance of CSOs 
should entail in order to promote the accountability and transparency of CSOs.  
 
Legality of CSOs  
The law can enhance CSOs legitimacy and their contribution to democratization by 
ensuring their legality and civility. Legitimacy is ‘the right to be and to do something 
in society—a sense that an organisation is lawful, admissible, and justified in its chosen 
course of action.’25 Similar to any other institution, CSOs should be civil and operate 
within the legal bound of the country. Incivility and non-compliance to the law, in 
addition to legal sanction causes CSOs to lose their trustworthiness attribution and 
thereby negatively impact their relationship with the government and the community.  
 
Effective Functioning and Performance  
CSOs should work effectively to achieve their vision, mission and values. CSOs 
effective functioning and performance involves among others greater participation of 
stakeholders; better assessment and analysis of their interventions and strategies; 
realistic and time framed planning; cost-effective and sustainable implementation of 
                                                          
23 International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, ‘Checklist for CSO Laws’ (2006) 3 < 
http://www.humanitarianforum.org/data/files/resources/704/en/ICNL-NPOChecklist.pdf >Accessed 12 
May 20115; See also, Rajesh Tandon, above n 22.  
24 Ibid, 3. 
25 Mark Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’ (1995) Academy of 
Management Review, 20 (3) 571-610, 574; Meyer John and Richard Scott, Organisation Environments: 
Ritual and Rationality (Sage 1983).  
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programs; regular monitoring of activities and evaluation of outcomes. Effectiveness 
will help to instill confidence of the public on the one hand and to make CSOs 
responsive to the community they are meant to be serving.26 Ensuring effectiveness is 
even more compelling for CSOs having public benefit status since the state extends 
benefits to them based on their efficiency attribution in the provision of public goods.27 
This requires that the structures and processes to evaluate the ongoing effectiveness of 
CSOs based on their vision, mission and goals be in place. Although the impact of the 
law in determining the effectiveness of CSOs could be rather remote, it may still 
facilitate that by requiring CSOs to regularly report on their performance and 
utilization of funding. The law also establishes a regulating Agency which will follow 
up on the reports and thereby facilitate CSOs effectiveness.  
 
Vision, Mission and Goals 
Vision, mission and goals in addition to giving CSOs a clearly defined identity, also 
help them to set a direction and to make transparent and efficient decisions towards 
that direction. Although CSOs have the freedom to freely choose their vision, mission 
and purposes, the law may require them to clearly define the same as it carries with it 
a practical and legal relevance. From a practical point of view, clearly defined vision 
and mission helps to track CSOs performance and to monitor the progress or 
achievement of programmes and thereby enhance efficiency. From the legal point of 
view however, setting the vision and purposes of CSOs is particularly important for 
the following reasons.  
 
First, the very purpose of verifying the legality of the purposes demands that they are 
clearly spelt out. Secondly, clearly defined purposes transparently communicate to the 
public what the CSO stands for and thus help the public to make an informed decision 
to join or to fund the organisation. Thirdly, defining the purposes of the organisation 
is important as it distinctly characterizes the identity of the organisation. Since not all 
CSOs have equal privileges and responsibilities, the purpose of any particular CSO 
needs to be clearly defined. For instance, the purposes of CSOs demarcate whether it 
                                                          
26 Rajesh Tandon, above n 22. 
27 For a detail discussion on the role of CSOs on the promotion of public goods, See Jonathan Garton , 
The Regulation of organized Civil Society (Hart Publishing 2009)  
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is a public benefit organisation or not and consequently the type and amount of tax 
privileges the legal system offers it. Thus a law requiring CSOs to clearly but freely 
define their purpose will take a preliminary step in ensuring CSOs legality and 
transparency without however restricting their autonomy in choosing their purposes.  
 
Institutional Governance System 
The governing body of CSOs also needs to be accountable and participatory. CSOs 
acquiring legal personality as juridical persons must have well established structure 
and predictable procedures. Thus they need to have ‘a governing body’ that represents, 
and accounts to the organisation. The governing body will be responsible and 
accountable to the stakeholders when its mandates, responsibilities and liabilities are 
clearly defined in advance. Accountability of the governing body is important because 
the autonomy of CSOs should be safeguarded not only from the dominance or control 
of the state, but also from the governing bodies.28 If not, CSOs would fail to play a role 
of ‘school of democracy’ as weakness in autonomy limits CSOs effectiveness and 
ability to develop a democratic culture. 29  Thus a law may facilitate a workable 
institutional governance system with an accountable governing body by stating or 
directing the bylaws to set out the respective rights, duties, powers and also the 
liabilities of governing bodies such as the board, trustees and executive bodies that 
represent the organisation in a hierarchy. 30     
 
Participation  
Legitimacy is grounded in the perceptions of stakeholders in the larger environment in 
which the organisation is embedded. 31  Participation of stakeholders is therefore 
particularly crucial for the legitimacy of CSOs. Moreover participation enhances the 
quality of the social capital as communities learn the principles of democracy through 
engagement.   Hence, by stipulating or guiding the bylaws to contain provisions that 
                                                          
28 Melek Saral, ‘Civil society and Human Rights Protection in Iraq since 2003’ (2009), paper presented 
for the final Shur Conference , Human Rights in Conflict the role of civil society Rome, Italy, 8 < 
http://shur.luiss.it/files/2009/05/saral.pdf > accessed 02 April 2015. 
29 Ibid.  
30Klingelhofer Stephan and Robinson D, above n 7 at 8; See also Leon Irish and others, Guidelines for 
Laws affecting Civic Organisations (2ndeds, Open Society Institute 2004) 36. 
31Mark Suchman, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’ (1995) Academy of 
Management Review 20 (3) 571-610, 574; Meyer John, and Richard Scott, ‘Organisation Environments: 
Ritual and Rationality’ (Sage 1983).  
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promote open recruitment and voluntary membership the law may encourage the 
participation of stakeholders and consequentially strengthen the legitimacy of CSOs.   
 
Professional and ethical norms  
The ‘trustworthiness’ attribution of the sector demands a better professional and ethical 
standard. The law may thus require CSOs officers and board members to be loyal, to 
be diligent and to maintain the confidentiality of nonpublic information about the 
organisation.32Although self-perpetuating boards guarantee independent governance 
for CSOs it should also be carefully circumscribed and reinforced by rules of fiduciary 
responsibility that require the governing bodies to act in the interests of the public and 
not those of any private person such as the founders. The requirement of fiduciary 
responsibility and the protection against private benefit generate public trust and 
enhance the legitimacy of CSOs thereby creating an enabling environment for 
membership and support. The rules of fiduciary responsibility that are particularly 
relevant to ensure CSOs credibility are discussed below.  
 
i. Restriction on the distribution of profit  
The non-distribution constraint is crucial to prevent undue private benefit. CSOs are 
not-for -profit entities. That is, profit earned, cannot be distributed to the founders, 
board members, members, employees etc. Thus the rules governing the sector should 
contain a prohibition on the distribution of profits. Without the non-distribution 
constraint CSOs would lack their attribution of trustworthiness. A comparative country 
study has also shown that in nearly all countries where non-distribution constraints are 
stipulated by the law, consumers tend to support CSOs more than in countries where 
the legal system does not provide such constraints.33  
 
Nevertheless, the law may also make an exception to the general principle of non-
distribution constraints. The strict application of non-distribution constraint risks the 
exclusion of a significant proportion of ‘non-statutory’ and ‘non-profit’ community-
based development organisations and cooperatives which distribute dividends to their 
                                                          
32 Leon Irish and others, above n 30 at 43. 
33Lester Salmon and Stefan Toepler, ‘The Influence of the Legal Environment on 
the Development of the Not profit Sector’ (2000) Center for Civil Society Studies, 
Working Paper Series 17 (7). 
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members. Nevertheless, such organisations as cooperatives, social enterprises and 
mutual benefit organisations also contribute to pluralize the public sphere and 
represent interests of segments of groups in a society. This exception is justified 
because despite the fact that they fail the test of non- profit distribution, the basic 
objectives of these organisations were not to make profits but to improve the livelihood 
of the general community.34 Hence, an enabling law also needs to take the nature of 
CSOs into consideration in making an exception to the rule of non-profit distribution. 
 
ii. Restriction on Private Inurement 
The law should also deter undue private benefit through the prohibition of private 
inurement.35 While it is quite acceptable that persons who provide services for CSOs 
should be permitted to get reasonable reimbursement and appropriate benefits, 
however there is a strong and a salutary tradition that board members serve on a 
voluntary basis and without compensation since otherwise people would tend to form 
organisations to earn benefit rather than to pursue a social cause. Yet the law may 
permit that in situations where the work is very demanding even board members can 
be reasonably compensated and decisions regarding compensation must be made in a 
judicious manner and according to the organisation policy.36  
 
iii. Restriction on Self-dealing  
The law should also put a limit on Self-dealing so as persons in a position to influence 
or control a CSO shall not cause it to undertake a contractual transaction that 
constitutes an unreasonable self-benefit detrimental to the organisation by draining its 
assets and damaging its public image.37 Such transactions would only be valid after 
legitimate negotiation and if done at a price and on terms that are not disadvantageous 
to the CSO.  
 
Public trust also demands that CSOs in principle should not be permitted to share out 
assets to the founders, officers, board members, employees, donors, or members upon 
                                                          
34Lester Salamon and Helmut Anheier, Defining the Non-profit Sector: A cross-national Analysis 
(Manchester University Press 1997) 33. 
35 Leon Irish and others above n 30 at 48. 
36 Leon Irish and others above n 30 at 48. 
37 Leon Irish and others above n 30 at 49.  
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its liquidation.38 Otherwise, such persons would have an incentive to dissolve and 
liquidate an organisation to obtain assets to which they are not otherwise entitled.39  
 
iv. Restriction on Conflict of interest 
Additionally the law and internal regulations should in general terms require that, 
officers, board members, and employees of CSOs disclose and also avoid any actual 
or potential conflict between their personal or business interests and that of the CSO. 
Once the person in a fiduciary position discloses a potential conflict of interest, an 
organisation can address it either by way of waiver, recusal or review. The decision 
whether a conflict exists or not shall be determined by the agency regulating CSOs 
and, when contested, reviewed by the court on a case-by-case basis. 
 
To sum up, the law may influence the accountability of CSOs by regulating the 
dynamics of its governance. CSOs are said to have a ‘functioning governance’ or ‘good 
governance’  when they are mission- based and performs efficiently to attain such 
mission; has a structure with clear mandates and liabilities of its governing body; 
exercises responsible resource mobilization and management; promotes the highest 
professional and ethical standards. A CSO that exhibits such characteristics of a 
functioning system of internal governance not only better serves the public interest but 
also inculcates the principles of democracy.  
  
8.3.2 CSOs Governance under the Ethiopian Legal System 
The CSP provides a number of mandatory and recommendatory provisions that could 
potentially enhance well-functioning governance of CSOs that promote their 
accountability and transparency. It also appoints the Charities and Societies Agency 
and sector administrators to enforce the accountability measures. Although it would be 
unnecessary to list out all the accountability measures that we have discussed in the 
preceding chapters for the sake of avoiding repetition, it may however be relevant to 
recap some of them at this juncture. 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 Leon Irish and others, above n 30 at 50. 
39 Stephan Klingelhofer and Robinson David, above n 7 at 8. 
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Legality 
Firstly, in order to ensure the legality of charities and societies, the CSP requires their 
periodical registration.40 As the law requires Charities and Societies to let know the 
Agency or sector administrators in their proposals required for registration, the purpose 
of establishment of the organisations and their activities that would help the Agency 
to screen out any illegal organisation or illegal activity.  The CSP also requires 
Charities and Societies to provide fiscal and operational reporting to the Agency 
annually which can also allow as a tool to ensure CSOs engagement in lawful purposes. 
Article 81 of the CSP also requires that ‘an annual activity report or other documents 
be kept by the agency, when requested by a concerned body, may be made open to the 
public at any reasonable time if the agency or the sector administrator or the charity 
and society so decides’. All these measures would enable to ensure CSOs legality 
which is necessary to promote their legitimacy and also to protect the public.  
 
Effective Functioning and Performance 
The CSP also ensures that CSOs are working and efficiently utilizing their budget in 
order to promote their purposes of formation. The CSP requires Charities and Societies 
to spend 70 or more percent of their total budget as their operational cost and only 30 
percent on administrative cost. Although what constitutes administrative cost is 
broadly defined by the law thus causing a possible challenge for some organisations as 
we have seen in the previous chapter, such requirement nonetheless would in general 
help to promote the effective functioning and performance of Charities and Societies.   
 
Professional and ethical norms  
In order to promote an ethical and professional norm in the sector, the CSP also 
restricts private inurement and distribution of profit. Article 41 (1) and (2) of the CSP 
for instance stipulates that a trustee shall not be entitled to remuneration unless such 
entitlement is given to him either by the trust instrument or by a law or by the consent 
of all trustees as a reasonable remuneration for the services he rendered in his 
professional capacity. A restriction on the distribution of profit from income generating 
activities is also provided under Article 103 of the CSP. The proceeds from income 
generating activities shall be used to further the purposes for which the charity or 
                                                          
40 CSP, Article 65 (2). 
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society was established. Moreover with respect to promoting professional and ethical 
norms within the sector and protecting public property, the CSP penalizes any 
misconduct or mismanagement in the administration of the charity or society.41 
 
Institutional Governance System 
The CSP provides a number of provisions that deal with the institutional governance 
system of Charities and Societies. It requires that charities and societies are established 
having clear structure and predictable procedures with a governing authority that 
assumes well-defined responsibilities, powers and liabilities.  Thus, charities shall be 
organized with the structure of the Board of management, manager, auditor and other 
departments as may be necessary.42 Societies on the other hand should be structured 
according to their bylaws, however having regard to the mandatory provision requiring 
a General Assembly, an internal auditor and the necessary officers. 43  In order to 
facilitate the constitution of the structure and governance of charities and societies, the 
Agency draws up model rules in pursuance of Article 17 of the CSP.44   
 
The CSP also ensures the accountability of the governing bodies in particular and that 
of the organisations in general. Thus in addition to allowing the bylaws to set out the 
respective rights and responsibilities of the governing bodies such as the board and 
trustees; it also contains provisions governing the same. Hence, among others the CSP 
sets rules of appointment and dismissal of the boards or trustees of charities; defines 
the rights and duties of the boards, the trustee, the manager, the auditor and members; 
and stipulates the number of members of the board and trustees, their remuneration 
and the number of meetings they should conduct. 45 It also determines the entitlements 
that private beneficiaries may have from the charitable trusts; and other issues related 
to the governance and structure of charities.46  
 
The CSP also contains provisions that govern the structure and governance of Societies 
which include the powers and functions of the General Assembly and the auditor; 
                                                          
41 CSP, Article 102 (1) and (2). 
42 CSP, Article 19. 
43 CSP, Article 58. 
44 CSP, Article 17 (5).  
45 For issues related to the structure and governance of charities, see CSP, Article 20- 54. 
46 CSP, Article 45. 
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election of manager; amendment procedure of bylaws; membership; manner of 
conducting meetings if not provided on the bylaw etc.47 The CSP also in particular 
demands the legitimacy of Societies through open membership and effective 
participation of stakeholders. 48  This is commendable as open and voluntary 
membership would make the constitution of charities and societies democratic. The 
mandatory stipulations that regulate the structure and governance of charities and 
societies; optional ones that fill up the gaps left by the bylaws; and the provision of 
model bylaws are acceptable means to ensure that accountability mechanisms are in 
place. However the excessive legal stipulations such as the requirement on the number 
of meetings and the number of board members or trustees; and the forceful application 
of presupposed optional provisions might come out as a challenge for the exercise of 
autonomy. In general, the CSP ensures accountability by requiring CSOs to have good 
and functioning governance, failure of which entails a range of sanctions. 
 
8.3.3 Reporting and Disclosure of Information  
The second model of regulation of accountability of CSOs that we are going to discuss 
under this chapter is the reporting and disclosure of information. The law may promote 
CSOs accountability and transparency through both voluntary and compulsory 
disclosure of information and reporting. Reporting of activities will ensure that the 
organisation is engaged in permissible lawful purposes and pursue the same in 
effectively. Reporting of accounts will also help to see that the organisation is 
efficiently using its finances and tax benefits, if any, for its purposes of establishment.49 
Disclosing of information about its governance system also helps the public to make 
an informed decision towards any of their dealings with the organisation.  In general 
accountability through disclosure requirements helps to tackle the information 
asymmetry that is inherent in CSOs provision of public goods, complex private 
services, and the redistribution of wealth.50 
 
However reporting requirements that aim at ensuring accountability must not 
unwarrantedly infringe CSOs freedom. Reporting requirements thus need to be guided 
                                                          
47For issues related to the structure and governance of societies, see CSP, Article 55-Article.  
48 CSP, Article 57. 
49 Stephan Klingelhofer and David Robinson, above n 7 at 9. 
50 Jonathan Garton, The Regulation of organized Civil Society (Hart Publishing 2009) 217. 
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by the principles of proportionality, necessity and confidentiality in order not to affect 
the fundamental freedom of CSOs existence and operation. Thus, firstly, reporting 
requirements should be proportionate to the scope, size and capacity of CSOs.51 
Otherwise burdensome reporting requirements could increase the supply side 
transaction cost and discourage people not to form CSOs or to close down already 
established ones. For instance it may be enough to require CSOs to present their 
activity and budget reports and audit reports annually or bi- annually. Secondly, the 
principle of proportionality also entails that the reporting obligation needs to be 
commensurate with the benefits the organisations obtain from the state.52 It is thus 
appropriate to require detailed and extensive reporting from CSO that are registered as 
public benefit organisations and receive the highest level of financial benefits. Thirdly, 
taking the challenge of CSOs accountability to many actors including the general 
assembly, government and donor agencies, easy to complete and standardized 
reporting requirements that communicate only the necessary information would be 
more enabling for CSOs.53 Fourthly, although the publication of the report may enable 
communication to the wider public and contribute to enhancing public trust and serve 
as a form of ‘passive enforcement’, the specific rules requiring the dissemination of 
reports should not however be expensive and onerous to CSOs. 54  Moreover, the 
principle of necessity also demands that reporting requirement should take privacy and 
confidentiality into consideration.   
 
In as much as the disclosure of information helps CSOs to build trust and credibility, 
the full transparency may not always be possible and necessary.55 This is particularly 
important for CSOs working in a difficult political environment because disclosure of 
information may put people in danger.56 For example, it may well be inappropriate or 
                                                          
51 Mark Ginsburg, ‘‘NGOs: What's in an Acronym?’’ (1998) Current Issues in Comparative Education) 
1(1) 2-5; Hudson Alan, ‘Making the Connection: Legitimacy Claims, Legitimacy Chains and Northern 
NGOs' International Advocacy’ (2000) In Lewis, D. and Wallace, T. (Eds.) After the 'New Policy 
Agenda'? Non-Governmental Organisations and the Search for Development Alternatives (Kumarian 
Press 2000). 
52Public Interest Law Initiative, Enabling Civil Society: Practical Aspects of Freedom of Association, 
source book 171 <http://pilnet.org/public-interest-law-resources/30-enabling-civil-society-practical-
aspects-of-freedom-of.html> accessed on 14 April 2015; Leon Irish and others, above n 30 at 32. 
53 Ibid, 94; Leon Irish and others, above n 30 at 32; Public Interest Law Initiative, Enabling Civil Society: 
Practical Aspects of Freedom of Association, source book 171 <http://pilnet.org/public-interest-law-
resources/30-enabling-civil-society-practical-aspects-of-freedom-of.html > accessed 14 April 2015. 
54 Klingelhofer Stephan and Robinson David, above n 7 at 10. 
55 Leon Irish and others, above n 30 at 32. 
56 Leon Irish and others, above n 30 at 32. 
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impossible for human rights organisations to disclose some of their sources of 
information, identities of clients or even the identities of donors and members. To do 
so could trigger the closure or repression of the organisation and the end of its work. 
It may also put their members and supporters at risk.57The respect for privacy and 
confidentiality, however, is not without limits and should not prevent government from 
doing its primary task of protecting the public from unlawful criminal activity.  
 
Within these general guiding principles, regulation through disclosure may ensure the 
accountability of CSOs. Thus the law may require formally established CSOs, having 
more than minimal activities or receiving more than minimal funding or benefits from 
private donors and the state to periodically publish or otherwise create public 
accessibility to their activity and financial management. 58  The publication and 
accessibility of reports may potentially open access to a public scrutiny by stakeholders 
who could lodge a complaint or initiate an inquiry to be made by the Agency which is 
given the mandate to regulate CSOs. Hence, the disclosure of information serves as a 
supervisory tool for the state, it also assists citizens to play their watchdog role. Thus, 
disclosure of basic information is in the interest of both the state and the public to 
tackle the information gap between CSOs and stakeholders and thereby enhance CSOs 
legitimacy and accountability.  
 
8.3.4 Reporting and Disclosure of Information under the Ethiopian 
Legal System 
Like many other charity laws of different jurisdictions, the CSP also provides 
voluntary and compulsory disclosure of information and reporting by charities and 
societies as the major accountability mechanism.  It requires charities and societies to 
submit an activity report; to keep accounting records; to submit statements of accounts, 
particulars of bank accounts and external audit report to the Agency. 59  Generally 
speaking, all these are necessary measures that ensure the accountability of charities 
and societies by ensuring their financial transparency and legitimacy to their stated 
mission. The requirement that ‘annual activity report or other documents kept by the 
                                                          
57 International Council on Human Rights, ‘Human Rights Organisations: Rights and Responsibilities’ 
Final Draft Report (2009) 28. 
58 Leon Irish and others, above n 30 at 32. 
59 CSP, Articles 77, 78, 79 and 80. 
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agency… be made open to the public at any reasonable time if the agency or the sector 
administration or the charity and society so decides’ 60 also ensures downward 
accountability of charities and societies to their constituencies and the public at large. 
The reporting requirement of the CSP also fulfills the principle of proportionality as it 
takes regard of the scope, size and capacity of CSOs.  It exempts small organisations 
whose annual flow of funds does not exceed fifty thousand Birr from submitting an 
annual statement of accounts. 61  They can instead prepare receipts and payments 
account and a statement of assets and liabilities.  On the other hand, charities and 
societies whose annual gross income is more than Birr 100,000 are required to be 
audited by an external auditor in addition to submitting an annual activity and financial 
reports.62 This helps charities and societies with lesser financial and human capabilities 
not to be overburdened with the reporting requirements and got discouraged to form 
or to sustain their associations.   
 
Nonetheless the discretionary powers invested in the Charities and Societies Agency 
demand a careful application of the rules if the autonomy of CSOs is to be maintained 
and the supply side transaction cost reduced. For instance,  the CSP provides that in 
addition to submitting an annual statement of accounts, charities and societies are 
required to keep accounting records that explain all the transactions and contain the 
identity of all donors for a minimum of five years in order to disclose the same at any 
time the Agency requests.63  In addition to the annual reports, the Agency may also at 
any time require the submission of an activity report and annexed financial report.64  It 
may also order the examination of accounts anytime it thinks necessary by external or 
internal auditor or an auditor designated by the Agency.65 Thus, although periodical 
and timely presentation of financial and activity reports could serve as an 
accountability mechanism, the requirements of keeping and adducing these documents 
any time as requested by the Agency could be cumbersome and meddlesome for 
charities and societies.  
 
                                                          
60 CSP, Article 81 and 82. 
61 CSP, Article 78 (2).  
62 CSP, Article 79 (3) and (4). 
63 CSP, Article 77. 
64 CSP, Article 80 (2) and (3). 
65 CSP, Article 79. 
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A second example that could give leeway to unfettered authority of the Agency unless 
properly enforced is stipulated under Article 84 which states that the Agency may at 
any time either for general or for particular purposes institute inquiries with regard to 
a specific or class of charities or societies. Nevertheless, the law fails to provide 
possible grounds that could allow instituting such inquiry. Such a sweeping power that 
allows the Agency to make such inquiry for whatsoever reason without justifying itself 
could create a loophole for possible abuse. Nonetheless such inquiry must be justified 
in terms of its necessity, proportionality and transparency not to jeopardize the 
autonomy of the organisations. Good practice that protects the autonomy of CSOs and 
limits the discretion of the regulating body only to the limited necessity thus demands 
that the Agency has to provide reasons for its decision to bring an inquiry to let the 
organisation defend itself. If prima facie evidences still prove the necessity of the 
inquiry after the organisation was given the opportunity to defend itself, the principle 
of transparency may require that the Agency publicize the reason of its inquiry and the 
results of the inquiry to let all stakeholders and the public. 
 
Furthermore, the Agency or sector administrators may require the charity or society or 
its representative or an employee to furnish accounts and statements, documents and 
‘any other evidence’ either in writing or orally for such inquiry or for any other 
purpose.66 Such requirements that demand the provision of ‘any requested evidence’ 
should also be construed in line with the principles of ‘necessity and proportionality’ 
not to intrude so much against organisational privacy and confidentiality. The 
application of this rule for instance needs to be seen in light of protection of informants 
and witnesses of human rights violation as it would otherwise trigger the repression of 
clients and witnesses and cripple the contribution of the sector in human rights 
monitoring. 
 
Further intrusion in the functioning of societies is made possible by the law as it 
requires societies to notify the Agency in writing of the time and place of any meeting 
of the General Assembly not later than seven working days prior to the meeting. 67 
Although the purpose of the notification is not clarified by the legislation, it 
nonetheless shows the degree of intrusiveness the law has permitted against societies. 
                                                          
66 CSP, Article 84, 85 and 87. 
67 CSP, Article 86. 
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Before the enactment of the CSP the preceding draft documents contain a provision 
which requires similar notification to enable the representatives of the Agency and 
even the police to be present.68 Such clearly marked out threatening purposes of the 
notification are omitted in the final draft after the sector representatives made a plea to 
that effect during discussions before the enactment.69 Although the police presence is 
omitted, nonetheless the requirement to notify the Agency by itself still shows the level 
of intrusiveness that can be exercised by the Agency.  Moreover, given the number of 
charities and societies and the human capacity of the Agency70, it is evident that the 
attendance of the Agency will be limited to a few. Hence, this might open a room for 
the arbitrary selection of charities and societies which might challenge government 
policies and legislations.  
 
To sum, even though the need to ascertain the accountability of charities and societies 
through disclosure and reporting is appreciated, the excessive and erratic requirement 
to disclose all types of information any time requested, and the condition of notifying 
and allowing the regulating agency in the meetings of CSOs may however have the 
potential of jeopardizing the independence of charities and societies.  
 
8.3.5 Sanction  
Accountability mechanisms be it command and control or incentive based regulations 
need to be enforced and thus failures need to be sanctioned. Moreover Reports though 
necessary are not often sufficient;71  they must also receive scrutiny by concerned 
authority.72 The law should therefore stipulate who should inspect the reports and what 
actions need to be taken. Improper and deceptive matters and questions on the report 
should trigger inquiries, inspections and formal audits as deemed necessary.  
 
                                                          
68 First draft Proclamation issued by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) as Charities and Societies 
Proclamation No.00/2008, Article 16. 
69  Several formal and informal discussions have taken place between the MoJ-Ethiopia and the 
representatives of the Ethiopian CSOs. The author of this thesis has been present in many of the 
discussions representing the Coalition of 16 local CSOs and networks which was established as an ad-
hoc Taskforce dubbed as ‘Taskforce for an enabling environment for civil society in Ethiopia’. 
70 In 2009 where all Ethiopian CSOs were requested to re-register, there were only 12 officers assigned 
to supervise and advise the more than 2000 charities and societies (See the Agency’s website at 
<www.chsa.et.org> accessed on 12 25 May 2015. 
71 Klingelhofer Stephan and Robinson David, above n 7 at 8-9. 
72 Ibid.  
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If formal auditing or an inquiry by the regulating Agency or an investigation by the 
police or any legally authorized personnel discloses failure of CSO to comply with the 
law or to fulfill its stated purposes or to use its funds in a legal and satisfactory manner, 
it is appropriate for the law to impose reasonable sanctions. Although education and 
advice are also paradigms of regulation of CSOs, in the event that CSOs committed a 
crime or made a serious fault a reasonable and proportionate sanction, clearly provided 
in advance of the act or omission that warrants the penalty, may be imposed.  
 
The law needs to sanction CSOs that are illegal or fail to comply with the mandatory 
accountability requirements in order to protect the public from the wrongdoings of 
those that the public often considers trustworthy.  However, it is important that the 
sanction should not be used beyond a means of regulating the legality and 
accountability of CSOs and not discourage the formation and the operation of CSOs. 
Thus, an enabling environment for CSOs demands that any sanction must be, (i) 
reasonable; (ii) predictable; (iii) and appealable.  
 
Reasonable 
Reasonable sanctions take into account the nature, severity and recurrence of the 
wrongdoing.  Thus firstly, sanctions may increase in severity with the severity of the 
acts of violation. Thus for instance non-flagrant wrongs may be tolerated with a 
warning notice. Secondly, sanctions imposed need to be graduated and served after 
prior notices.  Thirdly, sanctions also need to take the nature of the wrong committed. 
Thus for instance, improper or illegal acts related to private benefits such as self-
dealing and distribution of profits to members may be sanctioned by the suspension or 
removal of the governing body or employees responsible for the act since the unlawful 
enrichment of individuals in CSOs should not be reasons to affect the organisation as 
a whole. On the other hand, unlawful activities such as terrorism may face severe 
sanctions including involuntary termination of the organisation since such act would 
cause a serious threat for the peace, safety and security of the public.  
 
Predictable 
An enabling environment for CSOs require that the law must clearly provide the 
grounds of sanctions, the types of sanctions and the power of the sanctioning authority 
not to leave unlimited and arbitrary discretion of application of sanctions.  
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Appealable 
The right of judicial appeal is also a key provision that an enabling law must contain 
in parallel to sanctioning of CSOs. CSOs need to have the right of appeal to challenge 
the form of sanction or the decision that warrants sanction itself. This is particularly 
important for CSOs engaged in unpopular activities such as public advocacy or 
watchdog against government action. The ever-present danger of over-regulation by 
the state or the use of reporting and audit requirements to harass CSOs that are critical 
of the state or otherwise unpopular can be checked only through judicial appeal.  While 
administrative decisions should be subjected to appeal to be challenged in the court of 
law for correction of governmental abuse and to deter possible future abuses, any 
criminal sanction should be enforceable only through independent court order.73 
 
8.3.6 Sanction under the Ethiopian Legal system 
In order to enforce the accountability measures, the CSP provides a number of 
sanctions for non-compliance. For instance failures related to the disclosure and 
reporting of fiscal matters are punishable as follows. Failure to submit Annual 
Statements of Accounts will result in a fine with not less than ten thousand birr and not 
exceeding twenty thousand Birr.74 Failure of the duty to Keep Accounting Records is 
punishable with fine between Twenty thousand and Fifty thousand Birr.75 Failure to 
notify the particulars of Bank Accounts is also punishable with a fine between fifty 
thousand birr and hundred thousand Birr. This helps to ensure the financial 
transparency of CSOs and may be considered reasonable and predictable. 
 
However the law seems to impose a severe penalty on officers failing to comply with 
the above requirements. Thus, any officer, employee or person who participates in the 
above acts is punishable with fine not less than ten thousand Birr and not exceeding 
Twenty thousand Birr; or imprisonment not less than five years and not exceeding ten 
years or both. Such severe punishment that entails five to ten years of imprisonment 
for failure to submit the particulars of the bank account and/or financial report could 
                                                          
73 Leon Irish and others, n 30 at 32. 
74 CSP, Article 80. 
75 CSP, Article 79. 
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have been rectified easily with a warning.  This could however increase the supply side 
transaction cost for the formation and sustainability of CSOs. 
 
The Agency also has a power to suspend officials76 and to suspend or dissolve charities 
and societies77, even devoid of appeal to court78. For instance, when the Agency is 
satisfied that there is or has been any misconduct or mismanagement in the 
administration of the charity or society, it can suspend the responsible officer and order 
the organisation to improve its system of operation and to assign another officer.79 It 
may also suspend some operation of the charities and societies at fault meanwhile.80 
This decision is not however subject to judicial appeal for the Ethiopian resident and 
foreign charities.   
 
The Agency may also either suspend or cancel the license of charities and societies 
and dissolve them for reasons of failing to comply with the legislation governing them 
or the Agency’s orders; submitting falsified accounts and reports; procuring 
registration by fraud or misrepresentation; undertaking unlawful purposes or purposes 
prejudicial to public peace, welfare and security; failing to renew its license or 
committing a crime.81 Even if some of these measures are necessary to ensure the 
accountability, legality and legitimacy of charities and societies, the wider discretion 
of the Agency and the ambiguity of some of the grounds of sanction, added to the 
severity of the measures that can be taken even for minor faults in degree and without 
a single warning, could threaten the independence of individual organisations as well 
as the sector as a whole.  
 
Regarding the right of appeal, the Proclamation provides Charities and Societies the 
right to an administrative appeal against any decision made by the registering and 
supervising agency. Any organisation which is aggrieved by the decision of the 
director of the Agency can lodge its appeal to the Board within 15 days from the date 
of the decision82 . The board that has seven members out of which two of them 
                                                          
76 CSP, Article 91. 
77 CSP, Article 91, 92 and 93. 
78 CSP, Article 104 (2). 
79 CSP, Article 90 (1). 
80 CSP, Article 90 (2). 
81 CSP, Article 92. 
82 CSP, Article 104(2) 
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nominated from the charities and societies is nonetheless far from ‘independent’ as all 
members including those that represent the sector are nominated by the government.83 
However the CSP limits the right of judicial appeal to only Ethiopian charities and 
societies denying the Ethiopian resident charities and societies and foreign charities 
against the constitution, which provides the Right of access to justice for ‘everyone’ 
including any association representing the collective or individual interest of its 
members, to bring a justiciable matter to a court of law.84 The right to appeal is denied 
for foreign charities on the ground that the right to access justice is a democratic right 
not a fundamental right reserved only to citizens. Following this argument, the law 
treats the Ethiopian resident charities and societies that receive more than 10% of their 
annual income from foreign sources as foreign entities regardless of the citizenship of 
their members and the workplace of the organizations and therefore denied them the 
right to judicial appeal.  
 
Ethiopian Charity or Society, or Ethiopians aggrieved by the decision of the Board 
may however appeal to the Federal High Court within 15 days from the date of the 
decision.85 When an organisation appeals to Court, it might also apply for a stay of 
execution of the decision to dissolve it. If the court grants the stay of execution, the 
organisation can continue operating until the court gives a final decision on the appeal.  
On the other hand the CSP in contravention of the basic constitutional principle of 
‘access to justice’ denies Ethiopian Resident charities and societies as well as Foreign 
Charities the right to judicial appeal against the decision of the Board of the Agency.86 
Incidentally, it is good to note that CSOs working on democratization are allowed the 
right to judicial appeal since they all are required to be registered as Ethiopian charities 
or societies. 
 
In sum, the CSP is commendable in stipulating legal provisions that ensures the 
accountability of the civil society sector. It provide different mechanisms whereby 
Charities and Societies remain accountable by commanding the exercise of good 
governance enforced through sanctions; and requiring disclosure and reporting. Such 
                                                          
83 CSP, Article 8. 
84 The FDRE Constitution, Article 37. 
85 CSP, Article 104 (3). 
86 CSP, Article 104 (2). 
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accountability measures are necessary to ensure the legality and trustworthiness of the 
sector. Nonetheless the wider discretionary power of the Agency in enforcing 
accountability measures, severe penalties on officers; and the lack of judicial appeal 
for Ethiopian resident and foreign organisations could remain as challenge to the 
functions of CSOs. Although accountability is necessary, extreme caution owing to 
fear of severe penalties however may possibly cause CSOs to undertake self-
censorship thus compromising their voice or influence and threatening the autonomy 
the sector. However, if CSOs have to be effective in their contribution to 
democratization or any other social good, the accountability mechanisms should be 
limited only to judicious actions that made them answerable to the public.  
 
Both autonomy and accountability are essential features of CSOs and indispensable 
means to play their role in democratization. Thus, it is necessary that the accountability 
mechanisms that are set by the CSP should be applied within the constitutional 
framework that guarantees freedom of association; and individual cases should be 
assessed in line with the requirement of ‘necessity in a democratic society.’ Any 
accountability and punitive measures should thus be taken in a manner that should not 
threaten the autonomy, existence and healthy functioning of CSOs. Measures should 
thus be taken in good faith, and to the extent that is deemed possible CSOs need to be 
given a chance to rectify errors before resorting to severe actions such as suspension 
of license, dissolution or criminal conviction of officers.
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
As indicated in the introduction this thesis aims to answer the question whether the law 
governing CSOs has a role to play in assisting CSOs contribution to democratization. 
It does so firstly by laying the conceptual framework for what constitutes CSOs and 
what is democracy. It also explores if CSOs have any contribution to democratization 
and concludes that lawful CSOs that have democratic mission and organization, 
exercise autonomy, and are representative and inclusive will contribute to democracy 
by building the social capital, influencing policies and legislations and holding 
government accountable. The thesis further explains that in addition to exhibiting such 
characteristics, CSOs further need enabling environment to play such democratic 
functions. The thesis argues that one of such enabling environment necessary for CSOs 
democratic functions is the legal framework. Hence, focusing on the enabling legal 
framework, and taking the Ethiopian law as a case study it analyses such aspects of 
CSOs as their formation, purposes, resources and accountability that are specifically 
governed by the legal regime, and answers beyond a reasonable doubt that laws may 
either assist or hinder CSOs contribution to democratisation. 
 
Democracy as a system of governance enshrines liberty, equality and the protection of 
human rights. The protection and enforcement of such fundamental rights require some 
procedural mechanisms such as free, fair, inclusive and periodical election that ensures 
the rule of the people. Moreover, democracy entails a system that ensures the 
participation of the electorate in the public sphere beyond election periods, and the 
accountability of the elected officials throughout their office term.  
 
Among others, the existence of strong CSOs plays a crucial role in the initiation and 
consolidation of democracy. In an authoritarian regime that does not constitutionally 
guarantee fundamental rights CSOs may have a role of delegitimising the authoritarian 
government and fighting for a regime change. Once the democratization process is 
initiated, CSOs contribute to electoral democracy through voters and civic education 
and election monitoring to ensure peaceful and fair elections. CSOs also offer 
procedural guarantees for sustainable democracy as they can provide a forum of 
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participation and civic engagement for citizens and empowering them by planting 
democratic ideas and civic skills. They also reinforce government accountability 
serving as a watchdog, enhancing regulatory quality and promoting transparency. 
 
However an enabling legal environment for CSOs is a fundamental prerequisite that 
together with other socioeconomic and political conditions co-determine the role CSOs 
can play in the democratization process. As is elucidated in the previous chapters in 
detail by taking the Ethiopian legal framework as a case study, the law may either assist 
or hinder the democratization role of CSOs. The law in particular regulates CSOs legal 
existence, purposes of formation, resource mobilization, and accountability. In 
regulating these aspects of CSOs the law influences the essential facets of CSOs in 
their democratization role, including the growth and the plurality of CSOs, their 
operational and financial autonomy, activism, legitimacy and accountability.  
 
For CSOs the most favourable legal framework means constitutionally recognized 
freedom to associate for any lawful purpose; freedom to form and to get legal 
personality free of red tape; freedom to express themselves without frontiers; freedom 
to solicit legitimate funds from any legal source of their choice; freedom to have a day 
in court; predictable and non-discriminatory rules and regulations and minimised 
limitations and sanctions1. These freedoms, however also need to be balanced with 
their accountability.  
 
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia constitution lays an enabling general 
framework for CSOs by recognizing freedom of association and other fundamental 
rights such as the freedom of assembly, the freedom of information and the freedom 
of expression. The constitution also stresses the fundamental nature of such freedoms 
and ensures their protection by specifically allowing their interpretation according to 
the international human rights treaties such as the UDHR and the ICCPR ratified by 
the nation.2 However, instead of getting advanced along with the constitution and 
enforcing such constitutional principles, the Charities and Societies Proclamation 
(CSP) that governs the sector rather regressed and contravenes the supreme law of the 
country in many aspects. It restricts such fundamental rights as freedom of association, 
                                                          
1 For a detail discussion on favourable legal environment for CSOs, See chapter 4 above. 
2 The FDRE Constitution, Article 9 and Article 13. 
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freedom to access justice, freedom of communication and networking; and contravenes 
democratic and constitutional principles such as equality before the law, and 
sovereignty of the people. Consequently the CSP negatively impacts on the 
engagements of CSOs and most notably the advocacy CSOs and their contribution to 
democratization. It does so by discouraging the growth of the sector; and 
systematically suppressing their activism, resource mobilization capability, and 
autonomy. 
 
Firstly, the CSP curtails the growth of the sector by putting intricate procedures to form 
and to sustain CSOs and networks of CSOs.   The mandatory requirement for charities 
and societies to get registered; the cumbersome procedures to get legal personality; the 
obligation to renew license every three years; and the discretion of the registering 
Agency that leaves wide scope for motivated procedural delays increases the supply-
side transaction cost of the formation of CSOs. The restrictions on the formation of 
consortiums also impacts on the strengthening of the sector and their capacity to 
become a voice. Moreover, the unconstitutional denial of the right of judicial appeal 
against administrative grievances and unwarranted dissolutions for Ethiopian resident 
and foreign charities threatens the existence of CSOs. These in turn affect the growth 
of the sector and the engineering and strengthening of the social capital that facilitates 
the democratization of the country.  
 
As Robert Putnam argues3 ‘networks  or organisations can contribute to mediating 
between citizens and the state; mobilizing and conveying citizens’ interests to 
government; constraining government actions by stimulating citizens’ actions and 
inculcating democratic values.’ Indeed many other scholars also concur with the 
contribution of social and political capital 4  engineered by CSOs for economic 
                                                          
3 Robert Putnam, ‘Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital’ (1995) Journal of Democracy 6 
(1) 65-78, 67. 
4John Booth and Patricia Richard, ‘Civil Society, Political Capital and Democratization in Central 
America’ (1998)The Journal of Politics 60 (3) 780-800. 
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development5, political participation,6 democratic values7 and democratization,8 save 
the ‘uncivil ones.' 9  However, the cumbersome procedures of formation, resource 
mobilization and accountability imposed by the CSP would affect the engineering and 
the growth of a social capital that could stir communal empowerment and activism that 
makes demands from the public authorities and influences government decisions, 
policies and legislations. Thus by impeding the growth and activism of CSOs, the law 
plucks out the social force that is indispensable to push the nascent democratization 
process. 
 
Second, it suppresses the activism of CSOs by barring the engagement of CSOs in the 
democratization purposes. Despite the constitutional recognition of the freedom of 
association for any lawful purpose as is relevant in a democratic society, the CSP 
discriminately denies nearly 80% of CSOs, that it classifies as Ethiopian Resident 
Charities and Societies and Foreign Charities, not to be engaged in scores of lawful 
purposes. The restricted areas of engagement include the promotion of human rights, 
the promotion of democracy including election monitoring; the promotion of equality 
of gender, religion and minority groups; the promotion of efficiency of the justice 
sector; the promotion of conflict resolution and conflict management.10 This comes 
from a construal of political purpose to include nearly all the engagements of the 
community in the public sphere, beyond what is conventionally considered as partisan 
purposes. All these roles having a pronounced contribution to the nascent 
democratization the country was experiencing, the restriction of financial resources for 
the promotion of such democratic purposes has expelled many of the CSOs that could 
have shaped the contours of democracy in the country.  
                                                          
5Albert Hirschman, Getting Ahead Collectively: Grassroots Experiences in Latin America (Pergamon 
1984); John Clark, Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organisations (Kumarian press 
1991). 
6  Steven Rosenstone and John Hansen, Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America 
(Longman Publishing Group 2009); Conway Margaret ‘Political participation in the United States’ 
(1991) congressional quarterly press. 
7 John Booth and Patricia Richard, ‘Repression, Participation and Democratic Norms in Urban Central 
America’ (1998) American Journal of Political Science 40, 1205-32. 
8 Larry Diamond, ‘Introduction: Civil Society and the Struggle for Democracy’ in the Larry Diamond 
(eds) Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Democracy in the Developing World 
(Freedom House 1991); Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (MIT Press 
1992). 
9 Monga Célestin, ‘Uncivil Societies: A Theory of Socio-political Change’ (2009) Policy Research 
Working Paper The World Bank, Development Economics Policy Review Unit, 4942, 2. 
10 CSP, Article 14 (5). 
233 
 
 
The contours of democracy in a country depend on the inputs of society who are the 
social forces in ‘defining, controlling and legitimating state power.’ 11  CSOs as 
institutions created by the different segments of society would have an important and 
integral role to play in participating and empowering the society to shape such 
contours. Thus any restriction against such role of CSOs would significantly affect the 
way the contour of democracy will be formed. The establishment of democratic 
structures and institutions, however well- meaning they may be, would only make an 
imperfect contour without the full-fledged participation of the society. Sustaining 
democratic principles and cultivating democratic culture requires that the society and 
their organisations need to forge ahead with the democratization process. Adam 
Prezworski argues along these lines asserting that ‘democracy is consolidated when 
compliance- acting within the institutional framework-constitutes the equilibrium of 
the decentralised strategies of all the relevant political forces.’12 Moreover CSOs create 
and sustain the asset of new democratic norms which regulate the behaviour of the 
state and the character of political relations between the state and the public sphere of 
society and individual citizens.13 Thus, the CSP’s prohibition of a very large group of 
CSOs from such democratization role will certainly have an adverse consequence to 
the democratization process of the nation.  
 
Thirdly, the CSP also incapacitates the vibrancy and the efficiency of the rest of a 
handful of active advocacy CSOs by imposing barriers to access resources. It denies 
such CSOs classified as Ethiopian Charities and Societies, their freedom to solicit 
funds from any legal source, and restricts them only to local funding with identified 
donors. Such restriction imposed notwithstanding the unfavourable socio-economic 
reality of the country has essentially rendered them unable to function and stultified 
their role in democratization. Furthermore, vague and very limited tax concessions; 
cumbersome public fundraising procedures; prohibition of anonymous donations; 
limited engagement in only ‘incidental’ income generating activities; and the wide 
                                                          
11 Gordon White, ‘Civil Society, Democratization and Development: Clearing the Analytical Ground’ 
in Peter Burnell and Peter Calvert (eds) Civil Society in Democratization (Franc Cass 2004) 13. 
12 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe 
and Latin America (Cambridge University Press 1991) 26. 
13 Gordon White, above n 11 at 15.  
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discretion of authorities to make decisions on these matters significantly impede the 
financial capability and the financial autonomy of CSOs.  
 
Gordon White drawing on some theories of collective action asserts, ‘the capacity for 
collective action is affected by factors such as diseconomies of numerical scale, or the 
resources available to potential actors (for example, it is usually easier for a small 
group of large landowners to organize and exert influence than a large number of small 
tenants.).’14 Without underestimating the worth of constituency, this assertion clearly 
shows the worth of financial capability to influence the democratization process by 
exerting pressure on government to respect the rule of law and human rights. The CSP 
however by depleting the financial resource of advocacy CSOs left them incapable to 
influence the democratization process. Thus in general the facts that a very large 
number of CSOs are denied and the rest incapacitated from participating in the 
democratization of the country would in general make the community fail to internalize 
the democratic ideals, and disengage them from shaping the contours of democracy. 
 
In addition to the financial limitations, the CSP also unclearly but seemingly rules out 
the engagement of such advocacy CSOs in electoral democracy, by singling out mass 
based organisations to undertake such purposes as voter education, organizing 
seminars on current affairs and the platforms of candidates and election monitoring.  
This is like giving a double sentence for vibrant advocacy CSOs in the country that are 
restrained not to access foreign funding, as most of them do not have mass 
membership.  
 
Fourthly, the CSP also impinges on the autonomy of CSOs through unwarranted and 
unchecked discretion of the regulating Agency beyond what is reasonably necessary 
to ensure the sector’s accountability.  It is true that the advance of a civil society which 
does not necessarily contain the democratic ideal does not in itself ensure the 
democratization of the political system.’15 Thus, the resolve of the CSP to ensure the 
accountability of CSOs is commendable and could be enabling to decrease the 
demand- side transaction cost of CSOs. Nonetheless, it contains unwarranted 
                                                          
14Ibid, 12. 
15 Jean-Francois Bayart, ‘Civil Society in Africa’ in Patrick Chabal (ed.) Political Domination in Africa 
(Cambridge University Press 1986) 118.  
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limitations and disproportionate sanctions that affect their autonomy. It puts an 
inflexible 30% administrative cost limit; requires the submission of an activity report, 
financial report, audit report, bank accounts not only periodically, but any time the 
Agency requests to; requires the disclosure of any types of information or documents 
anytime. It also gives excessive authority to the Agency to permit or deny registration 
and renewal of license; to approve or deny fundraising; to investigate the organisations 
anytime it deems necessary; to suspend officers and the operation of CSOs; to dissolve 
Ethiopian Resident charities and societies and Foreign charities without court order; 
and to confiscate properties of CSOs found to be in violation of the law and to give it 
to another charity or society that it hand-picks. The CSP also imposes severe pecuniary 
penalties on charities and their officers. It also puts ‘undefined’ terms of imprisonment 
on officers even for minor administrative or professional faults. The CSP thus infringes 
on the ideal notion of CSOs as an autonomous entity and cause them to operate in a 
state of fear and unwarranted self-censorship. 
 
Such evasion in the operational autonomy of CSOs and threat of grave sanctions make 
their survival questionable, let alone pressurising the government and pushing for the 
democratization process. Such threat against autonomy is by itself a deterring factor 
not to establish CSOs and an impending cause to dissolve existing ones. Even those 
CSOs that endure the pressure may contribute little to democratization, if at all, in 
terms of what Warren has referred as ‘developmental effects’16 or Uhlin designates  as 
‘ the individual aspect of democracy.’17 This is to say that while the enduring CSOs 
may still serve as a school of democracy by bringing ‘developmental effects’ on 
individuals in the form of capacity enhancement in networking and collective decision-
making process, nevertheless, their effect on the ‘institutional aspect’18 of democracy 
will however be minimal.  Thus CSOs in Ethiopia will be essentially limited to 
contribute to democratization in terms of promoting rights, equality, justice and peace; 
forging the public opinion; influencing the democratic institutions, monitoring the 
state’s action and ensuring accountability. The CSP also weakens the potentially 
                                                          
16 Mark Warren, Democracy and Association (Princeton University Press 2001) 97 
17 Anders Uhlin, ‘Which Characteristics of Civil Society Organisations Support What Aspects of 
Democracy? Evidence from Post-communist Latvia’ (2009) International Political Science Review 30 
(3) 271–295, 275 
18  Ibid, 277. 
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crucial intermediary role between state and society and affect the political 
communication that is held to be a characteristic of democratic consolidation process. 
Although the developmental CSOs would still serve as transmission-belt in 
socioeconomic matters by transmitting the demands of the public, the political 
communication would however be lacking owing to the diminished size and capacity 
of advocacy CSOs. 
 
Thus the CSP rather than enforcing the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of 
association and creating a legally protected enabling environment for CSOs, has 
weakened the democratization process by limiting citizens’ engagement in the public 
sphere and reinforcing excessive government control. It even defeats the very purpose 
for which the proclamation is enacted, which according to the preamble is to ‘ensure 
the realization of the rights to association enshrined in the constitution; … and aid and 
facilitate the role of charities and societies in the overall development of Ethiopian 
peoples.’   
 
Hence, if the principle of constitutionalism has to be respected and the nascent 
democratization process of the country has to continue and be sustained, the current 
legal framework governing the Ethiopian CSOs needs to be amended in line with the 
constitution of the country that guarantees individuals rights to participate in the public 
sphere. This in particular calls for the following recommendation points. 
 
The recommendations to follow are made based on the legal analysis made in the 
preceding chapters taking the Ethiopian legal framework as a case study but can be 
applicable to a broader cases of laws governing CSOs Thus the following section 
provides some recommendations that help to draw an enabling legal framework for 
CSOs in general and for the case of Ethiopia in particular. 
 
The recommendations are therefore framed in two parts. Although there may not be a 
one-fits-all’ regulation that best serves all legal systems the first section of the 
recommendation provides general principles that can be commonly applicable. The 
second part provides specific recommendations that the Ethiopian legal framework 
needs to take in to consideration. 
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Recommendations 
A. General 
1. The legal existence of CSOs needs to be facilitated to allow the growth of the 
sector as it contributes to the democratization of a nation and the provision of 
public and quasi private goods. These among others require the legal 
recognition and the enforcement of the right to form various types of CSOs 
constituted either formally or informally to pursue any lawful purpose that 
benefits either their own members or the public at large.  Thus, the legal 
requirements laid down to regulate the formation of CSOs and their coalition, 
the acquisition of legal personality and registration as well as their dissolution 
needs to be well-defined, undemanding and non-discriminatory. Moreover 
CSOs needs to have the right to appeal against any administrative decision that 
affect their legal existence.  Such legal rules that ensure the formation and the 
sustainability of CSOs increases CSOs representation, autonomy and the 
growth of the sector and thereby enhances their contribution to 
democratization.  
 
2. The legal framework needs to uphold a constitutional doctrine that CSOs are 
entitled to do what its members can do in their individual capacity to the extent 
that the applicability of such right permits, as the right to association is derived 
from the individual liberty. Thus it needs to recognize the right of CSOs to 
pursue any lawful purpose that do not threat the rights, freedoms, safety and 
security of other individuals, groups or the public as a whole. The right to 
pursue any lawful purpose shall also include among others the right of CSOs 
to independently choose their own purposes of formation; to pursue the same 
autonomously without any undue interference from the government or any 
other organ; and the freedom to choose any lawful operational strategies, 
approaches and activities that leads to the attainment of such purpose; and the 
freedom to solicit fund from any lawful purpose and to utilize the solicited fund 
for the purpose. Thus CSOs need to have the freedom to engage in any purpose 
as long as both the end and the means involved are lawful. 
 
Such recognition offers CSOs the right to pursue democratic promotion as a 
legitimate purpose and allows them to employ any lawful operational strategies 
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such as government accountability, community empowerment, capacity 
building of democratic institutions, lobbying and advocacy for reforms of laws 
and policies etc. and thereby greatly contribute to the institutional aspects of 
democracy. Moreover the recognition to pursue any lawful purpose allows the 
formation of diverse types of CSOs which serves as a school of democracy and 
thereby enhances the developmental aspects of democracy.  
 
While the requirement of legality is a general precondition for all CSOs, the 
purposes of CSOs may also need to be nonpartisan in order to ensure their 
neutrality. While the contribution of strong political parties that provide 
alternative policies for the public is indispensable for the consolidation of 
democracy, as they need to be governed by a distinct law, the legal framework 
governing CSOs may also require CSOs to limit their objectives of formation 
to non-partisan purposes. Thus the laws governing CSOs may sanction typical 
partisan purposes such as provision of financial or in kind support; 
campaigning against or in support of any political party or a candidate; or any 
form of direct or indirect support to the promotion of the interest of any political 
party or a candidate. 
 
3. The rights of CSOs to mobilize both tangible  and intangible resources as a 
fundamental right consequential to the freedom of association needs to be 
recognized as the right to form associations is of no value or a diminished value 
without the necessary human and financial resources. Owing to their non- profit 
orientation CSOs need to rely on resource mobilization and the law needs to 
broaden up their potential source of fund such as membership fee, public 
collection, tax concessions, public grants, foreign aid and commercial income 
generating activities that will be reinvested for the purpose of the organization. 
Moreover the rules that govern the resource mobilization of CSOs needs to be 
well-defined and non-discriminatory. The law also needs to facilitate the 
mobilization of intangible resources by providing enabling conditions for 
CSOs that encourage volunteers and employees to engage in the sector. 
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Such legal framework that clearly recognizes and enforces the right of CSOs to 
mobilize resources from different sources, in addition to ensuring the sustainability 
and financial autonomy of CSOs and thereby enhance the democratic and overall 
contribution of CSOs, it is particularly important for those CSOs that represent the 
less advantaged community whose interest would otherwise be compromised 
owing to the impact of money-politics in the governance system. Thus the law 
needs to recognize the right of CSOs to solicit fund from any lawful sources, and 
to utilize the fund for any lawful purpose that does not compromise the safety and 
security of the public as is required in a democratic society.  
4. Last but not least, the legality and credibility of CSOs need to be ensured 
through accountability measures to protect the public safety, security as well 
as the public fund. The accountability measures however needs to be well-
defined, not costly, easy, undemanding, non- discriminatory and must strike 
the necessary balance with the autonomous and sustainable existence of CSOs. 
Such balanced measures in addition to ensuring the trustworthiness of CSOs 
allows mutual acceptance and respectful cooperation between States and CSOs.  
 
B. Specific Recommendations to Ethiopia 
1. In light with the above-mentioned enabling legal conditions for the formation 
of CSOs, the CSP in particular needs to be reformed 
a.  to give recognition to informal CSOs; 
b.  to allow coalition of all types of CSOs with no restriction as to their 
nature and to allow network CSOs pursue any lawful purpose and 
implement any lawful activities; 
c. to recognize CSOs right to independently determine their place of 
formation in any or all part of the country; 
d. to amend the excessive scrutinizing power of the Charities and Societies 
Agency and sector administrators in the process of registering CSOs, 
and to limit their mandate only to the necessary minimum that is 
required to regulate the accountability and legality of the sector;  
e. to improve the representation of CSOs in the Board of Charities and 
Societies that serves as an administrative appellate organ; and to allow 
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CSOs to make their own decisions in who will be representing the 
sector in the Board 
f. to provide specific time limit within which the Board of Charities and 
Societies must pass a decision on appeals presented to it; 
g. to make the Charities and Societies Agency accountable to  the 
legislature instead of the executive branch of the government; 
h. to amend the re-registration requirement recognizing the perpetual 
existence of CSOs once registered and operating lawfully; 
i. to revise the conditions of dissolution of CSOs so as to limit dissolution 
only to serious causes that threatens the public safety and security by 
the standard of a democratic society; and  
j. to grant all types of CSOs the right to judicial appeal on all matters that 
affect their legal existence. 
 
2. While the Constitution of Ethiopia clearly recognizes freedom of association 
and other rights such as freedom of expression, assembly, communication, 
networking that facilitates CSOs democratic functions, in light with the above-
mentioned enabling legal conditions that facilitates the free engagement of 
CSOs in all lawful purposes, the Ethiopian legal framework specifically needs 
to:  
 
a. Broadly conceptualize the freedom of association as a fundamental 
right and interpret it in line with the constitution and other international 
treaties such as the ICCPR ratified by the nation. 
b. Narrowly define partisan purposes so as to allow CSOs engagement in 
all lawful public matters other than campaigning for political parties or 
candidates; and financial or in kind support to political parties or 
candidates. 
c. Balance the need to protect state sovereignty with people’s sovereignty 
as is necessary in a democratic society to allow wider engagement of 
the public and their organisations’ in the public sphere. 
d. Most decisively, revise the CSP so as to allow CSOs engagement in any 
lawful purpose including the advancement of human and democratic 
rights; the promotion of equality of nations, nationalities and peoples 
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and that of gender and religion; the promotion of the rights of the 
disabled and children; and the promotion of conflict resolution or 
reconciliation, notwithstanding the source of the income for the 
implementation of such purpose as long as the source of income is legal. 
Such reforms will positively influence the engagement of citizens in 
shaping the democratization contours of the county. 
 
3. In line with enabling legal conditions, the legal regime of Ethiopia that govern 
the resource mobilization of CSOs needs to: 
a. Collect and reconcile all the legal rules that govern the resource 
mobilization of the sector found scattered on different legal instruments 
for the purpose of avoiding inconsistent rules and ensuring clarity, 
predictability, accessibility and non-discrimination. 
b. Revise some of the harsh penalties that the CSP imposed on officers of 
CSOs not to discourage qualified personnel and volunteers from the 
sector 
c. Provide some encouraging benefits to volunteers in the form of tax 
concessions or otherwise 
d. Allow public collection whenever CSOs choose to undertake such form 
of mobilization and not limit public collection only as a last resort when 
other means of resource mobilization has become impossible  
e. Limit the discretion of the Charities and Societies Agency in giving 
permission to public collection only to the conditions necessary for the 
Agency to supervise any illegality thus revising its mandate to 
determine the purpose of public collection; and allowing CSOs to 
undertake public collection for any purpose as long as their purposes of 
formation was determined to be lawful when registered. 
f. Limit the discretion and arbitrariness of the Charities and Societies 
Agency in determining the commercial income generating activities of 
CSOs by clearly stipulating the grounds whereby the Agency shall refer 
in making its decisions to allow or deny such undertaking. 
g. Revise the condition that income generating activities must be limited 
only to incidental activities to the main objectives of the organizations 
to enable CSOs engage in better income generating activities to ensure 
242 
 
their financial sustainability and probably apply a ceiling to the amount 
of money an organization could annually earn from the commercial 
activity. 
h. Revise the tax regime to allow a more liberal tax concession for public 
benefit CSOs and to clarify the vague provisions not reconciled with 
the CSP. 
i. Consider policies that allow accessibility of public fund to CSOs in a 
systematic manner that doesn’t compromise their autonomy but ensure 
their financial sustainability. 
j. Allow foreign funding for all types of CSOs indiscriminately as long as 
the source of funding and the means used to access the fund are legal; 
and the purpose for which the fund will be utilized is lawful and not 
threatening the public safety and security by the standard of a 
democratic society. Thus consequently revise the rules that classify 
CSOs as Ethiopian and Ethiopian resident, which doesn’t have any 
jurisprudential backing and made only to distinguish those that receive 
more than ten percent of their funding from foreign sources. 
k. Ensure that foreign funding will not threaten the autonomy of CSOs and 
create allegiance to the protection of foreign interest by allowing a 
systematic tripartite partnership between CSOs, the Government and 
foreign donors and requiring the prohibition of any gagging order that 
threatens the autonomy of CSOs and the sovereignty of the state. 
l. Provide a more flexible approach as to what constitutes an 
administrative cost of CSOs and as to the ratio of administrative and 
operational cost taking the nature, the size and the financial capability 
of CSOs. 
 
4. Ensuring the accountability of CSOs without unwarrantedly infringing on the 
freedom of CSOs also  calls for revising all the legal provisions of the Charities 
and Societies Proclamation and the regulations and directives issued to 
implement the proclamation that gives stretched and arbitrary discretion to the 
Charities and Societies Agency, the Sector Administrators, and the Charities 
and Societies Board. This in particular calls for reforms: 
243 
 
a. To give guidelines or to specifically provide the grounds whereby the 
Charities and Societies Agency may ask for additional reports other 
than the periodical ones; and the grounds whereby it may institute 
general or specific inquiry, in order to avoid the exercise of unfettered 
discretion that threatens the autonomy of CSOs. 
b. to revise some of the harsh penalties imposed against Charities and 
Societies and their officers 
c. to allow access to justice for all types of Charities and Societies 
regardless of their source of income or nature whatsoever 
 
5. Further to revising the particular legal impediments imposed on CSOs, creating 
an overall enabling and conducive environment that broadens the operational 
space for all democratic actors such as the media and political parties and 
facilitating partnership with the government will enable the consolidation of 
the nascent democratization process Ethiopia has started exercising. 
 
 
 
 
244 
 
TABLE OF CASES 
TABLE OF AMERICAN CASES  
 
FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 409 (1984) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)  
Slee v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 42 F 2d 184 (2nd Cir 1930) at 185 
The Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. v. Comm’r, 858 F. 2d876, 881 (2d Cir, 1988) 
cert denied, 490 U.S. 1030 (1989); 
United States v Dykema, 666 F.2d1096, 1101 (7th Cir 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S.983 
(1982);
245 
 
TABLE OF AUSTRALIAN CASES  
 
Aid/Watch Incorporated v. Commissioner of Taxation [2010] HCA 42 
Royal North Shore Hospital of Sydney v Attorney General [1938] 60 CLR396
246 
 
TABLE OF ENGLISH CASES 
 
Anti-vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1948] AC 31(HL) 62 
Auckland Medical Aid Trust v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1997] 1 NZLR 
382,395 
Bonar Law Memorial Trust V IRC (1933) 49 TLR 220 (Conservative Party);  
Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [1917] AC 406 [442] 
McGovern v Attorney-General [1982] Ch 321 [506] 
Perpetual Trustee Co (Ltd) v Rovins (1967) 85 WN (Pt. 1) (NSW) 403, 411 
Re Hopkinson [1949] 1 ALL ER 346 (Labour Party) 
Thrupp v. Collett (No 1) (1858) 53 ER 844. 
Webb v O’Doherty (1991) (1991) 3 Admin LR 731
247 
 
TABLE OF EUROPEAN COURT CASES 
 
Ezelin v. France (1991), Series A, no. 202 
Izmir Savas Karsitlari Dernegi and Others v Turkey, App no.46257/99 (ECtHR, 02 
March 2006) 
N.F. v. Italy, App no37119/97(ECtHR 2August2001) 
Sidiropoulos and Others V. Greece 10 July 1998, para 40 
Socialist party and others v. Turkey ECGR 1998-III 41 
United Communist Party of Turkey and others v Turkey ECHR 1998-I, 33 
248 
 
BIBLOGRAPHY 
 
6 P, Restricting the Freedom of Speech of Charities: Do the Rationales Stand Up? 
(Demos 1994). 
Abbink J, ‘Breaking and making the state: the dynamics of ethnic democracy in 
Ethiopia’ (1995) Journal of Contemporary African Studies13 (2) 149–63. 
Abbink J, ‘Discomfiture of democracy? : The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia and its 
Aftermath’ (2006). 
Amdwork E and Gebre A, ‘Tracking Trends in Ethiopia’s Civil Society (TECS): Mass 
Based Societies in Ethiopia: Prospects and Challenges’ (2011) 2. 
Ameha B and Zemedeneh N, Company Registration in Ethiopia (The Addis Ababa 
Chamber of Commerce and the Swedish Agency for International Development 
Cooperation, SIDA Research Team 2005) 19. 
Amnesty International, Stifling Human Rights Work, the Impact of Civil Society 
Legislation in Ethiopia (Amnesty International 2012) 27. 
Andrews W, ‘Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax’ (1972) Harvard Law 
Review 86 (2). 
Anheier H, Civil Society: Measurement, Evaluation, Policy (Earthscan 2004) 22. 
Aristotle, Politics (Oxford University Press1995). 
Aron R, Democracy and Totalitarianism (Praeger 1969).  
Aspen H, ‘The 1995 national and regional elections in Ethiopia: local perspectives’ 
(1995) Working Papers on Ethiopian Development, Trondheim: Centre for 
Environment and Development, University of Trondheim. 
Baldwin R, and Cave M, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice 
(Oxford University Press1999). 
Bayart J, ‘Civil Society in Africa’ in Patrick Chabal (ed.) Political Domination in 
Africa (Cambridge University Press 1986). 
Behn R, Rethinking Democratic Accountability (Brookings Institution Press 2001).  
Berman S, ‘Civil Society and Political Institutionalization’ (1997) American 
Behavioral Scientist 40 (5) 562–74. 
 Berman S, ‘Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic’ (1997) World 
Politics 49 (3) 51–66. 
Bermeo N, Nord P, and Bandi A, Civil Society before Democracy (Rowman and 
Littlefield publishers 2000). 
249 
 
Bingham P, Contemporary Democracies (Harvard University Press1982). 
Birhanu K, ‘The Role of NGOs in Promoting Democratic Values’ in  Bahru Z and 
Siegfried P (Eds) The Challenge of Democracy from Below (Nordiska Africa institute 
and Forum for Social Studies 2002). 
Bittker B, ‘Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?’ (1972) Tax 
Law Review 28, 37. 
Booth J and Richard P, ‘Civil Society, Political Capital and Democratization in Central 
America’ (1998) The Journal of Politics 60 (3) 780-800. 
Booth J and Richard P, ‘Repression, Participation and Democratic Norms in Urban 
Central America’ (1998) American Journal of Political Science 40, 1205-32. 
Bratton M, ‘Civil Society and Political Consolidation in Africa’ (1994) IDR Reports 
11 (6) 4-5 in Burnell Peter and Calvert Peter Civil Society in Democratization (Frank 
Cass Co, ltd 2005). 
Bowden B, ‘Civil Society, the State and Global Civil Society: Global Civil Society’ 
(2006) Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations- Routledge, 163-165. 
Brysk A, ‘Democratizing Civil Society in Latin America’ (2000) Journal of 
Democracy 11 (3) 151–65. 
Célestin M, ‘Uncivil Societies: A Theory of Socio-political Change’ (2009) Policy 
Research Working Paper 4942 2, The World Bank. 
Charity Commission (England and Wales), CC9. 
Charles R, ‘Charity and Politics’ (1982) New Zealand University Law Review 
(NZULR) 10 169,171. 
Chisolm L, ‘Accountability of nonprofit organisations and those who control them: 
The legal framework’ (1995) Nonprofit Management and Leadership 6 (2). 
Chisolm L, ‘Politics and Charity: A proposal for Peaceful Coexistence’ (1990) 58 
George Washington Law Review 308 (320). 
Clark E, ‘The Limitation on Political Activities: A Discordant Note in the Law of 
Charities’ (1960) 46 Virginia Law Review 439, 462-463.  
Clark J, Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organisations (Kumarian 
press 1991). 
Clark J, Civil Society, NGOs and Development in Ethiopia: A snap shot view (The 
World Bank 2000) 4.  
Clarke G, The politics of NGOs in South East Asia: participation and protest in the 
Philippines (Routledge 1998). 
250 
 
Cohen J and Arato A, Civil Society and Political Theory (MIT Press 1994). 
Council of Europe’s Recommendation on the legal status of NGOs in Europe CM/Rec 
(2007) 14, s IV 28-29. 
Dagne K, and Hailegebriel D, Assessment of the Impact of the Charities and Societies 
Regulatory Framework on Civil Society Organisation in Ethiopia (Task Force on 
Enabling Environment for civil societies in Ethiopia 2012). 
Dahl R, Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition (Yale University Press1972).  
Dahl R, On Democracy (Yale University Press1998). 
Dal Pont G, Law of Charity (Lexisnexis 2010) 72-75. 
Danziger J, Understanding the Political World: A Comparative Introduction to 
Political Science, (4th ed, Longman 1998). 
Department of Political Science and International Relations (DPSIR), ‘The May 1995 
Elections in Ethiopia: The Quest for Democratic Governance in a Multi-ethnic 
Society’ Unpublished report, Addis Ababa university, 1997. 
Desposato S, ‘Legislative Politics in Authoritarian Brazil’ (2001) Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 16 (2) 287-317. 
Development Assistance Group-Ethiopia (DAG-E), ‘Guideline to determine 
operational and administrative (70/30): early evidence of impact’ (2011) Tracking 
Trends in Ethiopia’s Civil Society, Policy Brief 5, 2-3. 
Diamond L, ‘Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation’ (1994) 
Journal of Democracy 5 (3) 4-17. 
Diamond L ‘Toward Democratic Consolidation’ (1994) Journal of Democracy 5 (3). 
Diamond L, ‘Rethinking Civil Society: Towards Democratic Consolidation (1994) 
Journal of Democracy 5 (7) 4-17. 
Diamond L, ‘Introduction: Civil Society and the Struggle for Democracy’ In the 
Diamond, Larry (eds) Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Democracy 
in the Developing World (Freedom House1991). 
Diamond L, ‘Is the Third Wave Over?’ (1996) Journal of Democracy 3(3)23-24. 
Diamond L, ‘Rethinking civil society: Toward democratic consolidation’ in Diamond 
Larry and Plattner Marc (Eds.) The Global Resurgence of Democracy Consolidation 
(Johns Hopkins University Press 1996) 227-240. 
Diamond L, ‘Towards Democratic consolidation’ (1994) Journal of Democracy 5(3). 
Diamond L, Developing Democracy toward Consolidation (Johns Hopkins University 
Press 1999). 
251 
 
 DiMaggio P and Powell W, ‘Introduction’ in Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell (eds) 
The New Institutionalism in Organisational analysis (Chicago University Press 1991) 
1-38. 
Ebrahim A, ‘Accountability in Practice: Mechanism for NGOs’ (2003) 31 (5) World 
Development 813-829, 816. 
Ebrahim A, ‘Placing the Normative Logics of Accountability in 'Thick' Perspective’ 
(2009) American Behavioral Scientist 52 (6) 885-904. 
Edwards B, and Gillham P, Resource mobilization theory (The Wiley-Blackwell 
Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements 2013). 
Edwards B, and McCarthy J, ‘Resources and social movement mobilization’ (2004) in 
Snow David and others (eds) The Black-well Companion to Social Movements 
(Blackwell Publishing 2007) 116–152. 
Edwards M, and Hulme D, ‘Too close for comfort? The impact of official aid on 
nongovernmental organisations (1996) World Development 24 (6). 
Edwards M, and Hulme D, Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and 
Accountability in the Post-Cold War World (Kumarian Press 1996).  
Emerson T, ‘Freedom of association and freedom of expression’ (1964) The Yale Law 
Journal, 74 (1). 
Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front, Revolutionary Democracy and 
Struggle for the Development of Democratic Rule (EPRDF 2006). 
European Union Election Observation Mission (EU-EOM)-Ethiopia, Final Report 
House of People’s Representatives and Council of Elections May 2010 (2010) EU-
EOM. 
Finer S. E, The History of Government from the Earliest Times’ Vol. III (Oxford 
University Press 1997). 
Fisher J, Non governments: NGOs and the political development of the Third World 
(Kumarian Press 1998) 126. 
Fisher W, ‘DOING GOOD?: The Politics and Anti-Politics of NGO Practices’ (1997) 
Annual. Review. Anthropol 439-464, 441. 
Fisherman J, and Schwarz S, Nonprofit Organisations: Cases And Materials (3rd edn, 
Foundation Press 2006) 328. 
Forbrig J, ‘The Nexus Between Civil Society and Democracy: Suggesting a critical 
approach’, in Reichel Walter (edn.) Political Priorities between East and West. 
252 
 
Europe's rediscovered wealth – What the accession-candidates in Eastern and Central 
Europe have to offer (2002) 2, 79-103. 
Fowler A, ‘An enabling environment for civil societies: What does it mean and how 
does law fit in?’ (2003) Centre for Civil Society, Research Report 7, 1 and 3. 
Fox J, ‘Civil Society and Political Accountability: Propositions for Discussion’ (2000) 
Working Paper presented at ‘Institutions, Accountability and Democratic Governance 
in Latin America’ Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of 
Notre Dame. 
Fox J, ‘How Does Civil Society Thicken? The Political Construction of Social Capital 
in Rural Mexico’ (1996) World Development 24 (6) 1089-l103. 
Fries R, ‘The legal Environment of Civil Societies’ in Kaldor Mary, Helmut Anheier, 
and Glasiusothers Marlies (eds) Global Civil Society (LSE 2003) 224. 
Fry R, ‘Accountability in Organisational Life: Problem or Opportunity for 
Nonprofits?’ (1995) Nonprofit Management and Leadership 6 (2) 181-195. 
Fukuyama F, ‘Social Capital, Civil Society and Development’ (2001) Third world 
Quarterly 22, 38-52. 
Garton J, The Regulation of organized Civil Society (Hart Publishing 2009) 38. 
Gebre-Egziabher S, The Role of Civil Society Organisation in Democratization 
Process in Ethiopia (2002) Paper presented at the fifth International Conference of the 
International Society for the Third Sector, University of Cape Town, South Africa. 
Gellner E, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals (Allen Lane 1994). 
Gershman C, and Allen M, ‘New Threats to Freedom: The Assault on Democracy 
Assistance’ (2006) 7 (2) Journal of Democracy 36-51, 44. 
Gill G, The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition 
Process (St Martin’s Press2000). 
Ginsburg M, ‘NGOs: What's in an Acronym?’ (1998) Current Issues in Comparative 
Education 1 (1) 2-5. 
Gohlert E, `Thai Democracy and the May 1992 Crisis: The Role of Private Non-Profit 
Organisations', (1992) paper presented to the Western Conference of the Association 
for Asian Studies, Tucson, University of Arizona, 23 (24) 2. 
Grugel J, Democratization: A Critical Introduction (Palgrave Publishers 2002) 79 
Gurr T, Why Men Rebel (Princeton University Press 1970). 
253 
 
Hadenius A and Uggla F, ‘Making Civil Society Work, Promoting Democratic 
Development: What Can States and Donors Do? (1996) World Development 24 (10) 
1621-1639. 
HaileGebriel D, ‘Restrictions on foreign funding of civil societies’ (2010) The 
International Journal of Not-for-Profit-Law 12 (3). 
Handelman H, The Challenge of Third World Development (5thedn, Pearson Education 
2006) 
Harbeson J, ‘A bureaucratic authoritarian regime’ (1998) Journal of Democracy 9 (4) 
62–9. 
Hasenfeld Y and Gidron B, ‘Understanding Multi-purpose Hybrid Voluntary 
Organisations: The Contributions of Theories on Civil Society, Social Movements and 
Non-profit Organisations’ (2005) Journal of Civil Society 1 (2) 97–112. 
Henze P, ‘A political success story’ (1998) Journal of Democracy 9 (4) 40–54. 
Herouy B, ‘The VAT Regime Under Ethiopian Law with Special Emphasis on Tax 
Exemption: The Ethiopian and International Experience’ (2004) Christian Relief and 
Development Association 18. 
Higley J, and Kullberg P, ‘The Persistence of Post-communist Elites.’ Journal of 
Interdisciplinary studies (1996) 18 (2) 133-147. 
Hirschman A, Getting Ahead Collectively: Grassroots Experiences in Latin America 
(Pergamon 1984). 
Howard M, ‘Civil Society and Democracy’ (2010) International Encyclopedia of Civil 
Society, Springer Science. 
Huber E, Dietrich R, and Stephens J, ‘The Paradoxes of Contemporary Democracy: 
Formal, Participatory and Social Democracy’ (1997) Comparative Politics 29 (3) 323-
42. 
Hudson A, ‘Making the Connection: Legitimacy Claims, Legitimacy Chains and 
Northern NGOs' International Advocacy’ (2000) in Lewis, D. and Wallace, T. (Eds.) 
After the 'New Policy Agenda'? Non-Governmental Organisations and the Search for 
Development Alternatives (Kumarian Press 2000).  
Huntington S, Political Order in Changing Societies (Yale University Press 1968) 
Huntington S, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
(University of Oklahoma Press 1991). 
Huntington Samuel, ‘Will more countries become democratic?’(1984) Political 
science quarterly 99 (2) 204. 
254 
 
Hyden G, ‘Building Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium’ in John Burbidge 
(ed.) Beyond Prince and Merchant: Citizen Participation and the Rise of Civil Society 
(Pact Publication 1997). 
Iheme B, ‘The Legal and Regulatory Framework for Civic Organisations in Namibia’ 
(2009) International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 11(2) 76. 
Inglehart R, and Welzel C, ‘How Development Leads to Democracy? What We Know 
About Modernization’ (2009) Foreign Affairs 88 (2) 34-37. 
International Center for Non-Profit-Law (ICNL) and World Movement for 
Democracy, Defending Civil Society (ICNL2008). 
International Centre for Non-for-profit law (ICNL), ‘Political Activities of NGOs: 
International Law and Best Practices’ (2009) International Journal of Non-Profit 
Law12 (1)  
International Council on Human Rights, ‘Human Rights Organisations: Rights and 
Responsibilities’ Final Draft Report, 2009. 
Irish L and others, Guidelines for Laws affecting Civic Organisations (2nd eds, Open 
Society Institute 2004). 
Jezer M and Miller E, ‘Money politics: campaign finance and the 'subversion of 
American democracy’ Notre dame journal of law ethics and public policy, 8. 
Jilani H, ‘Report submitted by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
human rights defenders, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 58/178’  22.  
Joireman S, ‘Opposition politics and ethnicity in Ethiopia: we will all go down 
together’ (1997) Journal of Modern African Studies 35 (3) 387–407.  
Joseph R, ‘Oldspeak vs. newspeak’ (1998) Journal of Democracy 9 (4) 55–61. 
Juan L and Alfred S, ‘Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Johns Hopkins 
University 1996). 
Juan L, The breakdown of democratic regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Re-
equilibration (John Hopkins University Press 1978). 
Kamarava M, Politics and society in the developing world (2nd edn, Routledge 2000). 
Kassis M, ‘Civil Society Organisations and Transition to Democracy in Palestine’ 
(2001) International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organisation 12 (1) 36. 
 Keane J, Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives (Verso 1988). 
Keane J, Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions (Stanford University Press 1998). 
255 
 
Kearns K, Managing for Accountability: Preserving the Public Trust in Nonprofit 
Organisations (Jossey-Bass 1996). 
Kornhauser W, The politics of Mass Society (Routledge and Kegal 1960). 
Kurtz L, The Anti-Apartheid Struggle in South Africa (1912–1992): Summary of events 
related to the use or impact of civil resistance (International Center on Nonviolent 
Conflict 2010). 
Levitsky S, and Way L, ‘International Linkage and Democratization’ (2005) Journal 
of Democracy 16 (3). 
Lindenberg M, and Coralie B, Going Global: Transforming Relief and Development 
NGOs (Kumarian Press 2001). 
Lipset M, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and 
Political Legitimacy’ (1959) American Political Science Review 53. 
Lipset M, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Doubleday 1960). 
Lyons T, ‘Closing the transition: the May 1995 elections in Ethiopia’ (1996) Journal 
of Modern African Studies 34 (1) 121–42. 
 Lyons T, ‘Ethiopia in 2005: the beginning of a transition?’ (2006) CSIS Africa Notes, 
Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
Margaret C, Political participation in the United States’ (Congressional Quarterly 
Press1991).  
Mavrikos-Adamou T, ‘Challenges to democracy building and the role of civil society’ 
(2010) Democratization 17 (3) 514-533. 
McCrudden C, ‘The Impact of Freedom of Speech’ in Basil Markesinis (eds) The 
impact of the Human Rights Bill on English Law (Oxford University Press 1998) 
85,105. 
Mercer C, ‘NGOs, civil society and democratization: a critical review of the literature’ 
(2002) Progress in Development Studies 2 (5). 
Meyer J, and Scott R, Organisation Environments: Ritual and Rationality (Sage1983).  
Migliorisi S, and Wescott C, A review of the World Bank Support for Accountability, 
IEG Working Paper 11(5). 
Ministry of Justice (MoJ) Ethiopia, ‘First draft Proclamation of Charities and Societies 
Proclamation No.00/2008. 
Najam A, ‘NGO Accountability: A conceptual framework’ (1996) 14 Development 
Policy Review 342. 
256 
 
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs/African–American Institute 
(NDI/AAI), An Evaluation of the June 21, 1992 Elections in Ethiopia (NDI/AAI1992). 
Ndegwa S, ‘Civil Society and Political Change in Africa: The Case of Non-
Governmental Organisations in Kenya’ (1994) International Journal of Comparative 
Sociology 35, 19-36. 
Neighborhood, ‘Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational 
Exchange’ (2008) European Union Politics 9 (2)187. 
 North D, ‘Economic performance Through Time’ in Mary Brinton and Victor Nee 
(eds.) The New institutionalism in Sociology (Russell Sage Foundation 1998). 
Norwegian Church Aid –Ethiopia, Annual Report (2010). 
Norwegian Institute of Human Rights (NIHR), ‘Local and regional elections in 
Ethiopia 21 June 1992: report of the Norwegian Observer Group’ (NIHR1992). 
Ottaway M, ‘The Ethiopian Transition: Democratization or New Authoritarianism?’ 
‘An Analysis of the New Constitution of Ethiopia and the Process of its Adoption’ 
(1996) Northeast African Studies 3, 2138. 
O’Donnell G, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (University of 
California Institute of International Studies 1979). 
Pakulski J, Higley J, and Kullberg J, ‘The Persistence of Post-communist Elites’ 
(1996) Journal of Democracy 7 (2). 
Pankhurst Richard, ‘self-Help in Ethiopia’ (1958) Ethiopian Observer 11 (11). 
Parachin A, ‘Distinguishing Charity and Politics: The Judicial Thinking Behind the 
Doctrine of Political Purpose’ (2008) Alberta Law Review 45 (4). 
Paxton P, ‘Social capital and democracy: An interdependent relationship’ (2002) 
American Sociological Review 67 (254–77). 
Poluha E, The 1995 Ethiopian elections viewed from the grassroots (1995 SIDA).  
Powell F, The politics of Civil Society: Neoliberalism or Social Left? (The policy press 
2007).  
Przeworski A and others, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and 
Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge University Press 2000) 92-103. 
Przeworski A, Cheibub J, Alvarez M, and Limongi F, Democracy and Development: 
Political Institutions and Well Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge University 
Press 2000) 92-103. 
Przeworski A, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America (Cambridge University Press 1991). 
257 
 
Przeworski A. ‘Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy,’ in 
O’Donnell, Guillermo, Schmitter, Phillipe and Whitehead, Laurence (eds) Transitions 
from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, Part III (Johns Hopkins 
University Press 1986). 
Putnam R, ‘Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital’ Journal of 
Democracy 6 (1) (1995) 65-78. 
Putnam R, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton 
University Press 1993). 
Rahmato D, ‘Civil Society Organisations in Ethiopia’, in the Zewde, Bahru and 
Pausewanf Siegfried (Eds) The challenge of Democracy from Below (Nordiska Africa 
institute and Forum for Social Studies2002) 105. 
Rahmato D, Banteyirgu A, and Endeshaw Y, CSOs/NGOs in Ethiopia- Partners in 
Development and Good Governance (Ethiopian CSO/NGO Task Force 2008). 
Rahmato D, and others, CSOs-NGOs in Ethiopia: Partners in Development (Taskforce 
on Enabling Environment for CSOs in Ethiopia 2010). 
Reich R, ‘Toward a Political Theory of Philanthropy’ department of Political Science, 
Stanford University 3-10). 
Robinson J, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge University 
Press 2006). 
Roland P, Democratic Political Theory (Princeton University Press 1979). 
Rose R and Shin D, ‘Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third-Wave 
Democracies’ (2001) British Journal of Political Science 31(2) 331–75. 
Rosenstone S, and Hansen J, Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America 
(Longman Publishing Group 2009). 
Rummel R.J, ‘Democratization,’ In Vogele, William and Powers Roger (edn) Protest, 
Power, and Change: An Encyclopedia of Nonviolence Action from Act-up to Women’s 
Suffrage (Garland Publishing 1996).  
Salamon L, and others, Global Civil Society: An Overview The John Hopkins 
Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (2003). 
Salamon L, and Anheier H, ‘In Search of the non-profit sector: the question of 
definitions’ (1992) Voluntas 3 (2). 
 Salamon L, and Anheier H, Defining the Non-profit Sector: A cross-national Analysis 
(Manchester University Press 1997). 
258 
 
Salamon L, and Anhieir H, ‘Measuring the non-profit sector Cross-nationally: a 
comparative method’ (1994) Voluntas 4 (4). 
Salamon L, and Flaherty S, ‘Nonprofit Law: Ten Issues in Search of Resolution’, in 
Salamon, Lester and Anheier, Helmut: In Working Papers of the Johns Hopkins 
Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (1996) 20 (6) The Johns Hopkins Institute for 
Policy Studies. 
Salmon L, and Toepler S, ‘The Influence of the Legal Environment on the 
Development of the Notprofit Sector’ (2000) Center for Civil Society Studies, 
Working Paper Series 17 (7).  
Schedler A, ‘Restraining the State: Conflicts and Agents of Accountability’ in Schedler 
Andreas, Diamond Larry and Plattner Marc (eds) The Self-Restraining State: Power 
and Accountability in New Democracies (Lynne Rienner1999). 
Schmidt J, ‘Civility, enlightenment, and society: conceptual confusions and kantian 
remedies’ (1998) American Political Science Review 92 (2). 
Schmitter P, and Karl T, ‘What Democracy is ...and is not’ in the Diamond, Larry and 
Plattner, Mark (edn) Electoral Systems and Democracy (The John Hopkins University 
Press 2009). 
Schmitter P, and Karl T, ‘What Democracy is ...And is not’ Journal of Democracy 
(2009) 2 (3) 75-88. 
Sen A, ‘Democracy as a Universal Value,’ in Diamond Larry and Plattner Marc (eds) 
Democracy Global Divergence of Democracies (Johns Hopkins University 
Press2009). 
Share D, ‘Transitions to Democracy and Transition through Transaction.’ (1987) 
Comparative Political Studies 19 (4) 530.  
Sheridan LA, ‘Charity versus Politics’ (1973) 2 Anglo-American Law Review 47, 58.  
Shils E, ‘The Virtue of Civil Society’ (1991) Government and Opposition 26 (1). 
Smelser N, Theory of Collective Behavior (Free press 1963). 
Statement of the Sixteenth Annual John Hopkins International Fellows in Philanthropy 
Conference, ‘Towards an enabling legal Environment for Civil Society’ (2005) 
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 8 (1). 
 Suchman M, ‘Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches’ (1995) 
Academy of Management Review 20 (3). 
259 
 
Tarrow S, ‘Making Social Science Work Across Space and Time: A Critical Reflection 
on Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work’ (1996) American Political Science 
Review 90. 
The International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) and World Movement for 
Democracy Secretariat at the National Endowment for Democracy, Defending Civil 
Society: A Report of the World Movement for Democracy (World Movement for 
Democracy and ICNL 2008). 
Tilly C, Democracy (Cambridge University Press 2007). 
Tocqueville A, Democracy in America (Achor Books 1969). 
Tocqueville A, Democracy in America (Vintage Books 1945).  
Tronvoll K, ‘Ethiopia: a new start?’  (Minority Rights Group International 2000).  
Tronvoll K, and Aadland Ø, The Process of Democratisation in Ethiopia: an 
expression of popular participation or political resistance? (Norwegian Institute of 
Human Rights 1995). 
Turner R, and Killian L, Collective Behavior (2nd edn, Prentice-Hall 1957).  
Tusalem R, ‘A Boon or a Bane? The Role of Civil Society in Third- and Fourth-Wave 
Democracies’ (2007) International Political Science Review 28 (3). 
Tushnets M, ‘The New Constitutional Order’ (Princeton University Press 2003). 
Uhlin A, ‘Which Characteristics of Civil Society Organisations Support What Aspects 
of Democracy? Evidence from Post-communist Latvia’ (2009) International Political 
Science Review 30 (3) 271–295. 
Valenzuela A, ‘Latin American Presidencies Interrupted’ (2004) Journal of 
Democracy 15 (4) 5–19. 
Vanhannen T, Prospects of Democracy: A Study of 172 Countries (Routledge 1997). 
Varshney A, ‘Ethnic Conflict and Civic Civil Society: India and Beyond’ (2001) 
World Politics 53, 362-98.  
Vaughan S, ‘The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference of July 1991: its origins, 
history and significance’ (1994) Occasional paper, Centre of African Studies, 
Edinburgh University. 
 Vaughan S, and Tronvoll K, The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian 
Political Life (Sida Studies 2003). 
Vestal T, ‘An Analysis of the New Constitution of Ethiopia and the Process of its 
Adoption’ (1996) Northeast African Studies. 
260 
 
Wagle U, ‘The Civil Society Sector in the developing world, Public Administration 
and Management’ (1999) An Interactive Journal 4 (4). 
Waren M, Democracy and Association (Princeton University Press 2001). 
White G, ‘Civil Society, Democratization and Development: Clearing the Analytical 
Ground’ in Peter Burnell and Peter Calvert (eds) Civil Society in Democratization 
(Franc Cass 2004) 13. 
World Bank, ‘Anticorruption in Transition: A contribution to the policy debate’ (2000) 
World Bank.  
 Yishai Y, ‘Civil Society and Democracy: The Israeli Experience’ (2002) International 
Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organisations 13 (3) 218-221.
261 
 
WEB SOURCES 
 
Charity Commission, Speaking out Guidance on Campaigning and political activities 
by Charities (CC9)’2008 <http://www.charity-
commission.gov.UK/Publications/cc9.aspx> accessed on 10 January 2015 
CRDA, Assessment of the Operating Environment for CSO/NGOs in Ethiopia 
(CRDA2006) 6 
<http://www.crdaethiopia.org/Documents/Assesment%20of%20NGOs%20Operating
%20Environment%20in%20Ethiopia.pdf> accessed on 11 April 2015  
Hayes A, ‘The Role of Interest groups’ 
<http://www.ait.org.tw/infousa/zhtw/docs/demopaper/dmpaper9.html> accessed 11 
March 2015  
HeinRich Böll Foundation, ‘Closure of the HeinRich Böll Foundation office in 
Ethiopia’ Press Release, November 29, 2012 <http://www.boell.org/web/145-Closure-
of-HBF-Ethiopia-Office.html> accessed on 12 February 2015 
Heinrich Volkhart and Mahi Khallaf, ‘Assessing Civil Society In Cyprus And Across 
The World’ (2011) The Civicus Civil Society Index, CIVICUS, 2 
<http://www.civicus.org/view/media/AssessingCivilSocietyinCyprus_AcrosstheWorld
.pdf.> accessed on 30 April 2015 
Volkhart H, and Khallaf, M ‘Assessing Civil Society In Cyprus And Across The 
World’ (2011) The CIVICUS Civil Society Index, CIVICUS, 2 
<http://www.civicus.org/view/media/AssessingCivilSocietyinCyprus_AcrosstheWorl
d.pdf> accessed on 30 February 2015 
Hetty Kovach and others, ‘Power without accountability? Execute Summary of the 
Global Accountability Report’ (One world Trust 2003) 
<http://www.oneworldtrust.org/htm1GAP/ >   accessed 2 April 2015 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), ‘Publication 557, Tax Exempt Status for your 
Organisation’ (2011) 49 <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf> accessed 13 May 
2015 
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, ‘Checklist for CSO Laws’ (2006)3 
<http://www.humanitarianforum.org/data/files/resources/704/en/ICNL-
NPOChecklist.pdf> accessed 12 May 2015  
262 
 
International Service for Human Rights (ISHR) ‘Right to Access Funding, Human 
Rights Defenders Briefing Papers Series’ (2009) 3 <www.ishr.ch/.../346-hrd>  
accessed 23 April 2015 
IRC, ‘Lobbying’ <http://www.irs.gov/Charities-and-Non-Profits/Lobbying> accessed 
06 March 2015 
IRS, ‘The restriction of Political Campaign Intervention by Section 501 (C) (3) Tax 
exempt organisations’<http://www.irs.gov/Charities-and-Non-Profits/Charitable-
Organisations/The-Restriction-of-Political-Campaign-Intervention-by-Section-
501(c)(3)-Tax-Exempt-Organisations> accessed 08 March 2015 
IRS, ‘The restriction of Political Campaign Intervention by Section 501 (C) (3) Tax 
exempt organisations’<http://www.irs.gov/Charities-and-Non-Profits/Charitable-
Organisations/The-Restriction-of-Political-Campaign-Intervention-by-Section-
501(c)(3)-Tax-Exempt-Organisations> accessed 08 March 2015 
Karatnycky A, and Ackerman P, ‘How Freedom is Won: From Civic Resistance to 
Durable Democracy’ Freedom House’ 
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/special_report/29.pdf> accessed on 18 May 
2015 
Sikkink K, ‘Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin 
America’ (1993) International Organisation, 47 (3) 411-441 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706982>   Accessed on 01 April 2015 
Klingelhofer S, and Robinson D, ‘Law and Civil Society in The South Pacific: 
Challenges and Opportunities; International Best Practice and Global Development’, 
International Center for Not-for-profit Law (ICNL) 8-9 < 
http://www.vanuatu.usp.ac.fj/sol_adobe_documents/world/icnl/klingelhofer2.htm> 
accessed 4 April 2015. 
Morlion L, ‘What is a ‘Good’ Democracy? Theory and Empirical Analysis’ (2002) 
University of Florence. <http://ies.berkeley.edu/research/files/CP02/CP02-
What_is_Good_Democracy.pdf> accessed on 10 March 2015 
Robinson M, and Friedman S, ‘Civil society, democratisation and foreign aid in 
Africa’ (2005), Institute of Development Studies, IDS Discussion paper 383, 
6<http://www.ids.ac.UK/files/dmfile/Dp383.pdf> accessed on February2015 
g M, Ethiopia Curb on Charities Alarms Human Rights Activities, THE GUARDIAN, 
Jan. 26, 2009, available at <http://www.guardian.co.UK/world/2009/jan/26/ethiopia-
charities-human-rights> accessed on 12 February 2015 
263 
 
Saral M, ‘Civil society and Human Rights Protection in Iraq since 2003’ (2009), paper 
presented for the final Shur Conference , Human Rights in Conflict the role of civil 
society Rome, Italy, 8 <http://shur.luiss.it/files/2009/05/saral.pdf> accessed 02 April 
2015 
Morris D, ‘Charities and the Contract Culture: Partners or Contractors? Law and 
Practice in Conflict’ (1999) Charity Law Unit, University of Liverpool, 
<http://www.liv.ac.UK/media/livacuk/law/cplu/clurep1.pdf> accessed 2 April 2015. 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe/Office for democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights Office (OSCE/ODIHR), ‘Key Guiding Principles of 
Freedom of Association with an Emphasis on Non-Governmental Organisations’4 
<http://www.un.org.kg/en/publications/document-
database/article/Document%20Database/UN%20System%20in%20Kyrgyzstan/Hum
an%20Rights%20and%20Human%20Rights%20Based%20Approach/115-
Governace/2129-osce-odihr-note-outlining-key-guiding-principles-of-freedom-of-
association-with-an-emphasis-on-non-governmental-organisationorganisations-eng> 
accessed on 11 March.2013 
Paul Bater, ‘Evaluating Incentives for Donations to Public Benefit Organisations’ 
(2000) 2 IJNL 3 < http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol3iss2/art_2.htm> accessed 
10 May 2015 
Schmitter P, ‘Some Propositions about Civil Society and the Consolidation of 
Democracy’ (1993) Working paper <http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_10.pdf 
>accessed on 15 April 2015 
Public Interest Law Initiative, Enabling Civil Society: Practical Aspects of Freedom 
of Association, source book 89 <http://pilnet.org/public-interest-law-resources/30-
enabling-civil-society-practical-aspects-of-freedom-of.html> accessed 14 April 2015 
Tandon R, ‘‘Board Games’: Governance and Accountability in NGOs’ 2 
<http://www.wtrc-tmed.org/resources/Board%20Games.pdf> accessed 20 March 
2015 
Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Ethiopia, Jan 2010, 
<http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/9098610.28194427.html> accessed 19 March 2015  
Sisk T, ‘Global Networks for democracy promotion’ UN Vision Project on Global 
Public Policy Networks 
<http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/Sisk_Local_Governance.pdf> accessed 12 April 
2015 
264 
 
The TECS team, ‘Tracking Trends in Ethiopia’s Civil Society (TECS): Mass Based 
Societies in Ethiopia: Prospects and Challenges’ 2 < 
http://www.dagethiopia.org/index.php?option=com_docmanandtask=doc_downloada
ndgid=293andItemid=120> accessed on 21 May 2015 
THE UK Civil Society Almanac 2009: Executive Summary<http://www.ncvo-
vol.org.UK/uploadedFiles/NCVO/What_we_do/Research/Almanac/NCVOCivilSoci
etyAlmanac2009Summary.pdf> accessed 29 May 2015 
 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom 
of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, April 24 
<http://freeassembly.net/rapporteurreports/funding-report/ > accessed 10 May 2015 
UN Volunteers and others, ‘Voluntarism and Legislation: A Guidance Note’ (2004) 
<http://www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/volunteer_en.pdf> accessed 20 April 2015
265 
 
TABLE OF ETHIOPIAN LEGISLATIONS AND DIRECTIVES (ETHIOPIA) 
 
Charities and Societies Consortium Directive. 
Charities and Societies Operational and Administrative costs Directive No 2/2011. 
Charities and Societies Public Collection Directives No5/2011. 
Ethiopian Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP) No.621/2009.  
Ethiopian Civil Code (1961). 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution (1995).  
Income Tax Proclamation No. 286/2002.   
Income Tax Regulation No 78/2002 of the Council of Ministers of Ethiopia. 
Transitional Charter of the Government of Ethiopia (1991). 
Value Added Proclamation Tax No. 285/2002.
266 
 
TABLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAWS  
 
Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (UN, 
1989). 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Fundamental Principles on the Status of Non-governmental Organisations in Europe. 
International Convention for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (UN, 1966).  
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN, 1966).  
UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination 
Based on Religion or Belief.  
UN Declaration on the Rights and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs 
of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (Declarations on Human Rights Defenders) (UN, 1999). 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN, 1989). 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (UN, 1948).  
